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The University of Kentucky College of Law. Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) was organized
in 1973 as the first pennanently staffed. full time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. It endures with the threefold purpose: 1) to assist lawyers in keeping abreast of changes in the law;
2) to develop and sustain practical lawyering skills; and 3) to maintain a high degree of professionalism in the
'practice of law. Revenues from seminar registrations and publication sales allow the Office to operate as a
separately budgeted. self-supporting program of the College. No tax dollars or public funds are used in the
operation of UK/CLE.
Seminars
UK/CLE provides a variety of convenient. practical seminars to satisfY' the continuing legal education
needs oflawyers. Seminars range from half-day programs in selected areas to in-depth programs extending over
several days. While most seminars are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington. UK/CLE has a longstanding
statewide commitment. Since its first year of operation. beginning with a crirninallaw seminar in Madisonville.
Kentucky. the Office has continued to bring high-quality continuing legal education to attorneys in every region
of Kentucky.
Publications
Each seminar is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound course
materials are offered for sale following seminars and are conSistently regarded as valuable. affordable references
for lawyers.
Since 1987. UK/CLE has produced a series of Practice Handbooks and Monographs. Each Practice
Handbook is an extensively referenced. ftilly'indexed practice guide conSisting of separately authored chapters.
allowing for the comprehensive coverage of a distinct body of law. Their fonnat permits updating through
supplements and revised indexes. Each Monograph is a concisely written practice gUide. often prepared by a single
author. designed to cover a topic of narrower scope than the Handbooks. They are convenient references on topics
often not treated elsewhere.
Professional Management
UK/CLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in
Lexington. Its staff manages course registrations. publication planning and editing. publication sales. seminar and
publication marketing. publication composition and printing. and seminar content planning. as well as budgeting.
accounting and financial reporting. As an "income based" program. UK/CLE's seminar tuitions and publication
sales are budgeted to generate sufficient revenues for self support.
Commitment to Quality and Creativity
UK/CLE is a member of the Association of Continuing Legal Education Administrators (ACLEA). As
such. UK/ CLE subscribes to the ACLEA Standards in Continuing Legal Education; and the Standards of Fair
Conduct and Voluntary Cooperation administered under the auspices oftheAmerican Law Institute-American Bar
Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education. Throughout its existence UK/CLE has been
actively involved in the activities and services proVided by ACLEA. UK/CLE's association with national and
international CLE professionals has afforded it the opportunity to continually reassess instructional methods.
quality in publications. arid effective means of delivering CLE services at conSistently high levels of creativity and
qUality.
'
An Integral Part of the Legal Profession's Tradition Of Service
An enonnous debt is owed to the judges. law professors. and practitioners who generously donate

their time and talent to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience are the fundamental
ingredients for our seminars and publications. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication
to a distinguished profession. high quality continuing legal education would not exist.
As a non-profit organization. UK/CLE relies upon the traditional spirit of service to the profession that
attorneys have so long demonstrated. We are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement in the continuing
education process. If you would like to partiCipate as a volunteer speaker or Writer, please contact us and indicate
your areas of interest and experience.
'
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SECTION A

A.

OVERVIEW.

As of March 3, 1994, 942 House Bills and 340 Senate Bills had been introduced in the
1994 Session of the Kentucky General Assembly. No more House Bills may be introduced since
the last day for introducing House Bills was March 2, 1994; the last day for Senate Bill
introductions was March 4, 1994. Compared to the 1992 Session, 948 House and 431 Senate
Bills were introduced.
This outline contains summaries of 16 Senate Bills and 44 House Bills which had the
following status as of March 3, 1994:
Senate Bills

House Bills

Passed by General Assembly
Directly Affect FI
Of Interest to FI

o
o

2
4

2
1

1
4

1
13

7
25

17

43

Passed by Either Senate or House
Directly Affect FI
Of Interest to FI
Pending in Either Senate or House
Directly Affect FI
Of Interest to FI
TOTAL:

Bills passed during the 1994 General Assembly and not vetoed by the Governor will take
effect ninety days after adjournment (approximately July 13, 1994) unless provided differently
in the bill.
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B.

BILLS DIRECTLY AFFECTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSo

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REORGANIZATION
Senate Bill 78
Introduced by Senator Joseph U. Meyer

This bill amends KRS 287.011 relating to organization of the Department of Financial
Institutions and approves reorganization of the Department into three divisions: Law and
Regulatory Compliance, Planning and Management and Supervision.
This bill confirms a reorganization plan previously implemented by the Commissioner;
it passed the House on January 25, 1994 and was posted in the Senate State Government
Committee on March 1, 1994.

ABANDONED PROPERTY/ESCHEAT
House Bill 79

*

Introduced by Representative Marshall Long

This bill, among other things, reduces the escheat period for bank demand deposits and
the contents removed from safe deposit boxes from 10 to 7 years and non-demand deposits from
25 to 7 years.
The bill passed the House on February 13, 1994. A Senate Committee Substitute passed
on February 28, 1994 and the bill was returned to the House which concurred in the Senate
Substitute on March 3, 1994.

BANK SHARES TAX
House Bill 82
Introduced by Representative Marshall Long

This bill amends KRS 136.270 to provide that the fair cash value of bank shares may be
determined in any manner by the Revenue Cabinet and repeals the present statutory formula for
determining fair cash value method.
This bill is currently in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee
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DEEDS OF TRUST
House Bill 114
futroduced by Representative Michael Bowling

This bill amends KRS 381.190 to pennit sale of real estate covered by a deed of trust to
be "pursuant to a power of sale clause" instead of pursuant to a court judgment and prescribes
. the form which a deed of trust covering single or multi-family property must take.
This bill passed the House on February 23, 1994, and is currently in the Senate Judiciary
Committee.

REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX
House Bill 157

*

futroduced by Representative William Lear

This bill amends KRS 142.050 to exempt from the real property transfer tax certain
transfers by or to a trust so long as the transfer, if made by the grantor of the trust to the trust's
beneficiaries, would have been exempt.
This bill has passed the House and Senate and was delivered to the Governor on March
1, 1994 for signing.

LIEN INFORMATION SYSTEM
House Bill 464
futroduced by Representatives Ramsey Morris and James Bruce

This bill adds new sections to KRS Ch. 14 and creates a lien information system in the
Secretary of State's office who is responsible for developing and implementing and coordinating,
on a statewide level, the strategic planning and regulations relating to the creation, operation and
maintenance of the system and a master index listing all UCC filings as' well as motor vehicle,
mobile home, boat and certain tax liens.
In implementing the lien information system, the Secretary of State is authorized to,
among other things, adopt administrative rules and regulations and require standardized
information for entry into the system's master index. In short, the Secretary of State is charged
with developing the procedures, acquiring the necessary computer hardware and software and
otherwise implementing the system.
Once the system is in place, filing of financing statements and perfection of security
interests will remain unchanged. Secured parties will continue to file financing statements and
other UCC documents with the local county clerks or in the Secretary of State's office depending
upon the residency of the debtor and the type of collateral. The same is true with respect to
notation of security interests relating to motor vehicles, mobile homes and boats required to be
A-3
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titled in Kentucky. Perfection will continue to be done locally through the county clerk of the
debtor's residence or where the motor vehicle is principally operated if the debtor is a nonresident. The sole means of perfecting and discharging a security interest in such property will
continue to be by notation on the title certificate.
At the time a financing statement, other VCC document or title lien statement is filed,
the local county clerk or Secretary of State is required to transmit the information contained in
the documents, together with the date and time of filing, to the Secretary of State's office for
inclusion in the master index.
Following receipt in the Secretary of State's office, a written notice confirming the
receipt of the information and reflecting all information received will, if requested by the secured
party, be sent to the secured party of record or other lienholder. This will enable the secured
party to determine if the information has been correctly recorded in the master index.
At the time the system first becomes operable, searches of the master index for effective
financing statements, lien notations and other VCC filings will be conducted by, and at the
offices of, the local county clerks. Non-residents of Kentucky may request the Secretary of
State's office to conduct the search.
A report of the search (as of a specified date and hour) will be issued in the form of a
certificate listing the file number, date, hour and filing location of each filing and the names and
addresses of each secured party, lessor or consignor. Neither the county clerks nor the
Secretary of State's office is, however, personally liable for any damage which may arise due
to information furnished pursuant to the search which is subsequently shown to be inaccurate or
incomplete, and House Bill 464 provides that any person obtaining information from the system
should examine the individual filings referred to in the certificate for any legal reliance.
It is contemplated that the system will be self supporting and funded by increases in the
filing fees for most VCC documents, one· dollar of which will be credited to a trust fund and

used to pay for the necessary start-up costs, software, hardware, maintenance and other costs
of developing and operating the network. The fee for searching the master index will be fixed
by administrative regulation.
The system will come into existence as well as the increase in the VCC and other filing
fees will take effect on the effective date of House Bill 464 in July, 1994. However, in order
to provide sufficient time to implement the necessary computer programs and related matters,
the system is not required to be operational until April 15, 1996.
This bill was reported favorably by the House State Government Committee on February
24, 1994, but was recommitted to the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee on March
3, 1994.

A -4

RECORDING INSTRUMENTS IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICES
House Bill 553 (See Senate Bill 176)
Introduced by Representatives Thomas

~err

and Arnold Simpson

This bill amends KRS 382.335 to prohibit county clerks from recording "any instrument"
unless it "complies with the official indexing system of the county, " which has been in existence
for at least 24 months prior to the effective date of the Bill or which is implemented for the
purpose of allowing computerized instrument searches.
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on February 24, 1994.

INSURANCE
House Bill 599
Introduced by Representative Steven Riggs

This bill adds new sections to Subtitle 11 of KRS Ch. 304 authorizing the Commissioner
of Insurance to issue cease and desist orders against persons violating provisions of Subtitle 11
~. g., transacting unauthorized insurance) and providing for a hearing.

GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS
House Bill 754
Introduced by Representative Mark Farrow

This bill amends KRS 66.480 to require local governments, including school districts,
to obtain bids from at least three banks or savings and loan associations prior to investing monies
in repurchase agreements or interest-Qearing deposits, i.~., opening bank accounts.
This bill is currently in the House Counties and Special Districts Committee.

MORTGAGE LOAN COMPANIES AND BROKERS
House Bill 855
Introduced by Representative Billy Ray Smith

This bill amends KRS Ch. 294, relating to mortgage loan companies, by adding certain
consumer protection provisions and, among other things, providing that anyone conducting a
mortgage loan business without a license is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not
less than $500 nor more than $1,000.
This bill was posted in the House Banking and Insurance Committee on March 3, 1994.
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CREDIT CARD APPLICATIONS
House Bill 892
Introduced by Representative Ruth Ann Palumbo

This bill creates a new section of KRS Ch. 367 to make it unlawful for a credit card
issuer, or anyone acting under the insurer's direction, to knowingly send or distribute a credit
card application to a minor.
This ,bill is currently in the House Banking and Insurance Committee.
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C.

BILLS IMPACTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

PARTNERSHIPS
Senate Bill 38
Introduced by Senator Michael Moloney

This bill authorizes a partnership to sue and be sued in the partnership name; it is
currently in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

FORFEITURE OF CORPORATE CHARTER
Senate Bill 47
Introduced by Senators Mike Moloney and Kelsey Friend

This bill amends KRS Chs. 271B, 272, 273 and 274 to provide, among other things, for
possible corporate charter forfeiture if a corporation or any officer or agent is convicted of
bribery of a public servant.
The bill passed the Senate on January 24, 1994 and is currently posted in the House
Judiciary Committee.

LINKED DEPOSIT LOAN PROGRAM
Senate Bill 100
Introduced by Senator Larry Saunders

This bill establishes a linked deposit loan program. Lending institutions are" not required
to participate in the program but may elect to do so.
This bill has been recommitted to the Senate Appropriations and Revenue Committee.

SECURITY SERVICES AND SECURITY OFFICERS
Senate Bill 145
Introduced by Senator Fred Bradley

This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 15B to establish a licensing program for
private security officers.
This bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
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ELIMINATION OF MARGINAL NOTATIONS
Senate Bill 163
Introduced by Senator Nick Kafoglis

This bill amends KRS 382.290 to eliminate marginal notation of assignments or releases
of retained liens or mortgages in the county clerk's records and requires that such assignments
or releases be by separate instrument.
This bill in currently in the Senate Local Government Committee.

RECORDING INSTRUMENTS IN COUNTY CLERKS' OFFICES
Senate Bill 176 (See House Bill 553)
Introduced by Senate Joseph U. Meyer

This bill amends KRS 382.335 to prohibit county clerks from recording "any instrument"
unless it "complies with the official indexing system of the county. "
This bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

STATE DEPOSITORIES
House Bill 85

*

Introduced by Representative Marshall Long
I

This bill amends KRS 41.070 to provide that the Revenue Cabinet may deposit tax
receipts directly with a depository designated by the State Treasurer and transfers the abandoned
property function currently in the Revenue Cabinet to the State Treasurer.
This bill has passed the House and Senate and was delivered to the Governor on March
1, 1994.

INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS
House Bill 160
Introduced by William Lear

This bill adds new sections to KRS Ch. 360 authorizing the court - not the jury - to
award pre-judgment interest and amends KRS 360.040 to fix post judgment interest (now 12%)
at a rate equal to the "prime" rate set by Federal Reserve Board in effect on December 5 of the
year prior to the year the judgment is entered plus 2 %. The bill also permits recovery of
attorney fees "in a contract action".
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on January 11, 1994.
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE TAX AND LIEN
House Bill 171
Introduced by Representatives Charles Geveden and Stan Cave

This bill imposes tax upon dealers in marijuana and controlled substances and creates a
lien upon the real and personal property of the dealer for payment of the tax and penalties.
This bill was reported favorably by the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee
on March 1, 1994. Posted for passage on March 4, 1994.

DEEDS OF RELEASE
House Bill 451
Introduced by Representative Mark Farrow

This bill amends KRS 382.020 to provide that no deed of release may be recorded unless
it contains the names of both the mortgagor and mortgagee.
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee and reported favorably on March
3, 1994.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT/RESTRICTING RECOVERY OF DAMAGES
House Bill 454
Introduced by Representative Billy Ray Smith

This bill amends Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution and authorizes the General
Assembly to limit non-economic loss, punitive damages and non-pecuniary damages arising from
injuries resulting in death or to a person or property.
This bill in currently in the House Elections and Constitutional Amendments Committee.

CREDIT CARDS
House Bill 611
Introduced by Louis Johnson

This bill adds new sections to KRS Ch. 365 prohibiting a credit card application from
being sent into the state unless it is expressly requested by the receiving consumer.
This bill was posted in the House Banking and Insurance Committee on February 25,
1994.
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TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS
House Bill 623
Introduced by Representative Richard Lewis

This bill adds the "Unifonu Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act" to KRS Ch. 394 and
penuits property to be transferred by will to a life insurance or other trust so long as the trust
was established by a separate instrument executed before, concurrently with or after execution
of the will. Moreover, the transfer is effective even though the trust is amendable or revocable
or was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death.
This bill is currently posted in the House Judiciary Committee.

COUNTY CLERK FEES
House Bill 647
Introduced by Representatives Marshall Long, Don Gedling, Ron Cyrus and June Lyne

This bill amends KRS Chs. 64, 186 and 186A relating to fees payable to county clerks
by establishing new fees or increasing present recording and other fees.
This bill was posted in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee on February
28, 1994.

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
House Bill 779
Introduced by Representative Michael Dean Bowling

This bill amends KRS 382.135 to delete requirements that a commissioner's foreclosure
deed contain a statement of consideration; amends KRS 426.006 to prohibit the Commonwealth
or any local government having an ad valorem tax lien from being named as defendants in
foreclosure actions; and amends KRS 426.705 to clarify the bond requirements of purchasers
at foreclosure sales.
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on March 3, 1994.

AUTHORIZATION OF TRUST AMENDMENTS
House Bill 833
Introduced by Representatives Jim LeMaster and Louis Johnson

This bill creates a new section of KRS Ch. 386, relating to trusts, to establish methods
of amending all types of trusts (other than charitable trusts) in order to enable the trust to qualify
as a marital deduction trust or to take advantage of "any other federal or state income, estate,
excise, or inheritance tax benefit."
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on March 3, 1994.
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BILLS OF INTEREST.

INTEREST ON INCOME TAX REFUNDS
Senate Bill 3
Introduced by Senators John D. Rogers and Tom Buford

This bill would require Kentucky income tax refunds to bear interest 60 (rather than 90)
days after the return is filed.
The bill is currently in the Senate Appropriations and Revenue Committee.

INTANGmLE TAX
Senate Bill 28
Introduced by Senator Tom Buford

This bill amends KRS 132.020 to reduce the ad valorem tax on intangibles from $.25 to
$.10 per $100 of value over a three year period beginning January 1, 1995.
This bill is currently in the Senate Appropriations and Revenue Committee.

FALSE REGULATORY REPORTS
Senate Bill 58
Introduced by Senator Tom Buford

This bill amends KRS 519.040 to make it a Class A misdemeanor to file a false report
with a regulatory or administrative agency.
This bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary .Committee.

INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES
Senate Bill 102 (See House Bills 196 and 279)
Introduced by Senators Richard L. Roeding, David L. Williams, Charlie Borders, Tom Buford, Lindy Casebier, Gene Huff,
Dan Kelly, Virgil Moore, Tim Philpot, John Rogers and Gex Williams

This bill repeals existing Kentucky inheritance tax and imposes a tax equal to the "federal
credit: "
This bill is currently in the Senate Appropriations and Revenue Committee
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KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION/INTANGffiLE TAX
Senate Bills 103 and 105 (See House Bills 156 and 219)
mtroduced by Senators Richard L. Roeding, David L. Williams, Charlie Borders, Tom Buford, Lindy Casebier, Gene Huff,
Dan Kelly, Virgil Moore, Tim Philpot, John Rogers, Gex Williams and Joseph U. Meyer

These bills amend Kentucky's Constitution to exempt intangible personal property from
taxation after January 1, 1995.
These bills are currently in the Senate State Government Committee.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
Senate Bill 184
mtroduced by Senator Fred Bradley

This bill, among other things, creates KRS Ch. 175 relating to limited liability companies
- taxed as partnerships but with the company's owners having the same limited liability as
corporate shareholders.
This bill passed the Senate on February 25, 1994 and was posted in the House Judiciary
Committee on March 3, 1994.

ELECTRONIC EDITION OF THE KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES
Senate Bill 301 (See House Bill 553)
mtroduced by Senator Walter A. Baker

This bill amends KRS 7.138 to permit the Legislative Research Commission to designate
an electronic version of the statutes as an "official electronic version" upon certain conditions.
The bill was posted favorably to the Consent Calendar by the Senate State Government
Committee on 'March 3, 1994.

LIVING WILL DIRECTIVE ACT
Senate Bill 311
mtroduced by Senator David K. Karem

This bill repeals Kentucky's current Living Will Act (KRS 311.622 to 311.644) and
Health Care Surrogate Act (KRS 311.970 to 311.986) and establishes a comprehensive living
will statutory scheme relating to health care decisions.
The bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary Committee
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MECHANIC'S LIENS
House Bill 9
Introduced by Representatives Marshall Long. Jim Callahan and William Donnermeyer

This bills amends KRS 376.010 to grant mechanic's lien rights to suppliers and lessors.
This bill passed the House on February 24, 1994 and is currently in the Senate Judiciary
Committee.

MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION
House Bill 19

*

Introduced by Representative Jim Callahan

This bill amends KRS 186A.035 to provide for joint/survivorship ownership of motor
vehicle by husband and wife unless registration states to the contrary.
This bill passed both the House and Senate. It was signed by the Governor on February
24, 1994.

LIABILITY FOR REAL PROPERTY TAX
House Bill 20
Introduced by Representative Frank Rasche

This bill amends KRS 132.220 to provide that if real property is transferred after the tax
assessment date (January 1), the transferee is obligated for payment of the tax and is considered
to be the owner of the property from the date the tax become delinquent.
This bill is currently in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee.

PAYMENT OF SALES AND INCOME TAXES
House Bill 80

*

Introduced by Representative Marshall Long

This bill permits the Revenue Cabinet to require taxpayers, whose average monthly
liability for sales tax or income tax withholding exceeds $25,000, to pay the taxes by electronic
fund transfer.
This bill passed both the House and Senate. It was signed by the Governor on February
11, 1994.
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INCOME TAX
House Bill 107

*

Introduced by Representative Marshall Long

This bill incorporates the federal Internal Revenue Code in effect on December 31, 1993
into Kentucky's income tax provisions (KRS Ch. 141).
This bill passed both the House and Senate.
February 28, 1994 for signing.

It was delivered to the Governor on

CAMPAIGN FINANCE
House Bill 148
Introduced by Representative Marshall Long

This bill requires political contributions by individual contributors to a candidate or
committee to be by single check - thereby prohibiting "bundling" of contributions.
This bill was posted in the Elections and Constitutional Amendments Committee on
February 25, 1994.

KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION/INTANGffiLE TAX
House Bill 156 (See House Bill 219 and Senate Bills 103 and 105)
Introduced by Representatives William Lear, Kenneth Harper and Leslie Trapp

This bill amends the Kentucky Constitution to exempt intangible property from taxation;
it is currently in the House Elections and Constitutional Amendments Committee.

STANDBY GUARDIANS
House Bill 173

*

Introduced by Representative Gross Lindsay

This bill creates a new section of KRS Ch. 387 to provide a procedure for appointment
of a "standby" guardian to be appointed following disability.
This bill passed the House on February 1, 1994 and the Senate on March 2, 1994; it was
delivered to the Governor for signing on March 3, 1994.
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LOANS BY KENTUCKY HOUSING CORPORATION
House Bill 234
Introduced by Representative Jim Wayne

This bill amends KRS 198A.065, relating to the Kentucky Housing Corporation,
expanding the Corporation's authority to participate in residential housing project loans.
This bill passed the House on March 3, 1994 ..

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
House Bill 255 (See Senate Bill 184)
Introduced by Representatives Louis Johnson and Stan Cave

This bill creates a new KRS Ch. 275 relating to limited liability companies and is
currently in the House Judiciary Committee.
The bill is currently in the House Judiciary Committee.

OPEN RECORDS OF PUBLIC AGENCIES
House Bill 274
Introduced by Representatives William Donnermeyer and Denver Butler

This bill amends KRS 61.872 to require public agencies to make an effort reasonably
calculated to locate a public record if requested to do so.
This bill was posted in the House State Government Committee on February 22, 1994.

"GOING OUT OF BUSINESS" AND "FIRE" SALES
House Bill 314
Introduced by Representative Steven Riggs

This bill creates new provisions in KRS Ch. 367 regulating "going out of business" and
"fire" sales.
This bill is currently in the House Business Organizations and Professions Committee.
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ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
House Bill 322
Introduced by Representative Rex Smith

This bill amends or adds sections to KRS Ch. 13A revising the procedure for adoption
of administrative regulations.
This bill passed the House on February 15, 1994 and is currently in the Senate Economic
Development and Tourism Committee.

INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES
House Bill 372
Introduced by Representatives Jim LeMaster, William Lear, Robert Damron, Drew Graham, Kenneth Harper, Dave Stengel,
Leslie Trapp and Charlie Walton

This bill enacts new sections ofKRS Ch. 140A (effective for estates and decedents dying
after 1/1/98) which provides for 4.;.year phase-in of new "pick-up" tax, i.~., equal to "federal
credit. "
This bill is currently in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee.

CIVIL JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS
House Bill 461
Introduced by Representative Dave Stengel

This bill amends KRS 24A.120 to increase the amount in controversy jurisdiction of
District Courts from $4,000 to $10,000.
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on February 24, 1994.

GiFTS BY ATTORN'EY-IN-FACT
House Bill 589
Introduced by Representative Jim LeMaster

This bill creates or amends sections of KRS Ch. 386 and 387 to authorize an attorney-infact to make gifts of the principal's property to establish an estate plan and minimize taxes
subject to certain conditions and appointment by the district court of any attorney to represent
the principal.
This bill passed the House on March 1, 1994; it was received in the Senate March 2,
1994 and is currently in the House Judiciary Committee.
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S~ULTANEOUSDEATH

House Bill 615
Introduced by Representative Richard Lewis

This bill adds new sections of KRS Ch. 397 relating to presumptions in the event of
simultaneous deaths unless the governing instrument deals explicitly with simultaneous deaths
or common disasters.
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on March 3, 1994.

EXEMPTING PENSIONS FROM INCOME TAX
House Bill 654
Introduced by Representative Leslie Trapp

This bill creates new sections of KRS. Ch. 141 exempting pension distributions for
Kentucky income taxes over a five year period beginning with the 1994 tax year.
This bill is currently in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee.

WAGE AND HOUR VIOLATION LIENS
House Bill 660
Introduced by Representative Mark S. Brown

This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 337 to impose a lien upon an employer for the
amount of any civil penalty assessed for wage and hour violations. The lien is superior to
encumbrances created after recording and continues for ten years unless released.
This bill was posted in the House Labor and Judiciary Committee on March 1, 1994 and
reported favorably on March 3, 1994.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH VIOLATION LIENS
House Bill 661
Introduced by Representative Mark S. Brown

This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 338 to impose a lien upon an employer for the
amount any penalty fixed for occupational safety and health violations. The lien is superior to
encumbrances created after recording and continues for ten years unless released.
This bill was posted in the House Labor and Industry Committee on March 1, 1994 and
reported favorably on March 3, 1994.
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BUSINESS ENTITIES
House Bill 717
Introduced by Representative Jim LeMaster

This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 271B and 362 authorizing merger of Kentucky
corporations with limited liability companies and limited partnerships and specifying the merger
procedure.
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on March 2, 1994.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS PROHmITED
House Bill 762
Introduced by Representative Joe Barrows

This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 336 prohibiting an employer from requiring,
as a condition of employment, that an employee waive any right under Kentucky or federal law .
This bill is currently in the House Labor and Industry Committee.

DECEDENT'S ESTATES
House Bill 910
Introduced by Representative Arnold Simpson

This bill amends KRS 395.455 to include surviving children as persons to whom assets
of an estate may be distributed when administration of the estate is dispensed with.
The bill is currently in the House Judiciary Committee.

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS
House Bill 924
Introduced by Representative Tom Riner

This bill amends various provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes making social
. security numbers confidential and, among other things, prohibiting social security numbers from
appearing on driver's licenses issued after July 1, 1995.
This bill is currently in the House State Government Committee.
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This outline is designed to provide general information on the subject matters covered. It is not
intended to provide either a complete survey of all possible developments or a comprehensive
explanation or analysis of those developments mentioned. Readers should consult the original
source materials referenced. Furthermore, this outline is not intended nor should it be used as a
substitute for specific legal advice or opinion. Finally, this outline is published with the
understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal service.
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Federal Legislative Developments
I.

Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Title XIII of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Pub. L. 103-66).
A.

New section 6050P of the Internal Revenue Code created to
impose information reporting requirements for any
discharge of indebtedness over $600 after December 31,
1993.

B.

Every financial institution described in IRS 5581 or
591(a) must file a return with the IRS and provide a
statement to the debtor whenever it discharges indebtedness of $600 or more. Banks, savings institutions, and
credit unions included.

C.

Return is made "at such time and in such form as the
Secretary may be regulations describe".

D.

contents of return to IRS:

E.

1.

The name, address and TIN of each person whose
indebtedness was discharged during the calendar
year;

2.

The date of the discharge and the amount of the
indebtedness discharged;

3.

Such other information as the Secretary may prescribe.

Statement To Be Given To Debtor:
1.

2.

F.

Any financial institution required to make a return
for a discharge of indebtedness must furnish to
each person whose name is set forth in the return a
written statement showing:
a.

the name and address of the entity required to
make the return;

b.

the information required to be shown on the
return with respect to that person.

Statement must be furnished on or before January 31
of the year following the calendar year for which
the return was made.

Penalties For Failure To Comply.
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G.

1.

Failure to file with the IRS is subject to the
penalties of IRC §6274(d) (1) (B) for failing to file
a correct information return.

2.

Failure to provide a debtor with a correct written
statement is subject to the penalties of IRC
§6274(d) (2) for failure to provide a correct payee
statement.

IRS promulgated temporary regulations on December 27,
1993, and proposed them as the final regulations. See 58
Fed. Reg. 68,301 and 68,307. Comment period on proposed
final regulation expired February 25, 1994.
1.

Amount discharged must be broken down into interest, principal, administrative costs, and fines.

2.

Must describe "origin of the indebtedness" (i.e.,
student loan, mortgage, credi t card, etc. ), and
also an indication that the indebtedness was discharged in bankruptcy, if known.

3.

Multiple discharges do not have to be aggregated to
reach $600 threshold unless separate discharges
"are pursuant to a plan to evade the reporting
requirements."

4•

Indebtedness considered discharged "upon the occurrence of an identifiable event indicating that the
indebtedness will never have to be paid by the
debtor, taking into account all the facts and
circumstances".
Identifiable event includes, but
is not limited to, the following:
a.

discharge in bankruptcy;

b.

agreement between
discharge;

c.

"A cancellation or extinguishment by operation
of law that renders the debt unenforceable
(such as the expiration of the statute of
limitations for collection of the indebtedness)".

creditor

and

debtor

to

Bookkeeping entry is not, of itself, an identifiable event, but it is a circumstances that may be
taken into account in determining whether a discharge has occurred.
5.

Wha t if the creditor does not know the TIN?
It
"must be requested of the debtor for purposes of
meeting the requirements" of the regulation.
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II.

Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 (Pub. L. No. 103-94; 107
stat. 1001).
A.

section 9 of the Act adds 5 U.S.C. §5520a relating to the
.garnishment of federal employees' pay.

B.

§5520a(b):
"Subject to the provisions of this section
and the provisions of section 303 of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §1673) pay from an agency to an
employee is subject to legal process in the same manner
and to the same extent as if the agency were a private
person."

C.

Definitions:
1.

"agency" means "each agency of the Federal Government" and specifically includes
a.

an "executive agency, except for the General
Accounting Office";

b.

"any .agency of the
Government"; and

c.

1.lany agency of the legislative branch of the
Government, including the General Accounting
Office, each office of a Member of Congress, a
committee of the Congress, or other office of
the Congress;

judicial branch of

the

2.

"employee' means "an employee of an agency (including a Member of Congress as defined under section
2106)"

3.

"legal process" means "any writ, order, summons, or
other similar process in the nature of a garnishment, that --

f \

!

4.

a.

is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction
within any State, territory, possession of the
United States, or an authorized official
pursuant to an order of such a court or pursuant to state or local law; and

b.

orders the employing agency of such employee
to withhold an amount from the pay of such
employee, and make a payment. of such withholding to another person, for a specifically described satisfaction' of a legal debt of the
employee, or recovery of attorney's fees,
interest, or court costs."

Procedure for serving "legal process":
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a.

May be by certified or registered mail, return
receipt requested or by personal service.

b.

Served upon:
(1)

appropriate agent designated for receipt
of such service of process pursuant to
regulations issued under this section; or

(2)

the head of the agency, if no agent had
been so designated.

c.

Must be accompanied by "sufficient information
to permi t
prompt
identification of the
employee and the payments involved."

d.

Agent properly served must respond:
(1)

to person serving legal process within 30
days or such longer period as may be
prescribed by applicable state law

(2)

give written notice that legal process
has been served (together with a copy) to
the affected employee within 15 days.

5.

Agencies not required to vary their normal pay and
disbursement cycles in order to comply with any
such legal process.

6.

If agency receives more than one legal process,
priority is based on the time of service; except
that process under 42 U.S.C. §659, 661 and 662 for
the enforcement of employee's legal obligation to
provide child support or make alimony payments have
priority over earlier legal process.

7.

Regulations to be promulgated and the regulations
"shall provide that an agency' s administrative
costs in executing a garnishment action may be
added to the garnishment, and that the agency may
retain costs recovered as offsetting collections."

8.

Special rules integrating the statute with the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 for
members of the uniformed services.

9.

Effective Date:
120 days after date of enactment
(which was october 6, 1993).
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III. Housing and community Development Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No.
102-550).

~

A.

§933 of the Act creates a new statute regulating rebates
in connection with consumer credit transactions and
prohibiting the use of the "Rule of 78's" in calculating
such rebates in certain cases.

B.

"If a consumer prepays in full the financed amount under
any consumer credi t transaction, the credi tor shall
promptly refund any unearned portion of the interest
charge to the consumer".

C.

In calculating the amount of the rebate in a precomputed
consumer credit transaction of a term exceeding 61 months
which is consummated after september 30, 1993, the
creditor "shall compute the refund based on a method
which is at least as favorable to the consumer as the
actuarial method." This prohibits the use of the Rule of
78's.

D.

Any prepayment triggers the rebate provisions, including
a prepayment for a financing or an acceleration due to a
default or otherwise.

E.

No refund is required if the total refund would be less
than one dollar.

F.

statute adopts the Truth In Lending Act's definitions of
"consumer" and "creditor". See 15 U.S.C. §1502(h) and
(f) •
In addition, the statute expressly states that
"creditor" includes any "assignee" and "subassignee" of
any creditor.

G.

Credi tor required, upon oral or wri tten request, to
provide a statement of (A) the amount necessary to prepay
the account in full and (B) the amount of any refund.
1.

The statement must be provided before the end of
the 5-day period b~ginning on the date the request
is received.

2.

If the request is in writing, the statement must be
in writing.

3.

A customer is entitled to receive one free annual
statement, and the creditor may impose a reasonable
fee to cover the cost of producing additional
statements provided the charge is disclosed to the
consumer in advance.
.

.'
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Federal Administrative Developments
I.

Problems with Non-Insured Investment Products.
A.

B.

OCC issues on February 24, 1993, new §413 (Retail
Nondeposit Investment Sales) for the Comptroller's
Handbook for National Bank Examiners to supersede
guidelines in Banking Circular 274 (7/19/93).
section
413 incorporates an Interagency Statement issued by the
OCC, FRB, FDIC, and OTS on February 15, 1994.
1.

Agencies expect all banks dealing in uninsured
products to make it clear to customers that such
products are not FDIC insured and that the purchase
involves possible risk to principal.

2.

Bank tellers are not to make specific recommendations about uninsured products and are not allowed
to take customer orders for uninsured items.

3.

Bank should advertise uninsured products in
clearly different manner from insured products.

4.

Banks should obtain a signature from the customer
acknowledging that the disclosures regarding the
risks of investing in uninsured products are
clearly understood.

5.

Banks are expected to ensure that sales recommendationsare suitable for a particular customer.

6.

Compensation of sales staff should be structured to
protect the customer.

a

Recent article in the March 1994 Consumer Reports
magazine severely criticized bank involvement in the sale
of mutual funds and did Ii ttle to help the image of
banks.
1.

The article points out problems when mutual funds
are being sold by employees with inadequate training.
It also points out potential problems when
third parties sell mutual funds from bank premises.

2.

The tone of the article is evident from the following by-line appearing in large print on the first
page:
"Our investigation of 40 banks in five
states found bad investment advice and outright
lies about safety."
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II.

Regulation B - Availability Of Real Estate·Appraisals.
A.

FRB issues final rules adding a new §202. 5a to its
Regulation B (12 C.F.R. Part 202) to implement the
appraisal report distribution require~ents of FDICIA
§223. See 58 Fed. Reg. 65657 (12/16/93).

B.

§223 amended the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C.
§1691-1691f). ("ECOA") by adding a new paragraph (e) to
ECOA §701 (15 U.S.C. §1691(e» stating:
"Each creditor shall promptly furnish an
applicant, upon written request by the applicant made within a reasonable period of time
of the application, a copy of the appraisal
report used in connection with the applicant's
application for a ldan that is or would have
been secured by a lien on residential real
property. The creditor may require the applicant to reimburse the creditor for the cost of
the appraisal."

\\

i

C.

"Dwelling".
1.

The FRB substi tuted the term "residential real
property" in the statute with the term "dwelling".
See 12 C.F.R. §202.5a(a).
"Dwelling" is then
defined as follows:
"[A] residential structure that contains
one to four units whether or not that
structure is attached to real property.
The term includes, but is not limited to,
an individual condominium or cooperative
unit, and a mobile or other manufactured
home." 12 C.F.R. §202.5a(c).

D.

2.

The FRB refused suggestions to expand the definition of "dwelling" to include larger, multifamily
units in the belief that this "could impose a
significant burden on institutions which could
outweigh the benefits to consumers." However, the
FRB reminded creditors that the nondiscrimination
requirements of Regulation B "are applicable to
transactions involving multifamily dwellings".

3.

Note:
the
appraisal
distribution
requirement
applies regardless of the purpose of the loan so
long as it involves a loan secured or to be secured
by a lien on a dwelling.
Thus, a loan to start a
small business would be covered if the requisite
lien were taken •.

"Appraisal Report".
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E.

.1.

12 C.F.R. §202.5(c) defines the term as "the documentes) relied upon by a creditor in evaluating the
value of the dwelling."

2.

If a third party appraiser is used and his value is
accepted, the FRB's explained that this would be
"the complete appraisal report signed by the appraiser, including all information submitted to the
lender by the appraiser for the purpose of determining the value of the residential property."

3.

If the third party appraiser's value is not used,
the FRB explained that the applicant would receive
both the third party report and "a copy of documents that reflect the creditor's valuation of the
dwelling •
includ[ing] staff appraisals or
other notes indicated why the value assigned by the
third party appraiser is not the appropriate valuation."

4.

If the credi tor performs an in-house appraisal,
"the appraisal report would be the report of the
credi tor's staff appraiser, where applicable, or
the other documents of the creditor which assign
value to the dwelling."

Means Of Compliance - "Routine" Delivery Or Delivery Upon
Request.
1.

Creditors may choose between two alternative
methods of delivering appraisal reports. They may
elect to automatically provide a copy of appraisal
reports for all covered loan applications. See 12
C.F.R. §202.5a{a) (1). Alternatively, creditors may
choose to provide a copy upon the applicant's
written request. See 12 C.F.R. §202.5a{a) (2).

2.

For so-called "routine delivery", the regulation
does not establish mandatory deadlines or timetables for delivery.
The regulation does state
that delivery must routinely occur "whether credit
is granted or denied or the application is withdrawn. "
The FRB' s explanation assumed good faith
compliance and merely expected delivery "when the
appraisal is completed, or later in the application
process {for example, when notice is given of
action taken on the application)".

3.

A creditor that only provides a copy upon receipt
of a written request must comply with certain
notice and timing requirements.
a.

First, the creditor must provide written
notice to the applicant of his or her right to
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receive an appraisal report.
The notice may
be gi ven at any time during the application
process but no later than when the creditor
provides notice of action taken under the
deadlines established by §202.9 of Regulation
B.

4.

b.

The FRB decided not to require that the notice
be in a separate form that the applicant can
keep. Nor did the FRB impose size, typeface,
or conspicuousness requirements.
The FRB
stated that the notice "may be included on or
with the adverse action notice, the application, or other documents."

c.

The written notice to the applicant "shall
specify that the 'applicant's request must be
in writing,
give the creditor's mailing
address, and state the time for making the
request" • Model Form C-9 was added by the FRB
to Appendix C of Regulation B, and proper use
of this form satisfies compliance with the
notice requirement.
Credi tors are not required to use this form and may design their
own provided the required information is
included.

d.

The "time for making the request" refers to
the fact that an creditor need not provide the
appraisal report if the request is received
more than 90 days after the credi tor has
provided notice of action taken on the application or 90 days after, the application is
withdrawn.

The statute requires that the appraisal report be
"promptly furnished" , and the FRB's regulation
establishes a generally rule of thumb which is 30
days after the later of time the creditor receives
an applicant's request , receives the' report, or
receives reimbursement from the applicant for the
report.
a.

The 30-day period is somewhat ambiguous since
the specific language of the Regulation says
"promptly (generally within 30-days)" after
the triggerip.g events.
The FRB wrote that
, this language "provide [s] greater flexibility"
and allows a longer time for providing a copy
"in exceptional circumstances". On the other
hand, if the applicant has a special need for
the report and the creditor could have provided a report sooner, is there a violation if
the creditor waits until the 30th day?
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F.

G.

How Much Can The Creditor Charge For Providing The Report
CO.py?
1.

The statute states that a creditor may "require the
applicant to reimburse the creditor for the cost of
the appraisal."
There is no provision in the
regulation explaining this requirement.

2.

The FRB did comment on this statutory language in
its preamble to the regulation. It wrote that the
"provision permits a creditor to require the consumer to pay for the cost of the appraisal prior to
providing a copy." However, if the applicant has
already paid for the appraisal as part of the
application fee, another charge for a copy could
not be imposed.

3.

In any event, the FRB indicated that a creditor may
"require reimbursement of photocopy and postage
costs that are incurred in providing the copy of
the report, unless prohibited by state or other
law. "

Effective Date - December 14, 1993, but compliance is
optional until June 14, 1993.

III. OCC Proposal To Amend National Bank Lending Limits:
59 Fed
Reg. 6593 (2/11/93) (comment period expires April 12, 1994).
A.

Permits lending limits generally to be calculated based
upon bank capital figures reported in quarterly call
reports. "Unimpaired capital and surplus" is the total
of a Bank's Tier 1, Tier 2, and ALLL not calculated in
Tier 1 and Tier 2.

B.

Additional rules apply for
insider loans.

C.

Calculations will be made when a loan is made and
quarterly thereafter unless (a) there is a adverse change
in the bank's capital category for prompt corrective
action, (b) a material event occurs that event causes
bank's capital to decrease or increase by 10% or more, or
(c) the OCC requires a specific bank to use more frequent
capital calculations.

D.

If a loan that was within a bank's limit when made
becomes non-conforming, 'a bank must exercise its "best
eff'orts" to bring the loan into conformity with the
lending limit.
Special 5 business day conformity
deadline for a loan is becomes nonconforming because
collateral securing the loan to satisfy a lending limit
exception has declined in value.
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investment securities and

E.

New exception to the lending limit that would permit a
national bank to complete the financing of a project in
progress in accordance with prior commitments up to an
additional 5% of bank's capital and surplus.

F.

Clarifies other lending limit rules by incorporating
prior significant OCC interpretations.

IV.

Department of Justice - ERISA: ERISA is violated when trust
companies earn interest for their own account from the "float"
between the time benefit checks are written to E~ISA plan
participants and the time the checks are presented for payment. Trustee for ERISA plans would be directed to.pay benefits. Trustee then transferred sufficient funds to a general
account and issued checks to participants. until the checks
were cashed, the trustee would earn income on the funds in the
general account under a retail repurchase agreement wi th
another financial institution. [Department of Labor Advisory
opinion No. 93-24A (9/13/93)].

V.

Department of Justice - ATK Accessibility Requirements.
Effective February 17, 1994, the D~partment of Justice adopted
amendments to regulations implementing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 to change the reach requirements for
accessible automated teller machines.
28 C.F.R. Part 36,
Appendix A, §4.34.3 (59 Fed. Reg. 2674, 2677 (1/18/94).

VI.

Environmental Protection Aaencv
CERCLA Secured Lender
Exemption:
On February 4, 1994, the United states Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held in a 2-1 decision
that the federal Environmental Protection Agency "lacks
statutory authority" to promulgate its "lender liability" rule
protecting lenders from having to pay under federal law for
cleanups at hazardous waste sites (Subpart L of 40 C.F.R. Part
300) •
Chemical Mfgs. Ass'n v. Environmental Protection
Agency, No. 92-1414 (1994 WL27881) (D.C. cir.).

\1I

However, two major decisions have been rendered recently in.
favor of lenders using analysis almost identical to the EPA's
Rule but relying exclusively on the plain language of the
statute: waterville Industries. Inc. v. Finance Authority of
Maine, 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993) (secured lender does not
automatically lose its exemption merely by taking title to
real property collateral when the debtor defaults "so long as
the owner proceeds within a reasonable time to divest itself
of ownership."); and United states v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69 (4th
Cir. 1993) (Wachovi~ Bank & Trust Co. was protected from
liability by the secured creditor exemption even though
Wachovia purchasedcontami:9q\~d property as the sole bidder at
its foreclosure sale).

State Administrative Developments
Kentucky Real Estate Commission Form.

Disclosure Of Condition

A.

KRS 324.360 (enacted by the 1992 General Assembly)
requires the Kentucky Real Estate Commission to promulgate an administrative regulation creating a "seller's
disclosure of conditions form". Regulations are codified
at 201 KAR 11:250 (1993).

B.

The form must be completed and signed by the seller of
residential real estate if any licensed real estate agent
receives compensation.

C.

D.

1.

If property is listed, form must be completed and
signed by seller at the time of listing.

2.

If property is not listed, form must be completed
and signed within 5 business days of any executory
contract for sale.

No form is required for:
1.

Residential purchases
warranty is offered.

2.

Sale of real estate at auction.

3.

Court supervised foreclosure.

Copy retained by real
prospective purchaser:

of

new

estate agent

if

written

and delivered to

1.

Upon request and

2.

When makes a signed written offer to purchase.

E.

If seller refused to complete and sign the form, real
estate agent must advise the prospective purchaser in
writing and "without unreasonable delay".

F.

Question: If you were representing a lending bank, would
you allow a closing to occur if the statute had not been
complied with?

Judicial Developments
I.

homes

Kentucky Supreme Court.
A.

LENDER LIABILITY:
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1.

B.

Hanson v. American National Bank & Trust Co., Ky.,
865 S.W.2d 302 (11/24/93) (after earlier decision
vacated by united states Supreme Court).
a.

Jury's punitive damages award of $5.775 million did not violate procedural or sUbstantive
due process under the standards set forth in
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
u.s. 1 (1992), and TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 u. S.
113
S.ct. 2711 (1993).

b.

Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
.
u.s. ___ , 114
S.ct. 751 (No. 93-644) (1/14/94) (granting
certiorari on the issue of the constitutionality of Oregon's procedure for reviewing punitive damages in which an appellate court only
examines whether
the
jury was
properly
instructed and whether there was evidence
justifying punitive damages and cannot review
actual dollar amount award).

2.

Denies motion for discretionary review of Liberty
National Bank and Trust Co. v. Donaldson, Ky.App.,
No. 91-CA-2416 (jury verdict of $7 million (less
directed verdict on unpaid promissory note) for
failure to act in good faith in connection with
claimed line of credit), on September 22, 1993.

3.

Steelvest. Inc.v. Scansteel Service Center, Jefferson Circuit Court, No. 86-CI-4607 (on remand
after Kentucky Supreme Court decision) finds violation of fiduciary duty by former officer who established competing business but insufficient proof of
damages.

CLOSING

ATTORNEYS

~

DANGERS

OF

DUAL

REPRESE!,'TATION'i

Reversing dismissal of seller's claim for fraud and
malpractice against closing attorney who (a) represented
both the seller and the purchaser of a car dealership and
(b) was married to the principal individual controlling
the purchaser. Conrad Chevrolet. Inc. v. Rood, Ky., 862
S.W.2d 312 (1993).
1.

Seller claimed that security agreement in his favor
and personal guaranty from the attorney's spouse
were not included in closing documents.

2.

Waiver of conflicts that was signed at the closing
but backdated to the date the representation
started was, "as a matter of law", an insufficient
basis for granting summary judgment in favor of the
attorney.
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C.

D.

a.

The waiver could be considered evidence of
overreaching . instead of evidence of proper
conduct, and this created a genuine issue of
fact requiring trial.

b.

The waiver could not constitute "consent after
consultation" under Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorneys because the
conflict was so great that the attorney could
not engage in the dual representation even
with a client's purported consent.

c.

Merely including the waiver as a closing document was not sufficient "consultation" to
support a client's consent to the dual representation.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:
1.

First Kentucky Trust Co. v. Christian, Ky., 849
S.W.2d 534 (1993).
"An action against a trustee
for breach of fiduciary duty where the trust is
continuing and sUbsisting and no repudiation has
occurred may be brought at any time during the
existence of the trust pursuant to KRS 413.340 and
KRS 386.735." Action filed in 1989 based upon 1977
trust activity was timely.

2.

Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, Ky., 831
S.W.2d 912 (1992).
Failure of partners doing
business under assumed name to comply with statute
requiring filing of certificate of assumed name was
sufficient to
create estoppel under tolling
statute, thereby tolling statute of limitations
during period of non-compliance.
In dicta, court
states that "Parties are at liberty to contract for
limitation period less than period fixed by statute."

MECHANIC'S LIENS:' Greensburg Depos it Bank v.
Motors, Ky., 851 S.W.2d 476 (1993).

GGC-Goff

1.

Enforcing written mechanic's lien waiver demanded
by bank before bank would make a loan to property
owner. Consideration for waiver was bank approval
and disbursement of loan. In any event, an implied
waiver would arise since the bank detrimentally
relied upon potential lien claimant's statements
that he would not claim a lien if the loan was
made.

2.

Court made this ruling even though lien claimant
argued that the bank orally represented to him that
he would be paid if he executed the lien waiver and
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the loan proceeds were disbursed. Trial court had
found that lien claimant had not proven the alleged
modification of the lien waiver.

II.

E.

APPEAL OF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES: Where a judgment
awards an attorney's fee, the attorney is required to be
named as a party to an appeal thereof only if the
judgment is "directed in favor of [the] attorney and
enforce[able] in his name." If the judgment is "simply
by way of reimbursing a party for an expense incurred",
then the attorney is not required to be named in the
notice of appeal. Knott v. Crown Colony Farm. Inc., 865
S.W.2d 326 (11/24/93) (Liebson, J.).

F.

WILLS:
Generally describing requirements for a holographic will and finding that the document in question
did not meet those requirements.
Mallory v. Mallory,
Ky., 862 S.W.2d 879 (9/30/93).

G.

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS:
1.

Refusing to issue writ of prohibition to set aside
trial court's order authorizing discovery of peer
review records in medical malpractice case. Appalachian Regional Health Care. Inc. v. Johnson, Ky.,
862 S.W.2d 868 (May 27, 1993).

2.

Affirming Court of Appeal's writ of prohibition
which set aside trial court's order prohibiting
discovery for other car owners who allegedly had
suffered sudden acceleration incidents. volvo Car
Corp. v. Hopkins, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 777 (Sept. 2,
1993) .

Kentucky Court of Appeals.
A.

FRAUD CLAIMS:
"Where a fraudulent representation is
discerned while the contract is executory and before
either party has substantially performed in conformance
with the terms of the contract, we deem the appropriate
rule to be that affirmance or continued performance by
the defrauded party under the contract also effectively
waives the right to sue for damages" in addition to
waiving the right to rescind the contract.
This rule
applied to bar fraud claim brought by purchasers of tire
company who completed closing after learning that the
accounts payable were substantially understated by the
seller.
Hopkins v. Performance Tire & Auto Service
Center. Inc., Ky.App., 866 S.W.2d 438 (12/10/93).

B.

JEOPARDY TAX ASSESSMENTS AND FORECLOSURE ACTIONS:
In a foreclosure action, another lien claimant has
standing to require the Revenue Cabinet prove that the
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amount of a tax lien based upon a jeopardy tax assessment
is correct even if the taxpayer did not contest the
assessment. Revenue Cabinet v. Liberty National Bank of
Lexington, Ky.App., 858 S.W.2d 199 (1993).
C.

ATTORNEY'S LIEN/SET-OFF:

Attorney's lien on proceeds of
borrower's "lender liability" crossclaim is superior to
bank's set-off claim based upon borrowers unpaid debt.
Exchange Bank of Mt. Sterling v.Wells, Ky.App., 860
S.W.2d 785 (3/19/93).

D.

Second mortgagee does not have
right of redemption after foreclosure sale since right of
redemption is limited to owner of property. Redemption
by owner does not resurrect prior mortgages or liens when
property sold free and clear of the liens. Kirklevington
Associates« Ltd. v. Kirklevington North Associates, Ltd.,
Ky.App., 848 S.W.2d 453 (1993).

E.

AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES:
In purchaser' s suit
against seller of real property for breach of general
warranty based upon judgment lien against the property,
Court of Appeals held that the warranty against encumbrances was breached upon conveyance and purchaser did
not have to wait until eviction. Blankenship v. Stovall,
Ky.App., 862 S.W.2d 333 (1993).

F.

POWERS OF APPOINTMENT:
Lillv v. citizens Fidelity Bank
and Trust Company, Ky.App., 859 S.W.2d 666 (1993).

RIGHTS OF REDEMPTION:

COVENANT

1.

Defines general and special powers of appointment
which generally are "the power or authority given
by a donor, such as a testator, to a donee to
appoint the beneficiaries of the donor's property,
or interest therein which is vested in a person
other than the donee of the power.
The power may
be created by deed or will and is in the nature of
a trust."
a.

General power - may be exercised in favor of
any person including the donee.

b.

Special power - may be exercised only for the
benefit of a particular group or class, which
does not include the donee.

2.

Law governing a power of appointment is the law in
effect at the time of the exercise of the power by
the donee not the law in effect at the time the
donor creates the power.

3.

KRS 394.060 applies to both general and special·
powers of appointment.
statute since 1972 has
provided that a devise or bequest of property over
B - 16

which the testator has any power of appointment is
deemed to be an exercise of the power unless a
contrary intention appears in the donee's will.
Prior to 1972, statute only applied to general
powers of appointment.
4.

Adopting the rule that "Under a power of appointment, ei ther general or special, containing no
restriction as to the nature of the estate to be
raised, the donee is not limited to an appointment
of the legal estate, but may execute the power by
an appointment in trust for the obj ects of the
power, except where the instrument expressly or
impliedly shows that the donor intended the appointees to take absolutely and not in trust."

5.

Applying "blue-pencil"
Perpetuities problem.

rule

to

a

Rule

Against

G.

DISCRIMINATION:
(A) Union employee may bring a claim
for sexual and racial discrimination under Kentucky's
Civil Rights statute (KRS 344.010 et seq.) without first
utilizing union grievance procedure. Presumably the same
would be true for a non-unionize employer's personnel
manual.
(B) Although sexual or racial harassment by a
co-worker is not a violation of KRS 344.010 et seq if
employer did not know and should not have known of harassment, summary judgment against employee was improper
where employee testified that supervisory personnel were
informed of at least some of objectionable conduct and
were participating in some. Kirkwood v. Courier-Journal
andLouisville Times Co., Ky.App., 858 S.W.2d 194 (1993).

H.

WHAT ARE "MINUTES"?: There are no such thing as "unofficial minutes" because "a body's minutes do not have any
legal existence until they are actually adopted or
approved." In this case, Planning COlfindssion's decision
based upon minutes that had not yet been formally
approved was invalid because the decision was not based
upon an official "public record".
Helm v. Citizens To
Protect the Prospect Area, Inc., Ky.App., 864 S.W.2d 312
(10/29/93) .

I.

APPEAL OF ORDER CONFIRMING SALE: Notice of Appeal from
an order confirming a foreclosure sale must include
purchasers.
Lagatella v. Farm Credit services of MidAmerica, Inc., No. 92-CA-31118 (3/15/93) (unpublished).

III. United States Supreme Court.
A.

DISCRIMINATION:
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
U.S. _
(11/9/93) (1993 WL 453611).
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1 ..

To be actionable as an "abusive work environment",
discriminatory harassment need not seriously affect
an employee's psychological well-being" or lead the
employee to "suffer injury".

2.

What is unlawful sexual discrimination:
"When the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult'
that is "sufficiently seVere or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' Title VII [of the civil Rights Act of
1964] is violated." [Quoting Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986)].

3.

4.

B.

Combination of objective and subjective test measured under the facts and circumstances.
a.

Test],.s obj ecti ve - would the environment
reasonably be perceived as hostile or abusive?

b.

Test is subjective
was the environment
actually perceived as hostile or abusive?

c.

"Whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all
the circumstances."

What is not unlawful sexual discrimination:
a.

"mere utterance of an
epi thet which
engenders offensive feelings in an employee"
because it does not "sufficiently affect the
conditions of employment".

b.

"if the victim does not subjectively perceive
the environment to be abusi ve" because the
conduct "has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment".

RICO:
1.

Reves v. Ernst & Young,
U.S.
, 113 S.ct.
1163 (1993).
Supreme Court affirmed grant of
summary judgment dismissing RICO claim against
accounting firm that had prepared certain auditing
reports for a bankrupt agricul tural cooperati ve
which allegedly overvalued gasohol plant owned by.
the cooperative.
a.

Plaintiff claiming a violation of 18 U.S.C.
S1962(c) must, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, adduce facts from which a jury
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could reasonably conclude that the defendant
took "some part in directing the enterprise's
affairs."
b.

2.

C.

IV.

In dicta, Supreme Court indicated that liabili ty nevertheless may .extend to "lower-rung
participants in the enterprise who are under
the direction of upper management" and to
"others 'associated with' the enterprise who
exert control over it as, for example, by
bribery."
section 1962 (c) makes it illegal
"to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity". However, analysis explicitly does
not apply to claims under §1962(a) or (b).

NOW v. Scheidler,
U.S.
(No. 92-780) (reversing dismissal of RICO claims against antiabortion activists and. ruling that RICO does not
contain an economic-motive requirement).

CIVIL FORFEITURES: United states v. A Parcel of Land,
Buildings, Appurtenances And Improvements Known As 92
Buena Vista Avenue (S. ct. No. 91-781) (Feb. 24, 1993).
1.

Federal government sought civil forfei ture of a
residence purchased with funds ($216,000 wire
transferred to her) she allegedly received as a
gift from a convicted drug dealer, the dealer now
being a fugitive.
Woman claims that she did not
know the funds were drug proceeds.

2.

Government argued that there is no "innocent owner"
defense to .civil forfeiture, only to criminal
forfeiture.
Government argued that under the
"relation back" doctrine , title to the tainted
funds vested in the government at the time the
crime was committed, so drug dealer could not
transfer ownership of those funds at all.

3.

Supreme Court (6-3) rejected government's theory
and held that title does not vest in the government
until a jUdicial decree of forfeiture is entered.
Accordingly, a transferee of even tainted property
was an "owner" and could assert an innocent owner
defense.

u.S. court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
A.

FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT/LIABILITY OF GUARANTOR:
In case
arising out of the sale of a marina on Lake Cumberland,
the Sixth Circuit held that genuine issues of material
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fact existed as to whether or not guarantor of promissory
note was fraudulent induced by alleged misstatements in
seller's financial statements to enter into guaranty
agreement. Furthermore, guarantor's liability could not
be determined until amount of debtor's liability was
finally determined which could not occur until resolution
of debtor's set-off claims against the creditor. Moore.
Owen. Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439 (6th Cir.
1993).
B.

METHOD OF CALCULATING DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT: General rule
is that "a debtor's deficiency judgment is calculated as
of the time that the creditor has repossessed the secured
property, has liquidated it in a commercially reasonable
manner, and all cash from all transactions was realized."
Parties may contract around this general rule, and sixth
Circuit holds that parties did so in this case. Specifically, bank and debtor agreed that deficiency judgment
would be determined when bank disposed of house which it
received pursuant to deed in lieu of foreclosure and
disposal was deemed to occur when bank traded debtor's
house for another house.
Disposal did not occur two
years later when bank sold second house for lesser amount
due to general decline in real estate market. Abrams v.
F.D.I.C., 5 F.3d 1013 (6th Cir. 10/4/93).

C.

FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT:
FDCPA was "not
intended to govern attorneys engaged solely in the
practice of law." Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18 (6th Cir.
·1993) •

D.

CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION:
U. S • A.. Inc.,
F. 3 d
App. LEXIS 23757).

Banek v. Yoaurt ventures
(6th Cir. 6/8/93) (1993 U.S.

1.

Enforcing a choice of law prov1s10n in a franchise
agreement between a Michigan franchisee and a
Georgia franchisor selecting Georgia law.

2.

Federal court in diversity will apply the rules of
the state wher~ it sits in deciding whether or not
to enforce a choice of law provision.

3•

Although Michigan law applied to decide enforceability, sixth Circuit noted that "we move cautiously when asked to hold contract clauses unenforceable on public policy grounds." Also, party
challenging choice of law had burden of showing the
specific differences in the two laws and the
specific public policy of the home state that. would
be violated by application of the choice ·of law
clause.
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4.

The following choice of law prov1s1on was sufficiently broad to cover not only contract claims but
fraud claims which were "directly related to the
franchise agreement" and were not "tangentially
related to the franchise relationship":
"This Agreement was made and entered into
in the state [of] Georgia and all rights
and obligations of the parties shall be
governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the state of Georgia."

E.

v.

BANKRUPTCY STAY:
A creditor, having obtained a final
judgment of non-dischargeability from a bankruptcy court
as to its debt, is not required to seek relief from the
bankruptcy automatic stay prior to execution on the
judgment against property which is not a part of the
bankruptcy estate. In re: Embry, 10 F.3d 401 (12/3/93).

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
A.

B.

FRAUD & PUNITIVE DAMAGES: Miller's Bottled Gas, Inc. v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 817 F. Supp. 643 (W.o. Ky. 1993)
(Heyburn, J.)
1.

Under Kentucky law, a plaintiff who presents enough
evidence to go to a jury on a fraud claim is not
automatically entitled to go to the jury on punitive damages.

2.

A judge may refuse to instruct the jury on a punitive damages claim on the ground that the plaintiff
has not meet his burden of producing sufficient
evidence to justify punitive damages.

3.

However, Judge Heyburn did note that he would
"defer to the sound judgment of the . • . Kentucky
Supreme Court to state an unequivocal rule of law
to the contrary."

FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES: Presence of a valid contractual
forum selection clause selecting Tennessee as the forum
does not automatically render venue in Kentucky improper.
However, such a forum selection clause "constitutes a
significant factor that figures centrally in a district
court's calculus when evaluating a discretionary transfer
under [28 U.S.C.] §1404(a). Such clauses are prima facie
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown
by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the
circumstances. "
Credi tors Collection Bureau, Inc. v.
Access Data, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 311 (W.O. Ky. 1993)
(Heyburn, J.).
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C.

ENVIRONMENTAL:
Property owner cannot state a viable
negligence claim under Kentucky law based upon pollution
crossing over onto owner's property where level of
contamination is less than federally mandated safety
levels.
Also, nuisance claim cannot be based upon
public's perception of contamination if such contamination, in fact, does not exist. Lamb v. Martin Marietta
Energy Systems. Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 7/27/93)
(Foreman, J.).

D.

ENVIRONMENTAL: Fletcher v. Tenneco. Inc., No. 91-118
(E.D. Ky. 1993) (opinion to be reported at 816 F. Supp.
1186 withdrawn after case settled while motion to
reconsider pending).
1.

Court held "that, as a matter of law, the contamination of plaintiffs' land by a substance widely
accepted as hazardous constitutes" a nuisance, that
is a condition that "would substantially annoy or
interfere with the use and enjoyment of property by
a person of ordinary health and normal sensitivities." (quoting KRS 411.550(2».

2.

The Court ruled that in the absence of a claim by
Tenneco, Inc. that the statutes and regulations
regulating PCP's are invalid, the Court could not
override the regulatory decision as to the danger
of PCB's by considering extrinsic evidence that the
PCB contamination would not cause health problems.

3.

Disposal of PCP's was an ultrahazardous activity
for which Tenneco was liable even if Tenneco did
not know at the time of disposal that the substance
was toxic.
.

E.

LIEN PRIORITY IN JOINTLY OWNED REAL PROPERTY: Where real
property is jointly owned by husband and wife, lien of
judgment creditor of husband (who subsequently become
sole owner of property upon death of wife) is inferior to
later judgment creditor of husband and wife.
Raybro
Electric Supplies. Inc. v. Barclay, 813 F. Supp. 1267
(W. D • Ky. 1992).

F.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: Declaring that the Interstate
Horeseracing Act of 1978 (15 U.S.C. §§3001-3007) is an
unconstitutional violation of substantive due process
because i t " is an unreasonable means of advancing a
legitimate governmental interest."
Specifically, its
grant to private parties a absolute veto power over
simulcasting of horse races assures that the statute will
be applied to "favor selfish interests over public ones."
Kentucky Division Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective
Ass'n v. Turfway Park Racing, 832 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Ky.
1993) (Bertelsman, C.J.).
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VI.

u.s. Bankruptcy courts for the Eastern and western Districts
of Kentucky.
A.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT DISCHARGEABLE:
Award of punitive
damages arising out of bankrupt's sale of house in which
he misrepresented the quality of the house were nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523 (a) and adopting the
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in In re st. Laurent,
991 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1993). In re winters, 159 B.R.
789 (Bkrtcy. E.D.Ky. 10/18/93).

B.

APPROVED RATE FOR PARALEGALS: Maximum compensation for
paralegal work will be one-third of the highest hourly
rate allowed to attorneys (which is $175/hr).
In re:
optical Corporation of America, Inc., 157 B.R. 823
(Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 8/30/93).

C.

DISMISSAL OF CHAPTER 7 CASE WHERE DEBTORS COULD REHABILITATE UNDER CHAPTER 13:
Chapter 7 debtors were not
sufficiently "needy" and their case could be dismissed as
"substantial abuse" of Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. §707(b)
where debtors had sufficient income to fund three-year
Chapter 13 plan that would pay all or almost all of their
debts.
Inre: Hutton, 158 B.R. 648 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Ky.
1993).

COMMENT - Forum shopping is now important in Kentucky. SUbstantial
differences exist between state and federal courts concerning
discovery, summary judgment standards, and judicial attitudes.
VII. Kentucky Cases To Watch In The coming Months.
A.

Owensboro National Bank v. Stephens, 6th Cir., Nos. 926330/6331.
Appeal of District Court's decision that
Kentucky national banks may act, pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§92, as insurance agents from their offices in towns of
less than 5,000.
Related cases are (a) Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A.
v. Gallagher, 11th Cir., No. 93-3508, which is an appeal
from a contrary decision by the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida; (b) Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295 (1993), holding
that §92 impliedly restricts sales of fixed and variable
annuities to national banks in small towns . Petition for
certiorari to be filed with U.S. Supreme Court.; (c) New
York state Association of Life Underwriters v. New York
State Banking Department, N.Y.Ct. App., DOL#91133613,
which raises the issue of whether a state bank's incidental powers only allows a bank to engage in activities
necessary to put into effect an express power and that
the sale of annuities is not incidental in such respect.
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B.

Peoples Bank of Sandy Hook v. Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, E.D. Ky., No. 93-91. Petition by two
state banks and the Kentucky Bankers Association to
challenge decision of the OCC that a national bank may
relocate its main office across county lines and retain
branches in the county where the main office was located
prior to the relocation. Companion case is Peoples Bank
of Sandy Hook v. Kentucky Department of Financial
Institutions, Franklin Circuit Court, No. 93-CI-1502
(challenging DFI's parity letter on main office relocations).
1.

OCC has also approved two interstate main office
relocations.
a.

Pennsylvania national bank relocates main
office to Salem, New Jersey and then merges
with New Jersey bank. Approved 1/10/94.

b.

National bank headquartered in D.C. with
branches in Maryland relocated main office to
Aspen Hill, Maryland and then merge with
Maryland bank. Approved 2/4/94.

C.

General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Hulette,
Kentucky Court of Appeals, No. 93-CA-000499 (Oral
argument scheduled for April). Is County Clerk who fails
to note a lien upon a motor vehicle when tendered a
properly completed lien statement insulated from
liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity?

D.

Stephens v. Bank of Louisville, Franklin Circuit Court.
Dispute over Bank of Louisville loan to Dudley Webb
secured by pledge of bonds from Kentucky Central Life
Insurance Company.

E.

U.s. ~ancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,
u.S. Sup. ct., No. 93-714.
Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to determine whether "new value" exception to
absolute priority rule in bankruptcy survived the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. The absolute
priority rule disallows reorganizations plans in which
the debtor retains an interest in the reorganized entity
unless creditors consent to such plan or they receive
full repayment of debts owed to them.
The "new value"
exception allows for a debtor to retain some interest in
the property if new capital is infused as part of the
reorganization plan.

F.

Arkansas
92-4198.
to file
dormant
employee

v. Federated Department Stores, 6th Cir., No.
Appeal of bankruptcy decision allowing states
proof of claims alleging entitlement under
account and escheat laws to various uncashed
paychecks, dividend checks and accounts payable
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checks of Federal Department stores.
Bankruptcy Court
had held that the only proper claimants were the "rightful owners" and thus had disallowed state claims.

VIII.

Other

Decisions

Rendered.

A.

California Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of America, Cal.App. 1st
Dist., Nos. A055112 & A056217.
Action by California
Grocers Ass'n to declare invalid a bank's $3 fee charged
to account holders who deposit NSF checks. Trial court
held that bank's markup was 73.4% over cost and fair
profit, that this was too high, and that the bank was
required to return excess. On appeal, Court of Appeals
reversed because a $3 fee was not unconscionable and was
reasonable where it was toward the low end of similar
charges assessed by other California banks.

B.

ABA Standing Committee On Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Opinion No. 93-379.
1.

Reported to be the Committee's first ever opinion
on hourly billing.

2.

Lawyers may not bill more than one client for the
same hours spent.
Example - airplane trip to
meeting for Client A during which you do work for
Client B. Cannot bill both clients for same time.

3.

Lawyers cannot add a surcharge for expenditures on
behalf of a client.
Example - buying donuts for
meeting at a cost of $10.00 and billing $20.00.

4.

Lawyers must pass on any discounts for third party
services.

5=

In most circumstances, attorneys may recoup only
their actual costs for services performed in-house
such as photocopying, long-distance phone calls,
computer research and secretarial overtime.
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INTRODUCTION
For generations, many Americans have shared a common dream -- taking charge of
their lives, and through hard work and individual responsibility, making both a success of
themselves and a contribution to a better society. For many -- perhaps most -- people in our
capitalist society, access to credit is the key to achieving this dream. A person's ability to go
to school, to buy a house, to start a business, is often determined by whether credit is
available. Further, by enabling borrowers to become producers, credit can be the means
through which people in a capitalist system escape poverty. Put simply: Credit is often the
hammer that allows people to forge their future.
Credit is critical to the workings of the capitalist economy. And credit allows people
outside the mainstream of that economy to enter it. For all of these reasons, fair and equal
access to credit is in the public interest.

THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
The effort to reform the CRA has been a daily concern of mine for nearly a year.
The proposed rule is intended to fulfill a directive from President Clinton to breathe new life
and new purpose into the CRA. Fifteen years ago, Congress passed the CRA to ensure that
banks and thrifts served the financial needs of their entire communities, and, in particular, to
help economically empower persons of low and moderate income. For a number of reasons,
however, the CRA never achieved the full promise Congress had intended. Recognizing
this, President Clinton last July told the four federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies to
rethink the entire system of regulation through which we put the CRA into effect. In
December, we proposed our reform package.
We crafted the reform package to achieve the goals the President established for us.
The proposal is intended to set forth more objective, performance-based CRA assessment
factors that focus on lending, investment, and the provision of banking reviews.
In proposing these changes, we are eager for the public to comment on the package.
We are more than half of the way through the 90-day comment period, so there is plenty of
time left to do so. We want to hear if we have gotten things wrong, if we could do a better
job. But we also want to hear if we have gotten things right. We will need positive
reinforcement, as well as constructive criticism, when we craft the final package of reforms.
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As you know, from the very beginning, we have been dedicated to a painstaking
process of consultation and deliberation so the ftnal product would be right. The President
gave us a difficult mission. We knew from the start that we could not perform it in a
vacuum. Before we made a single decision on proposing reform, we turned to the public for
direction. We held a series of hearings throughout the country -- hearings in Washington,
Los Angeles, Albuquerque, San Antonio, Chicago, New York City, and Henderson, North
Carolina -- the most extensive series of hearings ever held on CRA. We heard more than
250 witnesses and recorded thousands of pages of testimony. We walked through South
Central Los Angeles and a minority neighborhood in New York to see with our own eyes
and to listen with our own ears to what should be done. We talked with representatives of
the Navajo Nation -- to bankers large and small -- to poor people in rural America. What
we saw and what we heard shaped the reform package we proposed.
Here in Washington, we heard the Reverend Charles Cummings, Junior, tell us:
"Low-income and minority communities here in D.C. are ravaged by a shortage of jobs and
of affordable housing. Bank redlining has contributed to the spiral of decline in our
communities. Abandoned houses, check-cashing outlets, vacant lots and boarded-up store
fronts are the symptoms of a credit famine in our neighborhoods. Community reinvestment
is not the only solution to our urban problems, but without bank participation, any plan to
tum ·things around is doomed to fail. "
At the same hearing, we heard a banker describe how the current system undercut
lenders that were dedicated to achieving meaningful community reinvestment.
"I would like to show you a photo," she said, "and believe it or not it's real, it's not
a staged picture. The printouts here make up a pile about 20 feet high and represent the
quarterly reports documenting just one aspect of our CRA efforts. Think of the people and
the resources that it takes to produce those reports. Would any of you sitting here today
wade through that stack of paper in order to make a decision? I don't think so. And our
managers, who must balance the need to make community development loans with all of
their other responsibilities, feel exactly the same way. "
In Arizona, Richard Mike, a small businessman who is a member of the Navajo
Nation, testified to his frustration in obtaining bank credit to expand his operations on the
reservation. He was told that a government agency guarantee would be required for such a
loan. Mr. Mike stated: "If the Navajo Nation and its people are to become financially
independent, it is essential that they have access to credit and banking services. I believe the
U.S. insured banks in Arizona have a long way to go to meet the requirements of the
Community Reinvestment Act when an established businessman from the Navajo Nation is
willing to offer a high equity loan, full personal guarantees, waiver of sovereign immunity by
the Navajo Nation, liens on all other assets and properties, and still be unable with a good
business record, a good location, and a good ftnancial position, to secure any loan without a
government guarantee. "
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I would also like to briefly mention what Angela Roberts told us. Ms. Roberts works
with the BEC New Community Shepherds Program, an organization in Brooklyn, New York,
that provides counseling to credit applicants.
Ms. Roberts said: "There is no great mystery about the reasons our cities and rural
areas are in trouble. Reinvestment is the key. Recycle our capital in part back into our
communities so that we can build housing and small businesses and we will see the end of
guns and drugs and an enormous decline to crime. Do that and we will see a new American
renaissance. "
If that sounds moving coming from me, imagine how moving it was listening to her.

We had a big job to do.
In setting the goals of reform last July, the President could not have been clearer.
The implementation of CRA, he said, "has focused too much on documentation and process,
and not enough on actual performance. Banks complain about excessive paperwork and
inconsistent implementation of the law. Community groups complain that their communities
remain unserved, and the CRA evaluations often fail to reflect actual community
reinvestment activities."
We were challenged to revise our regulatory approach to reduce unnecessary
compliance burdens and to reward improved performance by lenders.
We were challenged to recognize the diversity of lenders -- in size, in the product
lines lenders offer -- and the diversity of the markets that lenders serve. Our regulations
were to be made flexible to address that diversity.
J

We were challenged to strengthen enforcement of CRA, particularly in regard to
lenders with consistently poor performance.
In our reform package, we have tried to meet all of those goals.
To provide clearer guidance to lenders, the reform package would eliminates the 12
qualitative assessment factors that appear in current regulation. It would eliminate subjective
evaluations of minutes, meetings, marketing efforts, and so forth. The proposed rule would
make significant reductions in regulatory burden.
No longer would lenders have to prepare CRA statements, review these statements
annually and note these reviews in the minutes of the board of directors meetings, or justify
the basis for their community delineations, or ascertain community credit needs and explain
their methods of doing so.
Instead of public relations or documentation, the proposal would stress quantitative
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measures of performance: lending, service and investment performance -- the kind of
performance you can bank on. No longer would a lender get an "A" just for effort. Under
the proposed rule, not every institution would be subject to assessment in each measure of
performance. Rather, the regulator would consider the products and services an institution
offers in its normal course of business. Retail banks -- those that focus on individual
consumers -- would be evaluated primarily on their lending performance. Wholesale banks - those that focus on serving business -- and limited purpose banks that do not engage in
significant retail lending would be evaluated primarily on their investments. In this way, the
proposal would respond to the diversity of markets that banks serve. The proposal would
also respond to the range in bank size. It would provide for streamlined -- but rigorous -examinations of small institutions, while stressing that these institutions would still be
responsible for helping to meet the credit needs of their entire communities.
Under the proposal, the regulators would publish a list of the institutions that are
scheduled to undergo examinations and the public would be invited to submit comments on
the CRA performance of any institution on the list.
The proposed regulation would make clear that a lender found in substantial
noncompliance with the law would be subject to formal enforcement actions.
And we would work together to improve public access to data required by the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act and the proposed CRA regulations.
CONCLUSION
In the specific ways I have discussed the proposal would meet the goals the President
set -- and would address the concerns and needs that we heard expressed in our public
hearings.
Let there be no mistake, this is an aggressive proposal. It responds to long and loud
criticism of CRA: Bankers, community activists, academic experts, members of Congress
and others identifying flaws in our current CR.A~ approach and advocating change.
The proposal would restructure the system of evaluation under CRA -- because
virtually everyone agrees that a restructuring is needed. The proposal would judge lenders
by what they do, not by what they say -- because virtually everyone agrees that this shift in
emphasis is needed. Our proposal would allow differing lenders to meet their CRA
obligations in differing ways -- because virtually everyone agrees that this flexibility is
needed. This proposal is aggressive -- an aggressive effort to cure the problems in the
current system.
Is the proposal perfect? If it were, we would not have had to put it out for comment.
Public comment is -- and is intended to be -- a stress test that will reveal flaws and
imperfections.
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One problem has already come to light: We were not sufficiently clear in
communicating several elements of the proposal and as a result there has been some
confusion. I would like to address those elements briefly to clear up that confusion.
First of all, there is a misconceptipn that small banks are exempted from eRA. That
is certainly not the case. Under the proposal, small banks would be subject to a different
kind of examination from large banks -- one that takes into account the differences in the
way small banks operate and the size of their portfolios. But we would continue to examine
small banks and hold them accountable for meeting all their eRA obligations.

iJ

Second, some people have expressed concerns about the 60 percent loan-to-deposit
ratio that would be applied to small banks. They have assumed that, if a small bank did not
have 60 percent loans-to-deposits, it would automatically receive a less than satisfactory eRA
rating. That is not true.
The 60 percent ratio is a screen -- not a test -- one of five screens for small banks in
the proposal. If a bank is picked up by this screen, it simply means that examiners will take
a closer look at the bank's loans in its local community. There may be good reasons for the
lower ratio. For example, it is certainly understandable that a local recession might translate
into all banks in a community dropping below a 60 percent loan-to-deposit ratio. If that is
the case, the banks' lending may well be satisfactory.

!
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Incidentally, some people have asked the source of that 60 percent ratio. It is nothing
more than the median loan-to-deposit ratio for all banks with less than $250 million in assets.
That means that at least half of all small banks will pass this screen -- though passing this
screen will not alone ensure a satisfactory rating. I hope we will get comments on whether
that is the correct ratio or whether we should adopt a more appropriate standard.
A final point of confusion is the notion that the proposal would create a selfcontained, stand-alone compliance system -- that once the final rule is in place, nothing more
will need to be done. Not true. After the rule is in place we will need to write detailed
examination procedures and develop examiner training to ensure consistent application of
eRA requirements. We will need to address managerial and day-to-day problems. We will
need to establish procedures to govern a range of activities from approving eRA plans to
collecting and analyzing data. And we will.
Public comments are an essential part of rulemaking. Already, comments on our
propose eRA rule have highlighted points that need clarification or a second look. As we go
forward, the regulators will continue to listen to the voice of the public, and respond to it.
Thank you.

*****************************
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CRA REFORM PROPOSAL WOULD INCREASE LOW-INCOME LENDING
AND REDUCE REGULATORY BURDEN ON BANKS
A new regulatory proposal would encourage banks to provide credit, services, and
investments to America's low- and moderate-income communities, while reducing the
regulatory burden on financial institutions. The proposal carries out President Clinton's
initiative to reemphasize the original goal of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) by
making credit and financial opportunities available to all people in all communities
throughout urban and rural America.
Comptroller of the Currency Eugene A. Ludwig today released a copy of the new proposed
regulation for public comment. The other federal financial institution supervisory agencies
(the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of
Thrift Supervision) are expected to announce similar proposals later this week.
"The proposed reform package we are unveiling today follows the President's directive and
fulfills the promise of the law," said Comptroller Ludwig at a White House news conference.
"It would channel billions of dollars in new credit into America's distressed communities,
while at the same time reducing unnecessary burdens on the banks. .It would make the law
work."
The proposed CRA rule emphasizes performance over documentation. The following three
evaluation standards, or tests, would replace the current 12 assessment factors for CRA
review and rating:
•

The lending test would evaluate direct lending, and if the institution chose,
indirect lending through loan pools, lending consortia, subsidiaries, funded
non-chartered affiliates, or other lenders in which the institution had invested.

•

The service test would evaluate the provision of branches accessible to lowand mcxierate-income areas, and the provision of services that promote credit
~vailability .
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•

The investment test would take into account investment in organizations or
initiatives that foster community development, small and minority-owned
business development, or affordable housing lending.

Banks would not be required to meet all three tests to get satisfactory ratings. Retail banks
would be evaluated primarily on their lending, although their services and investment records
would also be assessed. Wholesale and limited purpose banks would be evaluated primarily
on their investment in organizations and initiatives that promote credit availability or funding
for affordable housing, community development arid small and minority-owned business
development.
Sm?JI independent banks with under $250 million in assets, or members of a holding
company structure with less than $250 million in assets, would be eligible for streamlined
examinations. Larger banks would be required to report additional data to regulators on the
geographic distribution of their small business and some consumer loans. New data
reporting requirements would not apply to small institutions.
A bank would also have the option of submitting to its regulator a CRA plan for approval
and then be evaluated under that plan. The plan would have to be publicly available and
have measurable goals. The regulator would consult with community groups to determine
whether the plan responded to community credit needs.
The Comptroller said that the proposed changes would improve the consistency of CRA
examination and enforcement. Banks would continue to make CRA ratings public, and the
public would have an opportunity to comment on CRA performance.
The proposed changes would be phased in, and banks could elect to be evaluated under either
the old or new standards until July 1995.
"This reform package reflects -- not just the thinking of regulators -- but the best thinking of
the American people," said Mr. Ludwig. "It represents the result -- not just of technical
analysis -- but of participatory government. It stands -- not as a policy imposed from above
-- but as a consensus -- and a compromise -- forged among those who will live with its
results. "
The proposed rule will be published in the Federal Register. The public will have 60 days to
comment on the proposal from the date of publication.
###
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For Release After White House Press Conference
December 8, 1993

COMl\fUNITY REINVESTMENT ACI' REFORM PROPOSAL
Major Issues
1.

What will be the underlying basis ror
rerorm proposal?

eRA

performance evaluations under the

J '

In assessing an institution's CRA performance, regulators recognize that the institution
is expected to help meet the credit needs of its entire community. In examinations,
however, particular attention will be paid to the institution's record of helping to meet
the credit needs in low- and moderate-income census tracts or rural areas (cnllectively

I

I

referred to as low- and moderate-income geographies in the regulation) and of low- and
moderate-income individuals. That record will be evaluated primarily using three
measures -- a lending test, a service test, and an investment test. An institution's fair
lending record will also be considered.

2.

Do banks and thrifts need to engage in aU three eRA activities - lending,
investment, and service -- in order to earn a satisractory or better eRA rating?
No. As a general rule, banks and thrifts will be evaluated on the basis of the product
lines offered to their customers in the normal course of business.
The lending test will apply to all retail banks and thrifts and will evaluate direct lending
by the institution itself and, if the institution elects, indirect lending through loan pools;
lending consortia; bank subsidiaries and funded non-charter afflliates; and other entities,
in whom the bank or thrift has made investments, that lend in low- and moderate-income
individuals or geographies.
The service test evaluates the accessibility of a retail bank's branches and the extent to
which the bank provides other facilities and services that enhance credit availability. The
service test does not require any bank to expand its branch network or to operate its
facilities at a loss. It considers non-traditional branches, including mini-branches in
grocery stores or branches operated in conjunction with other banks, other local
businesses, churches, or other non-profit organizations. Wholesale and Emited purpose
institutions will be evaluated on the extent to which they provide other services that
enhance credit availability.
The investment test evaluates banks on the amount of their investments that ben~fit lowand moderate-income geographies or persons. The investment test will constitute the
principal test in evaluating the eRA performance of wholesale and limited-purpose
institutions (instead of the lending test). The investment test will apply to provide extra
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credit to retail institutions that make qualified investments (community development
investments or investments that otherwise benefit low- and moderate-income
communities) .

3.

Will banks and thrifts still delineate communities for purposes or tbeir eRA
examinations?
The geographic area in which a retail bank or thrift does the bulk of its lending shall be
used to define an institution's service area. A bank or thrift may elect to delineate its
service area for its supervisory agency, but will not be evaluated on the method used to
delineate its service areas.
A rebuttable presumption shall exist that an institution's service area is acceptable if that
area:
•
•

is broad enough to include low- and moderate-income geographies; and
does not arbitrarily exclude low- and moderate-income geographies.

An institution could demonstrate that its service area is acceptable despite its failure to
satisfy these requirements by demonstrating, for example, that a service area that does
not include low- and moderate-income geographies does not do so because there are no
such geographies within any reasonable distance given the size and financial condition
of the institution.
Separate service areas shall exist where institutions serve substantial areas across state
lines or across MSA lines.

4.

How will a bank or tbrirt's perfonnance be evaluated under the lending test?
The guiding principle will be whether the bank or thrift is making loans in low- and
moderate- income geographies as well as to wealthier geographies. At its core, the
lending test requires a comparison of a lender's market share of loans made in low-and
moderate-income geographies with its market share of loans in other geographies in its
service area. A bank and thrift will also be evaluated on whether it makes loans
throughout its service area or the percentage of its lending in low- and moderate-income
geographies. Institutions will receive extra credit under the lending test for "secondlook" programs, creative or innovative underwriting, 10ans for which there is a
particularly pressing need, and loans to third parties, such as community development
organizations or intermediaries that make or facilitate lending in low- and moderateincome geographies.
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s.

Will the loans have to be made directly by the bank or thrift to be considered in the
institution's performance evaluation?
No. An institution may elect to count· under the lending test loans made through a loan
pool, a lending consortium, by subsidiaries or funded non-charter affiliates, or through
community development and affordable housing lenders, women-owned or minorityowned financial institutions, low-income credit unions, and others that lend directly to
the low- and moderate-income community.
Regulators will attribute to the institution its percentage (based on the level of the bank
or thrift's investment or participation) of each loan in a loan pool, a loan consortium,
subsidiary, funded non-charter affiliate or community lending organization in which the
bank has invested or participated. Lending by the consortia or the community
development lender need not be restricted to the institution's service area for it to be
considered as helping to meet the institution's eRA responsibilities.

6.

What criteria will be used to evaluate an institution's performance under the lending
test?

•

Outstanding
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's lending performance
outstanding if:

•

•

The institution's market share of reported loans in low- and moderateincome geographies in its service area significantly exceeds its market
share of reported loans in other geographies in its service area; and

•

Either it has made a significant amount of loans in the vast majority of the
low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area

•

Qr its loans to low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area
represent a substantial percentage of its loans in its service area.

High Satisfactory
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's lending performance
high satisfactory fashion if:
•

The institution's market share of reportable loans in low- and moderateincome geographies in its service area is at least roughly comparable to
its market share of reported loans in other geographies in its serviee area;
and

c - 11

•

•

~

•

Qr its loans to low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area
represent a very signijicafIJ percentage of its loans in its service area.

it has made a significant amount of loans in most of the low- and
moderate-income geographies in its service area

Low Satisfactory
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's performance low
satisfactory if:

•

•

The institution's market share of reportable loans in low- and moderateincome geographies in its service area is aI least roughly comparable to
its market share of reported loans in its entire service area; and

•

Either it has made a significant number of loans to many of the low- and
moderate-income geographies in its service area

•

Qr its loans to low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area
represent a signijicafIJ percentage of its loans in its service area.

Needs to Improve
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's performance needs
to improve if:

•

•

The institution's market share of reportable loans in low- and moderateincome geographies in its service area is less than, and not roughly
comparable to, its market share of reported loans in other geographies in
its service area; or

•

It has made a significant amount of reportable loans in only a few of the
low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area; and its
reportable loans to low- and moderate-income geographies in its service
area represent an insignificant percentage of its reportable loans to its
servIce area.

Substantial Noncompliance
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's performance as
substantial noncompliance if:
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7.

•

The institution's market share of reportable loans in low- and moderateincome geographies in its service area is signijicanr/y less than its market
share of reported loans in its entire service area; and

•

It made very few, if any, loans in the low-and moderate-income
geographies in its service area.

Will regulators take other information into account in assessing a bank or thrift's
performance under the lending test?
Yes. The regulator may increase a presumptive rating if the bank or thrift participates
in a program for giving second reviews to loan applications, particularly if done in
conjunction with community organizations who participate in the review or offer
applications from low- and moderate-income individuals that the bank will consider for
credit. Regulators may also increase a presumptive rating if the institution makes a
substantial amount of loans that require creative or innovative underwriting (while
maintaining a safe and sound quality) or loans for which there is a particular need.
Regulators will also consider favorably loans to third parties, such a community
development organizations and intermediaries that make or facilitate lending in low- and
moderate-income geographies.
In exceptional cases, the regulator may reduce a presumptive rating if it concludes that
the quantitative measures fail to reflect the institution's actual record of lending to lowand moderate-income individuals or geographies.

8.

What factors will be considered under the service test?
In order to keep the test relatively straightforward and to reflect the law's expectation
that banks and thrifts be encouraged to help meet the credit needs of their communities,
the service test for retail institutions will emphasize branch location in or readily
accessible to low- and moderate-income geographies in the institution's service area.
Provision of services such as accessible ATMs, credit counseling, low-cost check
cashing, "lifeline" checking accounts, and other programs will be considered favorably,
but generally will not be required. If a bank or thrift offers or provides support for these
or other services designed to facilitate access to the institution in low- and moderateincome communities, those programs will enhance the institution's service record.
Wholesale and limited purpose institutions will be evaluated on the extent to which they
provide other services that enhance credit availability.

9.

What criteria will be used to evaluate an institution's record under the Service test?
For retail banks, the service test addresses the availability of branches throughout an
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institution's service area. A rebuttable presumption will exist that an institution's serviye
record in each area is:

•

Outstanding
If a substalUial percentage of its branches are located in or readily accessible to
low- and moderate-income geographies.

•

High Satisfactory
If a very significant percentage of its branches are located in or readily accessible·
to low- and moderate-income geographies.

•

Low Satisfactory
If a significaIU percentage of its branches are located in or readily accessible to
low- and moderate-income geographies.

•

Needs to Improve
If an insignificaIU percentage of its branches are located in or readily accessible
to low- and moderate-income geographies.

•

Substantial Noncompliance
If very few, if any, of its branches are located in or readily accessible to low- and
moderate-income geographies.

No bank or thrift will be required to expand the size of its branching network or to
operate facilities at a loss. Appropriate consideration will be given to the limitations
faced by institutions with a small number of branches. As described above, services that
ihcrease credit availability will not be required but a strong record of offering or
providing support to other organizations that offer such services could improve an
institution's rating by up to one level.

10.

Will other factors be taken into account under the service test?
Yes. The regulator may adjust an institution's rating upward to reflect a strong record
of offering or supporting services that promote credit availability for low- and moderateincome geographies or individuals. These services include credit counseling, low-cost
check cashing, "lifeline" checking accounts, financial planning, home ownership
- counseling, loan packaging assisting small and minority businesses, partnerships with
community-based organizations to promote credit-related services, extensive provision
of ATMs that are particularly accessible and convenient to low- and moderate-income
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geographies or individuals, and similar programs.
A regulator may adjust a bank's record upward or downward to .refleCt more accurately
its branch service to low- or moderate-income geographies or individuals. In determining
the appropriateness and degree of any adjustment the regulator may consider the
institution's record of opening and closing branches. The regulator might also consider
whether branches in or readily-accessible to low- or moderate-income geographies serve
low- and moderate-income individuals. Regulators may also take into account significant
differences in the quantity, quality, or types of services offered to low- and moderateincome individuals or geographies and similar considerations.

i.I

A bank or thrift could rebut a presumption raised by the quantitative measures by
demonstrating that they present an inaccurate picture of its service of low- and moderateincome geographies and individuals because of peculiarities in the demographics of its
service area, limitations imposed by its financial condition, economic limitations on
branch operation, or similar considerations.

11.

Can wholesale banks and limited-purpose banks be evaluated under the service test?
Yes. Wholesale and limited-purpose banks would be evaluated based on the extent to
which they offer services to promote credit availability, or provide support to
organizations that offer such services, in low- and moderate-income geographies or to
low- and moderate-income individuals.

12.

What factors will be considered under the investment test?
Wholesale and limited-purpose institutions will normally be evaluated under the
investment test instead of the lending test. Retail institutions will be evaluated under the
investment test (in addition to the lending and service tests), but investment performance
cannot reduce their composite rating.
Institutions will be evaluated based on the amount of capital they have devoted to
qualified investments not already considered under the lending test.
Qualified
investments include investments: in support of local affordable housing and community,
economic, or small business development; in community development banks, community
development corporations, community development projects, small business investment
corporations (including minority small business investment corporations), and minorityand women-owned financial institutions and other community development financial
intermediaries; in consortia or other structures serving low- and moderate-income
individuals and areas; and in state and local government agency housing bonds or state
and local government revenue bonds specifically aimed at helping low- an~ moderateincome geographies and individuals.
The focus of the investment test is the ultimate impact of the bank or thrift's investment
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not the investment per se. Therefore, qualified investments will not be credited under
the test unless they have had a demonstrable impact, e.g. in providing loans to low- and
moderate-income individuals or areas or community development projects that benefit
low- and moderate-income individuals and geographies.

13.

What criteria will be used to assign ratings under the investment test?
There will be a rebuttable presumption that an institution's investment performance is:

•

Outstanding
If it has devoted a substantial amount of its capital to qualified investments;

•

High Satisfactory
If it has devoted a very significant amount of its capital to qualified investments;

•

Low Satisfactory
If it has devoted a significant amount of its capital to qualified investments;

•

Needs to Improve
If it has devoted an insignificanJ amount of its capital to qualified investments;

•

Substantial Noncompliance
If it has devoted very lillie,

if any, capital to qualified investments.

An institution's rating under the investment test may be increased up to one level if a
large portion of its investments support community development activities that are
particularly complex, innovative, or intensive for an institution its size. Examples of
such activities include helping establish a new entity to conduct community development
activities or providing significant service or assistance in support of a qualified.
investment. In addition, qualified investments outside an institution's service area will
be taken into consideration unless the institution has neglected investments that would
benefit its service area.

14.

How will an institution's composite rating be determined?
For retail institutions, the institution's rating under the lending test will form the basis
- for its composite rating, For wholesale or limited-purpose institutions, the-institution's
rating under the investment test will serve as the basis for the composite rating',
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I .
For retail institutions, the base rating may be increased by up to two levels (on the five
rating scale) in the case of outstanding investment performance or by one level in the
case of high satisfactory investment performance. This base rating may be increased by
one level in the case of. outstanding service and decreased by one level in the case of
substantial non-compliance in service.
The rating will then be converted to the statutorily-required four level rating system, with
high satisfactory and low satisfactory both scored as satisfactory. An institution that
would otherwise receive a needs to improve rating will be rated in substantial
noncompliance if the institution received no better than a needs to improve rating on both
of its last two examinations.
Finally, the rating will be adjusted, if necessary, to take into account illegal lending
discrimination by the institution to arrive at a final composite rating.

15.

How will a reason to believe that an institution has engaged in illegal lending
discrimination arrect its eRA rating?
There will be a rebuttable presumption that to receive a composite rating of satisfactory
or better a bank or thrift has not:

. I

16.

•

Engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination that it has not fully corrected;
and

•

Committed an isolated act of illegal discrimination of which it has knowledge that
it has not corrected fully or is not in the process of correcting fully.

Will extenuating circumstances (little or no loan demand, an innovative product that
did not or is taking time to catch on, etc.) be taken into account in assessing eRA
ratings?

Yes, in at least two ways. First, the tests are set up as rebuttable presumptions.
Therefore a bank or thrift will have the opportunity to rebut the presumptive case by
citing extraordinary circumstances. Second, the tests generally take into account any
special circumstances related to the financial condition of the institution, its product lines,
and the environment within which it is operating.

17.

Will banks and thrifts still be required to assess the credit needs of their
communities?
- To perform under the quantitative measures, banks and thrifts will have to offer products
for which there is a market. Therefore, they have an incentive to perform needs
. assessments in their communities. Under the proposal, however, the regulators will not
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evaluate the methods used by an institution to assess credit needs.

18.

Will a bank or thrift have the option to submit to its regulators a eRA plan Cor
approval and then be evaluated on its perfonnance under the plan?
Yes. As an alternative to being rated ex post under the lending, service and investment
tests, an institution may submit a eRA plan with measurable goals against which its
subsequent performance will be assessed.
A bank submitting a proposed plan for approval must provide notice to the community
that its plan is available for public comment. An institution's regulator will consider
public comments in the assessment of the institution's plan.
Regulators will not approve a plan unless it provides measurable goals against which
subsequent performance can be evaluated and the proposed performance is at least overall
satisfactory. If an institution fails to meet or exceed the preponderance of the measurable
goals set forth in the plan, its performance will be evaluated under the lending, service,
and investment tests.

19.

Will there be differences between the examinations or small banks and large banks?
Yes. Small institutions will be fully subject to the eRA, but examinations will be
streamlined and data reporting requirements will be less stringent than for larger
institutions. The streamlined exam procedures and reduced reporting requirements will
apply to:

20.

•

Independent banks and thrifts with total assets of $250 million or less, and

•

Members of a holding company, the total banking and thrift assets of which are
$250 million or less.

What will a small bank

eRA examination entail?

A small bank's overall eRA performance will be presumed to be satisfactory if the bank:
•

Has a reasonable loan-to-deposit ratio (a ratio of 60 percent, adjusted for seasonal
variation, is presumed to be reasonable) given its size, its financial condition, and
the credit needs in its service area;

•

Makes the majority of its loans in its service area;

•

Has a good loan mix <.i&.... makes, to the extent permitted by law and-regulation,
a variety of loans to customers across economic levels);
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•

Has no legitimate, bona-fide complaints from community members;

•

Has not engaged in a pattern or practice of illegal lending disCrimination that it
has not fully corrected; or committed isolated acts of discrimination, of which it
has knowledge, that it has not corrected fully or is not in the process of
correcting fully; and
.

•

For a bank or thrift already subject to reporting home mortgage lending data
under HMDA, has a reasonable geographic distribution of HMDA loans;

A small bank or thrift that meets each of the standards for a satisfactory rating· and
exceeds some or all of those standards may warrant consideration for an overall rating
of outstanding. In assessing whether a small bank's eRA record is outstanding, its
regulator will consider the extent to which the bank's loan to deposit ratio, its lending
to its service area, and its loan mix exceed the standards for a satisfactory rating. In
addition, at the option of the bank, the acc will evaluate:

21.

•

Its record of making qualified investments, especially those in its local service
area; and

•

Its record of providing branches, ATMs, and "'ther services that enhance credit
availability or in other ways serve the convenience and needs of low- and
moderate-income persons in its service area.

Can a small bank or thrift receive a less than satisfactory rating using the
streamlined procedures?
Yes. A small bank or thrift that fails to meet or exceed ill of the standards for a
satisfactory rating under the small bank examination is not presumed to be performing
in a less than satisfactory manner, however. Rather, for those institutions, the regulator
conducts a more extensive examination of the bank or thrift's loan to deposit record, its
record of lending to its local community, and its loan mix. The regulator will also
contact members of the community, particularly in response to complaints about the
bank, and review the findings of its most recent fair lending examination. In addition,
at the option of the bank or thrift, its regulator will assess:

22.

•

Its record of making qualified affordable housing and community development
investments, especially those in its local service area; and

•

Its record of providing branches, ATMs, and other services that enhance credit
availability or in other ways meet the convenience and needs of low- and
moderate-income persons in its service area.

How will enforcement of the CRA be strengthened?
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Under the revised regulation, an bank or thrift will have a continuing and affirmative
obligation to help meet the credit needs of their communities, including low- and
moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and sound operation.' Banks with a
composite rating of Substantial Noncompliance will be subject to formal enforcement
actions.

23.

What data disclosure will be required?
Every bank, except small banks electing the small bank assessment method, will collect
and maintain the data: on its government insured and other reportable loans (home
purchase, home improvement, small business, small farm, and consumer loans) as
follows:
•
•
•
•
•

number of written applications,
number of application denials,
number and amount of approvals,
number and amount of loans purchased, and
number and amount of indirect loans the bank elects to have evaluated using the
lending test.

All information is to be provided by census tract or block numbering area where the loan
is located. A bank choosing to be rated under the strategic plan assessment is not relieved
from its obligation to report these data.
Summary data will be available to the public and to the banks. The data will be used by
the regulators to apply the Lending Test.

24.

What smaU business loan data will be required?
Small business loan data will be collected, reported, and disclosed in a summary format
the following categories:
•
•
•
•

25.

small businesses with average annual gross receipts of less than $250,000;
those with average annual gross receipts of more than $250,000 and less than $1
million;
those with average annual gross receipts of more than $1 million and less than
$10 million; and
manufacturing businesses with average annual gross receipts of more than $10
million and less than 500 employees.

What home mortgage loan data will be required?
Home mortgage loan data will be collected, reported, and disclosed
format as follows:
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in

the summary

•
•
•
•

Home purchase (1-4 family);
Home improvement (1-4 family);
Refinancings (1-4 family);
Multifamily (home purchase, home improvement, refinancings)

Where possible, data collected on home mortgages will be con.sistent with data collected
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.

26.

Will all consumer loans be included in the consumer loan category?
No. Credit card loans and auto and other vehicular loans will not be included in the
consumer loan category.

27.

When will the data be collected?
The information will be collected beginning July 1, 1994, for the remaining six months
of 1994. The data for the six months will be submitted to a lending institution's primary
regulator by January 31, 1995.
Beginning January 1, 1995, on an annual basis, a summary of a bank or thrift's data
collected under this regulation will be submitted to its primary regulator by January 31,
of the following year. The summary data will be submitted in a format that will be
prescribed in an appendix to the regulation.

28.

Will banks and thriftS be required to report data on indirect loans?
A bank or a thrift will not be required to report indirect loans unless the institution elects
to have the indirect loans attributed for purposes of the lending test. If a bank or thrift
elects to report its indirect loans, it will report all attributable indirect loans outside lowor moderate-income geographies as well as loans inside such geograph.ies.

29.

Will

eRA

perfonnance evaluations continue to be made public?

Yes. The format will be revised to ensure that the evaluations include all data relevant
in reaching a conclusion about an institution's CRA performance.

30.

How will the regulators conduct examinations involving affiliated banks or thrifts?

Multiple Branches operating under a Single Chaner
•

The primary regulator will conduct complete lending and service tests in a sample
of the service areas in which a bank operates.
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•

Separate composite eRA ratings will be assigned to the institution's performance
in each of the service areas studied. A list of the service areas in which the
institution's eRA performance was examined, along with the rating assigned to
the institution's eRA record in the service area, shall be included in the
institution's public performance evaluation.

•

The overall bank rating will reflect the performance of the bank in the service
areas studied.

Affiliated Banks operating under Separate Charters

31.

•

eRA

ratings are presently assigned to each separately chartered bank in a
multibank holding company, but those ratings are in no way consolidated for
purposes of assigning a eRA rating to the holding company as a whole. An
interagency agreement will be developed on methodology to assign a corporate
or consolidated eRA rating on a statewide, regional, andlor national level to bank
holding companies with multiple affiliates.

•

As called for in the law, eRA ratings will be assigned and public performance
evaluations prepared for each separately chartered bank or thrift.

•

As with the case of multiple branches operating under a single bank charter, the
holding company rating will reflect the performance of the separately chartered
affiliated banks studied.

Will the Dew regulations go into effect immediately or will there be a transition
period?
There will be a transition period.
Data collection will begin July 1, 1994. Data collected from July 1, 1994 to year end
will be reported the regulators no later than January 31, 1995. Thereafter banks will
collect data on an annual basis and the data shall be reported no later than January 31 of
the following year.
From April 1, 1995 to July 1, 1995, an institution could elect to be evaluated under the
standards that were in place under the old system rather than the new standards. After
July 1, 1995, the new standards will be mandatory except that, until April 1, 1996, an
institution showing good cause could request evaluation under the old standards. An
institution could also elect to be evaluated under a strategic plan during the transition
period.
.
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.. Embargoed until 3 p.m. March 8, 1994

/

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON FAIR LENDING
POLICY STATEMENT
The Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending met on :March 8, 1994 to consider the
following Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending. The Department of Housing
and Urban Development, the Department of Justice, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Housing Finance Board, and
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight have adopted the Policy Statement.
Governor Lawrence Lindsey was authorized by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to adopt the Policy Statement on behalf of the Board of Governors and
has done so. The participants in the Task Force meeting representing the Board of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of the National Credit Union
Administration, and the Federal Trade Commission fully support the Policy Statement
and have agreed to seek approval of the Policy Statement from their agencies. The
Task Force participants have agreed that the Policy Statement may be made public
pending this process. Upon completion of this process, the Policy Statement will be
published in the Federal Register as a Notice. The Notice will state that the agencies
welcome comments about the application of the principles in the Policy Statement to
specific policies and practices. The agencies anticipate providing further clarification
and elaboration on the application of the principles in the future.
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Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending
The Depanment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUO"), the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board").
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the Federal Housing Finance Board
("FHFB"), the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the National Credit Union
Administration ("NCVA"), and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
("OFHEO") (collectively, "the Agencies") are concerned that some prospective home buyers
and other borrowers may be experiencing discriminatory treatment in their efforts to obtain
loans. The 1992 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study on lending discrimination,
Congressional hearings, and agency investigations have indicated that race is a factor in some
lending decisions. Discrimination in lending on the basis of race or other prohibited factors
is destructive, morally repugnant, and against the law. It prevents those who are
discriminated against from enjoying the benefits of access to credit. The Agencies will not
tolerate lending discrimination in any form. Further, fair lending is not inconsistent with
safe and sound operations. Lenders must continue to ensure that their lending practices are
consistent with safe and sound operating policies.
This policy statement applies to all lenders, including mortgage brokers, issuers of credit
cards, and any other person who extends credit of any type. The policy statement is being
issued for several reasons, including:
•

To provide guidance about what the agencies consider in detennining if lending
discrimination exists; and

•

To provide a foundation for future interpretations and rulemakings by the Agencies.

A number of federal statutes seek to promote fair lending. For example, the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") seeks to prevent lending discrimination and redlioing
by requiring public disclosure of certain information about mortgage loan applications. The
Community Reinvestment Act (" CRA ") seeks affmnatively to encourage institutions to help
to meet the credit needs of the entire community served by each institution covered by the
statute, and CRA ratings take into account lending discrimination by those institutions. The
Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in
the provision of goods and services, including credit services. This policy statement,
however, is based upon and addresses only the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair
Housing Act, the two statutes that specifically prohibit discrimination in lending.
This policy statement has been approved and adopted by the signatory Agencies listed above
as a statement of the Agencies' general position on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the
Fair Housing Act for purposes of administrative enforcement of those statutes. It is intended
to be consistent with those statutes and their implementing regulations and to provide
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-3guidance to lenders seeking to comply with them. It does not create or confer any
substantive or procedural rights on third parties which could be enforceable in any
administrative or civil proceeding.
This policy statement will discuss what constitutes lending discrimination under these statutes
and answer questions about how the Agencies will respond to lending discrimination and
what steps lenders might take to prevent discriminatory lending practices.

A.

lending Discrimination Statutes and Regulations

(1)

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") prohibits discrimination in any aspect of
a credit transaction. The ECOA is not limited to consumer loans. It applies to any
extension of credit, including extensions of credit to small businesses, corporations,
partnerships, and trusts.
The ECOA prohibits discrimination based on:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Race or color;
Religion;
National origin;
-Sex;
Marital status;
Age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);
The applicant's receipt of income derived from any public assistance program;
and
The applicant's exercise, in good faith, of any right under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act.

The Federal Reserve Board's Regulation B, found at 12 C.F.R. Part 202, implements
the ECOA. Regulation B describes lending acts and practices that are specifically
prohibited, pennitted, or required. Official interpretations of the regulation are found
in Supplement I to 12 C.F.R. Part 202.
(2)

--

The Fair Housing Act ("PH Act") prohibits discrimination in all aspects of residential
real-estate related transactions, including, but not limited to:
•
•
•
•

Making loans to buy, build, repair or improve a dwelling;
Purchasing real estate loans;
Selling, brokering or appraising residential real estate; and
The sale or rental of a dwelling.

The FH Act prohibits discrimination based on:
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-4•
•
•
•
•

•

Race or color;
National origin;
Religion;
Sex;
Familial status (defmed as children under the age of 18 living with a parent or
legal custodian, pregnant women and people securing custody of children under
18); and
Handicap.

HUD's regulations implementing the PH Act are found at 24 C.F.R. Part 100.
Because both the PH Act and the ECOA apply to mortgage lending, lenders may not
discriminate in mortgage lending based on any of the prohibited factors in either list.
Liability under these two statutes for discrimination on a prohibited basis is civil, not
criminal. However, there is criminal liability under the PH Act for various forms of
interference with efforts to enforce the FH Act, such as altering or withholding evidence or
forcefully intimidating persons seeking to exercise their rights under the PH Act.

What is prohibited. Under the ECOA, it is unlawful for a lender to discriminate on a
prohibited basis in any aspect of a credit transaction and, under both the ECOA and the PH
Act, it is unlawful for a lender to discriminate on a prohibited basis in a residential real
estate related transaction. Under one or both of these laws, a lender may not, because of a
prohibited factor:
•

Fail to provide information or services or provide different information or
services regarding any aspect of the lending process, including credit availability,
application procedures, or lending standards;

•

Discourage or selectively encourage applicants with respect to inquiries about or
applications for credit;

•

Refuse to extend credit or use different standards in determining whether to
extend credit;

•

Vary the terms of credit offered, inCluding the amount, interest rate, duration, or
type of loan;

•

Use different standards to evaluate collateral;

•

Treat a borrower differently in servicing a loan or invoking default remedies; or

•

Use different standards for pooling or packaging a loan in the secondary market.
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-5A lender may not express, orally or in writing, a preference based on prohibited factors or
indicate that it will treat applicants differently on a prohibited basis.
A lender may not discriminate on a prohibited basis because of the characteristics of:
•

A person associated with a credit applicant (for example, a co-applicant, spouse,
business partner, or live-in aide); or

•. The present or prospective occupants of the area where property to be fmanced is
located.
Finally, the FH Act requires lenders to make reasonable accommodations for a person with
disabilities when such accommodations are necessary to afford the person an equal
opportunity to apply for credit.

B.

Types of Lending Discrimination

The courts have recognized three methods of proof of lending discrimination under the
ECOA and the FH Act:
•

"Overt evidence of discrimination," when a lender blatantly discriminates on a
prohibited basis;

•

Evidence of "disparate treatment," when a lender treats applicants differently
based on one of the prohibited factors; and

•

Evidence of "disparate impact," when a lender applies a practice uniformly to all
applicants but the practice has a discriminatory effect on a prohibited basis and is
not justified by business necessity.

Overt Evidence of Discrimination. There is overt evidence of discrimination when a lender
openly discriminates on a prohibited basis.
Example. A lender offered a credit card with a limit of up to $750 for
·applicants aged 21-30 and $1500 for applicants over 30. This policy violated
the ECOA' s prohibition on discrimination based on age.
There is overt evidence of discrimination even when a lender expresses -- but does not act on
-- a discriminatory preference:

-..

Example. A lending officer told a customer, "We do not like to make home
mortgages to Native Americans, but the law says we cannot discririlinate and
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-6we have to comply with the law." This statement violated the PH Act's
prohibition on statements expressing a discriminatory preference.

Evidence of Disparate Treatment. Disparate treatment occurs when a lender treats a credit
applicant differently based on one of the prohibited bases. Disparate treatment ranges from
overt discrimination to more subtle disparities in treatment. It does not require any showing
that the treatment was motivated by prejudice or a conscious intention to discriminate against
a person beyond the difference in treatment itself. It is considered by courts to be intentional
discrimination because no credible, nondiscriminatory reason explains the difference in
treatment on a prohibited basis.
Example. Two minority loan applicants were told that it would take several hours
and require the payment of an application fee to determine whether they would qualify
for a home mortgage loan. In contrast, a loan officer took fmancial information
immediately from nonminority applicants and determined whether they qualified in
minutes, without a fee being paid. The lender's differential treatment violated both
the ECOA and the PH Act.
Example: Redlining refers to the illegal practice of refusing to make
residential loans or imposing more onerous terms on any loans made because
of the predominant race, national origin, etc., of the neighborhood in which
the property is located. Redlining violates both the PH Act and the ECOA.
Disparate treatment may more likely occur in the treatment of applicants who are neither
clearly well-qualified nor clearly unqualified. Discrimination may more readily affect
applicants in this middle group for- two reasons. First, because the applications are all "close
cases," there is more room and need for lender discretion. Second, whether or not an
applicant qualifies may depend on the level of assistance the lender provides the applicant in
preparing an application. The lender may, for example, propose solutions to problems on an
application, identify compensating factors, and provide encouragement to the applicant.
Lenders are under no obligation to provide such assistance, but to the extent that they do, the
assistance must be provided in a nondiscriminatory way.

Example: A nonminority couple applied for an automobile loan. The lender
found adverse information in the couple's credit report. The lender discussed
the credit report with them and determined that the adverse information, a
judgment against the couple, was incorrect since the judgment had been
vacated. The nonminority couple was granted their loan. A minority couple
applied for a similar loan with the same lender. Upon discovering adverse
information in the minority couple's credit report, the lender denied the loan
application on the basis of the adverse infomiation without giving the couple
an opportunity to discuss the report.
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loans. They were given applications for fIxed-rate loans only and were not
offered assistance in completing the loan applications. They completed the
applications on their own and ultimately failed to qualify. Two similarly
situated nonminority borrowers made an identical inquiry about mortgage loans
to the same lender. They were given information about both adjustable-rate
and fIxed-rate mortgages and were given assistance in preparing applications
that the lender could accept.
Both of these are examples of disparate treatment of similarly situated applicants, apparently
based on a prohibited factor, in the amount of assistance and information the lender
provided. The lender might also generally exercise its discretion to disfavor some
individuals or favor others in a manner that results in a pattern or practice of disparate
treatment that cannot be explained on grounds other than a prohibited basis.
If a lender has treated similar applicants differently on the basis of a prohibited factor, it
must provide an explanation for the difference in treatment. If the lender is unable to
provide a credible and legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, the agency may infer that
the lender discriminated.
If an agency determines that a lender's explanation for treating some applicants differently is
a pretext for discrimination, the agency may fmd that the lender discriminated,
notwithstanding the lender's explanation.

Example: A lender rejected a loan application made by a female applicant
with flaws in her credit report but accepted applications by male applicants
with similar flaws. The lender offered the explanation that the rejected
application had been processed by a new loan officer who was unfamiliar with
the bank's policy to work with applicants to correct credit report problems.
However, an investigation revealed that the same loan officer that processed
the rejected application had accepted applications from males with similar
credit problems after working with them to provide satisfactory explanations.
When a lender's treatment of two applicants is compared, even when there is an apparently
valid explanation for a particular difference in treatment, further investigation may establish
disparate treatment on a prohibited basis. For example, seemingly valid explanations for
denying loans to minority applicants may have been applied consistently to minority
applicants and inconsistently to nonrninority applicants; or "offsetting" or "compensatory"
factors cited as the reason for approving nonminority applicants may involve information that
the lender usually failed to consider for minority applicants but usually considered for
Roominorityapplicants.
A pattern or practice of disparate treatment on a prohibited basis may also be established
through a valid statistical analysis of detailed loan flle information, provided that the analysis
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underwriting decisions are the subject of a statistical analysis, detailed information must be
collected from individual loan flies about the applicants' qualifications for credit. Data
reported by lenders under the HMDA do not, standing alone, provide sufficient information
for such an analysis because they omit important variables, such as credit histories and debt
ratios. HMDA data are useful, though, for identifying lenders whose practices may warrant
investigation for compliance with fair lending laws. HMDA data may also be relevant, in
conjunction with other evidence, to determine whether a lender has discriminated.

Evidence of Disparate Impact. When a lender applies a policy or practice equally to credit
applicants, but the policy or practice has a disproportionate adverse impact on applicants
from a group protected against discrimination, the policy or practice is described as having a
"disparate impact." Policies and practices that are neutral on their face and that are applied
equally may still, on a prohibited basis, disproportionately and adversely affect a person's
access to credit.
Although the precise contours of the law on disparate impact as it applies to lending
discrimination are under development, it has been clearly established that proof of lending
discrimination using a disparate impact analysis encompasses several steps. The single fact
that a policy or practice creates a disparity on a prohibited basis is not alone proof of a
violation. Where the policy or practice is justified by "business necessity" and there is no
less discriminatory alternative, a violation of the PH Act or the ECOA will not exist.
The existence of a disparate impact may be established through review of how a particular
practice, policy or standard operates with respect to those who are affected by it. The
existence of disparate impact is not established by a mere assertion or general perception that
a policy or practice disproportionately excludes or injures people on a prohibited basis. The
existence of a disparate impact must be established by facts. Frequently this is done through
a quantitative or statistical analysis. Sometimes the operation of the practice is reviewed by
analyzing its effect on an applicant pool; sometimes it consists of an analysis of the practice's
effect on possible applicants, or on the population in general. Not every member of the
group must be adversely affected for the practice to have a disparate impact. Evidence of
discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish that a policy or practice adopted or
implemented by a lender that has a disparate impact is in violation of the PH Act or ECOA.
Identifying the existence of a disparate impact is only the fIrst step in proving lending
discrimination. When an Agency fmds that a lender's policy or practice has a disparate
impact, the next step is to seek to determine whether the policy or practice is justified by
!business necessity." The justification must be manifest and may not be hypothetical or
speculative. Factors that may be relevant to the justification could include cost and
profItability.
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by business necessity, it still may be found to be discriminatory if an alternative policy or
practice could serve the same purpose with less discriminatory effect.

Example: A lender's policy is not to extend loans for single family residences
for less than $60,000.00. This policy has been in effect for ten years. This
minimum loan amount policy is shown to disproportionately exclude potential
minority applicants from consideration because of their income levels or the
value of the houses in the areas in which they live. The lender will be
required to justify the "business necessity" for tbepolicy.
Example: In the past, lenders primarily considered net income in making
underwriting decisions. In recent years, the trend has been to consider gross
income. A lender decided to switch its practices to consider gross income
rather than net income. However, in calculating gross income, the lender did
not distinguish between taxable and nontaxable income even though nontaxable
income is of more value than the equivalent amount of taxable income. The
lender's policy may have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities and
the elderly, both of whom are more likely than the general applicant pool to
receive substantial nontaxable income. The lender's policy is likely to be
proven discriminatory. First, the lender is unlikely to be able to show that the
policy is compelled by business necessity. Second, even if the lender could
show business necessity, the lender could achieve the same purpose with less
discriminatory effect by "grossing up" nontaxable income (i.e., making it
equivalent to gross taxable income by using formulas related to the applicant's
tax bracket).
Lenders will not have to justify every requirement and practice every time that they face a
compliance examination. The Agencies recognize the relevance to credit decisions of factors
related to the adequacy of the borrower's income to carry the loan, the likely continuation of
that income, the adequacy of the collateral to secure the loan, the borrower's past
performance in paying obligations, the availability of funds to close, and the existence of
adequate reserves. While lenders should think critically about whether widespread, familiar
requirements and practices have an unjustifiable disparate impact, they should look especially
carefully at requirements that are more stringent than customary. Lenders should also stay
informed of developments in underwriting and portfolio performance evaluation so that they
are well positioned to consider all options by which their business objectives can be
achieved.

C.

Answers to Questions Often Asked by Financial Institutions and
the Public
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lending discrilnination. The Agencies have compiled this list of common questions, with
answers, in order to provide further guidance.

Ql:

Are disparities in application, approval, or denial rates revealed by Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") data sufficient to establish lending .
discrimination?

A:

HMDA data alone do not prove lending discrimination. The data do not contain
enough information on major credit-related factors, such as employment and credit
histories, to prove discrimination. Despite these limitations, the data can provide "red
flags" that there may be problems at particular institutions. Therefore, regulatory and
enforcement agencies may use HMDA data, along with other factors, to identify
institutions whose lending practices warrant more scrutiny. Furthermore, HMDA
data can be relevant, in conjunction with other data and information, to determine
whether a lender has discriminated.

Q2:

Does a lending institution that submits inaccurate HMDA data violate lending
discrimination laws?

A:

An inaccurate HMDA data submission constitutes a violation of the HMDA, the
Federal Reserve Board's Regulation C, and other applicable laws, and may subject
the lending institution to an enforcement action, which could include civil money
penalties, and, if the lender is a HVD-approved mortgagee, the' sanctions of the HUD
Mortgagee Review Board. An inaccurate HMDA data submission, however, is not in
itself a violation of the ECOA or the PH Act. However, a person who intentionally
submits incorrect or incomplete HMDA data in order to cover up a violation of the
PH Act may be subject, under the PH Act and federal crLminal statutes, to a fme or
prison term or both. In addition, a failure to ensure accurate HMDA data may be
considered as a relevant fact during a PH Act investigation or an excirnination of the
institution's lending activities.

Q3:

Does a second review program only for loan applicants who are members of a
protected class violate laws prohibiting discrimination in lending?

A:

Such programs are permissible if they do no more than ensure that lending standards
are applied fairly and uniformly to all applicants. For example, it is permissible to
review the proposed denial of applicants who are members of a protected class by
comparing their applications to the approved applications of similarly qualified
individuals who are not members of a protected class to determine-if the applications
were evaluated consistently. It is impermissible, however, to review the applications
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of members of a protected class in order to apply standards to those applications
different from the standards used to evaluate other applications for the same credit
program or to apply the same standards in a different manner, unless such actions are
otherwise permitted by law, as described in Question 4.
Other types of second review programs are also permissible. For example, lenders
could review the proposed denial of all applicants within a certain income range.
Lenders also could review a sampling of all applications proposed for denial, or even
review all such applications.

Q4:

:May a lender apply different lending standards to applicants who are members of
a protected class in order to increase lending to that sector of its community?

A:

Generally, a lender that applies different lending standards or offers different levels of
assistance on a prohibited basis, regardless of its motivation, would be violating both
the PH Act and the ECOA. There are exceptions to the general rule; thus, applying
different lending standards or offering different levels of assistance to applicants who
are members of a protected class is permissible in some circumstances. For example,
the PH Act requires lenders to provide reasonable accommodation to people with
disabilities. In addition, providing different treatment to applicants to address past
discrimination would be permissible if done in response to a court order or otherwise
in accord with applicable legal precedent. However, the law in this area is complex
and developing. Before implementing programs of this sort, a lender should seek
legal advice.
Of course, affmnative advertising and marketing efforts that do not involve
application of different lending standards are permissible under both the ECOA and
the PH Act. For example, special outreach to a minority community would be
permissible.

Q5:

Should a lender engage in self-testing?

A:

Principles of sound lending dictate that adequate policies and procedures be in place
to ensure safe and sound lending practices and compliance with applicable laws and
regulations, and that a lender adopt appropriate audit and control systems to determine
whether the institution's policies and procedures are functioning adequately. This is
as true in the area of fair lending as in other operations. Lenders should employ
reliable measures for auditing fair lending compliance. A well-designed and
implemented program of self-testing could be valuable part of this process. Lenders
should be aware, however, that data documenting lending discrimination discovered in
a self-test generally will not be shielded from disclosure.

a
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Self-testing and corrective actions do not expunge or extinguish legal liability for the
violations of law, insulate a lender from private suits, or eliminate the primary
regulatory agency's obligation to make the referrals required by law. However, they
will be considered as a substantial mitigating factor by the primary regulatory
agencies when contemplating possible enforcement actions. In addition, HUD and
DO] will consider as a substantial mitigating factor an institution's self-identification
and self-correction when determining whether they will seek additional penalties or
other relief under the PH Act and the ECOA. The Agencies strongly encourage selftesting and will consider further steps that might be taken to provide greater
incentives for institutions to undertake self-assessment and self-correction.

Q6:

What should a lender do if self-testing evidences lending discrimination?

A:

If a lender discovers discriminatory practices, it should make all reasonable efforts to
determine the full extent of the discrimination and its cause, e.g., determine whether
the practices were grounded in defective policies, poor implementation or control of
those policies, or isolated to a particular area of the lender's operations. The lender
should take all appropriate corrective actions to address the discrimination, including,
but not limited to:
•

Identifying customers whose applications may have been inappropriately
processed, offering to extend credit if they were improperly denied; and
compensating them for any damages, both out-of-pocket and compensatory; and
notifying them of their legal rights;

•

Correcting any institutional policies or procedures that may have contributed to
the discrimination;

•

Identifying, and then training and/or disciplining, the employees involved;

•

Considering the need for community outreach programs and/or changes in
marketing strategy or loan products to better serve minority segments of the
lender's market; and

•

Improving audit and oversight systems in order to ensure there is no recurrence
of the discrimination.

An institution is not required to report to the Agencies a lending discrimination
problem it has discovered. However, a lender that reports its discovery can ensure
that the corrective actions it develops are appropriate and complete and thereby
minimize the damages to which it will be subject.
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Q7:

Will a lender be held responsible for discriminatory lending engag'ed in by a
single loan officer where the lending institution has good policies and procedures
in place, is otherwise in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations
and neither knows or reasonably could have known that the officer was engaged
in illegal discriminatory conduct?

A:

Fair lending violations can occur even in the most well-run lending institutions that
have good policies in place to ensure compliance with fair lending laws and
regulations. Of course, the chances that such violations will occur can be greatly
reduced by backing up those policies with proper employee training and supervision
and subjecting the lending process to proven systems of oversight and review. Selftesting can further reduce the likelihood that violations may occur. Notwithstanding
these efforts, a single loan officer might still improperly apply policies or, worse yet,
deliberately circumvent them and manage to conceal or disguise the true nature of his
or her practices for a time. It may be particularly difficult to discover this type of
behavior when it occurs in the pre-application process.
In any case where discriminatory lending by a lending institution is identified, the
lender will be expected to identify and fairly compensate victims of discriminatory
conduct just as it would be expected to compensate a customer if an employee's
conduct resulted in physical injury to the customer. In addition, such a violation
might constitute a "pattern or practice" that must be referred to DOJ or a violation
that must be referred to HUD.
As in other cases of discriminatory behavior, where a lender takes se1f-initiated
corrective actions, such actions will be considered as a substantial mitigating factor by
the Agencies in determining the nature of any enforcement action and what penalties
or' other relief would be appropriate.

Q8:

H a federal fmancial institutions regulatory agency has "reason to believe" that a
lender has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of the
ECOA, the ECOA requires the agency to refer the matter to OOJ. What
constitutes a "reason to believe"?

A:

A federal financial institutions regulatory agency has reason to believe that an ECOA
violation has occurred when a reasonable person would conclude from an examination
of all credible information available that discrimination has occurred. This
determination requires weighing the available evidence and applicable law and
determining whether an apparent violation has occurred. Information supporting a
reason to believe finding may include loan fIles and other documents, credible
observations by persons with direct knowledge, statistical analysis, and the fmancial
institution's response to the preliminary examination fmdings.
--

C - 35

- 14 -

Reason to believe is more than an unfounded suspicion. While the evidence of
discrimination need not be defInitive and need not include evidence of overt
discrimination, it should be developed to the point that a reasonable person would
conclude that a violation exists.

Q9:

If a federal rmandal institutions regulatory agency has reason to believe that a
lender has engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination in violation of the

ECOA, the agency will refer the matter to DOJ. What constitutes a "pattern or
practice" of lending discrimination?
A:

Determinations by federal financial institutions regulatory agencies regarding a pattern
or practice of lending discrimination must be based on an analysis of the facts in a
given case. Isolated, unrelated or accidental occurrences will not constitute a pattern
or practice. However, repeated, intentional, regular, usual, deliberate, or
institutionalized practices will almost always constitute a pattern or practice. The
totality of the circumstances must be considered when assessing whether a pattern or
practice is present. Considerations include, but are not limited to:
•

Whether the conduct appears to be grounded in a written or unwritten policy or
established practice that is discriminatory in purpose or effect;

•

Whether there is evidence of similar conduct by a fmancial institution toward
more than one applicant. Note, however, that this is not a mathematical process,
e.g., "more than one" does not necessarily constitute a pattern or practice;

•

Whether the conduct has some common source or cause within the fmancial
institution's control;

•

The relationship of the instances of conduct to one another (e.g., whether they all
occurred in the same area of the fmancial institution's operations); and

•

The relationship of the number of instances of conduct to the fmancial
institution's total lending activity. Note, however, that, depending on the
circumstances, violations that involve only a small percentage of an institution'S
total lending activity could constitute a pattern or practice.

Depending on the egregiousness of the facts and circumstances involved, singly or in
combination, these factors could provide evidence of a pattern or practice.
QI0: How does the employment of few minorities and individuals from other protected
classes in lending positions -- e.g., Account Executive, Underwriter, Loan
Counselor, Loan Processor, Staff Appraiser, Assistant Branch ~nager and
Branch Manager - affect compliance with lending discrimination laws?
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The employment of few minorities and others in protected classes, in itself, is not a
violation of the PH Act or the ECOA. However, employment of few members of
protected classes in lending positions can contribute to a climate in which lending
discrimination could occur by affecting the delivery of services.
Therefore, lenders might consider the following steps, as appropriate to their .
institutions:
•

Advertising lending job openings in local minority-oriented publications;

•

Notifying predominantly minority organizations of such openings;

•

Seeking employment referrals from current minority employees, minority real
estate boards and local historically minority colleges and other institutions that
serve minority groups in the community; and

•

Seeking qualified independent fee appraisers from local minority appraisal
organizations.

Similar outreach steps could be considered to recruit women, persons with disabilities,
and other persons protected by the FH Act and the ECOA.

Qll: What is the role of the guidelines of secondary market purchasers and private
and governmental loan insurers in determining whether primary lenders practice
lending discrimination?

A:

-...

Many lenders make mortgage loans only when they can be sold on the secondary
market, or they may place some loans in their own portfolios and sell others on the
secondary market. The principal secondary market purchasers, Federal National
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
("Freddie Mac"), publish underwriting guidelines to inform primary lenders of the
conditions under which they will buy loans. For example, ability to repay the loan is
measured by suggested ratios of monthly housing expense to income (28 %) and toW
obligations to income (36%). However, these guidelines allow considerable discretion
on the part of the primary lender. In addition, the secondary market guidelines have
in some cases been made more flexible, for example, with respect to factors such as
stability of income (rather than stability of employment) and use of nontraditional
ways of establishing good credit and ability to pay (e.g., use of past rent and utility
payment records). Lenders should ensure that their loan processors and underwriters
are aware of the provisions of the secondary market guidelines that provide various
alternative and flexible means by which applicants may demonstrate their ability and
willingness to repay their loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac nof iiJfrequently
purchase mortgages exceeding the suggested ratios, and their guidelines contain
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detailed discussions of the compensating factors that can justify higher. ratios (and
which. must be documented by the primary lender).
A lender who rejects an application from an applicant who is a member of a protected
class and who has ratios above those of the guideliries and approves an application
from another applicant with similar ratios should be prepared to show that the reason
for the rejection was based on factors that are applied consistently without regard to
any of the prohibited factors.
These same principles apply equally to the guidelines of private and governmental
loan insurers.

QU: What criteria will be employed in taking enforcement actions or seeking remedial
measures when lending discrimination is discovered?

A:

Enforcement sanctions and remedial measures for lending discrimination violations
vary depending on whether such sanctions are sought by the appropriate federal
fmancial institutions regulatory agencies, DOJ, HUD or other federal agencies
charged with enforcing either the ECOA or the FH Act. The following discussion
sets out the criteria typically employed by the federal banking agencies (Le., OCC,
OTS, the Board and FDIC), NCUA, DOJ, HUD, OFHEO, FHFB and FrC in
determining the nature and severity of sanctions that may be used to address
discriminatory lending practices. As discussed in Questions 8 and 9, above, in certain
situations, the primary regulatory agencies will also refer enforcement matters to
HUD or DOJ.
The federal banking agencies:

The federal banking agencies are authorized to use the full range of their enforcement
authority under 12 U. S. C. § 1818 to address discriminatory lending practices. This
includes the authority to seek:
•

•

Eriforcement actions that may require both prospective and retrospective relief;
. and
Civil money penalties ("CMPs") in varying amounts against the fmancial
institution or any institution-affiliated party ("lAP") within the meaning of 12
U.S.C. § 1813(u), depending, among other things, on the nature of the violation
and the degree of culpability.

In addition to the above actions, the federal banking agencies may also take removal
and prohibition actions against any IAP where the statutory require_ments for such
actions are met.
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any potential enforcement action after giving full consideration to a variety of factors.
In making these determinations, the banking agencies will take into account:
•

The number and duration of violations identified;

•

The nature of the evidence of discrimination (i.e., overt discrimination, disparate
treatment or disparate impact);

•

Whether the discrimination was limited to a particular office or unit of the
fmancial institution or was more pervasive in nature;

•

The presence and effectiveness of any anti-discrimination policies;

•

Any history of discriminatory conduct; and

•

Any corrective measures implemented or proposed by the fmancial institution.

The severity of the federal banking agencies' enforcement response will depend on the
egregiousness of the fmancial institution's conduct. Voluntary identification and
correction of violations disclosed through a self-testing program will be a substantial
mitigating factor in considering whether to inltiate an enforcement action.
In addition, the federal banking agencies may consider whether an institution has
provided victims of discrimination with all the relief available to them under
applicable civil rights laws.

The federal banking agencies may seek both prospective and retrospective relief for
fair lending violations.
Prospective relief may include requiring the fmancial institution to:

-

....

•

Adopt corrective policies and procedures and correct any fmancial institution
policies or procedures that may have contributed to the discrimination;

•

Train fmancial institution employees involved;

•

Establish community outreach programs and changing marketing strategy or loan
products to better serve all sectors of the fmancial institution's service area;

•

Improve internal audit controls and oversight systems in order to ensure there is
no recurrence of discrimination; or

•

Monitor compliance and provide periodic reports to the primary federal regulator.
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•

Identifying customers who may have been subject to discrimination and offering
to extend credit if the customers were improperly denied;

•

Requiring the fmancial institution to make payments to injured parties:
• Restitution: This may include any out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result
of the violation to make the vIctim of discrimination whole, such as: fees or
expenses in connection with the application; the difference between any greater
fees or expenses of another loan granted· elsewhere after denial by the
discriminating lender; and, when loans were granted on disparate terms,
appropriate modification of those terms and refunds of any greater amounts
paid.
• Other AffIrmative Action As Awropriate to Correct Conditions Resulting
From Discrimination: The federal banking agencies also have the authority to
require a fmancial institution to take affIrmative action to correct or remedy
any conditions resulting from any violation or practice. The banking agencies
will determine whether such affIrmative action is appropriate in a given case
and, if such action is appropriate, the type of remedy to order.

•

Requiring the fmancial institution to pay CMPs:
The banking agencies have the authority to assess CMPs against fmancial
institutions or individuals for violating fair lending laws or regulations. Each
agency has the authority to assess CMPs of up to $5,000 per day for any
violation of law, rule or regulation. Penalties of up to $25,000 per day are also
permitted, but only if the violations represent a pattern of misconduct, cause
more than minimal loss to the fmancial institution, or result in gain or benefIt to
the party involved. CMPs are paid to the U.S. Treasury and therefore do not
compensate victims of discrimination.

National Credit Union Administration:
For federally insured credit unions, NCUA will employ criteria comparable to those
of the other federal fmancial institutions regulatory agencies, pursuant to its authority
under 12 U.S.C. § 1786.
The Department of Justice:
The Department of Justice is authorized to use the full range of it~ enforcement
authority under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et ~., and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et~. DOJ has authority to commence pattern
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through referrals from the federal fmancial institutions regulatory agencies, and to me
lawsuits in federal court where there is reasonable cause to believe that such
violations have occurred. DOl is also authorized under the FH Act to bring suit
based on individual complaints flIed with HUD where one of the parties to the
complaint elects to have the case heard in federal court.
The relief sought by DOJ in lending discrimination lawsuits may include:

•

An injunction which may require both prospective and retrospective relief; and,

•

In enforcement actions under the FH Act, CMPs not to exceed $50,000 per
defendant for a frrst violation and $100,000 for any subsequent violation.

Prospective injunctive relief may include:
•

A permanent injunction to insure against a recurrence of the unlawful practices;

•

AffIrmative measures to correct past discriminatory policies, procedures, or
practices, so long as consistent with safety and soundness, such as:
• Expansion of the lender's service areas to include previously excluded minority
neighborhoods;
• Opening branches or other credit facilities in under-served minority
neighborhoods;
• Targeted sales calls on real estate agents and builders active in minority
neighborhoods;
• Advertising through minority-oriented media;
• Self-testing;
• Employee training;
• Changes to commission structures which tend to discourage lending in
minority and low-income neighborhoods; and
• Changes in loan processing and underwriting procedures (including second
reviews of denied applications) to ensure equal treatment without regard to
prohibited factors; and
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Record keeping and reporting requirements to monitor compliance with remedial
obligations.

Retrospective injunctive relief may include relief for victims of past discrimination,
actual and punitive damages, and offers or adjustments of credit or other forms of
loan commitments.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development:
The Department of Housing and Urban Development is fully authorized to investigate
complaints alleging discrimination in lending in violation of the FH Act and has the
authority to initiate complaints and investigations even when an individual complaint
has not been received. HUD issues determinations on whether or not reasonable
cause exists to believe that the FH Act has been violated. HUD also may authorize
actions for temporary and preliminary injunctions to be brought by DO] and has
authority to issue enforceable subpoenas for information related to investigations.
Following issuance of a determination of reasonable cause under the FH Act, HUD
enforces the FH Act administratively unless one of the parties elects to have the case
heard in federal court in a case brought by DO].
Relief under the FH Act that may be awarded by an administrative law judge (" All ")
after a hearing, or by the Secretary on review of a decision by an All, includes:
•

Injunctive or other appropriate relief, including a variety of actions designed to
correct discriminatory practices, such as changes in loan processes or procedures,
modifications of loan service areas or branching actions, approval of previously
denied loans to aggrieved persons, additional record-keeping and reporting on
future activities or other aJ"fmnative relief;

•

Actual damages suffered by persons who are aggrieved by any violation of the
FH Act, including damages for mental distress and out-of-pocket losses
attributable to a violation; and

•

Civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each initial violation and up to $25,000 and
$50,000 for successive violations within specific time frames.

HUD also is authorized to direct Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to undertake various
remedial actions, including suspension, probation, reprimand, or settlement, against
lenders found to have engaged in discriminatory lending practices in violation of the
FH Act or the ECOA.

The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight:
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enforcement authority under 12 U.S.C. §§ 4631 and 4636, including cease and desist
orders and CMPs for violations by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of the fair housing
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of HUD pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 4545.

The Federal Housing Finance Board:
While the Federal Housing Finance Board does not have enforcement authority under
the ECOA or the PH Act, in reviewing the members of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System for community support, it may restrict access to long-tenn System advances to
any member that within two years prior to the due date of submission of a
Community Support Statement, had a fmal administrative or judicial ruling against it
based on violations of those statutes (or any similar state or local law prohibiting
discrimination in lending). System members in this situation are asked to submit to
the Finance Board an explanation of steps taken to remedy the violation or prevent a
recurrence.

The Federal Trade Commission:
The Federal Trade Commission enforces the requirements of the ECOA and
Regulation B for all lenders subject to the ECOA, except where enforcement is
specifically committed to another agency. The FTC may exercise all of its functions
and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") to enforce the
ECOA, and a violation of any requirement under the ECOA is deemed to be a
violation of a requirement under the FTC Act. The FTC .has the power to enforce
Regulation B in the same manner as if a violation of Regulation B were a violation of
an FTC trade regulation rule.
This means that the FTC has the power to investigate lenders suspected of lending
. discrimination a.'1d to use compulsory process in doing so. The Commission, through
DOJ or on its own behalf where the Justice Department declines to act, may me suit
in federal court against suspected violators and seek relief including:
•

Injunctions against the violative practice;

•

Civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation; and

•

Redress to affected consumers.

In addition, the Commission routinely imposes recordkeeping and reporting
requirements to monitor compliance.
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- 22 Q13: Will a rmancial institution be subjected to multiple actions by DO] or HUD and
its primary regulator if discriminatory practices are discovered?
A:

In all cases where referrals to other agencies are made, the appropriate federal
fmancial institutions regulatory agency will engage in ongoing consultations with DO]
or HUD regarding coordination of each agency's actions. The Agencies will
coordinate their enforcement actions and make every effort to eliminate unnecessarily
duplicative actions. Where both a federal fmancial institutions regulatory agency and
either DO] or HUD are contemplating taking actions under their own respective
authorities, the Agencies will seek to coordinate their actions to ensure that each
agency's action is consistent and complementary. The fmancial institutions regulatory
agencies also will discuss referrals on a case-by-case basis with DO] or HUD to
determine whether multiple actions are necessary and appropriate.
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I.

Introduction
For decades, Kentucky commercial banks were limited
in their geographic scope.

They were prohibited from

establishing branches outside their home county and from
forming multi-bank holding companies.

In the meantime,

market forces were pressuring commercial banks to expand
across county lines.

Over the last decade a number of

changes have taken place that enable Kentucky commercial
banking organizations to cross county and even state
lines.

While commercial banking organizations are still

limited in many respects in their ability to establish or
acquire banking offices outside their home county, they
now have a remarkable amount of flexibility in doing so.
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II.

What Changes Have Occurred?
A.

Multi-bank holding companies (KRS §§287. 900 through 910)
1.

Enacted in 1984.

2.

Permits a bank holding company to acquire control
of banks that have been in existence at least five
years.

3.

Permits

out

of

state

bank

holding

companies

to

acquire Kentucky banks on a reciprocal basis.
4.

Contains a different definition for "bank" than the
rest of KRS Chapter 287: "any institution organized
under this

chapter,

the banking laws of another

state, or the National Bank Act, as amended, to do
a banking business."
a.

General definitions for Chapter 287:
(1)

"

'Bank'

means any bank which is now or

may hereafter be organized under the laws
of this state .... "
(2)

" 'National
association'

bank'
means

or
a

'national
bank

bank

created

congress and organized pursuant

by

to the

provisions of federal law.
B.

Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989
1.

Authorizes bank holding companies to acquire thrift
institutions.

2.

Permits the merger of thrifts and commercial banks
(Oakar transaction) .

D-2

3.

Permits the conversion of thrifts into commercial
banks (Sasser transaction) .

C.

Commissioner of Financial Institutions Finding 92-3
1.

Issued in 1993.

2.

Permits

a

state

chartered

commercial

bank

to

relocate across county lines (up to 30 miles) and
retain

its

branch

offices

(but

not

its

main

office) .
3.

Finding

is

based

on

previous

ruling

by

the

Comptroller of the Currency that national banks may
do the same (12 U.S.C. §30(b).
4.

Presently

subject

of

litigation brought

by

the

Kentucky Bankers Association.
D.

Branch by Acquisition (KRS §287.915)
1.

Enacted in 1990.

2.

Permits a

bank holding company controlling more

than one bank in Kentucky to "combine" two or more
of them into a single bank and to retain branching
rights in each county where any of the combining
banks could branch.
a.

Each combining bank must then be in existence
for at least five years.

b.

"Combine"

means

either

a

merger

or

the

acquisition of all or substantially all of the
assets of a bank.
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c.

"Control" means direct or indirect ownership
of at least 80% of the issued and outstanding
voting securities of the bank.

III.

E~pansion

A.

Opportunities

Commercial bank acquisitions
1.

Straight acquisition
a.

Bank holding company may acquire a bank that
is at least five years old.

2.

Stake-out
a.

Bank

holding

company

may

obtain

non-

controlling interest in a younger bank and may
hold an option to acquire control exercisable
once the bank becomes five years old.
3.

Guppy Swallowing Whale
a.

A bank holding company controlling a bank less
than five years old may nonetheless acquire
control of banks five or more years old -even if the acquiring holding company is much
smaller than the target.

b.

As "loophole" to five year rule, this approach
has limitations.
(1)

May only be done every five years.

(2)

Requires shareholder vote of "target".

(3)

Requires

securities

law compliance

"target" shareholders.
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for

B.

Thrift Acquisitions
1.

No age limit for first thrift acquired (thrift is
not a bank for purposes of KRS §287.900).
a.

KRS §289.900 imposes five year rule on second
and subsequent thrifts.
(1)

Younger

thrifts

merging

them

may

into

be

thrift

acquired

by

subsidiaries

rather than holding them separately.
b.

If bank holding company controls no thrifts,
it may establish a de novo thrift.

c.

Federally

chartered

thrifts

may

branch

statewide (actually, nationwide).
d.

Bank

holding

companies

may

acquire

mutual

thrifts (Ilmerger conversions") .
(1)

These transactions are very attractive to
acquirors but are presently subject to a
moratorium imposed by the OTS.

C.

Opportunities to Establish Out-of-County Commercial Bank
Off"ices.
1.

Combination of commonly controlled commercial banks
under KRS §287.915.
a.

May not

include banks less

than five years

old.
2.

Convert a thrift into a commercial bank.
a.

Sasser transaction - - FDIC insurance continues
in SAIF.

D-5

b.

Federal savings banks are national banks under
KRS §287.010.

c.

KRS §287.170 et seq. provides for conversion
of national bank to state commercial bank.

d.

Once

converted,

continues

(i.e.,

state

bank's

existence

existence does not begin at

conversion) .
3.

Combine Thrifts into Bank.
a.

Oakar

transaction

FDIC

insurance

split

between BIF and SAIF.
b.

Federal savings banks are national banks for
purposes of KRS §287.915o

co
4.

Post combination branching rights?

Relocate Commercial Bank Office.
a.

Bare charter relocation.
(1)

Involves

relocation

of

main

office

of

bank to new county leaving no offices of
that bank in old county.
(2)

Has been done

in Kentucky a

number of

times without challenge.
(3)

Typically

done

when

holding

company

controls more than one bank in a single
county -- one bank purchases and assumes
substantially all
assets

and

of

the

liabilities

other

bank's

and establishes

the other bank's offices as its branch

1) - 6

offices;

the

other

bank

is

then

relocated.
(4)

Bare

charter

through

KRS

§287.915

combination?
(5)

Bare charter through P

&

A by de novo

thrift?
b.

Relocation leaving behind branches.
(1)

Supported by Commissioner and Comptroller
(so long as old main office not to be
retained as a branch) .

(2)
IV.

Not feasible until l£tigation resolved.

Conclusion
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FINDING OF PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES, SERVICES, OR PRODUCTS
92-3
MAIN OFFICE RELOCATIONS

The Commissioner of Financial Institutions issues this Finding of Permissible Activities,
Services, or Products pursuant to KRS 287.020(3). Competitive inequality exists between state
banks and national banks as a result of the difference in policies and rules governing relocation
of the banks' main offices and retention of existing branches. The relocation. of a state bank's
-main office is governed by KRS 287.185, while 12 USC Section 30(b) governs the relocation of
a main office of a national bank. 12 USC Section 30(b) provides that a main office may be
relocated not more than thirty miles from its present site. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency has interpreted 12 USC Section 30(b) as allowing national banks to relocate their main
offices across county lines and to retain existing branches in the original county of operation.
Using this interpretation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has approved several
transactions involving main office relocations across county lines by national banks in Kentucky,
some of which included retention of existing branches in the original county of operation.
Therefore, a state bank may, through a resolution of its board of directors, adopt the
provisions of 12 USC Section 30(b); and upon a vote of the shareholders owning two-thirds of
the stock of the bank and upon approval of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, a state
bank may relocate its main office within thirty miles from the city, town, or village in which the
main office was originally located. Existing branches in the original county may be retained, but
no new branches may be opened in the original county. The main office in the original county
must close.

Effective date:

dwa~ 21f, 1'113

EDWARD . HATCHETT,
COMMISSIONER
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STATUTORY APPENDIX
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12 USC 30
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KRS 287.010
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KRS 287.160
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KRS 287.170
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KRS 287.172
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KRS 287.173
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KRS 287.174

*

KRS 287.900

*

KRS 287.905

*

KRS 287.910

*

KRS 287.915

*

KRS 289.900

*

KRS

*

KRS 289.910

289~905
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12 USC

§ 30.

Change of name or location
(a) Any national banking association, upon written notice to the
Comptroller of the Currency, may change its name, except that such
new name shall include the word "National".
(b) Any national banking association, upon written notice to the
Comptroller of the Currency, may change the location of its main
office to any authorized branch location within the limits of the
city, town, or village in which it is situated, or, with a vote of
shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of such association for
a relocation outside such limits and upon receipt of a certificate of
approval from the Comptroller of the Currency, to any other location within or outside the limits of the city, town, or village in
which it is located, but not more than thirty miles beyond such
limits.
(May 1, 1886, c. 73, § 2, 24 Stat. 18; Sept. 8, 1959, Pub. L. 86-230, § 3, 73
Stat. 457; Oct. 15, 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, Title IV, § 405(a), 96 Stat. 1512;
Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. 97-457, § 19(a), 96 Stat. 2509.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Ren.lon Note. and LealtlaUve Reportl
1959 Act. Senate Report No. 730. see
1959 U.S.Code Congo and Am. News. p.
2232.
1981 Act. Senate Report No. 97-536
and Senate Conference Report No.
97~41. see 1982 U.S.Code Congo and
Adm.News. p. 3054.
Amendmenu
1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b). Pub,
L. 97-457 added "for a relocation outside
such limits" following "stock of such as·
sociation".
1982 Amendment. Subsec. (a). Pub.
L. 97-320 designated existing provisions
as subsec. (a). and in subsec. (a) as so
designated. substituted provisions per·

D - 13·

mittlng a change of name upon written
notice to the Comptroller. such new
name to include "National", for provi.
sions permitting a change of name or
location of the main office, with approv·
al of the Comptroller. within city limit.,
etc.. or outside such limits by vote of
shareholders. such change to be validat·
ed by certificate of approval.
Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 97-320 added
subsec. (b).
1959 Amendment. Pub.I- 86-230 required approval of the Comptroller of
the Currency before a national bank
could change the location of III main
office within the limitations of the city.
town. or village In which it Is situated.

I
I
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KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES

287.010. Definitions. - As used in this chapter, unless the context
requires otherwise:
(1) "Bank" means any bank which is now or may hereafter be organized
under the laws of this state or a combined bank and trust company;
(2) "National bank" or "national bank association" means a bank created
by congress and organized pursuant to the provisions of federal law;
(3) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of financial institutions;
(4) "Department" means the department of financial institutions;
(5) "Population" means the population as indicated by the latest regular
United States census; and
(6) "Trust company" includes every corporation authorized by this chapter to do a trust business;
(7) "Undivided profits" means the composite of the bank's net retained
earnings from current and prior years' operations;
(8) "Capital stock" shall mean, at any particular time, the sum of:
(a) The par value of all shares of the corporation having a par value that
have been issued;
(b) The amount of the consideration received by the corporation for all
shares of the corporation that have been issued without par value except
such part of the consideration as has been allocated to surplus in a manner
permitted by law; and
(c) Such amounts not included in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection as have been transferred to stated capital of the corporation, whether
through the issuance of stock dividends, resolution of the bank's board of
directors under applicable corporate law or otherwise by law; and
(9) "Surplus" means the amount of consideration received by the corporation for all shares issued without par value that has not been allocated to
capital stock or the amount of consideration received by the corporation in
excess of par value for all shares with a par value or both. (165a-1, 577,603,
612a, 883c-1, 883c-3: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 191, § 7; 1970, ch. 92, § 82;
1982, ch. 251, § 1, effective April 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 324, § 1, effective July
13, 1984; 1984, ch. 388, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.)
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287.160. State bank may reorganize as natioDal bank. - AIly state
bank desiring to reorganize under the laws of the United S~tes as a ~a
tional bank may, after its dissolution, and as soon as it obtainS ~uthonty
from the comptroller of the currency to commence business, retaIn any of
the assets, real or personal, which it acqUired as a state bank, subject to all
liabilities existing against the bank at the time of its reorganization. (588.)

287.170. National bank may reorganize as state bank. - Whenever
any national bank is authorized to dissolve, a majority of the directors of
the bank, upon authority in writing of the owners of two-thirds (2/3) of its
capital stock, may organize a state bahk.. The articles of incorporation shall
include a statement of the authority derived from the stockholders of the
. dissolved bank. All assets, real and personal, of such bank shall be vested
in and become the property of the state bank, subject to all liabilities existing against the bank at the time of its reorganization. (589.)

287.172. Conditions of and procedure for conversion of National
Banking Association to state bank or merger with state bank. - (1) A
National Banking Association may convert into or merge with a state bank
under a state charter, provided that:
(a) The action taken complies with federal law;
(b) In the case of a merger, the institutions to be merged are located in
the same city or county.
(2) In the case of each conversion, a written plan of conversion shall be
submitted, in duplicate, to the commissioner. Such plan shall be in form
satisfactory to the cOmmlssioner, shall prescribe the terms and conditions
of the conversion and the mode of carrying it into effect, and shall have
annexed thereto and forming a part thereof the proposed articles of incorporation of the state bank. which is to result from the conversion. Such articles of incorporation shall be in the form prescribed by law for the organization of state banks, with such variations, if any, as shall be satisfactory to
the commissioner. With such plan of conversion there shall be submitted,
in duplicate, to the commissioner a certificate of the president, secretary or
cashier of the National Banking Association certifying that all steps have
been taken which are necessary under federal law to the consummation of
the conversion. The commissioner shall approve or disapprove such plan of
conversion within sixty (60) days of the submission thereof to him. In considering the approval or disapproval of the conversion plan the commissioner shall take into account:
(a) Any pending administrative or judicial action to which the bank or
any officer or director of the bank is a party;
(b) The performance of the converting national bank for the five (5) years
preceding the application for conversion as compared to similarly situated
state-chartered banks; and
(c) The proposed name of the bank after conversion which shall not be
the same as or deceptively similar to any existing state-chartered bank.
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If the commissioner shall approve such plan, he shall file one (1) duplicate thereof, together with one (1) duplicate of such certificate submitted
therewith and the original of the approval of the commissioner, in the office
of the commissioner, and the other duplicate of such plan, together with a
duplicate of such certificate and a duplicate of the commissioner's approval,
shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which the principal
office of the state bank is to be located. After such filing in the office of the
commission, the conversion shall become effective upon the filing and recording of the articles of incorporation as provided in KRS 287.050, unless a
later date is specified in the plan, in which event the conversion shall
become effective upon such later date. If the commissioner shall disapprove
the conversion plan, he shall state his reasons for such disapproval in
writing to which the converting national bank shall have the right of appeal as permitted by law.
(3) In the case of each merger, a written plan of merger shall be submitted, in duplicate, to the commissioner. Such plan shall be in form satisfactory to the commissioner and shall prescribe the terms and conditions of the
merger and the mode of carrying it into effect. Such plan may provide the
name to be borne by the state bank, as receiving corporation, if such name
is to be changed. Such plan may also name the persons who shall constitute
the first board of directors of the state bank after the merger shall have
been accomplished, provided that the number and qualifications of such
. person shall be in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 287
relating to the number and qualifications of directors of a state bank; or
such plan may provide for a meeting of the stockholders to elect a board of
directors within sixty (60) days after such merger, and may make provision
for conducting the affairs of the state bank meanwhile. With such plan of
merger there shall be submitted, in duplicate, to the commissioner the
following:
(a) By the National Banking Association, a certificate of the president,
secretary or cashier of such association certifying that all steps have been
taken which are necessary under federal law to the consummation of their
merger;
(b) By the state bank, a certificate of the president, secretary or cashier
certifying that such plan of merger has been approved by the board of
directors of the state bank by a majority vote of all the members thereof,
that such plan has been submitted to the stockholders of the state bank at a
meeting thereof held; upon notice of at least fifteen (15) days, specifying the
time, and place and object of such meeting and addressed to each stockholder at the address appearing upon the books of the state bank and
published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and that such plan of merger has
been approved at such meeting by the vote of the stockholders owning at
least two thirds (2/3) in amount of the stock of the state bank.
(4) The commissioner shall approve or disapprove such plan of merger
within sixty (60) days of such submission thereof to him. If the commissioner shall approve such plan, he shall file one (1) duplicate thereof, together with one (1) duplicate of each of such certificates and the original of
the approval of the commissioner, in the office of the commissioner, and the
other duplicate of such plan, together with a duplicate of each of such
certificates and a duplicate of the commissioner's approval, shall be filed in
the office of the clerk of the county in which the principal office of the state
bank is to be located. Upon such filing in the office of the commissioner, the
merger shall become effective, unless a later date is specified in the plan, in
which event the merger shall become effective upon such later date.
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(5) At the time when such conversion or merger becomes effective:
(a) The resulting state bank shall be considered the same business and
corporate entity as the National Banking Association, although as to
rights, powers and duties, the resulting bank is a state bank;
(b) All of the property, rights and powers and franchises of the National
Banking Association shan vest in the resulting state bank and the resulting state bank shall be subject to and deemed to have assumed all of the
debts, liabilities, obligations and duties of the National Banking Association and to have succeeded to all of its relationships, fiduciary or otherwise,
as fully and to the same extent as if such property, rights, powers, franchises, debts, liabilities, obligations, duties and relationships had been
originally acquired, incurred or entered into by the resulting state bank;
provided, however, that the resulting state bank shall not, through such
conversion or merger, acquire power to engage in any business or to exercise any right, privilege or franchise which is not conferred by the provi. sions of KRS Chapter 287 upon such resulting state bank;
(c) Any reference to the National Banking Association in any contract,
will or document, whether executed or taking effect before or after the
conversion or merger, shall be considered a reference to the resulting state
bank if not inconsistent with the other provisions of the contract, will or
document;
(d) A pending action or other judicial proceeding to which the National
Banking Association is a party, shall not be deemed to have abated or to
have discontinued by reason of the conversion or merger, but may be prosecuted to final judgment, order or decree in the same manner as if the
conversion or merger had not been made; or the resulting state bank may
be substituted as a party to such action or proceeding, and any judgment,
order or decree may be rendered for or against it that might have been
rendered for or against the National Banking Association if the· conversion
or merger had not occurred. (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 222, § 2; 1966, ch. 239,
§ 200; 1980, ch. 192, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.)

D - 18

187.173. Conversion of state bank to or merger with National
(1) A state bank may convert into, or merge or
consolidate with, a National Banking Association under the charter of a
National Banking Association in the manner provided by federal law and
without approval of any state authority.
(2) The franchise of a state bank as a state bank shall automatically
terminate when its conversion into or its merger or consolidation with a
National Banking Association under a federal charter is consummated and
the resulting National Banking Association shall be considered the same
business and corporate entity as the state bank, although as to rights,
powers and duties the resulting bank is a National Banking Association.
(3) At the time when such conversion, merger or consolidation becomes
effective:
(a) All of the property, rights, powers and franchises of the state bank
shall vest in the National Banking Association and the National Banking
Association shall be subject to and be deemed to have assumed all of the
debts, liabilities, obligations and duties of the state bank and to have succeeded to all of its relationships, fiduciary or otherwise, as fully and to the
same extent as if such property, rights, powers, franchises, debts, liabilities, obligations, duties and relationships had been originally acquired,
incurred or entered into by the National Banking Association;
(b) Any reference to the state bank in any contract, will or document,
whether executed or taking effect before or after the conversion, merger or
consolidation, shall be considered a reference to the National Banking Association if not inconsistent with the other provisions of the contract, will or
document;
(c) A pending action or other judicial proceeding to which the state bank
is a party, shall not be deemed to have abated or to have discontinued by
reason of the conversion, merger or consolidation, but may be prosecuted to
final judgment, order or decree in the same manner as if the conversion,
merger or consolidation had not been made; or the National Banking Association may be substituted as a party to such action or proceeding, and any
judgment, order or decree may be rendered for or against it that might have
been rendered for or against the state bank if the conversion, merger or
consolidation had not occurred. (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 222, § 3, effective
March 21, 1952.)
Banking Association. -

Cross-References. Articles of incorporation of business corporations, contents, KRS
27IB.2-020.

Collateral References. 9 C.J.S., Banks
and Banking, §§ 468, 738, 739.

287.174. Provisions ofKRS 287.172 and 287.173 to constitute alternative method - Legislative purpose declared. - The methods and
procedures set out in KRS 287.172 and 287.173 are authorized in addition
to any other methods or procedures for the accomplishment of the same or
similar purposes which heretofore may have been established by law. It is
the purpose of KRS 287.172, 287.173 and this section to make effective in
this Commonwealth the provisions and purposes of the act of congress
dated August 17, 1950, which is compiled as chapter 729 of volume 64_ of
the United States Statutes, and as 12 U.S.C.A. sec. 214. (Enact. Acts 1952,
ch. 222, § 4, effective March 21, 1952; 1984, ch. 111, § 124, effective July
13, 1984.)
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ACQL"ISITION OF BANKS

287.900. Definition of terms used in this section and KRS 287.905
- Acquisition of one or more banks, wherever located - Limitations
- Acquisition by out-of-state banks - Limitation - In-county
merger or consolidation. - (1) For purposes of this section and KRS
'
287.905:
(a) "Bank" means any institution organized under this chapter, the
banking laws of another state, or the National Bank Act, as amended, to do
a banking business. However, it shall not include an "interim bank" chartered solely for the purpose of facilitating the acquisition of an existing
bank unless the existing bank has been in existence for less than five (5)
years;
.
(b) "Bank holding company," "company," and "control" have the meanings accorded them in the Federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as
amended. (12 U.S.C. Section 1841, et seq.). "Control" may be acquired by
acquisition of voting securities, by purchase of assets, by merger or consolidation, by contract, or othernise;
(c) "Individual" means a natural person, partnership, association, business trust, voting trust, or similar organiiation. Individual does not include
a corporation; and
(d) "Deposit" has the meaning accorded it in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder; excluded,
however, from deposits are all interbank deposits and all deposits in foreign
branches and international banking facilities, as shown in the reports
made by all federally-insured depository institutions to their respective
supervisory authorities.
(2) Any individual, or any bank holding company having its principal
place of business in this state, may acquire control of one (1) or more banks
or bank holding companies wherever located, except that no individual,
who on July 13, 1984, controls a bank or bank holding company wherever
located, and no bank holding company wherever located, may acquire, directly or indirectly, control of a bank having its principal place of business
in this state if the bank was chartered after July 13, 1984, and if, at the
time of the acquisition, the bank, has been in existence less than five (5)
years. The provisions of this subsection shall.not prohibit the organization
of a one (1) bank holding company for the purpose of acquiring control of a
bank even if the bank was chartered after July 13, 1984, and has been in
existence less than five (5) years at the time of the acquisition.
(3) No individual or bank holding company wherever located may ac~
quire control of any bank or bank holding company if, upon the acquisition,
the individual or bank holding company would control banks in this state
holding more than fifteen percent (15%) of the total deposits and member
accounts in the offices of all federally-insured depository institutions in this
state as reported in the most recent year-end reports made by the institutions to their respective supervisory authorities which are available at the
time of the acquisition.
(4)(a) During the period expiring five (5) years after July 13, 1984, no
individual or company wherever located may, directly or indirectly, by
merger, consolidation, purchase, or any other means, acquire control of a
bank or bank holding company if as a result the individual or company
would acqq.ire control of more than three (3) banks in this state during any
twelve (12) month period;
(b) Provided, however, a bank holding company wherever lc'cated, may
acquire control of a bank holding company which has its principal place of
business in this state and which controls more than three (3) banks located
in this state under conditions approved by the commissioner which would
require the following:
1. That an acquisition made under this subsection shall be limited to
only one (1) acquisition;
2. That the banks acquired in excess of the three (3) bank per year
limitation included in this acquisition shall be counted against future acquisitions during the remaining five (5) year period provided in this subsection; and
3. That the total barik acquisitions by a bank holding company shall not
exceed in the aggregate fifteen (15) banks during the five (5) year period
provided in this subsection.
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(5) The limitations set forth in this section or any other provision of this
chapter or any regulation promulgated ~hereunder, as now in effect or
amended after July 13, 1984, shall not apply to the acquisition of a bank if,
in his discretion, the commissioner, if the bank is organized under the laws
of this state, or the comptroller of the currency, if the bank is a national
bank, determines that an emergency exists and the acquisition is appropriate in order to prevent the probable failure of the bank which is closed or is
in danger of closing.
(6)(a) Any bank holding company having its principal place of business
in a state which is c;ontiguous to this state may acquire control of any bank
or bank holding company having its principal place of business in this
state, if the state wherein the bank holding company has its principal place
of business shall authorize the acquisition of control of a bank or bank
holding company in that state by a bank holding company having its principal place of business in this state under conditions substantially no more
restrictive than those imposed by this section;
(b) From and after two (2) years after July 13, 1984, any bank holding
company having its principal place of business in a state other than a state
which is contiguous to this state may acquire control of any bank or bank
holding company having its principal place of business in this state, if the
state wherein the bank holding company has its principal place of business
shall authorize the acquisition of control of a bank or bank holding company in that state by a bank holding company having its principal place of
business in this state under conditions substantially no more restrictive
than those imposed by this section; and
.
(c) For the purposes of this subsection, a bank holding company shall be
deemed to be located or have its principal place of business in the state or
other jurisdiction in which the total deposits of all the bank holding company's banking subsidiaries are largest.
(7). The provisions of this ~ecti.on shall not be construed to prohibit or
restrict the merger or consohdatlon of banks or bank holding companies
~ving their principal place~ of business in the same county and the operatIOn by the merged or consohdated corporation of the banks nor to prohibit
the sale of any bank or bank holding company to, and the p~chase thereof
by, .any ~ther bank or bank holding compB;ny with its principal place of
bUSIness In the same county and the operatIon of the bank as a branch so
long as the provisions of KRS 287.180(4) have been satisfied. (Enact. Acts
1984, ch. 130, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 444, § 12 effective
July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 226, § 2, effective July 14, 1992.) ,
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287.905. Filing of application to acquire bank with commissioner
- Examination of applicant - Cooperative agreements by commissioner to examine out-of-state bank or exchange confidential information. - (1) Any bank holding company which proposes to acquire control of a bank chartered in this state or a bank holding company which
includes a bank chartered in this state, shall concurrently file with the
commissioner copies of the application filed with the federal reserve board
under applicable federal law. The commissioner shall approve such acquisition within ninety (90) days of acceptance of a complete application if he
finds that:
.
(a) The terms of the acquisition are in accordance with the laws of this
state;
(b) The financial condition, or the competence, experience and integrity
of the acquiring company or its principals are such as will not jeopardize
the financial stability of the acquired bank or bank holding company;
(c) The public convenience and advantage will be served by the acquisition; and
(d) No federal regulatory authority whose approval is required has disapproved the transaction because it would result in a monopoly or substantially lessen competition.
(2) A non-refundable fee shall accompany each application and shall be
set by the commissioner in accordance with KRS 287.480'.
(3) The commissioner may examine or elect to participate in a joint examination, with the applicable federal or state regulatory agency, of any
holding company or nonbank subsidiary of the holding company that controls or is affiliated with a state-chartered bank.
(4) The commissioner may enter into cooperative agreements with federal or state regulatory authorities to examine an out-of-state bank that is
controlled by a Kentucky bank holding company or is controlled by a bank
holding company which includes a state-chartered bank, or accept reports
of examinations of such out-of-state banks from federal or state regulatory
authorities in lieu of conducting examinations.
(5) The commissioner may enter into cooperative agreements with federal or state regulatory authorities to exchange confidential information
and reports of examination relating to interstate acquisitions of banks and
bank holding companies.
(6) The cost of an examination shall be assessed against and paid by the
company examined. The assessment for the examination shall be calculated in the same manner as that used for bank examinations. (Enact. Acts
1984, ch. 130, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 444, § 13, effective
July 15, 1986.)
287.910. illegal acquisitions. - For purposes of this chapter, it shall
be illegal for any individual, corporation or bank holding company to directly or indirectly acquire, control, hold, charter, convert or operate any
bank, as defined in KRS 287.900, located in this state which is an "insured
bank" or eligible to become an "insured bank" as that term is defined in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which does not both accept deposits that the
depositor has the legal right to withdraw on demand and actively engage in
the business of making commercial loans. (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 444, § 14,
effective July 15, 1986.)
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287.915. Bank combinations - Operation of a combined bank as
• branch of the surviving bank - Other branches - Taxes - Definitions. - (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of KRS Chapter 287:
(a) An individual or bank holding company that controls two (2) or more
banks having their principal offices in this Commonwealth may, from time
to time, combine any or all of the commonly controlled banks in this Commonwealth into and with anyone of the banks, and thereafter the surviving bank, which shall have its principal office in this Commonwealth, shall
continue to operate its principal office and may operate the other authorized offices of the banks so combined as branches of the'surviving bank;
and
(b) Any combination authorized by this section shall not require the
approval of the commissioner of financial institutions, but on or before
thirty (30) days prior to consummation of any combination, the proposed
surviving bank shall notify the commissioner of the combination, and on
the effective date of any such combination the charter of any combined
bank organized under the laws of this Commonwealth shall be surrendered.
(2) Following any combination authorized by this section:
(a) The surviving bank may, subject to the approval of the commissioner
as provided in KRS 287.180(2), establish and operate additional branches
at any location where a combined bank could, on or after the combination
authorized by this section, have established and operated a branch;
(b) Any combined bank which is being operated as a branch of the surviving bank shall have a board of directors, a majority of which shall be
residents of the combined bank's community, which shall meet not less
often than monthly to advise the branch in a nonfiduciary capacity with
respect to the branch's community activities and affairs, customer relations, and local charitable activities;
(c)1. The surviving bank and each combined bank shall, for purposes of
the tax which may be imposed pursuant to the provisions of subsections (2)
or (3) ofKRS 136.270, be deemed to be located in the city or county in which
it was located prior to such combination, and that city or county may continue to impose the tax provided for in subsections (2) or (3) of KRS 136.270
upon that proportion of the taxable fair cash value of shares of the surviving bank as the deposits of the surviving bank within that city or county
bears to the total deposits of the surviving bank wherever located as reported to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or other applicable
regulatory authorities by the surviving bank; provided, that, so long as the
surviving bank maintains a branch or branches within a city or county
imposing the tax provided for in subsections (2) or (3) of KRS 136.270, such
tax shall in no event be less than the tax imposed by the city or county for
the year immediately prior to such combination. A copy of the deposit
report of the surviving bank and of any combined bank where deposits are
not included in the report of the surviving bank shall be submitted to the
Revenue Cabinet by the surviving bank with its annual report of banks and
trust companies for Kentucky property tax purposes as of the beginning of
each year and to the assessing officer of each city and county in which the
surviving bank and any combined bank is deemed to be located pursuant to
this subsection;
2. The surviving bank shall maintain a record of the deposits in each of
its offices resulting from such combination or thereafter established as
provided in paragraph (a) of this subsectio~ and, except for deposits transferred or relocated at the request of the depositor, shall not cause or permit
such deposits to be transferred or relocated to another branch with the
intent to reduce the amount of any tax imposed by any city or county
pursuant to subparagraph 1. of this paragraph;
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(3) For purposes of this section:
(a) The term "combine" or "combination" includes a merger or the acquisition of all or substantially all of the assets of a bank already controlled by
an individual or bank holding company;
(b) An individual or bank holding company "controls" a bank if that
individual or company, directly or indirectly, owns, controls or has the
power to vote at least eighty percent (80%) of the issued and outstanding
voting securities of the bank;
(c) "Combined bank" means any bank participating in a combination
authorized by this section other than the surviving bank;
(d) "Surviving bank" means a bank into which a combined bank has
been combined;
(e) "Bank" includes a national bank but does not include a bank which
has been in existence less than five (5) years; and
(f) "Individual", "bank holding company" and "deposit" shall have the
same meanings attributed to them in KRS 287.900(1). (Enact. Acts 1990,
ch. 181, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.)
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ACQUISITION OF SAVINGS AND LoAN AsSOCIATIONS

289.900. Definitions. - As used in KRS 289.905 and 289.910, unless
the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Control" shall have the meaning accorded the term in the Federal
Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. sec. 1730a(a)(2), as
amended. "Control" may be acquired by acquisition of voting securities, by
purchase of assets, by merger or consolidation, by contract, or otherwise;
(2) "Deposit" means any demand negotiable order of withdrawal, time
certificate, savings deposit, or savings share account made by an individual, corporation, state or federal governmental unit or any other organization without regard to the location of the depositor; however, excluded from
deposits are all inter-savings and loan association or interbank deposits
and all deposits in foreign branches and international banking facilities as
shown in the reports made by all savings and loan associations to their
respective supervisory authorities;
(3) "Individual" means a natural person, partnership, association, business trust, voting trust, or similar organization. Individual does not include
a corporation;
(4) "Savings and loan association" means any savings and loan association or savings bank organized under the laws of this state, under the laws
of any other state, or under the laws of the United States;
(5) "Kentucky savings and loan association" means a savings and loan
association having its principal place of business in this state;
(6) "Principal place of business" means:
(a) With respect to a savings and loan association, the state or territory
in which the savings and loan association's total deposits are the largest, as
shown in the most recent report of condition or summary report filed by the
savings and loan association with its supervisory authority; and
(b) With respect to a savings and loan association holding company, the
state or territory in which the total deposits of all direct and indirect savingsand loan subsidiaries of the savings and loan association holding company are the largest, as shown in the most recent reports of condition or
summary reports filed by the savings and loan association holding company
and its savings and loan subsidiaries with their respective supervisory
authorities;
(7) "Savings and loan association holding company" has the meaning
accorded the term in the Federal Savings and Loan Holding Company Act,
12 U.s.C. sec. 1730a(a)(1)(D), as amended, except that the term shall include mutual savings and loan association holding companies organized
pursuant to Section 408 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. sec.
1730a(s), as amended. (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 156, § 1, effective July 15,
1988.)
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289.905. Acquisition of one or more associations wherever located - Limitations - Acquisition by out-of-state associations Merge or consolidation. - (1) Any individual, or any Kentucky savings
and loan association holding company, may acquire control of one (1) or
more savings and loan associations or savings and loan association holding
companies wherever located, except that no individual who on July 15,
1988, controls a savings and loan association or savings and loan association holding company wherever located, and no savings and loan association holding company wherever located, shall acquire, directly or indirectly, control of a Kentucky savings and loan association if the Kentucky
savings and loan association was chartered after July 15, 1988 and if, at
the time of the acquisition, the Kentucky savings and loan association has
been in existence less than five (5) years. The provisions of this subsection
shall not prohibit the organization of a one (1) savings and loan association
holding company for the purpose of acquiring control of a savings and loan
association even if the savings and loan association was chartered after
July 15, 1988, and has been in existence less than five (5) years at the time
of the acquisition.
(2) No individual or savings and loan association holding company wherever located shall acquire control of any savings and loan association or
savings and loan association holding company if, upon the acquisition, the
individual or savings and loan association holding company would control
Kentucky savings and loan associations holding more than fifteen percent
(15%) of the total deposits in all Kentucky savings and loan associations as
reported in the most recent year-end reports made by Kentucky savings
and loan associations to their respective supervisory authorities which are
available at the time of the acquisition.
(3) (a) During the period expiring five (5) years after July 15, 1988, no
individual or corporation wherever located shall, directly or indirectly, by
merger, consolidation, purchase or any other means, acquire control of a
savings and loan association or savings and loan association holding company if as a result thereof such individual or corporation would acquire
control of more than three (3) Kentucky savings and loan associations
during any twelve (12) month period;
(b) However, a savings and loan association holding company wherever
located, :may acquire control of a savings and loan association holding company which has its principal place of business in this state and which
controls more than three (3) Kentucky savings and loan associations under
conditions approved by the commissioner which would require the following:
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1. That an acquisition made under this subsection shall be limited to
only one (1) acquisition;
2. That the Kentucky savings and loan associations acquired in excess of
the three (3) Kentucky savings and loan associations per year limitation
included in this acquisition shall be counted against future acquisitions
during the remaining five (5) year period provided in this subsection; and
3. That the total Kentucky savings and loan association acquisitions by
a savings and loan association holding company shall not exceed in the
aggregate five (5) Kentucky savings and loan associations during any five
(5) year period.
(4) The limitations set forth in this section or any other provision of this
chapter or any regulation promulgated thereunder, as now in effect or
amended after July 15, 1988, shall not apply to the acquisition of a Kentucky savings and loan association if, in his discretion, the commissioner, if
the Kentucky savings and loan association is organized under the laws of
this state, or the federal home loan bank board, if the Kentucky savings
and loan association is federally chartered, determines that an emergency
exists and the acquisition is appropriate in order to prevent the probable
failure of a Kentucky savings and loan association or savings and loan
holding company having its principal place of business in this state which
is closed or is in danger of closing.
(5) Any savings and loan association holding company having its principal place of business in any state may acquire control of any Kentucky
savings and loan association or of any savings and loan association holding
company having its principal place of business in this state, if the state
wherein the savings and loan association holding company has its principal
place of business shall authorize the acquisition of control of a savings and
loan association or savings and loan association holding company in that
state by a savings and loan association holding company having its prinCipal place of business in this state under conditions substantially no more
restrictive than those imposed by this section;
(6) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit or
restrict the merger, consolidation or other acquisition of Kentucky savings
and loan associations or of savings and loan association holding companies
having their principal places of business in this state and the operation by
the merged or consolidated corporation of the Kentucky savings and loan
associations, nor to prohibit the sale of any savings and loan association or
savings and loan association holding company to, and the purchase thereof
by, any Kentucky savings and loan association or any savings and loan
association holding company with its principal place of business in this
state or the operation of the savings and loan association as a branch.
(Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 156, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.)
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289.910. Filing of application to acquire association or holding
company - Examination of applicant - Cooperative agreements for
examination of out-of-state associations or exchange of confidential
information. - (1) Any savings and loan association holding company
which proposes to acquire control of a Kentucky state chartered savings
and loan association, or of a savings and loan association holding company
which controls a Kentucky state chartered savings and loan association,
shall concurrently file with the commissioner copies of the application filed
with the applicable federal supervisory authority. The commissioner shall
approve such acquisition within ninety (90) days of acceptance of a complete application if he finds that:
(a) The terms of the acquisition are in accordance with the laws of this
state;
(b) The financial condition, or the competence, experience and integrity
of the acquiring company or its principals are such as will not jeopardize
the financial stability of the acquired savings· and loan association or savings and loan association holding company;
(c) The public convenience and advantage will be served by the acquisition; and
(d) No fed.eral regulatory authority whose approval is required. has disapproved. the transaction because it would result in a monopoly or substantially lessen competition, or has otherwise disapproved. the transaction.
(2) A nonrefundable fee shall accompany each application and shall be
set by the commissioner in accordance with the fee-setting principles set
out in KRS 287.480.
(3) The commissioner may enter into cooperative agreements with federal or state regulatory authorities to examine an out-of-state savings and
loan association that is controlled by a savings and loan association holding
company having its principal place of business in this state, or accept reports of examinations of such out-of-state regulatory authorities in lieu of
conducting examinations.
(4) The commissioner may enter into cooperative agreements with federal or state regulatory authorities to exchange confidential information
and reports of examination relating to interstate acquisitions of savings
and loan associations and savings and loan association holding companies.
(5) The cost of an examination shall be assessed. against and paid by the
savings and loan association or savings and loan association holding com- .
pany examined. The assessment for the examination shall be calculated. in
the same manner as that used for savings and loan association examinations. (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 156, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.)
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SECTIONE

I

NON-TRADITIONAL BANKING PRODUCTS:
INSURANCE, ANNUITIES AND MUTUAL FUNDS

I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

The scope of this outline is to provide an overview as to current issues a.f(ecting
a bank's ability to sell insurance, mutual funds and .annuities. For anyone that
has not followed this area, the banking industry is in a state of flux over the
sale of insurance and retail nondeposit investments and .substantial changes
will likely occur in the near term which may substantially affect the contents of
this outline. This outline does not purport to be a road-map or a comprehensive
ex3.mination of the many issues facing banks in this area, but merely an
overview of certain current issues.

B.

Banks, insurance companies and mutual funds are increasingly competing with
each other and offering each other's product lines to customers. As banks offer
these non-traditional services to their customers, they are exposing themselves
to new legal and regulatory issues that are complex, often overlapping, and not
always consistent.

C.

Banks are usually enticed to offer nondeposit investments and insurance

products to enhance fee income and help solidify customer loyalty. A recent
American Banker article on mutual funds indicated that bank-managed mutual
funds grew by 34 percent in 1993. Bank trade groups recently indicated that

Americans were purchasing approximately $30 billion per month of mutual
funds with banks accounting for roughly 15 percent of that total. The current
low interest rate environment, as measured by low yields on insured depoSitory
instruments, are partially responsible for this growth.
D.

Banks may offer non-deposit investment products to customers in many ways.
One way is for the bank to lease space to a distributor of the product and in
return receive a rental fee for the space and, possibly, a percentage override of
the net or gross profits. A second way is for the bank to permit an outside
distributor to directly solicit its customers and the bank may perform
administrative services for the mutual fund with respect to its customers and,
possibly, investment advisory services to the fund for a fee. A,third
arrangement is for the bank to make mutual funds directly available to its
customers using its own employees to market the product. While the manner in
which the sale of uninsured products at banks may be conducted is varied, the
legal issues presented and the degree of regulatory overlap is obviously directly
related to the manner in which the product is marketed at each bank. The
more direct involvement a bank chooses to take in offering the product results
in greater fee generation, along with a more complex regulatory and legal
environment for the bank to operate.

E.

All retail sales of investment products by banks are regulated. as follows:
1.

National banks are subject to the rules and regulations of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency ["OCC"J.
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2.

State chartered member banks are subject to the rules and regulations
of the Federal Reserve System ("Federal Reserve").

3.

State chartered non-member banks are subject to the rules and
regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").

4.

Federally chartered and insured state-chartered savings associations
and savings banks are regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS").

At the present time, banks are exempt from registration under federal and state
securities laws from registration as an investment company and as a
broker/dealer. The federal securities laws include the Securities Act of 1933,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and
the Investment Company Act of 1940. This exemption from registration with
the SEC is not available for thrifts, subsidiaries of banks and holding companies
or joint ventures with banks.
While banks are exempt from the registration requirements of federal and state
securities laws, all banks and bank affiliates that engage in retail investment
sales are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
When a bank utilizes a third-party broker-dealer. the broker-dea1er's activities
are regulated by the SEC. Pursuant to the requirements set forth under federal
securities laws, broker-dealers are also subject to the rules and regulations of
securities self-regulatory organizations such as the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). The
prOvisions of ERISA may also regulate the sale of mutual funds that deal with
benefit plans and other areas regulated by ERISA.
F.

II.

There have been many studies authorized recently by the SEC, GAO, trade
groups, American Association of Retired Persons, and others. that indicate there
is some confusion on they part of many investors with respect to banks
involvement in the mutual fund business. A recent SEC study showed that 66
percent of those surveyed thought that money market funds purchased through
the banks were federally insured by he FDIC and 56 percent thought that all
mutual funds sold by banks were backed bi the assets of the bank or were
federally insured. The existence of investor confusion in the sale of mutual
funds has resulted in new guidelines being issued by each of the bank
regulators and by trade associations. There has also been concern expressed by
the SEC, and concern and new legislation proposed by members of Congress.

UPDATE ON BANKS SELLING INSURANCE PRODUCTS

A.

Agent for General Insurance.
1.

State Banks and Bank Holding Companies in Kentucky. Kentucky
banking laws in KRS 287.030 appear to substantially limit banks and
bank holding companies in Kentucky acting as insurance agent or
broker except: [1) credit life; (2) credit health; and (3) insurance of the
interest of a real property mortgagee in mortgaged property, other than
title insurance. The relevant section reads:
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(4) No person who after July 13, 1984, owns or acquires
more than one-half (1/2) of the capital stock of a bank
shall act as insurance agent or broker with respect to any
insurance except credit life insurance, credit health
insurance, insurance of the interest of a real property
mortgagee in mortgaged property, other than title
insurance. (KRS 287.030(4)).

With respect to bank holding companies owning banks in Kentucky, the
attorney general in OAG 81-173 has said:
A bank holding company may not acquire 100% of the

outstanding common stock of an insurance agency, since
the language of this section expresses the clear intent of
the legislature to limit the involvement of a bank's
majority shareholders, including one-bank holding.
companies, in insurance-related activities; accordingly,
any construction which would authorize ownership of an
insurance agency as a wholly-owned subsidiary on the
theory that it is a separate entity and is "acting" indirectly
or independently of its controlling parent corporation
would render that portion of the statute a nullity and lead
to the absurd result that the statute can be avoided by
mere organization as a bank holding company. (OAG 81173).

The Commissioner of the De~ent of Financial Institutions may be
limited in making a finding of permissible activities pursuant to KRS
287.020.3 (commonly referred to as "parity letters"). The relevant
restriction in KRS 287.020(3) states that "... This section shall not
apply to activities prohibited under Subtitle 9 of KRS Chapter 304."
2.

National Banks.
(a)

12 U.S.C. § 92. Federal banking laws permit national banks
located in places the population of which does not exceed 5,000

inhabitants to engage as agents in general insurance. The law
reads as follows:
.
§ 92 Action as insurance agent or broker;
procuring loans on real estate

In addition to the powers now vested by law in
national banking associations organized under the
laws of the United States any such association
located and doing business in any place the
population of which does not exceed five thousand
inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding
decennial census .. may, under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the
Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for
any fire, life .. or other insurance company
authorized by the authorities of the State in which
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such bank is loCated to do business in said State,
by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting
premiums on policies issued by such company;
and may receive for services so rendered such fees
or commissions as may be agreed upon between.
the said association and the insurance company
for which it may act as agent: Provided, however,
That no such bank shall in any case assume or
guarantee the payment of any premium on
insurance policies issued through its agency by its
principal:andprovidedjiuther, That the bank shall
not guarantee truth of any statement made by an
assured in filing his application for insurance. (12
U.S.C.§ 92).
The oce has also issued the following regulations:
§ 7.7100 National banks acting as general

insurance agents.
12 U.S.C. 92 provides that national banks may
act as agents for any fire, life, or other insurance
company in any place the population of which
d~ not exceed 5,000 inhabitants. This provision
is applicable to any office of a national bank when
the office is located in a community having a
population of less than 5,000 even though the
principal office of such bank is located in a
community whose population exceeds 5,000. (12
C.F.R. Part 7.7100).
§ 7.7495 Debt cancellation contracts.
A national bank may provide for losses arising
from cancellation of outstanding loans upon the
death of borrowers. The imposition of an
additional charge and the establishment of
necessary reserves in order to enable the bank to
enter into such debt cancellation contracts are a
lawful exercise of the powers of a national bank
and necessary to the business of banking. (12
C.F.R. Par 7.7495).

(b)

Recent Court Decisions.
(1)

On June 7, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
United states National Bank of Oregon v. Independent
Insurance Agents ofAmerica, Inc., 124 L. Ed. 2d 402, 113
S. Ct. 2173 (1993), 61 U.S.L.W. 4564 (1993), held that
Section 92 remains in force and preserves the statutory
power of national banks in the insurance field in towns of
5,000 orIess people.
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(2)

On July 16, 1993, the U.S. CircUit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Independent Insurance
Agents of America v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.
1993) upheld a ruling by the OCC that national banks
may sell any type of insurance nationwide from small .
towns of 5,000 people or less. The decision noted that no
specific congressional intent could be found to restrict the
geographical reach of insurance sales authorized by
Section 92.

(3)

The Fifth Circuit in Saxon v. Georgia Association of
Independent Insurance Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1968) relied on Section 92 to declare unlawful Comptroller
Saxon's ruling that permitted a national bank to sell its
borrowers "broad forms of automobile, home, casualty and
liability insurance." Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1012. The court
applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius and reviewed the legislative history to conclude
that national banks have no power to act as insurance
agents in towns greater than 5,000 people.

(4)

The Second Circuit on June 15, 1992 in American Land
Title Association v. Clarke, 968 F.2d ISO (2nd Cir. 1992),
the court struck down the OCC's decision that Chase
Manhattan Bank could sell title insurance as an
incidental activity under 12 U.S.C. § 24(7). The court
concluded that a power that had been withheld by
Congress cannot be found to be incidental and necessary.
This decision leaves in question the extent to which a
national bank may use Section 24(7) to conduct any form
of insurance activity. The court did distinguish
Independent Bankers Association v. Heimann, 613 F.2d
1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), which held that Section 92 did not
bar a national bank from selling credit life insurance in a
town with over 5,000 inhabitants, based largely on the
nature of credit life insurance as being unique to banking.

(5)

On August 4, 1992, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky. Frankfort Division, in
The Owensboro National Bank v. Moore, 803 F. Supp. 24
(E.D. Ky. 1993), held that Section 92 preempts KRS
287.030(4) and, accordingly, the plaintiff banks may not
.be prevented from applying for insurance licenses. Judge
Hood also noted that KRS 287.030(4) does not constitute
insurance regulation and, accordingly, the McCarranFerguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § lOll, et seq. ("McCarran Act")
has no application. However, Judge Hood in conclusion
noted:
The court specifically declines to determine
whether the Commissioner is required to
issue licenses once the completed
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applications are received. Whether
national banks are subject to Kentucky's
criteria for the issuance of an insurance
license is not properly before the court, and
may well implicate McCarran-Ferguson in
other respects. In any event, the court
need not reach this issue in narrowly
deciding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 287.030(4), as
interpreted, is preempted by 12 U.S.C. § 92,
and does not permit the Commissioner to
refuse to provide the requested
applications.
The decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and is presently awaiting
oral argument which should occur in April.
(6)

. On December 2, 1993, the United States District Court in
Barnett Banks oj Marion County, N.A. v. Florida, 839 F.
Supp. 835 (1993) ruled that Section 92 did not preempt a
Florida insurance statute that limits bank subsidiaries of
bank holding companies from insurance agency activities.
The court concluded that the McCarran Act grants to the
states the right to regulate the business of insurance.
The court distinguished the Owensboro National decision
as follows:
Additionally, the outcome of that court's
McCarran-Ferguson analysis differed from
that in the present case, Judge Hood
finding that the Kentucky statute did not
constitute insurance regulation.
Owensboro, however, is distinguishable for
three important reasons. First, there was
no state caselaw upon which Judge Hood
could rely for the meaning and/or purpose
of the state regulation. Second, the
Kentucky provision was located within that
chapter of the state statutes regulating
banks and trust companies, not that
portion which regulates insurance. Lastly,
the court there applied the tripartite test
announced in Union Labor We Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 73 L. Ed. 2d 647,102
S. Ct. 3002 {1982} for determining whether
a state law governs the "business of
insurance." As the subsequently decided
Fabe made clear, and as the instant
Defendants have duly noted, the Pireno test
applies to the second clause of McCarran- .
Ferguson (relating to the scope of antitrust
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immunity), while the instant analysis--and
that in Fabe--re1ates to the first clause of
the Act. In this vein, it should also be
noted that Fabe was a Sixth Circuit case,
and was remanded to that court of appeals,
before which an appeal from Owensboro
presently lies. [803 F. Supp. at 35).
(7)

While the courts have recently supported the ability of
national banks that have offices in towns of 5,000 or less
to act as agent for the sale of insurance as set forth above,
the next test for national banks may be satisfying the
requirements of the Department of Insurance to obtain an
insurance license. The issue, as in Barnett Bank above,
appears to be whether section 92 preempts state
insurance laws that bar or limit the sale of insurance by
certain parties. Since the McCarran Act clearly appears
to give states the right to regulate the business of
insurance, how do you reconcile limits that may be
imposed under the McCarran Act and Section 92
insurance authority? As an example, KRS 304.9-100
deals with the situation where the granting of a license for
engaging in the business of insurance is to be with
respect to the general public and not for the purpose of
permitting the licensee to write insurance for "controlled
business." The commissioner may withhold any license
". . . if he finds that the license has been or is being, or
will probably be used by the applicant or licensee
principally for the purpose of writing 'controlled
business'.... " that is:
[b) Insurance or annuity contracts covering
himself or members of his family, or the
officers, directors, stockholders, partners,
employees or debtors of a partnership,
association, or corporation of which he or a
member of his family is an officer, director,
stockholder, partner. associate, or
employee. (Emphasis added). [KRS 304.91000.
.

B.

Credit Life and Credit Health Insurance.
1.

Kentucky chartered banks pursuant to KRS 287.030(4) and national
banks as an incidental power imder 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) permit the bank to
act as agent in the sale of credit life and credit health insurance.

2.

The oce in 12 C.F.R. Part 2.1 regulates the disposition of credit life
insurance income. The OCC's position on credit life insurance was
upheld in Independent Bankers Association of America v. Heimann, 613
F.2d 1164 (O".C. Cir. 1980).
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3.

Banks must comply with the rules and regulations of the Department of

Insurance to sell credit life and credit health insurance.
C.

Update on the Sale of Annuities by Banks. The direct sale of annuities by
banks has become questionable based upon several recent court decisions.
Annuities have been traditionally sold by insurance companies. There are
variable and fixed rate annuities. The variable rate annuity is very similar to a
mutual fund and the fixed rate annuity is more like an insurance product.
1.

2.

National Banks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on
August 26, 1993, in Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company v. Clarke,
998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993), held that national banks were barred
from selling annuities in towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants and
further determined that "annuities" are an "insurance product" and not
financial investment instruments as the OCC had claimed. The court
also rejected the OCC's argument that Section 24(7) of the National Bank
Act provides independent authority for national banks to sell annuities.
The OCC requested that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rehear the case but the court declined on January 13, 1993, with a'
lengthy dissent from four judges; which sets the stage for a possible
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
State Banks in Kentucky. The Commissioner of the Kentucky
Department of Financial Institutions has taken the position in a letter
. dated May 25, 1990 and has recently verbally confirmed his position
with respect to variable and fixed annuities as follows:
We believe that KRS 287.210(2) permitsstate-chartered
banks to act as compensated agents for their customers
in purchasing or selling variable and fixed annuities. We
infer from this section the incidental authority to enter
into agreements with issuers or marketers of such
contracts whereby the banks may for a fee promote the
contracts and solicit their purchase by the banks'
customers, subject to the following requirements:
1.

The fee paid to the bank for each contract
sold may not vary with the volume of
contracts sold;

2.

Prospectuses, promotional materials,
advertising, and forms must clearly and
conspicuously state that the contract is a .
prod uct of the issuer, that it is not a
product of the bank, and that it is not
insured by the FDIC; and

3.

The bank must obtain a signed statement
prior to the sale of a contract in which its
customer acknowledges thaf the annuity is
an obligation of the issuer and not of the
bank, that the bank is acting as a
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compensated agent for the issuer, and that
. the obligation is not insured by the FDIC.
While your letter does not ask, I would add that
state-chartered banks may implement an incentive
program involving a pass-through of commissions to
employees who sell the contracts so long as full disclosure
of the compensation is made by the employee during the
sale of the contract. In addition, the employee's
percentage interest in commissions must not vary with
the volume of contracts sold, and the bank must have
written policies and adequate controls in place to prevent
product tie-ins and unsound lending practices. (Letter
from Commissioner ofKDFI dated May 25, 1990 to M.
Brooks Senn).
3.

D.

Department of Insurance. The Department of Insurance appears, based
upon informal discussions with staff members, to take the position that
an annuity in Kentucky is the.sale of an insurance product and that any
.sale of an .annuity must be in compliance with the rules and regulations
of the Department of Insurance ..

Leasing Space in Banking Facilities to Third-Party Distributors.
1.

National Banks. The OCC has indicated that national banks may lease
space in their lobbies to insurance agents and receive a percentage
override on the gross income from the sales. For a discussion on this
type of arrangement, see OCC Interpretive Letter No. 294, Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 85,438 (December 21, 1983). In 12 C.F.R. Part 7.7516,
the OCC's regulation states:
§ 7.7516 Sharing of banking quarters.
The operations of a national bank and another finan$1
institution should be separately identified and maintained
within any banking quarters which may be shared by
these institutions. Similarly, the assets and records of
such institutions should be segregated. Where a national
bank and another financial institution share banking
quarters, an active officer or employee of one institution
may engage in the performance of work for the other
institution pursuant to an agency agreement and under
such conditions as to insure that the agency relationship
is readily known to the customers of either institution.

The terms of any lease arrangement with a third party vendor should be
reviewed ~th the staff of the OCC prior to implementation.
2.

State Banks in Kentucky. The Commissioner of the KDFI has authorized
state-chartered banks in Kentucky to lease space in its lobby to a thirdparty vendor and has previously not taken exception to the bank
receiving compensation in the form of a rental payment of both fixed rent
and a percentage rent based on the volume of sale.
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Because no statute or regulation clearly authorizing such an
arrangement exists under Kentucky law, I would suggest any state bank
pursuing such an arrangement obtain a letter from the Commissioner
authorizing such a lease.
3.

E.

Ill.

Department of Insurance. The Department of 'Insurance may well object
to a bank entering such an arrangement with a third-party vendor if the
percentage rent based upon volume sold appears high and is the
equivalent of commission sharing. (See KRS 304.9-421. Sharing of
commissions prohibited.)

oee Insurance Guidelines. The oce has announced its intent to issue
guidelines on the sale of insurance by national banks in the form of an advisory
letter in the near future. At this time, these guidelines are not available.

UPDATE ON THE SALE OF MUTUAL FUNDS BY STATE BANKS AND NATIONAL
BANKS IN KENTUCKY.

A.

B.

'Overview. Unlike the authority for banks to sell insurance products the
permissibility of bank mutual fund activities under the Glass-Steagall Act
basically remains unquestioned. While banks may not underwrite or ~tribute
mutual funds, the real issue with respect to mutual funds has shifted to
supervisory and compliance concerns dealing with protecting the consumer,
providing adequate disclosure and insuring appropriate suitability standards
are instituted, among other issues. Each of the banking regulators, the banking
trade association, and others has set forth guidelines for banks that market,
directly or indirectly, mutual funds and annuities to their customers.
Bank Regulatory Guidelines. The following bank regulators have issued
guidelines on the marketing of non-insured products to a bank's customers:
1.

The oce in Section 413 for the Comptroller's Handbookfor National
Bank Examiners (OCe 94-13) on February 24, 1994 issued guidelines
with respect to retail nondeposit investment sales. A copy of oce 94-13
is attached'to this outline. oce 94-13 replaces Banking Circular 274,
which is rescinded.

2.

The OTS on September 7, 1993 in Thrift Bulletin 23-1 ("TB 23-1") issued
guidelines for thrifts on sales of uninsured products.

3.

The FDIe issued a supervisory statement ("FIL-71-93) on October 8,
1993 on sales of nondeposit investments.

4.

The Federal Reserve on June 25, 1993 issued a letter (SR 93-35) on the
separation of mutual funds sales activities from insured deposit-taking
activities.

5.

Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment
Products (NR 94-21) was released on February 15, 1994 under the
auspices of the fou.r bailking and thrift regulators. The guidelines
oversee sale of annuities, mutual funds and securities products made by
bank employees, sales made by employees of affiliated or unaffiliated
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entities occurring on bank premises and sales resulting from customer
referrals when the bank receives a benefit for the referral. NR 94-21
supersedes guidelines previously issued by the four banking agencies. A
copy of NR 94-21 is attached to this outline as a part of OCC 94-13.
C.

SEC. The SEC has long lobbied for functional regulation of sale of securities by
banks. In a recent speech to 1994 NASAA Winter Enforcement Conference, the
SEC Commissioner, Richard Y. Roberts, stated that he "would support the idea
that banks should be permitted to engage in the business of dealing in,
underwriting, and distributing the shares of investment companies and to
organize, sponsor, manage or control investment companies by conducting
these activities through separate non-bank affiliates.

D.

Bank Trade Group Guidelines.
1.

2.

On February 1, 1994, the American Bankers Association, The Bankers
Roundtable, Consumer Bankers Association, Independent Bankers
Association, National Bankers Association and the Savings &
Community Bankers of America released guidelines on Retail Investment
Sales. These guidelines are intended to complement the guidelines set
. forth by bank regulators.
A discussion of some of the provisions follows:
(a)

(b)

Purpose.

(1)

Enhance Customer Protection.

(2)

Complement Regulatory Policy.

(3)

Help Banks Comply

(4)

Encourage Training and Qualifications

Summary.
(1)

Oral and written disclosures. Oral and written
disclosures should be provided to the customer stating
that such products:
.are not bank deposits;
.are not obligations of or guaranteed by any bank;
.are not insured or guaranteed by the FDIC or any other
government agency; and
.involve investment risk, including the possible loss of
principal.

E - 11

IV.

(2)

Signed disclosures. The customer should sign a
disclosure form acknowledging that the customer has
read and understands the written disclosure.

(3)

Advertising and promotion. All advertising should contain
conspicuous and prominent notice of the uninsured
nature of investment products.

(4)

Location. Sales of nondeposit investment products should
take place in areas physically separate from deposittaking activities.

(5)

Settiru! and circumstances. Tellers should not- be
permitted to sell nondepositinvestment products and to
offer investment products. Nondeposit investment
products should only be sold by qualified personnel.

(6)

Employee qualifications and training. Bank management,
sales representatives and audit and compliance personnel
should demonstrate competence appropriate to the
function or responsibilities assigned to them. When
appropriate, and possible, sales representatives should
obtain a NASD license, such as Series 6 or 7. A NASD
license equivalency certificate may be appropriate.
Background checks for all sales repreSentatives are
strongly recommended.

(7)

Employee compensation and referral fees. Suitability, not
compensation, should guide in the sale of nondeposit
investments products. Referral fees to tellers and other
bank employees is permissible if not based upon the
success of the referral generating a sale.

(8)

Bank management and board of director oversight.
Banks should establish written policies and procedures
regarding retail sales of non-deposit investments
products. Policies should encompass third-party and
affiliated vend.or sales. Such policies should be designed
to achieve compliance with applicable banking, securities
and insurance laws and regulations. A compliance
program should be established, which is independent of
the sales program.

MISCELLANEOUS AND CURRENT EVENTS.

A.

The American Bankers Association announced in the American Banker on
February 10, 1994 that· it is developing a new series of training programs for
banks that sell mutual funds. The programs range from basic overview to
preparation for licensing.

B.

On February 1, 1994, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Benson speaking before-the
American Association of'Retired Persons called for mandatory disclosure
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requirements for bank mutual fund sales so the public will have sufficient
awareness as they make decisions.
C.

On November 4, 1993, Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.) introduced a bill (Securities
Regulatory Equality Act of 1993 (HR 3447)) requiring separate bank affiliates to
carry on securities activities and vested in the SEC the power to regulate them.

D.

On October 19, 1993 Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas) and Rep. Charles Schumer
(D-NY) introduced a bill (Depository Institution Retail Investment Sales and
Disclosure Act (HR 3306)) to insure consumers investing in mutual funds
through banks know their investments possess some risk and are not covered
by federal deposit insurance. The bill, if adopted, requires the bank to
physically separate the sale of uninsured products from the rest of the bank.

E.

As most of you are aware, Mellon Bank Corp. and The Dreyfus Corp. on

December 6, 1993 announced their intention to combine and form one financial
services company. The transaction has created much congressional interest, as
well as regulatory complexity as Mellon announced its intent to operate Dreyfus
as a subsidiary of its lead bank. On February 24, 1994 the OCC took an
unusual step of inviting public comments on the application.
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Contlct:

(202) 874-4700
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COMPTROLLER ISSUES GUIDANCE TO EXAMINERS ON MUTUAL FUND SALES
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today released procedures for
examining the mutual fund or other retail nondeposit investment sales operations of national
banks. The guidance implements the statement on nondeposit investment products issue9 by
the federal bank and thrift regulators last week.
.
"Today's action is the result of draft exam procedures that our examiners have been field
testing for the past six months. All OCC examiners will now have detailed guidance about
how to examine bank mutual fund sales," said Comptroller of the Currency Eugene A.
Ludwig. "I'm instructing examiners to determine that bank management responds
immediately to any matter that has the potential to confuse customers. as to the uninsured
nature of nondeposit investment products. "
The examination procedures cover all aspects of a national bank's retail sales activities,
including sales made by bank employees and sales on bank premises made by employees of
third party vendors. The procedures are more detailed than the acc's previous guidance
and offer specific examples of what the OCC expects from national banks that engage in this
business .
. Among other things, the procedures instruct examiners to:
•

Criticize sales programs with fund names so similar to the bank's ,that even mitigating
circumstances are unlikely to eliminate customer confusion. For example, a bank
named First National Bank would be misleading customers if it operated an uninsured
fund called First National Bank Fund.

•

Increase scrutiny of ALL aspects of a bank's sales program if the bank's name is
greatly similar to the fund's name.
- more -
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•

Assess the independence and thoroughness with which banks select the products they
will offer. In particular, examiners should criticize bank managers who choose
investment products simply because they generate the largest sales fees.

•

Verify that banks with investment sales programs have disclosed that mutual funds
and other nondeposit investment products (1) are not FDIC insured, (2) are not
deposits or other obligations or' guarantees of the bank, and (3) involve investment
risks. including possible loss of principal amount invested.

•

Determine whether these disclosures are featured conspicuously in all written or oral
sales presentations. advertising and promotional materials. confirmations. and periodic
statements that include the name or the logo of the bank or an affiliate. The
procedures state that disclosures in advertisements and brochures should appear in text
at least as large as that describing the product. The OCC will consider disclosures to
be conspicuous if they are on brochure covers or at the front of descriptive text.

•

Determine whether products recommended for sale are suitable investments for
customers. In p,articular. the prOcedures call for special attention for product
recommendations made to flfSt-time, risk averse, elderly. or surviving spouse
customers.

•

Verify that a bank has assigned a bank officer to be responsible for resolving any
customer complaims.

The procedures also include other examples of steps banks can take to minimize customer
confusion. For example. they give advice about how banks can ensure that sales personnel
are giving accurate disclosures to customers by using "testers." They also have guidance on
oversight of third party vendors seUing on bank premises and describe techniques used by
wen-managed banks to sele;t mutual funds or other investment products, such as annuities,
for sale to the bank's custoIIic;tS •
. The 'oce will send copies of the examination procedures to all national banks and all
riatioDal bank examiners.
#####
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acc BULLETIN

Comptroller of the Curren~y
Administrator of National Banks
Subject:

Nondeposit Investment Sales
Examination Procedures

TO:

Description:

Temporary Insert - Handbook
for National Bank Examiners

All Users of the Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners

PURPOSE
This issuance transmits a new section 413, Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales, for the
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners. This section should be inserted in the
handbook at the end of the "Other Areas of Examination Interest" section, behind section 412,
Discount Brokerage Activity.

REFERENCES
Banking Circular 274, Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales, is rescinded and replaced by new
section 413 to theComptroller's Handbookfor National Bank Examiners, dated February 1994,
attached.

BACKGROUND
On July 19, 1993, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currenc;y issued Banking Circular 274,
Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales, which provided guidelines for national banks involved in
the sale to retail customers of mutual funds, annuities, and other nondeposit investments.
Those guidelines were superseded on February 15, 1994, by the issuance of an Interagency
Statement, developed by the OCC, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the OTS. The
Interagency Statement will apply uniform standards to federally insured fmancial institutions
offering these services.

SCOPE
The Interagency Statement is incorporated in this insert, which provides national bank.
examiners with procedures for examining the nondeposit investment sales activities of national
banks. The questions and procedures presented here check for compliance with. the Interagency
Statement as well as laws, rules, and regulations. They also provide national bank. examiners
with a basis for evaluating management and controls in this type of operation.

Date:
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February 24, 1994
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Subject:

Nondeposit Investment Sales
Examination Procedures

Description:

Temporary Insert - Handbook
for National Bank Examiners

RESPONsmLE OFFICE
Questions concerning the Interagency Statement or any part of the insert may be directed to
the Office of the Chief National Bank Examiner, Capital Markets Group, in Washington, DC
at (202) 874-5070.

Susan F. Krause
Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy
Enclosure

Date:
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February 24, 1?94
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Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales
Introduction

Section 413.1

This section sets forth guidance for examiners reviewing bank nondeposit investment product retail sales operations, including bank-related marketing and promotional
activities. Examiners will review a bank's
programs for consistency with the Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of
Nondeposit Investment Products, dated
February 15, 1994 (Interagency Statement). The evaluation will cover all bankrelated activities including:
• Sales or recommendations made by
bank employees;
• Sales or recommendations made by
employees of affiliated or unaffiliated
entities occurring on bank premises
(including sales or recommendations
initiated by telephone or by mail
from bank premises); and
• Sales resulting from referrals of retail
customers to a third party when the
bank receives a benefit for the referral.

to comply with this regulatory guidance in
a timely manner.
This section applies to sales to individual
customers but does not apply to the wholesale sale of nondeposit investment products to non-retail customers, such as sales
to institutional customers or to fiduciary
accounts administered by an institution.
As part of its general responsibilities, however, a national bank should take appropriate steps to avoid potential customer confusion when providing nondeposit investment products to institutional customers or
to the bank's fiduciary customers. For
additional information on restrictions on a
national bank's use as fiduciary of the
bank's brokerage service or other entity
with which the bank has a conflict of
interest, including purchases of the bank's
proprietary and other products, see 12 CFR
9.12 and "Sales to Fiduciary Accounts,"
later in this section.

When reviewing a bank's nondeposit investment sales operation, examiners should
determine that the bank views customers'
interests as critical to all aspects of its
sales programs. Examiners should evaluate
a bank's policies and procedures from the
customers' perspective and should ascertain that customers are provided with a
high level of protection. If it becomes
necessary to recommend remedial action,
examiners should determine that bank
management responds immediately to any
matter that has the potential to confuse
customers as to the uninsured nature of
nondeposit investment products.

Scope
Examiner reviews of a bank's mutual fund
or other nondeposit investment sales program will concentrate on the policies and
procedures the bank .adopts and on the
effectiveness of their implementation.
When reviewing implementation of a
bank's program, examiners will investigate
whether senior bank management has:
(1)
Participated in planning the bank's
investment sales program;
(2)
Adopted a framework to ensure
compliance with all applicable laws,
rules, regulations, regulatory conditions, and the Interagency Statement; and
(3)
Ensured effective supervision of individuals engaged in sales activities,
including employees of the bank and
any other entity involved in bankrelated sales of investment products.

Banks that do not operate programs safely
and soundly or that engage in violations of
law or regulations will be subject to appropriate regulatory action. When determining
the appropriate action, examiners should be
mindful that some banks, especially banks
relying on third parties for sales of
nondeposit investment products, may need
time to conform their programs to the
Interagency Statement and to the guidance
contained'herein. At a minimum, however,
examiners should determine whether bank
management is making a good faith effort

Where relevant, references in this handbook section to bank management or bank
employees includes third party managers or
third party employees.
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Minimum Standards for Nondeposit
Investment Programs
Antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws prohibit materially misleading or
inaccurate representation in connection
with offers and sales of securities. (See,
for example, Section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-S.) If
customers are misled about the nature of
nondeposit investment products, including
their uninsured status, sellers could face
potential liability under these antifraud
provisions. Safe and sound banking also
requires that bank-related retail sales activities be operated to avoid confusing customers about the products being offered.
Use of nonbank employees to sell these
products does not relieve bank management of the responsibility to take reasonable steps to ensure that the investment
sales activities meet these requirements.
The Rules of Fair Practice of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
expressly govern sales of securities by
broker/dealers who are members of NASD.·
These rules apply to bank-related securities
sales by banking subsidiaries registered as
broker/dealers, affiliated broker/dealers,
and unaffiliated broker/dealers operating
under agreements with banks. These rules
apply whether such sales are made on
bank premises or at a separate location.
These rules do not expressly apply to sales
or recommendations made directly by the
bank. Even when these rules do not expressly apply, however, they are an appropriate reference for a bank compliance
program designed to ensure that the bank's
retail sales of all nondeposit investment
products are operated in a safe and sound
manner.
Before beginning to operate a nondeposit
investment sales program, banks may also
consider notifying their blanket bond carriers of plans to engage in these activities.
If applicable, this could permit the bank to
obtain written assurances from the carrier
that the bank's insurance coverage for
employees includes staff representing third
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
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party vendors.
Examiners also should encourage bank
management to review Retail Investment
5.ales: Guidelines for Banks. The publication, prepared jointly by six banking industry trade associations, contains voluntary
guidelines for bank sales of nondeposit
investment products as well as common
sense suggestions for putting many of the
DCC's recommendations into action.

Program Management
Banks must comply with all applicable
laws, rules,. regulations, and ~egulatory
conditions, and operate consistently with
the Interagency Sta.tement for any of their
bank-related retail sales of mutual funds,
annuities, or other retail nondeposit investment products. Bank.directors· are responsible for evaluating the risks imposed by
bank-related sales and are expected to
adopt a program statement and self-regulatory policies and procedures to ensure
compliance with all requirements. A bank's
policies and procedures must address bankrelated retail sales made directly by a bank,
through an operating subsidiary or affiliate,
or by an unaffiliated entity.
Examiners should expect that banks will
tailor their policies and procedures to the
scope of the bank's sales activities. The
level of detail contained in a bank's policies.
and procedures will depend on the structure and complexity of the bank's program.
Examiners will review the bank's securities
sales activities to determine that' the bank
has adopted a' statement that addresses
the risks associated with the sales program
and describes the features of the sales program, the roles of. bank employees, and the
roles of third party entities. The statement
should set forth the strategies the bank will
employ to achieve its objectives. It also
should outline the self-regulatory procedures bank management will implement to
ensure that the program's objectives are
met without compromising the customers'
best interests.
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At a minimum, examiners should expect
bank policies and procedures to address:

bank will use to select and review each
type of product sold or recommended.

Supervision of personnel involved in
nondeposit investment sales programs Senior bank managers will be expected to
ensure that specific individuals employed
by the bank, an affiliated broker/dealer, or
a third party vendor are responsible for
each activity outlined in the bank's policies
and procedures. Managers of the bank's
securities sales activities will be accountable for understanding the investment
products offered and the sales process, as
well as for assuring compliance with securities and banking laws, rules, and regulations.

For each type of product sold by bank
employees, the bank should identify specific laws, regulations, regulatory conditions,
and any other limitation or requirements,
including qualitative considerations, that
will expressly govern the selection and
marketing of products the bank will offer.
(See "Product Selection, n later in this
section for further discussion of these
issues.)

Designation of employees authorized to sell
investment products· - This should serve
as a guide for all bank-related employees
dealing with retail nondeposit investment
• product customers. The program statement should specify that only properly'
trained and supervised employees are
permitted to make investment sales or
recommendations. It should describe the
responsibilities of personnel authorized to
sell or recommend nondeposit investment
products and of other personnel who may
have contact with retail customers concerning the sales program. It also should
include a description of appropriate and .
inappropriate referral activities and the·
training requirements and compensation arrangements for each category of personnel.
The roles of other entities selling on bank
premises, including supervision of selling
employees - Bank management must plan
to monitor compliance by other entities on
an ongoing basis. The degree of bank
management's involvement should be
dictated by the nature and extent of
nondeposit investment product sales, the
effectiveness of customer protection sys(See
tems, and customer responses.
"Third Party Vendors," later in this section
for more details on programs operated by
third parties.)

Examiners should review:
• The process the bank uses to select
the products it will offer,
• What the bank did to ensure the
products meet its customers' needs
and expectations, and
• How well the bank is performing an
ongoing analysis of the appropriateness of the products offered for sale .
Examiners will also assess the independence and thoroughness of the analysis
and the degree to which the bank relies on
ratings services. Examiners should be
critical of· bank managers who simply
choose products that generate the largest
sales fees or accept what a third party has
to offer without performing an independent
analysis of the suitability of the products to
the bank's strategy and customer mix.
Examiners should not give the impression
that the agency expects bank managers to
be "stock pickers" or that it intends to
expand or limit the types of products banks
offer. Instead, examiners should determine
that bankers are selecting products that
generally meet their customers' needs.
(See "Third Party Vendors," later in this
section, for more details on the bank's
oversight roles when it relies on its third
party vendor to select products.)

The types of products sold - Policies and
procedures should include the criteria the

Policies governing the permissible uses of
bank customer information - Examiners
should determine that bank customer information policies address the permissible
uses of such information for any purpose

Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
Temporary Insert - February 1994

3

E - 21

Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales
Introduction

Section 413.1

associated with bank-related retail investment sales activity. In particular, if the
bank intends to use customer lists to telephone depositors whose certificates of
deposit are due to mature to inform them
about alternative investment products, the
policies should outline steps the bank will
take to avoid confusing customers as to
the risks associated with nondeposit investment products, including their uninsured nature.
Bank.s may also supply customer information lists to a third party vendor. Supplying
such information should only occur, however, after bank management has evaluated
steps the third party is taking to avoid
confusing customers and after determining
such steps are consistent with bank policy.
Bank management. also may wish to consider obtaining a legal opinion concerning
the bank's authority to share customer
information with third parties.
Communications with customers - Examiners should determine whether the bank's
policies consider the need for periodic and
.or,going communications with customers to
help them understand their investments
and to remind customers periodically that
the products they have purchased are not
insured deposits. Policies should outline
customer communications for the bank
during periods of market stress and assign
responsibilities for such communications.

Setting and Circumstances of
Nondeposit Investment Product
.
Sales
Banks should market nondeposit products
in a manner that does not mislead or confuse customers as to the nature of the
products or their risks. The setting and
circumstances surrounding sales of investment products is fundamental to ensuring
that customers can readily distinguish
between nondeposit investment products
and insured deposits. Examiners will determine ttJat bank management has established controls to distinguish retail deposittaking activi~ies from the promotion, sale,
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
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and subsequent customer relationships
related to retail nondeposit investment
sales.
To minimize customer confusion, sales of,
or recommendations for, nondeposit investment products on the bank's premises
should be conducted in a physical location
distinct from the area where retail deposits
are taken. Signs or other means should be
used to distinguish the investment sales
area from the retail deposit-taking area of
the institution.
In the limited situation in which physical
considerations prevent nondeposit investment product operations from being conducted in a distinct area of the bank, a
bank has a heightened responsibility to
ensure that measures are in place to minimize customer· confusion. To minimize
customer confusion, the bank should make
an officer responsible for each of the locations at which the investment product
sales will take place.
The bank also should .employ signs and,
where possible, separate desks and personnel for deposit-taking and investment product.sales. Investment product salespeople
should clearly identify themselves by the .
use of appropriate methods such as name
tags or separate business cards. In banks
where the investment program is likely to
be less elaborate, the examiner should
determine, at a minimum, that the bank
utilizes the written and oral disclosures
described below.
In no case should any employee, while
located in the routine deposit-taking area,
such as the teller window, make general or
specific investment recommendations
regarding nondeposit investment products,
or accept orders for such products, even if
unsolicited. Tellers and other employees
who are not authorized to sell nondeposit
investment products may only refer customers to individuals who are specifically
designated and trained to assist customers
interested in the purchase of such products.
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Product names - Banks may -not offer
nondeposit investment products with a
product name identical to the bank's name.
Names that imply that mutual funds are
U.S. government guaranteed also are prohibited.
Banks also should recognize that the potential for customer confusion may be increased if the bank offers nondeposit product names that are similar to the bank's
name. If the bank offers such nondeposit
products with names similar to the bank's,
it should design sales training programs to
minimize the risk of confusing customers.
In addition, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff have issued an opinion
that common names between a bank and a
mutual fund sold or marketed by or through
that bank are presumed to be misleading
and a violation of the Investment Company
Act of 1940. SEC staff contends, however, that a common name fund can rebut the
presumption that a fund's name is misleading by ensuring that the cover page of the
prospectus prominently discloses that the
fund's shares are not deposits or obligations of the bank and are not federally
insured.
When examining investment sales programs in a bank that is selling funds with
names similar to the bank's, examiners will
evaluate the steps that bank management
has taken to avoid confusing customers.
The greater the similarity between bank
and fund names, the more closelyexaminers will scrutinize all aspects of a bank's
sales program.

are so similar to a bank's name that they
are inappropriate because they are inherently confusing.
Examiners and bank management should
also be aware that the potential for customer confusion can depend on the context
in which the sales are taking place. For
example, it may be inappropriate for the
First National Bank to offer a mutual fund
product named "FNB Money Market Fund"
if First National Bank were also offering an
insured deposit product named "FNB Money Market Account."
Overall setting and circumstances - When
reviewing nondeposit investment product
sales operations, examiners should not
place undue weight on a single aspect of
the setting and circumstances of the sale.
Each bank's sales program is different, and
one set of rules may not cover all circumstances or provide all customers with the
necessary level of protection. Before judging a particular bank's operations, examiners should consider how the various elements of the program interact and whether
the elements combined mislead or avoid
misleading customers.
The following example illustrates how the
combination of certain elements can potentially mislead customers:
-An employee of the First National Bank
sits at a desk in the lobby. This employee sells money market mutual funds
and renews CDs. The employee tells
customers about two products the bank
is offering: the FNB Money Market
Fund, an uninsured retail nondeposit
investment product, and the FNB Money Market Account, an insured deposit.
This employee may have an incentive to
market the uninsured product because
the employee gets a commission for
selling a mutual fund but receives nothing for selling or renewing a deposit.

Examiners should criticize sales programs
in which fund names are so similar to the
bank's that even mitigating circumstances
are unlikely to eliminate customer confusion. For example, it may be acceptable
for "First National Bank" to offer a
nondeposit investment product named
"First Fund" as long as the bank has implemented sufficient disclosures, training, and
other measures to mitigate customer confusion. Other names, however, such as
"First Bank Fund" or "First National Fund"

This situation could confuse customers.
To mitigate customer confusion, the bank
should ensure that the employee has extensive knowledge of the products being sold
and that the employee is thoroughly aware
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of customer protection issues.
When
selling noninsured products, the employee
should also require customers to sign a
new account form acknowledging that the
product is not insured.
If space and personnel limitations appear to
increase the potential for customer confusion, examiners should encourage bank
management to require additional training .
and disclosures, to develop signs and
product names that clearly distinguish
among the products being sold, and to
assure that compensation for selling uninsured and insured products is equalized.
Examiners should expect banks with nondeposit investment sales programs already
in operation when this section is issued to
initiate actions immediately to conform all
aspects of the setting and circumstances
of the bank's program to these requirements. In particular, banks should take
immediate steps to correct any elements
that could confuse customers.

Disclosures and Advertising
Disclosures
Complete and accurate disclosure must be
provided to avoid customer confusion as to
whether a bank-related product is an investment product or an insured bank deposit. Examiners should determine that
banks selling, advertising,. or otherwise
marketing nondeposit investment products
to retail customers provide the following
product disclosures conspicuously: The
products offered (1) are not FDIC insured,
(2) are not deposits or other obligations or
guarantees of the bank, and (3) involve
investment risks, including possible loss of
principal amount invested.
The minimum disclosures should be provided to the customer:
• Orally during any sales presentation.
• Orally when investment advice concerning nondeposit investment products is provided.
• Orally and in writing prior to or at
the time an investment account is
opened to purchase these products.
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
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•

In advertisements and other promotional materials, as described below.

Examiners will determine whether these
disclosures are featured conspicuously in
all written or oral sales presentations,
advertising and promotional materials,
prospectuses, confirmations, and periodic
statements that include the name or the
logo of the bank or an affiliate.
Advertisements and brochures also should
feature these disclosures at least as large
as the text describing the bank's nondeposit investment products. The OCC believes
that these disclosures are conspicuous
when they appear on the cover of a brochure or on the first part of relevant written text. A bank's disclosures could also
be considered conspicuous if it prints the
required disclosures in a box or by displaying them in bold type or with bullet points.
The bank should obtain a signed statement
acknowledging such. disclosures from
customers at the time a retail nondeposit
investment account is opened. For accounts establ:;;'1ed before issuance of this
section, the bee";\', should consider obtaining
such a signed. statement prior to the next
sale. If the bank solicits customers by
telephone or mail, it should be assured that
customers agreeing to purchase nondeposlt
investment products receive the disclosure
acknowledgement form when they open a
new account. A bank shouid aiso request
all customers who previously opened investment accounts by mail without receiving these written disclosures to sign and
return a disclosure acknowledgement to
the bank.
Confirmations and account statements for
nondeposit investment products should
contain at least the minimum disclosures if
the confirmation or account statement
contains the name or logo of the bank or
its affiliate. If a customer's periodic deposit account statement includes account
information about nondeposit investment
products, the bank should clearly separate
that information from information about the
deposit account. The material on the cus-
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tomer's periodic deposit account relating to
nondeposit investment products also
should begin with the disclosures described
above as well as the identity of the entity
conducting the nondeposit transaction.
, Where applicable, examiners should determine that the bank has made additional
disclosures described in the Interagency
Statement regarding affiliate relationships
and specific fees and penalties.
Some disdosure obligations may arise from
the roles a bank or a bank affiliate may
play in the distribution, administration,
and/or management processes. For example, a bank' should disclose remuneration
'received for performing investment advisory services and administrative services
This
such as shareholder accounting.
dis'Closure obJigation may be met through
fee disclosures in a prospectus. If the
prospectus does not include such fee disclosures, the bank must make the disclosures by some other means. State law
requirements may also govern fee disclosures.

\

Additional disclosure responsibilities may
occur because of the manner in which
'nondeposit investment products are marketed. Examiners should determine whether public statements about the selection of
, the products a bank offers are reasonable.
As an example, if management represents
to customers that it has performed an
independent analysis of the product selected, the examiner should determine that the
bank has actually done so. Examiners will
also evaluate management's disclosure to
prospective customers of ratings applicable
to a particular product, including the source
of the rating. If ratings are used to promote certain products, examiners should
expect bank management to review whether the bank will disclose ratings changes
and, if so, determine how such disclosures
will occur.
Examiners should also determine whether
a bank-related sales program includes any
written or oral representations to customers concerning insurance coverage provided
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
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by any other entity apart from FDIC, e.g.,
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a state insurance fund, or an
insurance' company. If these types of
representations are made, examiners
should determine whether training concerning differences in insurance coverage is
provided to appropriate personnel. Appropriate personnel includes anyone who is
likely to respond to customer inquiries or
individuals designated to sell such products. Examiners should also determine if
written or oral explanations of the differences in coverage are provided to all customers.

Advertising
Examiners should assess the procedures
the bank uses to ensure that bank-related
sales advertisements are accurate, do not
mislead customers about the nature of the
product, and include required disclosures.
For example, claims about "no fees" or "no
charges" are not accurate if the selling
bank collects fees for investment advisory
services or collects fees for shareholder
accounting on the product or service being
advertised. In this case a bank could claim
that there are no "sales" charges and .inform readers that ~ description of other
charges is contained in the prospectus.
Examiners should determine that the bank
does not imply in advertising or in written
and oral presentations that the bank stands
behind an investment product.
The bank's marketing department should
not be solely responsible for bank-related
investment sales advertisements.
The
issuer, or, if a mutual fund, the distributer,
may prepare advertisements of specific
investment products that conform to standards developed by self-regulatory organizations such as NASD. Senior bank management should appoint an officer responsible for ensuring that bank investment
advertisements as well as advertisements
prepared by another party that make reference to the bank, or any advertisement
used in bank-related sales, are accurate,
not misleading, and include all required
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disclosures.

Suitability
Consistent with the Rules of Fair Practice,
the OCC expects banks to determine
whether a product being recommended is
an appropriate investment for the customer. Banks should ensure that any salespeople involved in bank-related sales obtain
sufficient information from customers to
enable the salesperson to make a judgment
about the suitability of recommendations
for particular customers. At a minimum,
suitability inquiries should be made consistent with the Rules of Fair Practice concerning the customer's financial and tax
status, investment objectives, and other
factors that may be relevant, prior to making recommendations to the customer.
This information should be documented
and updated periodically.'
A well-documented suitability inquiry can
protect a bank from dissatisfied customers
who threaten litigation. Such litigation
could introduce risk to the bank's capital.
Accordingly, the OCC may view banks
operating a retail securities business without appropriate suitability procedures to be
engaging in an unsafe and unsound practice.
Many banks use software programs that
document investor profiles to assist in
making suitability judgments. Each profile
is based on a customer's responses to
inquiries as to his or her financial and relevant personal history. The software program subsequently matches the customer's
investment needs and objectives to the
bank's available products. This type of
software is a tool, not a substitute for
professional judgement; it should not
weight bank proprietary products too heavily or bank deposits too lightly.

ability to absorb or recover losses. A
nondeposit investment salesperson should
also be aware that it is especially important
to make a careful suitability recommendation when dealing with a surviving spouse
who is not experienced in investment
matters.
Examiners should investigate potential
suitability problems in mutual fund sales
when reviewing "breakpoints" and "letters
of intent." Breakpoints are discounts that
are available to investors who purchase a
large amount of mutual fund shares in a
lump sum or as part of a cumulative investment program (e.g. under a "letter of intent"). The potential for abuse usually
occurs when the sale of several different
mutual fund shares takes place in quantities just below the level at which the purchaser would qualify for reduced sales
charges on anyone of the funds.
Examiners should determine whether a
bank officer has been assigned responsibility for implementing and/or monitoring the
suitability system. The examination approach should focus on the system the
bank has in place to make suitability inquiries, suitability judgements, and periodic
account reviews.
Examiners generally
should review sales patterns rather than
individual sales for suitability issues. To
determine the types of sales to test for
suitabilitv, examiners should investiaate
. marketing programs that target a cl~ass of
customers, customer complaints, sales to
first-time and risk-averse investors, sales
made by high- or low-volume salespersons,
volatile and new products, and the existence of mutual fund redemptions after
relatively short holding periods.

Qualifications and Training

One example of a critical suitability determination involves sales to elderly bank
customers. Many of these customers rely
upon investments or savings for retirement
income and may consequently demand high
yields. They may not, however, have the

Banks should implement detailed training
programs to ensure that sales personnel
have thorough product knowledge (as
opposed to simple sales training for a
product) and understand customer protection requirements. Examiners should assess the process the bank 'uses to ensure
that sales personnel are properly qualified

Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
Temporary Insert - February 1994

8

E - 26

i

Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales
Section 413.1

Introduction
and adequately trained to sell all bankrelated nondeposit investment products. If
bank personnel sell or recommend securities, the training should be substantively
equivalent to that required for personnel
qualified to sell securities as registered
representatives. Securities industry training is available in most metropolitan areas.

keting'division of a mutual fund sponsor or
another third party vendor. Bank staff
should also receive customer protection
and compliance training.
Examiners should .determine whether a
bank officer has been assigned responsibility for ensuring' that adequate training is
provided to bank staff, and for reviewing
the hiring and training practices of a third
party· vendor.

Examiners also should determine that the
bank's audit and compliance personnel and
persons with supervisory responsibilities
are properly trained and knowledgeable.

Compensation
Incentive compensation systems, which are
standard in the securities and insurance
businesses, are becoming increasingly
common in commercial banking. Personnel
who are authorized to sell nondeposit
investment products may receive incentive
compensation, such as commissions, -for
transactions entered into by customers.
However, . incentive compensation programs must not be structured in such a
way as to result in unsuitable recommendations or sales being m~de to customers.

A bank's hiring practices and training plan
should be designed around the complexity
and risks of the particular investment products being offered. While it may be appropriate JO have a banking generalist with no
securities industry background sell money
market mutual funds, it could be inappropriate to allow this individual to sell fixedrate annuities without extensive training.
If individuals with securities industry experience are hired to sell investment products
.for banks, they should have an understanding of securities industry customer protection and control systems and have an
adequate knowledge of the products being
·offered. Since they may not be familiar
with general banking regulations and may
not understand the needs of bank customers, banks should also ensure that these
individuals are instructed as to the specialized obligations' of selling investment products in a retail banking environment. Examiners should _expect management to
check with securities regulators to determine if potential bank sales employees with
previous securities industry experience
have a disciplinary history.

An improperly designed compensation
system can provide a bank employee with
the incentive to place his or her own compensation interests above the interests of
bank customers. Examiners should assess
the steps management has taken to ensure
that compensation programs do not operate as an incentive for salespeople to make
unsuitable recommendations or sales to
customers.
One way to avoid having the compensation
system drive the recommendation toward
mutual funds and away from certificate of
deposit renewals would be to separate the
nondeposit investment product sales and
CD renewal functions. Alternatively, if
employees are permitted to offer both
deposits and nondeposit investment products, a bank could reduce the temptation
by compensating the employee for renewing maturing deposits as well as for selling
nondeposit investment products. Examiners should discuss with bank management
where appropriate the methods used to
avoid possible conflicts of interest poten-

Banks engaging in lower volume mutual
fund and annuity sales frequently train
existing bank employees to sell investment
products. Examiners should determine that
bank management is satisfied that these
individuals have acquired "product knowledge," and thoroughly understand the need
to safeguard the customers' interests.
More specialized "product knowledge"
training is generally provided by the marComptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
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tially arising from the bank's' compensation
plan.
To investigate whether incentive compensation schemes could induce salespersons
to recommend products with higher commissions over a more suitable option, examiners should look to customer complaints and to sales patterns rather than to
individual sales. For example, an examiner
can look for instances in which sales for a
particular product increased after changes
to an incentive compensation system.

bank management should not rely on third
, party audit and control systems if that
vendor's control personnel receive transaction-based incentive compensation.
Bank employees, including tellers, may
receive a one-time nominal fee of a fixed
dollar amount for each customer referred
for nondeposit investment products. The
payment of this referral fee should not
depend on whether the referral results in a
transaction.

Fiduciary' Accounts

Examiners also should expect a bank to
increase its supervision of sales programs
as it increases its incentive compensation.
Examiners should be critical of supervision
that does not take into account the possibility that recommendations for purchases
of nondeposit investment products could
be influenced by the incentive compensation scheme.
If the overall setting and circumstances of '
a bank's investment sales program appears
to be only marginally satisfactory, examiners should regard higher incentive compensation on certain 'investment products and
lower compensation on deposits and other
investment products as having the potential for causing serious problems. In this
case the compensation system itself should
justify an increase in the level of bank
management supervision. If supervision is
not adequate, the examiner should criticize
the compensation system and other objectionabie factors in the setting and circumstance of the sale.
Bank supervisory employees who review
and approve individual sales, accept new
accounts, and review established customer
accounts should not receive incentive
compensation based on the profitability of
individual trades or accounts that are subject to their review. Similarly, department
auditors or compliance personnel should
not participate in incentive, compensation
programs that are based directly on the
'success of sales efforts nor should they
report to a mBnager who receives this type
of incentive c.ompensation. In addition,

Pursuant to 12 CFR 9.11 (d), examiners will
revieW' the investments held by national
banks as fiduciary to determine whether
such investments are in accordance with
law, 12 CFR 9, and sound fiduciary principles. In so doing, they will ensure that the
bank has complied with all applicable state
and federal restrictions on investment
transactions involving the bank's fiduciary
accounts.
Under 12 CFR 9.12, national bank fiduciaries may not invest funds held as fiduciary
in the stock of organizations with which
there exists such a connection as may
affect the exercise of the, best judgment of
the bank in acquiring the stock, unless
there exists specific authority for such an
investment in the governing instrument,
local law, a court order or through consents from all beneficiaries. As to accounts subject to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, such investments must be within the authority of that
Act. These principles govern purchases of
a bank's proprietary products, such as
. bank-advised mutual funds and private
label mutual funds for fiduciary accounts.
In addition, pursuant to 12 CFR 9.11 (d),
examiners will determine that fiduciary
purchases and retention of bank proprietary
products for fiduciary accounts are in
accord with sound fiduciary principles.
This requires that even if specific authority
exists for fiduciary accounts to purchase or
retain bank-advised or bank private label
mutual funds, the assets must be appropri-
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ate for each account. The investment
must be consistent with the purpose for
which each account was created, and
suitable for the beneficial interest holders
of each account. This requirement exists
as to purchases for individual accounts,
and for conversions of collective investment funds to bank-advised mutual funds.

tem to monitor customer complaints and to
review customer accounts periodically to
detect and prevent abusive practices.

Twelve CFR 9.7 requires banks to conduct
initial and annual reviews of each fiduciary
account as well as a separate review of all
securities by issuer to ensure compliance
with these requirements. These reviews
include:
.
• A documented review of each account to determine that the asset.s
of that account, including any proprietary products, meet the investment
objectives of the account. In struc- .
turing the account portfolio, the
fiduciary must consider the provisions of the document establishing
the account. The review must also
take into account the needs of the
beneficial· interest holders.
This
review should address the issues set
forth in the Comptroller's Handbook
for Fiduciary Activities, "Portfolio
Management. n
• A documented annual review of all
assets by issuer, including proprietary products. This review should
consider the quality of fund management, fee structure, risk diversification and anticipated rates of return. It should also address the considerations set forth in the
Comptroller's Handbook for Fiduciary
Activities, "Investments."

Examiners reviewing the compliance operations of a bank offering a variety of retail
investment products should ensure that the
bank has comprehensive self-regulatory
policies and that it is conducting an ongoing comparison of the bank's investment
sales practices with its stated investment
policy. In banks with a less elaborate
investment sales program, where an internal auditing group may perform all of the
bank'.s compliance functions, the examiner
should ensure that these auditors are periodically comparing sales practices with
policy.
Individuals performing the audit or compliance of the bank's investment program
should be qualified and should have the
necessary experience to perform the assigned tasks. Compliance personnel should
also' engage in ongoing training to keep
abreast of emerging developments in banking and securities laws and regulations.
Banks can establish independence of audit
or compliance personnel if such personnel
determine the scope, frequency, and depth
of their own reviews; report their findings
directly to the board of directors or an
appropriate committee of the board; have
their performance evaluated by persons
independent of the investment product
sales function; and receive compensation
that is not connected to the success of
investment product sales.
Bank compliance programs should be modeled after those in the securities business
where it is customary for compliance personnel to conduct regular and frequent
customer account reviews in order to
detect and prevent abuses. The extent and
frequency of customer account supervision
should be dictated by the aggressiveness
of the sales program and the riskiness of
products being offered.

Compliance Program
Banks must maintain compliance programs
capable of verifying compliance with the
guidelines specified in the Interagency
Statement and with any other applicable
requirements.
Banks should perform
nondeposit investment compliance programs independently of investment product
sales and management. At a minimum, the
compliance function should include a sys-

Examiners should expect the bank to assign individuals independent of the sales
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force to review periodically customer responses to suitability inquiries and to compare these responses to the type and volume of account activity to determine
whether the activity in an account is appropriate. If account activity is unusual relative to the customer's stated objectives
and risk tolerance, or if account activity is
brisk relative to the size of a customer's
investment or past practices, management
should make follow-up inquiries to determine if the activity serves the best interests of the customer.

If early redemptions are restricted to one
salesperson or one branch, management
can reasonably conclude that the problem
is localized. However, early redemptions
occurring throughout the sales network
may indicate that something is wrong with
the product itself or with the training provided to salespeople. Similarly, if reports
indicate that a salesperson is selling one
type of product almost exclusively, management may need to review that
individual's performance or training.
Ultimately, the way for bank management
to assure itself that the securities salespersons are providing the required disclosures
and making suitable recommendations to
customers is to "test" the sales program.
Effective "tests" can be conducted in
several ways. Larger banks sometimes
employ "testers" Who pose as prospective
customers and test the sales presentations
for a variety of issues including adherence
to customer protection standards. Many
other well-managed banks (of all sizes)
have instituted follow-up programs to
verify that their customers understood their
investment transactions. A bank manager,
who is independent of the sales force, may
telephone customers a few days after an
investment account is opened or an unusual transaction has taken place. The manager will determine if the customer understands what he or she has purchased;
understands the risks, including the uninsured nature of the product; understands
the bank's role in the transaction; and can
generally confirm responses to a suitability
inquiry previously provided.

If examinations or routine oversight by
bank management indicates that suitability
problems may exist, bank management is
expected to conduct its own review of all
affected accounts and to institute corrective actions. If it is determined that customers . may ,have been disadvantaged,
corrective actions should be designed on a
case-by-case basis and ,may include full
explanations to customers and, where
appropriate, offers to rescind trades.
Customer complaints are an indication of
potential problems that warrant a prompt
account review. Examiners should expect
the bank to assign a bank officer who is
independent of the sales force the responsibility for approving the resolution of
complaints or reviewing the resolution of
complaints by a third party vendor. The
examiner should evaluate the system for
assuring that all complaints (written and
oral) receive management's attention by
reviewing the bank's audit of the complaint
resolution system.

A bank officer usually can determine if a
customer understands an investment by
asking the customer to describe its general
features. The customer should be able to
describe how the product works and its
risks rather than simply recite what he or
she hopes to gain from the particular in:.
vestment. Managers usually also determine if the customer is satisfied with the
product and service or has any problems or
suggestions for improving service. If a
bank institutes a telephone follow-up program, it should maintain a record of con-

Managers of high-volume investment sales
programs also often use automated exception reporting systems to flag, potential
problems before customers complain.
Such systems monitor product sales and
the performance of salespersons. If the
bank has such systems in place, and if the
reports show significant volumes of mutual
fund redemptions after short holding periods, examiners should review the steps
management has 'taken to investigate
whether the product is being sold properly.
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versations with customers to resolve problems or disputes that may arise at a later
date.
"Negative consent" letters (e.g., notices
informing customers that unless they object, the bank assumes the customer understands and does not object to the transactions) may be a useful element in a
compliance program but should not be the
sole means of verifying that customers
understand nondeposit investment product
transactions and the bank's role in the
process.
Examiners should determine whether a
bank officer has been assigned the responsibility for assuring that the bank adequ~te
Iy _monitors the nondeposit investment
acpounts of customers. Examiners should
also determine whether the officer. has
developed or is developing a system to
monitor the customer account reviews of
outside vendors operating bank-related
sales programs.

Oversight of Third Party Vendors
When a bank uses a third party vendor to
sell nondeposit investment products, the
bank's board of directors must adopt a
written policy addressing the scope of the
activities of the third party, as well as the
procedures the bank intends to use for
monitoring the third party's compliance
with the Interagency Statement.
To select the third party vendor and monitor the ongoing acceptability of the vendor,
bank management usually reviews the
vendor's experience in the business and
the vendor's financial statement. Bank
management also usually contacts other
banks with which the vendor has done
business for references. Examiners should
also expect that bank management
checked with the vendor's regulator before
it entered into an agreement with the vendor and that management has continued to
review reports furnished to the vendor by
its regulator(s).
Bank management should enter into a
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
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written agreement with a third party vendor that has been approved by the bank's
board of directors before the vendor is
permitted, to offer nondeposit investment
products to the bank's customers. The
agreement should outline the duties and
responsibilities of each party and should
include a description of all of the activities
the third party is permitted to engage in on
the bank's premises. The agreement also
should set forth terms for the use of the
bank's space, personnel, and equipment as
well as compensation arrangements for
personnel of the bank and the third party.
The agreement also should:
• Specify that the third party will comply with all applicable laws and
regulations and will act consistently
with the provisions of this temporary
insert, especially the provisions
relating to customer disclosures,
• Authorize the bank to monitor the'
third party by periodically reviewing
and verifying that the third party and
its sales represe,ntatives are complying with its agreement with the
bank, with all applicable laws and
regulations, and with the provisions
of this temporary insert,
• Specify the type, scope, and frequency ~f reports the third party is
to furnish to bank management to
permit bank management to fulfill its
oversight responsibilities,
• Authorize' the institution and the
OCC to have access to appropriate
records of the third party,
• Require the third party to agree to indemnify the bank for any liability
that resulted from third party investment product sales program actions,
• Set forth the training which the bank
expects its employees and third
party personnel to possess, and
• Provide for written employment contracts between' the bank and the
third party vendor's employees.
Examiners will review the agreement to
determine that it specifies that the third
party vendor will comply with all applicable
requirements contained in the Interagency
Statement. Examiners also will review the
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agreement to determine if it includes provisions regarding bank oversight and examiner access to appropriate records. It is
expected that compliance with the agreement will be periodically monitored by the
institution's senior management.

to the third party vendor by its regulator(s) on at least an annual basis.
Bank management must monitor compliance by third party vendors on an ongoing
basis. Senior bank managers will be expected to ensure that specific individuals
employed by the bank and by the third
party vendor are responsible for each ,activity outlined in the bank's investment sales
policy. The degree of bank management's
involvement should be dictated by the
types of products being offered, the volume of sales, the nature of customers'
complaints, and the effectiveness of the
third party vendor's customer protection
systems.

Before entering into an agreement with a
third party vendor, bank management also
should be satisfied that the vendor uses a
product selection process similar to the one
outlined below. Banks relying on a third
party vendor to select products also should
understand and agree with the vendor's
method of analysis and document its concurrence with that method. Examiners
should determine whether management has
understood and concurred. Bank management should periodically investigate the
vendor's product selection process to
ensure that it continues to be appropriate
to the bank's customer mix. Examiners
. also should determine whether bank management understands and agrees with
contingency plans developed by the third
party vendor and the product issuer to
respond to customer orders during unusual
surges in redemptions.

Senior bank management also should appoint an officer responsible for ensuring
that bank' investment advertisements as
well as advertisements prepared by another
party that refer to the bank, or· any advertisement used in bank-related sales, are
accurate, not misleading, and include all
required disclosures. In addition, any advertising or promotional material - prepared by or on behalf of a third party vendor - should clearly identify the company
selling the nondeposit investment product
and should not suggest that the depository
institution is the se"er.

To fulfill its oversight responsibilities, it is
expected that bank management will receive various reports from the third party
vendor and have access to the vendor's
appropriate records. The reports received
will vary with the scope of the sales program and should be tailored to the needs of
the institution. The reports should always
include a list of all customer complaints
and their resolution. Other reports that
may facilitate bank management's oversight role, could include:
• A periodic listing of all new account
openings and descriptions of the
initial trades;
• A list of significant or unusual (for
. the customer) individual sales during
. a reporting period;
• Sales reports by product, salesperson, and location during a reporting
period; and
• Reports of internal compliance reviews of customer accounts originated at the bank and reports furnished

Examiner access to the records of third
party vendors should be governed by preliminary examination findings. \Vhen such
findings make it clear that bank management has discharged its oversight responsibility by reviewing and responding appropriately to third party reports, only a few
customer complaints have been filed
against the vendor, and the vendor's reports are timely, sufficiently detailed, and.
prepared by someone independent of the
vendor's sales force, examiner access to
third party records should generally be
limited to the reports furnished to management by the vendor.

Product Selection
This section describes in general terms the
methods that well-managed banks use to
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are usually regarded as necessary but
secondary considerations.

select specific non deposit investment
products and to determine that such products continue to be acceptable to the
bank's customer mix . . This information is
provided to help examiners understand and
review the process used by well-managed
banks to make this determination.

Management also considers the fund's
track record in terms of both risk and reward. Management analyzes the fund's
net asset value versus total return, its
management or operating expenses, the
turnover within the fund's portfolio, and
capital gains and other sources of income.
Other key considerations include the composition of the portfolio and concentrations
in types of holdings, sector weights, and,
in the case of equity funds, the percentage
of ownership represented by individual
issues.

Bank management should determine the
specific laws, regulations, regulatory conditions or other limitations or requirements,
including qualitative considerations, that
will govern the sale of products to be
offered. Although not required, most wellrun bank investment sales programs limit
the number of products offered so that
customers and salespersons will not be
presented with an overwhelming number of
choices. Limitations based on product
quality may also make it easier for sales
managers to shield certain classes of customers from inappropriate products.

Management also evaluates important nonstatistical factors such as the continuity,
tenure, and demonstrated talent of the
fund's management. They also may consider factors such as the quality of a mutual fund's operational and marketing support.

As a general practice, bank investment
programs offer at least one type of money
market mutual fund for customers who are
interested in liquidity. In addition, most
banks offer a U.S. government bond fund
for customers who stress safety and
steady income, an equity fund for customers interested in capital growth, and a taxexempt bond fund for customers who wish
to avoid taxes on investment earnings.

The bank itself, and not another -entity's
marketing· department, should select the
funds to be offered. Independent committees and qualified analysts should make the
final selections, not a sales manager whose
view of the commission structure may
affect this judgment.

When deciding which funds to offer, managers should review the fund's performance over an extended period of time.
Most bank managers prefer to avoid mutual
funds with volatile records. Management's
selection of a family of funds should not be
based on the performance of one particular
fund; each fund selection should stand on
its own merits.

If the bank uses outside consultants to help
select a mutual fund, bank management
should determine whether the consultant
receives compensation from mutual funds
or mutual fund wholesalers. If the analysis
is performed by another party, such as a
clearing broker or third party vendor, bank
management should understand and agree
with the method of analysis and should
document the bank's concurrence.

Management's selection of investment
products usually begins with an evaluation
of the stability of asset values over time
and an assessment of yields to investors.
Management also compares the performance of other funds with similar objectives over the same period(s). Specialized
ratings services (such as Morningstar or
Lipper) or ran kings by analytical services

Regardless of who selects the mutual fund
products, bank management will be expected to consider the issuer's contingency
plans for handling unusual surges in redemptions at the time such products are
being considered. Such contingency plans
normally include emergency staffing, communications, and operational programs that
are based on various market scenarios.
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Bank management should compare these
contingency plans to the expected needs of
bank customers during periods of stress.

thereby extinguishing its obligation to the
purchaser of the annuity. Annuity owners
are generally, but not always, asked to
consent to this transfer. A bank selling
annuities should consider the possibility of
such a transfer in its product selection
analysis. At a minimum, the bank should
disclose this possibility to prospective
customers.

Finally, once the initial selection process is
complete, bank management should conduct ongoing reviews to assur~ that the
products remain acceptable in light of the
bank's objectives and customer's needs.
Selection of annuity products is conducted
in the same manner. A variable-rate annuity, a hybrid form of investment that contains elements of mutual funds and insurance, could be characterized as a mutual
fund operated by an insurance company.
During product selection, bank management should consider the performance and
composition of the portfolio that is dedicated to the annuity holders.

Interagency Statement on Retail
Sales on Nondeposit Investment
Products
The full text of the interagency statement
begins on the next page.

Selection analysis for fixed-rate annuities
differs from variable-rate annuities. Since
fixed-rate annuities are obligations of insurance companies, the risks associated with
them.relate to the issuer's ability to honor
the terms of the annuity contract. Accordingly, the safety of an annuity depends
upon the financial standing of the firm that
issues it and the selection analysis involves
an assessment of the quality and diversification of. the company's assets, its holdings of junk bonds, mortgage-backed securities, and problem real estate' loans, as
well as the continuity of management.
Because it is difficult to independently .
.analyze insurance companies, ratings provided by rating agencies such as A.M.
Best, Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps,
Moody's and Weiss Research playa part in
annuity analysis. If bank management
relies significantly on such ratings rather
than on its own analysis, however, examiners should expect that the issuer selected
by the bank has received top ratings from .
most of the ratings services.
When analyzing annuities, management
also should recognize that an issuing insurance company can, in certain circumstances, sell or simply transfer the annuity
contract to another insurance company,
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
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Interagency Statement on Retail
Sales on Nondeposit Investment
Products
February 15, 1994

Introduction
Recently many insured depository institutions have expanded their activities in
recommending or selling to retail customers
nondeposit investment products, such a.s
mutual funds and annuities. Many deposItory institutions are providing these services at the retail level, directly or through
various types of arrangements with third
parties.
Sales activities for nondeposit investment
products should ensure that customers for
these products are clearly and fully informed of the nature and risks associated
with these products. In particular, where
nondeposit investment products are recommended or sold to retail customers, depository institutions should ensure that customers are fully informed that the products:
• Are not insured by the FDIC;
• Are not deposits or other obligations of
the institution and are not guaranteed
by the institution; and,
• Are subject to investment risks, including possible loss of principal invested.
Moreover, sales activities involving these
investment products should be designed to
minimize the possibility of customer confusion and to safeguard the institution from
liability under the applicable. ~nti-fraud
provisions of the federal seCUritIes laws,
which, among other things, prohibit materially misleading or inaccurate represent~
tions in connection with.the sale of securities.
The four federal banking agencies - the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Office of the .Comptroll~r
of the Currency, and the OffIce of Thrift
Supervision - are issuing this State~ent
to provide unifor~ gu.idance to d~~o.sltory
institutions engagIng In these actIvItIes.
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
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(Note: Each of the four banking agencies
has in the past issued guidelines addressing
various aspects of the retail sale of
nondeposit investment products. . OCC
Banking Circular.274 (July 19, 1993); FDIC
Supervisory Statement FIL-71-93 (October
8, 1993); Federal Reserve Letters SR 9335 (June 17,1993), and SR 91-14 (June
6, 1991); OTS Thrift Bulletin 23-1 (September 7, 1993). This Statement is intended to consolidate and make uniform the
guidance contained in the various existing
statements of each of the agencies, all of
which are superseded by this Statement.
Some of the banking agencies have adopted additional guidelines covering the sale of
certain specific types of instruments by
depository institutions, i. e., obligations of
the institution itself or of an affiliate of the
institution. These guidelines remain in
effect except where clearly inapplicable.)

Scope
This Statement applies when retail recommendations or sales of nondeposit investment products are made by:
•. Employees of the depository institution;
• Employees of a third· party, which may
or may not be affiliated with the institution (see Note, below, addressing which
institutions are covered), occurring on
the premises of the institution (including
telephone sales or recommendations by
employees or from the instituti?n's
. premises and sales or recommendatIons
initiated by mail from its premises); and
• Sales resulting from a referral of retail
customers by the institution to a third
party when the depository institution
receives a benefit for" the referral.
(Note: This Statement does not apply to
the subsidiaries of insured state nonmember banks, which are subject to separate
provisions, contained in 12 CFR 337.4,
relating to securities activities. For OTSregulated institutions that conduct sales of
nondeposit investment products through a
subsidiary, these guidelines apply to the
-subsidiary. 12 CFR 545.74 also applies to
such sales. Branches and agencies of U.S.

17

Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales
Introduction
foreign banks should follow these guidelines with respect to their nondeposit investment sales programs.)
These guidelines generally do not apply to
the sale of nondeposit investment products
to non-retail customers, such as sales to
fiduciary accounts administered by an
institution. (Note: Restrictions on a national bank's use as fiduciary of the bank's
brokerage service or other entity with
which the bank has a conflict of interest,
including purchases of the bank's proprietary and other products, are set out in 12
CFR 9.12. Similar restrictions on transactions between funds held by a federal
savings association as fiduciary and any
person or organization with whom there
exists an interest that might affect the best
judgment of the association acting in its
fiduciary capacity are set out in 1 2 CFR
550.10. However, as part of its fiduciary
responsibility, an institution should take
appropriate steps to avoid potential customer confusion when providing
nondeposit investment products to the
institution's fiduciary customers.)

Adoption of Policies and Procedures
Program Management. A depository institution involved in the activities described
above for the sale of .nondeposit investment. products to its retail customers
should adopt a written statement that
addresses the risks associated with the
sales program and contains a summary of
policies and procedures outlining the features of the institution's program and
addressing, at a minimum, the concerns
described in this Statement. The written
statement should address the scope of
activities of any third party involved, as
well as the procedures for monitoring
compliance by third parties in accordance
with the guidelines below. The scope and
level of detail of the statement should
appropriately reflect the level of the
institution's involvement in the sale or
recommendation of nondeposit .investment
products.
The institution's statement
should be adopted and reviewed periodi-

Section 413.1
cally by its board of directors. Depository
institutions are encouraged to consult with
legal counsel with regard to the implementation of a nondeposit investment product
sales program.
The institution'S policies and procedures
should include the following:
• Compliance procedures. The procedures for ensuring compliance with
applicable laws and regulations and
consistency with the provisions of this
Statement.
• Supervision of personnel involved in
sales. A designation by senior managers of specific individuals to exercise
supervisory responsibility for each activity outlined in the institution's policies
and procedures.
• Types of products sold. The criteria
governing the selection and review of
each type of product sold or recommended.
.• Permissible use of customer information. The procedures for the use of
information regarding the institution's
customers for any purpose in connection with the retail sale of nondeposit
investment products.
• Designation of employees to sell investment products. A description of the
responsibilities of those personnel authorized to sell nondeposit investment
products and of other personnel who
may have contact with retail customers
concerning the sales program, and a
description of any
appropriate and
inappropriate referral activities and the
training requirements and compensation
arrangements for each class of personnel.
Arrangements with Third Parties. If a
depository institution directly or indirectly,
including through a subsidiary or service
corporation, engages inactivities as described above under which a third party
sells or recommends nondeposit investment products, the institution should, prior
to entering into the arrangement, conduct
an appropriate review of the third party.
The institution should have a written agreement with the third party that is approved

Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
Temporary Insert - February 1994

18

E - 36

Retail Nondeposlt Investment Sales
Introduction
by the institution's board of directors.
Compliance with the agreement should be
periodically monitored by the institution's
senior management. At a minimum, the
written agreement should:
• Describe the duties and responsibilities
of each party, including a description of
permissible activities by the third party
on the institution's premises, terms as
to the use of the institution's space,
personnel, and equipment, and compensation arrangements for personnel of
the institution and the third party.
• Specify that the third party will comply
with all applicable laws and regulations,
and will act consistently with the provisions of this Statement and, in particular, with the provisions relating to customer disclosures.
• Authorize the institution to monitor the
third party and periodically review and
verify that the third party and its sales
representatives are complying with its
agreement with the institution.
• Authorize the institution and the appropriate banking agency to have access to
such records of the third party as are
necessary or appropriate to evaluate
such compliance.
• Require the third party to indemnify the
institution for potential liability resulting
from actions of the third party with
regard to the investment product sales
program.
• Provide for written employment contracts, satisfactory to the institution, for
personnel who are employees of both
the institution and the third party.

General Guidelines
1. Disclosures and Advertising
The banking agencies believe that recommending or selling nondeposit investment
products to retail customers should occur
in a manner that assures that the products
are clearly differentiated from insured
deposits. Conspicuous and easy to comprehend disclosures concerning the nature
of nondeposit investment products and the
risk inherent in investing in these products
are one of the most important ways of en-

Section 413.1
suring that the differences between
nondeposit products and insured deposits
are understood.
Content and Form of Disclosure. Disclosures with respect to the sale or recommendation of these products should, at a
minimum, specify that the product is:
• Not insured by the FDIC;
• Not a deposit or other obligation of, or
guaranteed by, the depository institution;
• Subject to investment risks, including
possible loss of the principal amount
invested.

The written disclosures described above
should be conspicuous and presented in a
clear and concise manner.
Depository
institutions may provide any additional
disclosures that further clarify the risks
involved with particular nondeposit investment products.
Timing of Disclosure. The minimum disclosures should be provided to the customer:
• Orally during any sales presentation,
• Orally when investment advice concerning nondeposit investment products is
provided,
• Orally and in writing prior to or at the
time an investment account is opened
to purchase these products, and
• In advertisements and other promotional
materials, as described below.

A statement, signed by the customer,
should be obtained at the time such an
account is opened, acknowledging that the
customer has received and understands the
disclosures.
For investment accounts
established prior to the issuance of these
guidelines, the institution should consider
obtaining such a signed statement at the
time of the next transaction.
Confirmations and account statements for
such products should contain at least the
minimum disclosures if the confirmations or
account statements contain the name or
the logo of the depository institution or an
affiliate. (Note: These disclosures should
be made in addition to any other confirma-
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tion disclosures that are required by law or
regulation, e.g., 12 CFR 12, 208.8(k)(3),
and 344.) If a customer's periodic deposit
account statement includes account information
concerning the
customer's
nondeposit investment products, the information concerning these products should
be clearly separate from the information
concerning the deposit account, and should
be introduced with the minimum disclosures and the identity of the entity conducting the nondeposit transaction.

Advertisements and Other Promotional
Material. Advertisements and other promotional and sales material, written or otherwise, about nondeposit investment products sold to retail customers should conspicuously include at least the minimum
disclosures discussed above and must not
suggest or convey any inaccurate or misleading impression about the nature of the
product or its lack of FDIC insurance. The
minimum disclosures should also be emphasized in telemarketing contacts. Any
third party advertising or promotional material should clearly identify the company
selling the nondeposit investment product
and should not suggest that the depository
institution is the seller. If brochures, signs,
or other written material contain information about both FDIC-insured deposits and
nondeposit investment products, these
materials should clearly segregate information about nondeposit investment products
from the information about deposits.

If sales activities include any written or oral
representations concerning insurance coverage provided by any entity other than the
FDIC, e.g., the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)' a state insurance
fund, or a private insurance company, then
clear and accurate written or oral explanations of the coverage must also be provided to customers when the representations
concerning insurance coverage are made,
in order to minimize possible confusion
with FDIC insurance. Such representations
should not suggest or imply that any alternative insurance coverage is the same as or
similar to FDIC insurance.
Because of the possibility of customer
confusion, a nondeposit investment product must not have a name that is identical
to the name of the depository institution.
Recommending or selling a nondeposit.
investment product with a name similar to
that of the depository institution should
only occur pursuant to a sales program
designed to minimize the risk of customer
confusion.
The institution should take
appropriate steps to assure that the issuer
of the product has complied with any
applicable requirements established by the
Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the use of similar names.

the depository institution should disclose
the existence of an advisory or other material relationship between the institution or
an affiliate of the institution and an investment company whose shares are sold by
the institution and any material relationship
between the institution and an affiliate
involved in providing nondeposit investment products. In addition, where applicable, the existence of any fees, penalties, or
surrender charges should be disclosed.
These additional disclosures should be
made prior to or at the time an investment
account is opened to purchase these products.

2. Setting and Circumstances
Selling or recommending nondeposit investment products on the premises of a depository institution may give the impression
that the products are FDIC-insured or are
obligations of the depository institution.
To minimize customer confusion with
deposit products, sales or recommendations of nondeposit investment products on
the premises of a depository institution
should be conducted in a physical location
distinct from the area where retail deposits
are taken. Signs or other means should be
used to distinguish the investment sales
area from the retail deposit-taking area of
the institution. However, in the limited
situation where physical considerations
prevent sales of nondeposit products from
being conducted in a distinct area, the
institution has a heightened responsibility
to ensure appropriate measures are in place
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to minimize customer confusion.

updated periodically and should occur on
an ongoing basis. _

In no case, however, should tellers and
other employees, while located in the
routine deposit-taking area, such as the
teller window, make general or specific
investment recommendations regarding
nondeposit investment products, qualify a
customer as eligible to purchase such
products, or accept orders for such products, even if unsolicited. Tellers and other
employees who are not authorized to sell
nondeposit investment products may refer
customers to individuals who are specifically designated and trained to assist customers interested in the purchase of such
products.
3. QIJalifications and Training
The depo~itory -institution should ensure
that its personnel who are authorized to
sell nondeposit investment products or to
. provide investment advice with respect to
such products are adequately trained with
regard to the specific products being sold
or recommended. Training should not be
limited to sales methods, but should impart
a thorough knowledge of the products
involved, of applicable legal restrictions,
and of customer protection requirements.
If depository institution personnel sell or
recommend securities, the training should
be the substantive equivalent of that required for personnel qualified to sell securities as registered representatives. (Note:
Savings associations are not exempt from
the definitions of "broker" and "dealer" in
Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; therefore, all
securities sales personnel in savings associations must be registered representatives.)

Depository institutions should investigate
the backgrounds of employees hired for
their nondeposit investment products sales
programs, including checking for possible
disciplinary actions by securities and other
regulators if the employees have previous
investment industry experience.
4. Suitability and Sales Practices
Depository institution personnel involved in
selling nondeposit investment products
must adhere to fair and reasonable sales
practices and be subject to effective management and compliance reviews with
regard to such practices. In this regard, if
depository institution personnel recommend
nondeposit investment products to customers, they should have reasonable grounds
for believing that the specific product
recommended is suitable for the particular
customer on the basis of information disclosed by the customer. Personnel should
make reasonable efforts to obtain information directly from the customer regarding,
at a minimum, the customer's financial and
tax status, investment objectives, and
other information that may be useful or
reasonable in making investment recommendations to that customer. This information should be documented and updated
periodically.
5. Compensation
.
Depository institution employees, including
tellers, may receive a one-time nominal fee
of a fixed dollar amount for each customer
referral for nondeposit investment products. The payment of this referral fee
should not depend on whether the referral
results in a transaction.

Depository institution personnel with supervisory responsibilities should receive training appropriate to that position. Training
should also be provided to employees of
. the depository institution who have direct
contact with customers to ensure a basic
understanding of the institution's sales
activities and the policy of limiting the
involvement of employees who are not
authorized to sell investment products to
customer referrals. Training should be

Personnel who are authorized to sell
nondeposit investment products may receive incentive compensation, such as
commissions, for transactions entered into
by customers. However, incentive compensation programs must not be structured
in such a way as to result in unsuitable
recommendations or sales being made to
customers.
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Depository institution compliance and audit
personnel . should not receive incentive
compensation directly related to results of
the nondeposit investment sales program.
6. Compliance
Depository institutions should develop and
implement policies and procedures to ensure that nondeposit investment product
sales activities are conducted in compliance
with applicable laws and regulations, the
institution's internal policies and procedures, and in a manner consistent with this
Statement. Compliance procedures should
identify any potential conflicts of interest
and how such conflicts should be addressed.
The compliance procedures
should also provide for a system to monitor
customer complaints and their resolution.
Where applicable, compliance procedures
also should call for verification that third
party sales are being conducted in a manner consistent with the governing agreement with the depository institution.
The compliance function should be conducted independently of nondeposit investment product sales and management
activities. Compliance personnel should
determine the scope and frequency of their
own review, and findings of compliance
reviews should be periodically reported
directly to the institution's board of directors, or to a designated committee of the
board.
Appropriate procedures for the
nondeposit investment product programs
should also be incorporated into the
institution's audit program.

Supervision by Banking Agencies
The federal banking agencies will continue
to review a depository institution's policies
and procedures governing recommendations and sales of nondeposit investment
products, as well as management's implementation and compliance with such policies and all other applicable requirements.
The banking agencies will monitor compliance with the institution's policies and
procedures by third parties that participate
in the sale of these products. The failure
of a depository institution to establish and
observe appropriate policies and procedures
consistent with this Statement in connection with sales activities involving
nondeposit investment products will be
subject to criticism and appropriate corrective action.
Questions on the Statement may be submitted to:
FRS Division of Banking Supervision
and Regulation,· Securities Regulation Section, (202) 452-2781;
Legal Division, (202) 452-2246.
FDIC Office of Policy, Division of
Supervision, (202) 898-6759;
Regulation and Legislation Section, Legal Division (202) 8983796.
OCC Office of the Chief National Bank
Examiner, Capital Markets Group,
(202) 874-5070.
OTS Office of Supervision Policy,
(202) 906-5740; Corporate and
Securities Division, (202) 9067289.
Effective date: February 15, 1994
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1. To determine if the bank has taken
reasonable steps to ensure that retail
customers can distinguish between
insured deposits and uninsurednondeposit investment products.
2. To determine if the banks' policies,
procedures, and practices provide for
an adequate self-regulatory system
that is designed to ensure customer
protections in all aspects of the sales
programs.

3. To ensure that bank management
operates the bank's nondeposit
investment sales program in a safe
and sound manner and complies
with
guidelines, interagency
statements, and all applicable laws
and regulations.

ace

4. TQ initiate cor:rective action when
the bank's policies, practices, procedures, or managerial controls are
deficient or when the bank has failed
to comply with laws, rules, regulations or
guidelines.

ace
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All examiners should be familiar with all
examination procedures, and should complete any steps they think are necessary.
However, there are some reasonable standards for which procedures form the basis
of review of certain types of operations:
For a community bank that uses an independent third party vendor to operate its
retail sales program, examiners may find it
adequate to complete only the Third Party
Vendor section of the ICQs and the related
examination procedures.

-

Program Management
3.

Determine the extent of management
involvement in the operation, and the
quality of management of the retail
nondeposit investment sales program.
Review:
• Responses to the Program Management section of the ICQ.
• Resumes of key officials involved
in the management of the sales
program to determine their experience and tenure with the bank.
• Written performance objectives and
performance appraisals of key
management personnel to ,determine whether objectives and appraisals incorporate· compliance
issues, particularly compliance with
disclosure and customer protection
standards.
• Reports furnished to senior management and the board of directors
to determine whether they are
sufficiently timely, accurate and
meaningful to permit effective
oversight.

4.

Review senior management's actions
in implementing the retail nondeposit
investment sales program and in offering any new products. Specifically
determine whether bank management:
• Participated in the development of
the bank's investment sales program strategic plan.
.
• Conducted a risk and regulatory assessment and adopted a compliance program directed at ensuring
compliance with all applicable
laws, rules, regulations, regulatory
conditions, and the Interagency
Statement's guidelines.
• Provided for internal audit/compliance participation in the developmentof the program.
• Adopted a program management
statement aimed at ensuring effec-

For a bank that operates its own sales program or operates through a joint venture or
an affiliated broker/dealer, an examiner will
usually find it necessary to complete all
sections at the first examination. At subsequent examinations of sales programs
with no apparent weaknesses, completion
of only the core examination· procedures
(indicated in bold type) may be adequate.
Any concern that surfaces when applying
the core procedures may be addressed by
expanding the examination.
1.

Complete the Internal Control Questionnaire (lCO). Note explanations for
any negative answers and changes
since the last examination.

Scope of the Examination .
2.

To determine the scope of the examination:
a. Meet with senior management of
the bank or department to discuss
the scope and direction of the retail
non deposit investment sales program.
b. Review the business plan and policy and procedure manual to gain
perspective on the nature of the.
bank's program. Note any significant changes since the last examination.
c. Review compliance and/or audit
coverage and reports since the last
examination. Note:
- Previously identified strengths
and weaknesses, and
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Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales
Section 413.3

Examination Procedures
tive supervision of the individuals
engaged in sales activities - whether they are employees of the bank
or of another entity involved in
bank-related sales of investment
products.

5.

Determine how the retail nondeposit
investment sales program is managed.
a. Analyze sales program growth and
earnings performance and determine why certain products have
high levels of performance. Consider how this performance relates
to incentive compensation and the
suitability of recommendations to
customers.
b. Review the customer mix and market surveys. Look at trends in
identifiable classes of customers
and be alert for concentrations by
types of customers. Also, try to
determine whether customers are
viewed as one-time buyers or are
being cultivated to establish longer
term relationships.
c. Review the products offered and
any market surveys and determine
the risk inherent in different products. Consider whether manage. ment has attempted to match
products to investors' needs in
general.
d. Review projections for the sales
program and for different products
and determine whether they:
- Are realistic in light of the
bank's customer mix;
- Relate to bank staffing and
training plans for the sales,
supervision, and compliance
functions; and
- Are consistent with the bank's
overall strategic plan.
e. Determine the effectiveness of the
bank's self-regulatory policies and
procedures as measured by the
number and type of customer
complaints and by responses to the
ICO.
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Product Selection
6.

Assess the adequacy of management
processes to select and review products sold. Review:
• Responses to the Product Selection
section of the ICO.
• Methods bank management uses
to select products to meet customer needs.
• Management's comparison of the
performance of the products they
offer to general market products
with similar objectives.

7.

Discuss your findings from the product selection review with senior management and make a judgement about
the appropriateness of management's
decision to continue to offer these
products.

Use of Customer Information
··8;

Determine whether policies governing
the permissible uses of bank customer information address the steps to be
taken to reduce possible confusion
among depositors· who are ~ei!1g
solicited to purchase nondeposlt Investment products.

Setting and Circumstances of. Sales

9. Determine whether bank management
has established effective controls to
distinguish retail deposit-taking activities from retail nondeposit investment
sales. Consider how the various elements of the setting and circumstances may interact to influence the customers' perception.

10.

Where the deposit-taking and securities sale functions are performed by
the same personnel, determine if the
bank uses appropriate written and oral
disclosures to guard against customer
confusion, and the extent to which
bank staff is trained to use, and does
use, such disclosures.

2

Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales
Examination Procedures

Section 413.3

Disclosures and Advertising

pany.

11 .

If representations about non-FDIC
insurance coverage are made,
determine whether:
- Each appropriate person who
has contact with customers is
trained concerning the differences among those coverages,
and
- Written or oral explanations of
the differences in coverage are
provided to all customers.

Review responses to the Disclosures .
and Advertising section of the Ica
and a representative sample of each
type of advertising and promotional
material.
a. Determine whether all of the required disclosures are featured
conspicuously in:
- All written or oral· sales presentations,
- Advertising and promotional
materials,
- Confirmations and account
statements that contain the
name or the logo of the bank or
an affiliate, and
- Periodic statements that include
information on both deposit and
nondeposit products.
b. Determine, where applicable, if the
bank has disclosed the existence
of:
- An advisory or other. relationship between the bank and any
affiliate involved in providing
non deposit investment products, and
- Any early withdrawal penalties,
surrender charge penalties, and
deferred sales charges.
c. Determine whether bank-related
sales advertisements are:
- Accurate, and
- Not likely to mislead customers
about the nature of the product.
d. Review product brochures and
advertising to ensure that they do
not imply that the bank stands
behind an investment product;
Also determine whether public
statements concerning the selection of the products a bank offer~
are reasonable.
e. Determine whether personnel make
any written or oral representations
concerning insurance coverage by
any entity other than the FDIC,
e.g., Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC); a state insurance fund; or an insurance com-

Suitability
12. Judge whether systems in place are
adequate to ensure that sales personnel make suitable recommendations and whether management is discharging its responsibilities under
these systems by reviewing:
• Responses to the Suitability section of the ICa,
• Customer complaints and resolutions,
• Sales patterns,
• Compensation differentials that
may influence recommendations,
and
• Compliance and/or audit reports.

13.

If your findings in 12, above, are
negative or uncertain, review a sample
of sales to determine if transactions
appear unsuitable for a customer,
based on responses to the suitability
inquiries. The sample should include
transactions involving:
• Customer complaints,
• Marketing programs that target a
class of customers,
• First-time and risk-averse investors,
• High or low volume salespersons,
• More volatile and newer products,
and
• Redemptions of annuities or mutual
funds after relatively short holding
periods.

14.

If, after the review in 13, above, you
are still not certain that recommenda-
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tions are suitable, direct bank management to conduct an independent review of all affected accounts and to
report their findings to the EIC.
15.

If you determine that customers may
have been disadvantaged, discuss
appropriate corrective action with
senior management. Such action
should be designed on a case by case
basis and may include:
• Full explanations to customers and,
where appropriate, offers to rescind trade.
• A recommendation to bring in 'an
independent audit or special counsel to perform further review of
customer transactions.
• Other action agreed upon between
bank management and the EIC.

sales programs or of individual
product offerings increases as
incentive compensation increases.
c. Determine whether referral fees
are, in any way, based on a sale
being made.
d. Review written performance objectives and a sample of performance
appraisals' for salespersons and
determine if the system for motivating and rewarding salespersons
strikes a reasonable balance between profitability and the need to
protect customer ,interests.

Sales to Fi,duciary Accounts

Review the compensation plan and assess the steps management has taken
to ensure that compensation programs
are not structured in a way that result
in unsuitable recommendations or
sales being made to customers.
a. Be alert to increases in the sales
volume of a particular product, to
customer complaints, and to suitability problems that may relate to
the incentive compensation system
and/or changes in compensation.
b. Determine whether supervision of

18. Determine whether, on retail nondeposit investment transactions involving the bank's fiduciary accounts, the
bank has complied with all applicable
state and federal restrictions, including the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.
a. If proprietary or private label sales
to trust accounts were executed
through the bank's nondeposit
investment sales program, determine if the transactions were expressly authorized under state law or
if authorization were obtained by
the bank.
b. Determine whether managef'!'lent's
justification of any transfer of trust
account investments to investments acquired through the bank's
nondeposit investment sales program has taken i'nto account all
relevant circumstances, account by
acccout. Relevant circumstances
include:
- The provisions of the trust account,
- The beneficiaries' needs,
- The quality of fund management,
- The fee structure,
- Risk diversification, and
- Rates of return.
c. Determine' whether the trust department conducts periodic re-
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Qualifications and Training
16.

Assess the bank's process for ensuring that supervisory, investment sales,
audit, ,and compliance personnel are
properly qualified· and adequately
trained by reviewing hiring and training practices and future plans and
determining whether they are:
• Designed around the complexity
and risks of the investment products being offered, and
• Consistent with the organization's
projections for growth and product
line expansion.

Compensation
17.

E - 46

Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales
Examination Procedures

Section 413.3

views of the ongoing prudence of
the investment.
Such reviews
should cover:
- The quality of the holdings,
- The compatibility of investment
.
objectives, and
- The availability of competing investments, including non-proprietary products, which might
better meet the fiduciary account's investment objectives.

a. Review responses under the Third
Party Vendor section of the ICO
and the text of the bank's oversight program.
b. Review the scope and frequency of
completed and scheduled oversight
reviews and reviews of customer
complaints and their resolution.
c. Review bank management's response to recommendations made
during past examinations.
d. Review the third party vendor
agreement and determine:
- Whether it specifies that such
entities will comply with all
applicable requirements, including those in the Interagency
Statement.
- How bank management assures
itself that third party vendors
comply with the terms of the
agreement.
e. Review how bank management
determined the adequacy of the
steps a third party vendor takes to
avoid customer confusion about
the nature of the product and the
bank's role in the sales process .
. f. Determine whether bank management understands and agrees with
the way the third party vendor
selects products.

Compliance Program
19.

Determine how effective the bank's
compliance program is by reviewing:
• Responses to the Compliance Program section of the ICa,
• The independence of compliance
personnel,
• Training provided to compliance
personnel,
• Automated exception reporting
systems, and
• The scope, frequency, and findings
of compliance reviews, and responses to findings.

20.

Determine whether results of periodic
reviews are formally communicated to
senior managers independent of the
sales function, and whether a followup system tracks management responses to noted exceptions.

21 .

If prior examination findings, compliance reports, a pattern of customer
complaints, or routine oversight by
bank management identifies the possibility that suitability problems may
exist, determine if bank management
has conducted a thorough review of
all affected accounts and instituted
appropriate corrective actions.

Third Party Vendors
22.

Determine the effectiveness of the
bank's oversight program and whether
bank management has discharged its
responsibilities under the program.
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23.

After making a judgment about the
effectiveness of the oversight of third
party vendor sales, complete any
other examination procedures that
appear appropriate.

Summary
24.

Determine if bank management has
demonstrated by its actions whether
it believes customers' interests are
critical to all aspects of its nondeposit
investment product sales programs.

25.

Discuss significant findings with the
EIC and bank management and prepare written comments.
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Program Ma'nagement
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Has the bank's board of directors
adopted a program management
statement that addresses:
• The features of the sales program?
• The associated risks?
• The roles of bank employees?
• The roles of third party entities?

Do policies and procedures for personnel who are not directly involved in
nondeposit investment product sales
detail what the employees may say
and not say about investment products?

Product Selection

Do the bank's policies address the
following issues:
• Program objectives?
• Strategies to be employed to
achieve objectives?
• Supervision of personnel involved
in nondeposit investment sales programs?
• Supervisory responsibilities of third
party vendors who are selling on
bank premises?
• Selection of the products the bank
will sell?
• Permissible uses of bank customer
information?
• Communications with customers?
• The setting and circumstances of
nondeposit product sales?
• Disclosures and advertising?
• Suitability of recommendations?
• Employee qualifications and training?
• Employee compensation systems?
• A compliance program?

Do written supervisory procedures
assign a manager the responsibility
for:
• Reviewing and authorizing each
sale?
• Accepting each new account?
• Reviewing and authorizing all salesor account-related correspondence
with customers?
• Reviewing and authorizing all advertising and promotional materials
prior to use?
Does the bank use written job descriptions to assign management responsibilities?
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6.

Does the bank select the products to
be offered?

7.

If so, does the selection process make
use of predetermined criteria that
consider the customers' needs?

8.

Does a qualified committee or an
analyst who is independent of the
sales function make the product selections?

9.

If the bank uses outside consultants
to help select products, does bank
management determine if the consultant receives compensation from product issuers or wholesalers?

10.

If the product selection analysis is performed by another party, such as a
clearing broker or third party vendor,
does bank management understand
and agree with the analysis method?

11 .

Does the bank conduct continuing reviews of product offeiings to assure
that they remain acceptable and are
such reviews done at least annually?

12.

Does bank management consider, as
part of the selection process, the
product issuer's contingency plans for
dealing with unusual surges in redemptions?

13.

Are these contingency plans based on
various market scenarios?

14.

Do the contingency plans include:
• Emergency staffing?
• Additional communications capabilities?

Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales·
Internal Control Questionnaire
•
15.

16.

Section 413.4

Enhanced operational support?

sell nondeposit investment products,
do operating procedures address safeguards to prevent possible customer
confusion?

Does the analysis of fixed and variable
rate annuities include a determination
of the credit quality of the issuing
insurance company?

22.

Does the analysis of fixed and variable
rate annuities include determining
whether the issuing insurance company can sell or simply transfer the
annuity contract to another insurance
company?

Are the people who sell nondeposit investment products distinguished from
people who accept deposits by such
means as:
• Name tags or badges?
• Business cards?

23.

Do operating procedures prohibit
tellers from offering investment advice, making sales recommendations,
or discussing the merits of any nondeposit investment product with customers?

24.

Does the bank offer nondeposit investment products with
product
names that are not:
• Identical to the bank's name?
• Similar to a deposit product?
(Example: XYZ Money Market Fund
vs. XYZ Money Market Account.)

25.

Does the bank avoid using the words
'.'insured," "bank," or "national" in
. product names?

Use of Customer Information
17.

Do written policies concerning the use
of information about bank customers
address:
• The minimum standards or criteria
for identifying a customer for solicitation?
• Acceptable calling times?
• The number of times a customer
may be called?
• The steps to be taken to avoid
confusing depositors about the
nature of the products being offered?

Setting and Circumstances of
Nondeposit Sales

Disclosures and Advertising

18.

Has a bank officer been assigned
responsibility for reviewing all current
and planned nondeposit investment
sales locations to determine whether
appropriate measures are in place to
minimize customer confusion?

26.

Has bank management designated an
officer to be responsible for ensuring
that bank-prepared investment advertisements and advertisements prepared by any other party are accurate
and include all required disclosures?

19.

Are nondeposit investment products
sold only at locations distinct from
where deposits are accepted?

27;

20.

Are sales locations distinguished by
use of:
• Separate desks?
• Distinguishing partitions, railings,
or planters?
• Signs?

Is a signed statement acknowledging
disclosures obtained from each customer at the time that a retail' nondeposit investment account is
opened?

28.

For accounts established prior to the
issuance of the Interagency Statement, are procedures in place to ensure that such a signed statement is
obtained prior to, or at the time of,
the next transaction?

21 .

If personnel both accept deposits and
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29.

Is there a tracking system designed to
monitor and obtain missing acknowl. edgments?

30.

Are all salespeople provided written
disclosure guidelines for oral presentations?

39.

Is there a tracking system designed to
monitor and obtain missing suitability
information?

31 .

Do the guidelines for oral presentat,ions clearly direct the speaker to:
• State the required disclosures?
• Clarify the bank's role in the sales
process?

40.

Are new accounts reviewed and formally accepted by a manager before
the first transfer is finalized?

41 .

If ratings are used in promoting certain products, does bank policy indicate whether the bank will disclose
ratings changes?

Does the new account acceptance
process include a review of the suitability inquiry and customer responses?

42.

Is each sale approved in writing by a
designated manager?

If so, does policy indicate how such
disclosures will occur?

43.

If the bank is selling annuities which
can be transferred to another obligor,
is this possibility disclosed to prospec~
tive customers?

Are breakpoints considered in both
the initial recommendation and in the
review of the suitability of those recommendations?

44.

Is suitability information for active accounts updated periodically?

45.

If the bank uses software programs to
assist salespersons in making suitability judgments, does the program:
• Weight bank proprietary products
and bank deposits similarly to other
products?
• Consider breakpoints?

46.

If a software program is not used, has
management identified which products meet certain investment objectives, or has management generally
categorized products as suitable for
either unsophisticated, sophisticated,
or risk-averse customers?

47.

Does the bank use suitability guidelines that would limit certain transactions with first time or risk-averse
investors, or would require a higher
level of approval?

48.

Is a bank officer who is independent
of the sales force assigned responsibility for reviewing complaints and

32.

33.
34.

Suitability
35.

Has a bank officer been assigned
responsibility for implementing and
monitoring the suitability system?

36.

Are systems in place to ensure that
any salespeople involved in bank. related sales obtain sufficient information from customers to enable them to
make a judgment about the suitability
of recommendations for particular
customers?

37.

Do suitability inquiries include information concerning the customer's:
• Financial and tax status?
• Investment objectives?
• Other information such as date of
birth, employment, net worth (net
of residential real estate), income,
current investments, or risk tolerance?

inqUiries documented on a standard
form or any other method that permits
ready review?

38. ' Are customer responses to suitability
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their resolution?

•

To not accept orders or sell nondeposit investment products?
• To avoid offering investment advice?
• To not make recommendations?
• To not discuss the merits of any
securities with customers?

Qualifications and Training
49.

Does the bank's staffing plan consider
its nondeposit investment sales program?

50.

Does the bank seek to employ dedicated investment specialists and not
platform generalists as sales representatives?

51.

Does management have written qualification requirements for outside hires
of salespeople and sales program
managers?

52.

Is a system in place to document
background inquiries made about new
bank sales employees who have previous securities industry experience to
check for a possible disciplinary history?

53.

54.

Has a bank officer been assigned
ensuring
that
responsibility for
adequate training is provided to bank
staff?

Is this training offered as part of:
• Initial training?
• Continuing training?

56.

Is there a training manual showing the
objectives of each initial and subsequent training session?

57.

Have lesson plans been developed for
in-house programs?

58.

Are tellers trained:

Does the bank provide training that
addresses suitability issues?

60.

Does suitability training specifically
address customer protection issues
associated with the most vulnerable
classes of investors who may actually
prefer the" no investment risk" aspect
of insured bank deposits?

61 .

Is product training provided to:
• Compliance staff?
• Audit staff?

62.

Does the bank have a formal plan to
meet future retail nondeposit investment product sales training needs?

Compensation

Does the bank have a formal training
program for individuals who:
• Make customer referrals for nondeposit products?
• Are engaged in retail sales of nondeposit investment products?
.
• Are· responsible for supervising
people who make referrals and/or
who engage in selling?

55.

59.
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63.

Are compensation· systems set up to
avoid pa·ying the same people incentive compensation for the sale of
nondeposit investment products when
no incentives are paid for renewing
certificates of deposit?

64.

Do supervisory policies control incentive compensation increases associated with sales contests or the introduction of new products?

65.

Are referral programs designed so that
employees, including tellers, may
receive a one-time nominal fee of a
fixed dollar amount for each customer
referred, without regard for whether
the sale is made?

66.

Do policies prohibit tellers from
participating in contests or other promotional programs in which prizes are .
based on successful sales to customers referred?
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67.

Do policies and procedures preclude
incentive compensation based on the
profitability of individual trades by, or
accounts subject to the review of,
bank employees who:
• Review and approve individual
sales?
• Accept new accounts?
• Review established customer accounts?

68.

Do policies and procedures preclude
payment of incentive compensation to
department auditors or compliance
personnel?

69.

Does the management structure preclude control, audit or compliance
personnel from reporting to managers
whose compensation is based on
profits from nondeposit investment
products sales?

70.

Does the compensation program
reduce remuneration to sales program
managers whose accounts show:
• Missing documents?
• Unreported customer complaints?
• Reversed or "bad" sales?
• Compliance problems?

Section 413.4
72.

Does the bank's written compliance
. program call for periodic reviews to
determine compliance with policies,
procedures, applicable laws and regulations, and the Interagency Statement? Do those reviews cover:
.. Customer complaints and their
resolution?
• Customer correspondence?
• Transactions with employees and
directors or their business interests?
• All advertising and promotional
materials?
• Scripts or written guidelines for
oral presentations?
• Training materials?
• Regular and frequent reviews of
active customer accounts?
• Customer responses to suitability
inquiries and a periodic comparison
of those responses to the type and
volume of account activity, with
the goal of determining whether
the activity in an account is appropriate? -

73.

Does the compliance program call for
compliance personnel to perform
continuing reviews of:
• Changes in the system for reporting customer complaints and resolutions?
• Changes in previously approved
standard correspondence with
customers?
• New advertising and promotional
materials prior to use?
• Changes in existing training programs or new training programs?
• Changes in incentive compensation
systems?
• New products under development?

74.

Does the timing, scope, and frequency
of compliance reviews consider factors such as:

Compliance Program
71.

Do audit or compliance personnel:
• Determine the scope and frequency
ot their own nondeposit investment
sales program reviews?
• Report their findings directly to th.e
board of directors or an appropriate
committee of the board?
.
• Have their performance evaluated
by persons independent of the
investment product sales function?
• Receive compensation that in no
way is connected to the success of
investment product sales?
• Receive training in products and
customer protection issues?
• Keep abreast of emerging developments in banking and securities
laws and regulations through ongoing training?

•
•
•

Comptroller's Handbook for Nationsl Bank Exami"ers
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Changes or differences in incentive
compensation paid on different or
new products?
Sales or referral contests?
Patterns of sales for specific, espe-
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cially new, products?
• Patterns of sales to customers who
have been identified as risk-averse
investors?
• New salespeople?
• Customer complaints?
75.

Does the bank have a system for
ensuring that all c,omplaints (written
and oral) receive bank management's
attention?

76.

Is that system periodically tested by
internal audit to determine whether
bimk management receives notice of
all complaints? '

77.

Does the bank use automated exception reporting systems to flag potential complianc~ problems?

78.

Do reports list:
~ Sales by product?
• Significant or unusual (for the customer) individual sales?
• Sales of products' the bank
considers more volatile to customers whose suitability inquiry responses indicate an aversion to
risk?
• Customer complaints by product,
salesperson, and reason, so that
patterns can be discerned?
• Unusual performance by salespersons, e.g., high or low volume or
single product sales?
• Significant volumes of annuity or
mutual fund redemptions after
short holding periods?

81 .

Has the bank instituted a follow-up
contact program to verify whether
customers understand their investment transactions?

82.

Do inquiries in the follow-up contact
program include discussion of the
customer's:
• Understanding of what he or she
has purchased?
• Understanding of the investment
risks and the absence of deposit
insurance coverage?
• Initial responses to the
salesperson's suitability inquiry?
• Understanding of fees?
• Problems or complaints?
• Understanding of the bank's role in
the transaction?

83.

If the bank operates a follow-up contact program, are records of customers responses maintained?

Third Party Vendors

79.

Do reports provide adequate informa-,
tion to conduct specific suitability
reviews for customers such as:
• Risk-averse investors?
• First-time investors?
• Customers with other narrow investment objectives?

80.

Does the bank employ "testers" who
pose as prospective customers and
test the sales presentations for adherence to customer protection standards?

84.

Has a bank officer been assigned
responsibility for ensuring that the
bank adequately monitors the effectiveness of ,~ustomer protection sys, tems?

85.

Has the bank developed a written
oversight program to monitor the
activities of outside vendors operating'
bank-related sales programs?

86.

Does the governing agreement with
third party vendors include provisions
regarding:
• Training for bank employees?
• Methods of implementing the customer protection standards contained in the bank's policy?
• Permission for the acc and the
bank to have access to appropriate
records involved in bank-related
sales?
• The scope and frequency of reports to be furnished?

87.

Do reports furnished by third party

Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
Temporary Insert - February 1994
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vendors include:
• A list of all new account openings
and initial trades?
• A list of significant or unusual (for
the customer) individual sales?
• A list of all written and oral customer complaints and their resolution?
• Sales reports by product, salesperson, and location?
• Internal compliance reviews of accounts originated at the bank?
• . Copies of reports furnished to the
third party vendor by their regulator?
88.

89.

third party audit and control systems
if the vendor's control personnel receive transaction-based incentive
compensation?

Are reports furnished by a third party
vendor:
• Prepared by someone independent
of the vendor's sales force? .
• Timely and sufficiently detailed?
Does bank management have proce. dures in place to avoid reliance on

Comptroller's Handbook for NationlJl Bank Examiners
Temporary Insert - February 1994

90.

If the product selection analysis is performed by another party, such as a
clearing broker or third party vendor,
does bank management understand·
and agree with the analysis method?

91 .

If customer information is provided to
the third party vendor, has a legal
opinion concerning the bank's authority to share customer information with
third parties been obtained?

92.

Has a b.ank officer been assigned
ensuring
that
responsibility for
adequate training is provided to bank
'staff, and for reviewing the hiring and
training practices of any third party
vendor?
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Laws·

Regulations +

Customer disclosure
requirements

15 USC 77a,
78a, and
80a

17 CFR 240
(Rule 10b-5)

Use of common names

15 USC 80a

Investments in
trust accounts

29 USC
1001
(ERISA)

Recordkeeping
and
confirmation requirements for securities
transactions
Antifraud restrictions

15 USC 77a
and 78a

..+

protection

OCC and Other
Issuances· •

Interagency
Statement on
Retail Sales of
Nondeposit
Products
(February 15,
1994)
Interagency
Statement

9

Interagency
Statement

12

Interagency
Statement

17 CFR 240
(Rule 10b-5)
AL 93-11 and
Interagency
Statement

Uniform guidelines

Customer
rules

Rulings +

15 USC 77a,
78a, and
80a

17 CFR 240
(Rule 10b-5)

'2 USC, unless specifically stated otherwise.
'2 CFR, unless sepcifically atated otherwise.
BC - Banking Circular, EC - Examining Circular, AL - Advisory Letter•

Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners
Temporary Insert - February 1994

E - 57

NASD Rules of
Fair Practice
and Interagency Statement
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SECTIONF

KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES

287.050. Organization to be approved by commissioner. - (1) Before filing the articles of incorporation of any financial institution mentioned in KRS 287.040, the incorporators shall present a copy of their proposed articles to the commissioner who shall investigate the financial
standing, moral character and capability of each of the incorporators and
proposed executive officers and directors, if known, and determine whether
there is reasonable assurance of sufficient volume of business for the proposed corporation to be successful, and whether the public convenience and
advantage will be promoted by the opening of the proposed corporation.
(2) In the event that the institution for which a charter is sought is to be
created solely for the purpose of effectuating a merger or consolidation to
facilitate the formation of a bank holding company, the commissioner may
waive all or any part of the requirements of subsection (1) of this section.
(3) If the commissioner determines that it is expedient and desirable to
permit the proposed corporation to engage in business, he shall approve the
articles of incorporation in writing, and the articles then may be filed and
recorded as provided in the g~neral corporation law.
(4) All amendments to the articles of incorporation of any financialinstitution mentioned in KRS 287.040 shall be approved by the commissioner
before filing with the secretary of state. (165a-20: amend. Acts 1946, ch.
141, § 29; 1982, ch. 251, § 4, effective April 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 324, § 7,
effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 444, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.)
Kentucky Law Journal. Comments,
Keeping Kentucky Banks Competitive in the
Financial Industry: The Multibank Holding
Company Statute, 72 Ky. L.J. 689 (1983-84).
Opinions of Attorney General. If the
identity of the chief executive officer of a proposed bank is material to the department of
banking in passing on an application to organize a bank. it is also material to any person

having standing to protest the application,
therefore if the commissioner of banking
(now financial institutions) elicits the identity of the executive officers from the applicants and has that information on file in a
public record, it should be made available for
public inspection. OAG 80-444.
Cited: First Nat'l Bank v. Peoples State
Bank, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 300 (Ky. 1978).
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287.050

BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
county indicated that their banking habits
were the result of the inadequate service and
hours of the existing bank, it was clear that a
new bank with increased hours and Saturday
banking would greatly service the public convenience and advantage. Farmers Deposit
Bank v. Department of Banking & Sec., 669
S.W.2d 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

AI'iALYSIS

1. Discretion of commissioner.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Sufficient evidence.
Notice and hearing.
Effect of approval.
Effect of denial.
Judicial review.
Branth banks.

1. Discretion of Commissioner.
In approving the organization of banks, the
commissioner has only such discretion as is
given him by statute. Beyond this his duties
are ministerial and enforceable by mandamus. Speer v. Dossey, 177 Ky. 761, 198 S.W.
19 (1917).
Although the commissioner was not required to conduct a hearing to afford protesting banks an opportunity to protest the approval of the articles of incorporation of a proposed bank, the fact that the hearing was not
conducted could be considered as evidence
bearing upon the question of the arbitrariness of the commissioner's· order. Phelps v.
Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
2. Sufficient Evidence.
Where the reports of the commissioner of
banking favorably showed the financial
standing, the moral character and the capability of each of the prospective incorporators
coupled with a reasonable assurance of a sufficient volume of business and the promotion
of public convenience, the commission did not
arbitrarily or capriciously authorize the incorporation of the new bank. Commercial
Bank v. Hall, 500 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. Ct. App.
1973).
The denial of an application for a new bank
. charter was based on substantial evidence
and was not arbitrary or capricious, where
the commissioner considered all of the evidence pertaining to the probable successful
operation requirement and not merely the
fact that there was some evidence that the
new bank might be profitable within the
third year. Department of Banking & Sec. v.
Coleman, 594 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979).
Expert financial testimony on deposit
growth, projected profits and. unusually low
penetration rate in county, as well as testimony on demographic and economic conditions, constituted substantial evidence of a
reasonable assurance of a sufficient volume
of business for a proposed bank to be successful. Farmers Deposit Bank v. Department of
Banking & Sec., 669 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. Ct. App.
1984).
Where the letters of many of the local merchants and citizens banking outside the
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3. Notice and Hearing.
The commissioner of banking and securities (now financial institutions) is not required to give notice of the filing of the articles of incorporation of a proposed bank for
approval under this section, nor is the commissioner required to conduct hearings upon
the application. Phelps v. Sallee, 529 S.W.2d
361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
4. Effect of Approval.
Where the commissioner of banking and
securities (now financial institutions) approved the articles of incorporation of a proposed bank but either neglected or refused to
stamp his approval on the articles and forward them to the secretary of state for recording, the department was without authority to
L'1ereafter modify, change, or set aside the
commissioner's order that the articles were
approved. Phelps v. Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361
(Ky. Ct. App. 1975).

5. Effect of Denial.
Repeated hearings before administrative
agencies, brought about by changing commissions, were not intended by the legislative
direction to the commissioner of banking
(now financial institutions); thus the denial
of an application for a bank or a branch
thereof shall operate as res judicata, and an
exception will be allowed only upon a showing of significant change of conditions or circumstances. Williams v. Cumberland Valley
Nat'! Bank, 569 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978).
6. Judicial Review.
Although there is no provision for an appeal from any order of the commissioner of
banking and securities (now financial institutions), protesting parties would be entitled
to judicial review on the question of arbitrariness of any administrative action. Phelps v.
Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
Except in cases where the commissioner's
findings are clearly erroneous and arbitrary,
courts should be inclined to follow the expertise of the banking and securities department
(now department of financial institutions) in
determining whether there is a reasonable
assurance of sufficient volume of business for
the proposed corporation to be successful. De- '.

BANKS AND TRl"ST COMPANIES
partment of Banking & Sec. v. Coleman, 594
S.W.2d.895 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

7. Branch Banks.
Inasmuch as the same standard applies to
original bank charters compared with licenses for branch banks, the commissioner's
duties under the statutes are the same. Williams v. Cumberland Valley Nat'l Bank, 569
S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
This section provides for the establishment
of a new bank, while KRS 287.180 relates to
the establishment of bank branches; however

the commissioner's duties under the two statutes are identical, and essentially the same
standards are applicable to the establishment
of branches as well as new banks. Department of Banking & Sec. v. Coleman, 594
S.W.2d 895 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
Collateral References. 10 Am. Jur. 2d,
Banks, §§ 7, 17.
9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking, §§ 7, 8.
Antimonopoly or antitrust laws, application to banks and banking institutions of. 83
A.L.R.2d 374.
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287.330. Assets may be pledged to secure deposits - Security not
required if deposit insured. - (D Banks, subject to statutory or charter
limitations, may pledge such portion of their assets as may be required by
law as collateral security for government deposits made with them, or any
of them, by or under the authority of the United States, or for any other
deposit required by law to be secured.
(2) Notwithstanding any law requiring security for deposits in the form
of collateral, surety bond or in any other form, security for such deposits
shall not be required to the extent said deposits are insured under the
provisions of section 12B of the Federal Reserve Act (38 Stat. 251) as
amended.
(3) If a hank proposes to sell its assets and transfer its deposit liability to
another bank and the purchasing bank is unwilling to accept a sufficient
amount of the assets to cover the liability to depositors and other creditors,
the selling bank may, with the consent of the commissioner, pledge all or a
part of its remaining or unacceptable assets to secure a loan for an amount
sufficient to cover the remaining liability to the depositors and other creditors. (579: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 324, § 27, effective July 13, 1984.)
Compiler's Notes. The Federal Reserve
Act referred to in subsection (2) of this sec-

tion is compiled throughout Title 12 of the
United States Code.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

1. Pledge of assets.
2. Securing public funds.
3. Liquidation.

1. Pledge of Assets.

Except in instances specifically authorized
by statute a bank has no authority to pledge
its assets as security for deposits. Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust &
Guar. Co., 153 Ky. 566, 156 S.W. 160, 45
L.R.A. (n.s.) 950 (1913). See City of Louisville
v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 245 Ky.
704, 54 S.W.2d 40 (1932).
2. Securing Public Funds.
Federal reserve members may secure public funds by transferring such deposits to its
commercial department and transferring specific and readily marketable securities to its

trust department to secure the repayment of
same. Louisville Bridge Comm'n v. Louisville
Trust Co., 258 Ky. 846, 81 S.W.2d 894 (1935).
Revenues of the Louisville Bridge Commission are public funds, the deposits of which
may be secured by a pledge of specific collateral. Louisville Bridge Comm'n v. Louisville
Trust Co., 258 Ky. 846, 81 S.W.2d 894 (1935).
3. Liquidation.
A bank has no authority to contract with a
secured depositor that in event of the bank's
liquidation the depositor may reCeive its pro
rata distributable share upon its debt before
applying the security, such a contract being
in violation of KRS 287.610 (now repealed),
City of Louisville v. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co., 245 Ky. 704, 54 S.W.2d 40 (1932).
Collateral References. 10 Am. Jur. 2d,
Banks, §§ 419, 420.
9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking, § 157.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Chief Executive Officers
All Kentucky State-Chartered Banks

FROM:

Ella D. Robinson, Direct'1llL1
Division of Supervision

DATE:

October 11, 1993

RE:

Participation Loan Documentation and Examination Procedures

y---

COMMISSIONER

~

During the course of recent examinations, field personnel of the Department have
experienced an unusual incidence of documentation exceptions on purchased loans. The
lack of proper structuring and documentation can cause undue risks to both the buying and
selling banks involved in a loan participation. The use of loan participations is considered
a viable tool for bankers in portfolio management and is not being discouraged by t~is
Agency. However, in light of the foregoing problems, and in order to insure improved
portfolio administration in this area. the following guidelines are being recommended.
Lending policy guidelines and considerations:
banks which anticipate activity in purchasing loan participations
shall incorporate into their lending policy guidelines which
address such activities;
.
these guidelines should insure that all loans purchased shall
conform to all policy provisions. including independent credit
analysis, just as if the credit were a direct extension.
Written participation agreements should. at a minimum,
address the following considerations:
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..JR.

Memo: Chief Ex~cutive Officer
October 11, 1993
Page -2-

.

-

obligation of the lead institution in providi~g credit information
on a timely basis and notice of material changes in the
obligor's financial condition:
procedures which require consultation with participants before
the lead lender modifies loan terms or any attendant loan
documents, such as security instruments or guarantees:
specific rights and remedies to involved parties upon default or
insolvency of the borrower:
procedures for the resolution -of workouts when the lead and
participating banks disagree on the handling of defaulted loans:
procedures for the resolution of conflicts which arise if more
than one obligation of the borrower enters into default status:
and
provIsions which provide for termination of the agency
relationship between participants upon the occurrence of events
such as breach
of duty, negligence, misappropriation, or
insolvency.
In addition to the above considerations, participations between affiliated institutions
require that utmost care be exercised in application of underwriting standards. and also
require compliance with Section °23A of the Federal Reserve Act. A participation
purchased from an affiliate is exempt from Section 23A provided that (1) the commitment
for purchase is obtained prior to the funding of the loan by the affiliate, and (2) the
purchasing bank's decision is predicated upon an independent analysis of the
creditworthiness of the borrower.
In summary, this Agency stands ready to assist its banks in any way regarding loan
participations, interpretation of governing rules and regulations or any questions regarding
this transmittal. Please do not hesitate to contact the Division of Supervision at (502)
564-3390, in the event of any questions.
EDR:CRR:kdw
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GOVEANOFt

Parity Letter 92-1
The Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions issues thi~ Finding
of Permissible Activity, Product, or Service pursuant to KRS 287.020(3). Competitive
inequality exists betWeen some state banks and national banks as a result of the different
calculations of their legal lending limits, which for state banks is found in KRS 287.280 and
for national banks is found in 12 USC 84 and 12 CFR § 32.4. Because of the differences
in the two legal lending limits, a state bank having the same capital as a national bank
nonetheless has different legal lending limits.
Therefore, a state bank may in its discretion choose to calculate its legal lending
limits as if it were a national bank Any state bank making such a choice shall:
(1)

Pass a fonnal resolution by it's board of directors adopting the
legal lending limits set forth in 12 USC 84 and 12 CFR § 32.4;

(2)

Amend the bank's loan policy to conform to the new legal
lending limits; .

(3)

Secure and maintain updated copies of all national bank rules
and regulations' relating to legal lending limits; and

(4)

Notify the Department and the FDIC that the bank has made
such a choice.,

Any state bank electing to operate under the national bank lending limits shall make
all loans under such limits. The legal lending limit in effect when the loan is extended shall
be the applicable legallending'limit for examination purposes. A bank is advised to consult
with its legal counsel for assistance in determining whether it would be better served by
electing to operate under the national bank lending limits.

[[j~~

Effective Date: August 25, 1992

Edward B. Hatchett, Jr.
Commissioner
AN EQUAL.. OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER MIFIH
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FINDING OF PERMISSmLE ACTIVITIES, SERVICES, OR PRODUcrS
92-2
OTHER REAL ESTATE OWNED

The Commissioner of Financial Institutions issues this Finding of Permissible Activities,
Services, or Products pursuant to KRS 287.020(3). Competitive inequality exists between some
state banks and national banks as a result of different rules relating to the treatment of Other real
estate owned, which for state banks is found in KRS 287.100(3) and for national banks is found
in 12 USC Section 29 and 12 CPR § 7.3025. Because of the differences between the two
treatments, state banks must write down the value of Other real estate owned by 10% annually,
while national banks may carry on their books a realistic fair market value determined by annual

appraisal.
Therefore, a state bank may at its discretion choose to handle Other real estate owned
as if it were a national bank. Any state bank making such a choice .shall:
(1)

Pass a formal resolution by its board of directors adopting the rules for
handling Other real estate owned set forth in 12 USC Section 29· and 12
CFR § 7.3025;

(2)

Amend the bank's policies to conform to these new rules;

(3)

Secure and maintain updated copies of all national bank rules and
regulations relating to the handling of Other real estate owned; and

(4)

Notify the Department and the FDIC that the Bank has made such a
choice.

Any state bank electing to handle Other real estate owned under the national bank rules
shall handle all such real estate acquired after the date of the election under such rules. A bank
is advised to consult with its legal counsel and accountant for assistance in determining whether
it would be better served by electing to operate under the national bank rules.
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FINDING OF PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES, SERVICES, OR PRODUCTS
92-3
MAIN OFFICE RELOCATIONS

The Commissioner of Financial Institutions issues this Finding of Permissible Activities,
Services, or Products pursuant to KRS 287.020(3). Competitive inequality exists between state
banks and national banks as a result of the difference in policies and rules governing relocation
of the banks' main offices and retention of existing branches.· The relocation of a state bank's
main office is governed by KRS 287.185, while 12 USC Section 30(b) governs the relocation of
a main office of a national bank. 12 USC Section 30(b) provides that a main office may be
relocated not more than thirty miles from its present site. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency has interpreted 12 USC Section 30(b) as allowing national banks to relocate their main
offices across county lines and to retain existing branches in the original county of operation.
Using this interpretation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has approved several
transactions involving main office relocations across county lines by national banks in Kentucky,
some of which included retention of existing branches in the original county of operation.
Therefore, a state bank may, through a resolution of its board of directors, adopt the
provisions of 12 USC Section 30(b); and upon a vote of the shareholders owning two-thirds of
the stock of the bank and upon approval of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, a state
bank may relocate its main office within thirty miles from the city, town, or village in which the
main office was originally located. Existing branches in the original county may be retained, but
no new branches may be opened in the original county. The main office in the original county
must close.

Erfective date:

~~ 2'+, 1't<f3

EDWARD . HATCHETT,
COMMISSIONER
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ATIORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: WHEN ARE
CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS PROTECfED?

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law. Its
purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.
The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer's being fully infonned by the client. . .. Admittedly
comglications in the application of the privilege arise when the
client is a corporation. which in theory is an artificial creature of
the law. and not an individual: but this Court has assumed that
the privilege applies when the client is a corporation. . . .

Uroohn Co. v. United States, 449 U;$. 383, 389-90 (1981) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
1.

OVERVIEW

The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence which shields from
disclosure confidential communications made between an actual or potential client and· an
attorney acting in his capacity as a lawyer, when the communications pertain to the
rendering of legal advice or services. See, U, Humphreys. Hutcheson and Moselet v.
Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1219 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964). The purpose of the rule is "to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice." Uroohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), quoted in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554
(1989). See also Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 814
(1992); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986).
To establish the attorney-client privilege, the following elements must be
demonstrated: (1) legal advice was sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in his/her
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capacity as such, (3) by a client, (4) who made the communications in confidence, (5) which
communications are at the client's insistence permanently protected, (6) from disclosure by
the client or his legal advisor, (7) unless the protection is waived. Fausek v. White, 965
F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 814 (1992).
As a practical matter, courts tend to CQnstrue the privilege narrowly. See

Wei! Ceramics & Glass. Inc. v.Work, 110 F.R.D. 500, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (privilege is an
exception to the fundamental principle that discovery should be liberal and broad so as to
further the search for truth); Humphreys. Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d
at 1219; In Re Grand JUly Proceedings (Doe), 575· F. Supp. 197, 200 (N.D. Ohio 1983),
affd, 754 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1985). In addition, the proponent of the privilege has the
burden of establishing that all elements of the privilege, including non-waiver, are present.
See PRE. Inc. v. Department of Justice, 139 F.R.D. 249, 254 (D.D.C. 1991); Varo. Inc. v.
Litton Sys. Inc., 129 F.R.D. 139, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (proponent must show precise facts
exist to support claim of privilege; failure of proof as to any element causes claim of
privilege to fail); In re Grand JUly Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 450 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 575 F.
Supp. at 200.
2.

THE PRIVILEGE PROTECTS COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE
CUENT TO THE LAWYER; NOT ALL COURTS EXTEND THE
PRIVILEGE TO COMMUNICATIONS FROM ATTORNEYS TO
CLIENTS.

Courts uniformly recognize the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to
communications from the client to the lawyer.

Such communications comprise the

fou:ndation of the privilege. The more difficult question sometimes arises, however, when
the communication is from the lawyer to the client. Some courts decline to apply the
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privilege in such circumstances, finding that no privilege attaches unless the communication
from the lawyer to the client relates quite directly to the client's confidential information.
See,~,

American Standard. Inc. v. Pfizer. Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Mead

Data Cent.. Inc. v. United States, 566 F.2d 242, 254 (D.e. Cir. 1977). While this narrow
approach is not always utilized,

~,

In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601-03 (N.D.

Tex. 1981), counsel must be cognizant of this threat to invocation of the privilege. Prudent
counsel is advised, to the greatest extent possible, to base his/her legal advice upon
confidential communications from the client to .the attorney. By so enveloping counsel's
communications with client confidences, the likelihood of successfully invoking the privilege
will be greater.

The attorney-client privilege does not protect against disclosure of the facts
underlying the communication. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 395; Humphreys.
Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d at 1219.
3.

THE CORPORATE CliENT IS ALSO PROTECTED BY THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.

The privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. at 390; Fausek V. White, 965 F.2d at 129; United States v. Bartone, 400
F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969). It is well-settled that the
attorney-client privilege is not lost or diluted merely because the attorney is an employee
of the corporate client.

See~,

Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 98 (D.N.J.

1990); In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.e. Cir. 1984); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v.
United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950). Thus, courts have uniformly held
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that confidential communications with "in-house" corporate counsel, acting in their capacity

as lawyers, are protected by the privilege.

See,~,

In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 99-

100; Jaroslawicz v. Engelhard Corp., 115 F.R.D. 515, 518 (D.N.J. 1987); Jonathan Corp. v.
Prime Computer. Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 696 (E.D. Va. 1987); Air-Shield. Inc. v. Air
Reduction Co., 46 F.R.D. 96, 97 (N.D.

m. 1968); 8 in 1 Pet Prods .. Inc. v. Swift &

Co., 218

F. Supp. 253, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F.
Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 519
(S.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 252
(N.D.N.Y. 1960).
However, "complications in the application of the privilege arise when the
client is a corporation." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 389; see also Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (administration of attorney-client
privilege presents special problems in the case of corporations). The Upjohn Co. Court
explained:
In the case of the individual client the provider of information and the person who acts on the lawyer's advice are one
and the same. In the corporate context, however, it will
frequently be employees beyond the control group as defined
by the court below-- "officers and agents . . . responsible for
directing· [the company's] actions in· response to legal
advice"--who will possess the information needed by the corporation's lawyers.
Middle-Ievel--and indeed lower-level-employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment,
embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is
only natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to
advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 391. (Copy included in Appendix). The Upjohn
Co. Court thus rejected the "control group" test in favor of a "case-by-case" analysis of the
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existence and scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. Id. at 39697. Under the Upjohn Co. analysis, the determination of whether the communications
involving a corporate client are protected depends upon whether, under the circumstances,
application of the attorney-client privilege will serve the underlying purposes and policies
of the privilege. Id. at 392, 396-97. See also Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods .. Inc., 672 F.
Supp. 237, 243 (W.D.N.C. 1987); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp.
1036, 1047 (D. Del. 1985).
The Upjohn Co. Court, in acknowledging the privilege, gave weight to the
following factors: (a) the employees communicated with counsel expressly to procure legal
advice, (b) the communications related to matters in the scope of their employment, (c)
employees were directed by superiors to consult witp counsel, and (d) top management did
not have knowledge of the subject matters. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 394.
4.

COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE CONFIDENTIAL.

Because the attorney-client privilege is premised upon a need to protect
confidential communications,the privilege does not apply if the circumstances indicate that
no confidentiality was intended. See United States v. Weger, 709 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.
1983) ("[i]nformation imparted to c01ffi:Sel without any expectation of confidentiality is I?-0t .
privileged"); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Waller, 581 F.2d, 585, 587 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978). Thus, communications between an attorney and client made in the presence of third persons are not
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privileged, unless the third person is an agent of the attorney or the client. 1 See Parsons
v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.D. at 417;

Humphreys. Hutcheson and Moseley v.

Donovan, 755 F.2d at 1219; John H. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2311, at 602 (John T.
McNaughton rev. 1961 & 1990 Supp.). The privilege also is waived if the client voluntarily
discloses the contents of the communications to a third person. See United States v.
Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other

~ounds,

449 U.S. 383

(1981).
5.

1HE COMMUNICATION MUST PREDOMINAN1LY INVOLVE
LEGAL ADVICE.

Furthermore, as is discussed elsewhere in these materials, the privilege does
not attach when counsel acts in a non-legal manner, providing primarily business and not
legal advice.

See,~,

United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

(where advice is primarily non-legal, mere presence of legal advice will not render
communication privileged), affd, 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987). Courts are particularly
reluctant to use the privilege to shield communications from discovery merely because
corporate officials who happen to be Jawyers are involved. See Radio Corp. of America
v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D.

m.

1955). See also Avianca Inc. v. Corriea,

705 F. Supp 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989); S.E.c. v. Gulf & Western Indus.. Inc., 518 F. Supp.
675, 681-83 (D.D.C. 1981) (limitation necessary to prevent corporation from shielding
business

tra~actions

from discovery merely by funneling communications through a

licensed attorney). Accordingly, courts will find that some discussions are privileged only
In order to qualify as an "agent", the third party must have more than a mere working
relationship with the attorney or client. Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.D. 408,
417 (M.D.N.C. 1992). See also Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40 (D. Md.
1974) ("Agents are only those persons essential to the lawyer's performance- of legal
services").
1
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upon a "clear showing" that the manager-lawyers were giving their advice "in a professional
legal capacity." In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 99.
likewise, the privilege is not applicable to legal advice rendered in aid of a
fraudulent scheme or criminal activity. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (socalled "crime-fraud" exception is a recognized exception to attorney-client privilege). See
also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d at 129; MisekFalkoff v. International Business Mach. Corp., 144 F.R.D. 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re
Antitrust Grand JUlY, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986) (reason for attorney-client privilege
completely eviscerated where client consults attorney for legal assistance in carrying out a
contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud). See also Horizon of Hope Ministty v. Clark
County. Ohio, 115 F.R.D. 1, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (communications between an attorney and
a client are not privileged if prepared in order to perpetrate a tort); but see Coleman v.
American Broadcasting Co .. Inc., 106 F.R.D. 201 (D.D.C. 1985) (crime fraud exception
does not extend to communications allegedly in furtherance of an attempt to conceal acts
of sexual harassment or other violations of the federal civil rights law).
6.

EXTENSION OR WAIVER OF EXISTING ATIORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE.

While individual discussions may be protected on the basis of their specific
. circumstances, all discussions about the legal meetings betWeen manager-lawyers and other
corporate officials, without regard to purpose, probably will not be protected by an
independent, ''blanket'' attorney-client privilege. As such, we now tum to the question of
whether the attorney-client privilege protecting communications made at corporate "legal
meetings" protects subsequent discussions of those communications, or whether those
subsequent discussions constitute a waiver of the privilege.
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A

Only Those Who Need To Know Should Have Access To
Privileged Communications.

The determination of whether the attorney-client privilege created during the
legal meetings extends to protect subsequent discussions of communications made during
those meetings, or whether those discussions amount to waiver of the privilege, is
complicated by the nature of the corporate client.
Prior to Upjohn Co., courts had reached an apparent consensus that the
subsequent intracorporate discussion of legal advice, or dissemination of privileged
materials, did not vitiate the privilege so long as continued confidentiality was intended and
the scope of the intracorporate dissemination was limited. One court, applying the "control
group" test, noted:
The fact that the communication at issue in this case [a
document] may have been circulated among more than one
employee of the Air Force does not necessarily destroy their
confidentiality, however. Where the client is an organization,
the privilege extends to those communications between
attorneys and all agents or employees of the organization who
are authorized to act or speak for the organization in relation
to the subject matter of the communication.
Mead Data Central. Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1977). See also Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 977 n.38
(3d Cir. 1981); Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 479 F. Supp. 985, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
This view applied equally to subsequent oral discussion of an attorney's advice:
A privileged communication should not lose its protection if an
executive relays legal advice to another who shares
responsibility for the subject matter underlying the consultation.
. .. It would be an unnecessary restriction 6f the privilege to
consider it lost when top management personnel discuss legal
advice.
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SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 518 (D. Conn.), app. dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031
(2d Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. at 253
(communication which "simply submits to non-legal personnel legal advice already received"
is privileged).
Courts applying the "control group" test thus held that the privilege extends
to discussion and dissemination of privileged communications among members of the
"control group" (however defined).

See,~,

Mead Data Cent.. Inc. v. U.S. Department of

Air Force, supra; Barr Marine Prods. Co .. Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. at 634;
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., supra; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp.
at 253. If the privileged communication was disseminated beyond the control group, it was
no longer privileged. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken. Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1163 (D.S.e. 1974).
For courts applying the more flexible "multi-factor" tests of the corporate
attorney-client privilege, the critical question was whether dissemination of the privileged
communication was limited to those employees who, regardless of their status, were
involved with the subject matter of the communication by virtue of their corporate duties.
See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. A
T & T Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 623 (D.D.e. 1979); SEC v. Texas Int'l Airport. Inc., 29 Fed R.
Servo 2d 408, 409-10 (D.D.C. 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 25 Fed R. Servo 2d
1248, 1254 (D.D.e. 1978); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D.
454,456 (N.D. TIL 1974), affd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); Rockwell Mfg. CO. V. Chicago
Pneumatic Tool Co., 57 F.R.D. 111, 113 (N.D. TIL 1972).
In Upjohn Co., the Supreme Court rejected a "control group" test which
limited the attorney-client privilege to communications with "senior management" who
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"playa 'substantial role' in deciding and directing a corporation's legal response." 449 U.S.
at 390, 393, 397. In lieu of the "control group" test, the Court sanctioned case-by-case
analysis of the privilege in the corporate context. Id. at 396-97. The Court's discussion,
however, suggests that the policies of the privilege would be furthered by extending the
privilege to cover the relaying of legal advice between and among certain "non-control
group" corporate employees:
The control group test adopted by the court below thus
frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the
communication of relevant information by employees of the
client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client
corporation. The attorney's advice will also frequently be more
significant to noncontrol group members than to those who
officially sanction the advice, and the control group test makes
it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the
employees who will put into effect the client corporation's
policy. See,~, Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken. Inc., 397
F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974) ("After the lawyer forms his
or her opinion, it is of no immediate benefit to the chairman
of the board or the president. It must be given to the corporate
personnel who will apply it").
Id. at 392. The Upjohn Co. Court also noted that the "narrow scope" of the "control group"
test "threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's
compliance with the law." Id.
Following Upjohn Co., courts addressing the question have concluded that,
for the corporate attorney-client privilege to apply, "the communication must originate in
confidence and not be disseminated beyond those persons who need to knoW; its contents."
SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus .. Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 681 (D.D.C. 1981). See also In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 18. 1981, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(attorney-client privilege only attaches "if the communication is disseminated to an
employee who needs to know the material because he has a direct responsibility-over the
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subject matter"). Thus, disclosure of confidential information to employees who will utilize
the information in performance of their duties should not destroy the privilege. See United
States v. Davis, 131 F.R.D. 391, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Cuno. Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D.
198,203 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., 672 F. Supp. 1,4 (D.D.C. 1986); Leucadia. Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674,
680 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. litig., 102 F.R.D. 468,
470 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (privileged corporate document retained privilege when only "selected
personnel" had access to it).
The conclusion that a limited dissemination of privileged communications
does not abrogate the privilege comports with general attorney-client privilege principles.
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 396-97 (referring to "policies" and "principles
of the common law" in ascertaining extent of corporate attorney-client privilege). Courts
have generally recognized that disclosure of confidences to agents of the attorney or client
does not destroy the privilege. See Golden Trade v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.D. at 417. Courts also have
held that disclosure of attorney-client communications to third parties constitutes waiver of
the privilege "unless the third parties' presence is consistent with an intention to keep the
communications confidential." In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition
of Wisconsin Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1155-57 (N.D.
139 F.R.D. 362, 364 (N.D.

m.

m. 1987); accord, Ferguson v. Lurie,

1991); see also In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488-

89 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867
(1973); Liggett Group. Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 21011 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Cantor. Fitzgerald Sec. Corp., 91 F.R.D.
414, 418-19 (N.D. Ga. 1981); SEC v. Texas Int'l Airport. Inc., 29 Fed R. Servo 2d at 409.

G -11

Similarly, the "common interest rule" applied by some courts "protects communications
made when a nonparty sharing the client's interest is present at a confidential
communication between attorney and client." United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417
(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. at 44-45), affd in
part vacated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989); Stanley Works v. Haeger Potteries. Inc., 35
F.R.D. 551, 554-55 (N.D. TIL 1964). See also Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94
(3rd Cir. 1992); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1989), affd 924 F.2d
443, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 55 (1991); Cheeves v. Southern Clays. Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128,
129-30 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
Each of these general principles supports the conclusion that the attorneyclient privilege is not waived as a result of limited dissemination of confidential
communications to corporate employees whose duties will be affected by such
communications.

Employees whose employment duties relate to the communications

clearly are "agents" of the corporate client for purposes of those communications. Likewise,
limited disclosure to such employees is "consistent with an intention to keep the communications confidential," and such employees would "share the client's interest" with
respect to the communications.
To enhance the argument that the attorney-client privilege created during
corporate legal meetings extends to protect the subsequent intracorporate dissemination of
such communications, several considerations should be borne in mind.

First, the

dissemination must be made with the intent that the privileged communications remain
confidential. Second, the dissemination should be limited to those corporate officials and
employees who will utilize the privileged communications within the scope of their
employment. Third, dissemination should also be restricted to those who need to know.
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B.

Overly Broad Dissemination May Result In A Waiver Of The
Attorney-Client Privilege.

On the other hand, the privilege will likely not extend to widespread
dissemination of communications made at the legal meetings, or even to limited.
dissemination of such communications to corporate officials and employees who, by virtue
of their employment, would not be concerned with the communications in their daily duties.
In one post-Upjohn Co. case, the court held that the company lost the attorney-client

privilege when a document was circulated to a corporate officer who had "deliberate[ly]
withdraw[n] from any responsibility" over the subject matter of the document. In re Grand·
JUly Subpoenas Dated Dec. 18. 1981, 561 F. Supp. at 1258-59.

In the event that the manager-lawyers have disseminated confidential

communications to. corporate officials who do not need to know of the communications
because of their job duties, three questions are raised: (1) Whether the manager-lawyers
have the ability to waive a privilege held by the corporation as a whole? (2) Whether the
disclosures would amount to waiver when the disclosures presumably were not intended
by the manager-lawyers to effect a waiver? (3) What is the

ext~nt

and effect of any waiver

resultig from the disclosures?
It is clear that corporate officers and directors possess the power to waive the

corporate attorney-client privilege. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub,
471 U.S. at 348. Thus, courts have concluded that

volunt~ry

statements by corporate

directors and officers about confidential communications waive the corporate privilege as
to those communications. See Wei! v. Investment/Indicators. Research and Management.
Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981); Velsicol Chern. Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 67476 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l
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Harvester's Disposition of Wisconsin Steel, 666 F. Supp. at 1151-54; Lee National Corp. v.
Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970). In addition, a corporation's voluntary
disclosure of privileged documents to government agencies is generally held to effect a total
waiver of the privilege as to those documents. Westinghouse Blec. Corp. v. Republic of
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-27 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897
F.2d 1255, 1265 (3rd Cir. 1990) ("attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications
that are intended to be disclosed to third parties or are in fact so disclosed"); In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Upjohn
Co., 600 F.2d at 1227 n.12; Artesian Indus .. Inc. v. Department of Health and Human
Servs., 646 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (D.D.C. 1986); United States v. Vehicular Parking; 52 F.
Supp. 751, 754 (D. Del. 1943). There is some discrepancy, however, as to whether the
privilege will attach to drafts of the final product. Compare In re Air Crash Disaster at
Sioux City. Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. lli. 1990) (an underlying privilege attaching to
drafts is not destroyed simply because a final product is disclosed to the public) with
United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 n.7 (4th Cir. 1984) (details underlying
published data, including drafts, are not privileged) and North Carolina Blec. Membership
Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 517 (M.D.N.e. 1986) and Schenet
v. Anderson, 678 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (B.D. Mich. 1988) (attorney-client privilege applies
to all information conveyed by clients to their attorneys for the purpose of drafting
documents to be disclosed to third person and all documents reflecting such information
to the extent it is not contained in the disclosed document or not otherwise disclosed to
third persons).
To the extent that the manager-lawyers are high-ranking corporate officers,
their disclosures could be deemed a corporate waiver of the privilege simply by virtue of
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their positions with the corporation. Furthermore, their disclosures could constitute waiver
on another ground. Courts have held that if a corporation fails to take adequate steps to
protect the confidentiality of privileged communications, the disclosure of such
communications will constitute a waiver. See Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods.. Inc., 672 F.
Supp. at 243; In re Conso!. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wisconsin
Steel, 666 F. Supp. at 1154-55; Jonathan Corp. v. Prime Computer. Inc., 114 F.R.D. at 697700; Underwater Storage. Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C.
1970); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
In Jonathan Corp., the court reasoned that the Upjohn Co. decision
precluded the conclusion that o:nJ.y "control group" members could waive the corporation's
attorney-client privilege and held that an employee's voluntary disclosure of a privileged
document constituted a waiver because the corporation "intentionally put the individual in
a position to make the disclosure as well as gave him the inforination to disclose." 114
F.R.D. at 697-700.

Accordingly, a· manager-lawyer's dissemination of privileged

communications to "inappropriate" employees could be viewed as a waiver of the
corporation's privilege.
Some courts have held that an inadvertent disclosure of confidential material
does not waive the privilege because a waiver must be "intentional." See Mendenhall v.
Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Georgetown Manor. Inc. v.
Ethan Allen.

I~c.,

753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (endorsed Mendenhall approach

as the ''better reasoned rule"); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). Other courts have found that inadvertent disclosure always causes a
waiver as once confidentiality is lost, the privilege cannot be restored. In re Sealed Case,
;

-

877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The majority position, however, seems to be that an intent
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to waive is not required and even inadvertent or intentionally limited disclosure constitutes
a waiver. See 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2327, at 636 (John T. McNaughton rev.
1961 & 1990 Supp.); McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 93, at 194 n.14 (2d
ed. 1972); see also Hydraflow. Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637-38 (W.D.N.Y.
1993); Western Trails. Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast. Inc., 144 F.R.D. at 8; In re Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Weil v. Investment/Indicators. Research &
Management. Inc., 647 F.2d at 24; Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods. Inc., 672 F. Supp. at 243;
Ranney-Brown Distrib.. Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus .. Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1977);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken. Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1161-62; Underwater Storage. Inc.
v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. at 549. But see KL Group v. Case. Kay &
Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 919 (9th Cir. 1987) (law firm's inadvertent disclosure of privileged
document did not constitute waiver because the disclosure was not the voluntary decision
of the corporate client); United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1417 (when personal secretary
to corporate officer delivered privileged tapes to third party under mistaken impression that
they were blank, no waiver occurred because the disclosure was inadvertent and
involuntary); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 519 (inadvertent disclosure did not
constitute waiver of privilege).
Courts adopting the majority approach typically apply a balancing test in
order to determine whether inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege.
See,

~,

In re Grand JUly Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 279 (M.D.N.C. 1992). The

following factors have been found to be relevant in deciding whether an inadvertent
.disclosure constitutes a waiver of the privilege:
(1) the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent
disclosure; (2) the amount of time taken to remedy the error;
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(3) the scope of discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and
(5) the overriding issue of fairness.
Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993) (inadvertent disclosure by
attorneys for city defending Fair Labor Standards Act Claim). See also In re Grand Jury
Investi~ation,

142 F.R.D. at 279; In re Sause Bros. Ocean

Towin~,

144 F.R.D. 111, 115

(D. Or. 1991); F.D.I.C. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp, 138 F.R.D. 479, 482
(E.D. Va. 1991); Bud Antle. Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183-84 (N.D. Cal.
1990); Kansas City

Li~ht. &

Power Co. v.

Pittsbur~h

& Midway Coal Minin~ Co., 133

F.R.D. 171, 172 (D.Kan. 1989); Parkway Gallery Furniture. Inc. v.

Kittin~er/Pennsylvania

House Group. Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50-52 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
In the event that a waiver is found, it is likely that a court would determine
that the waiver existed only as to those confidential communications actually disclosed by
the manager-lawyers. Courts are careful to ensure that the attorney-client privilege is not
applied so as to give the party asserting the privilege an advantage by allowing him to
disclose only those communications which are advantageous to his position. See Fox v.
California Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 527 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Burlington Indus. v.
Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. at 46; Duplan Corp. v.
Syl~ab

Deerin~

Milliken. Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1162;

Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. at 457-58; but see Western

Trails. Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast. Inc., 139 F.R.D. at 12 (court has discretion to impose
less than the full scope of waiver lias to all communications on same subject matter where
the client has merely disclosed a communication to a third party, as opposed to making
some use of it")
Dupa~e

quotin~

In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 809 n. 54; Chinnici v. Central

Hosp. Ass'n, 136 F.R.D. 464, 465 (N.D.

m.

1991) (production of some privileged

documents waives the privilege as to all documents of the same subject matter); -Standard
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Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings. Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). H
the privilege is being asserted for such purposes, courts will hold the privilege waived for
all communications relating to the same subject matter as the communications already

disclosed. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d at 1426; In
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989);

Burlin~on

Indus. v. Exxon Corp.,

65 F.R.D. at 46; Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken. Inc., 397 F. Supp. at

1162~

However, "[t]he rule of partial disclosure as a qualification on the privilege
should not be applied without reference both to the objectives of the privilege and the
qualification. ... [T]he rule of partial disclosure [is] one dictated by considerations of
fairness." International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D.
Del. 1968). Where disclosures made by the manager-lawyers clearly were not made to gain
a tactical advantage in litigation a broad waiver should not result. See In re Sause Bros.
Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. at 116 (defendant could not argue that it had been prejudiced
by disclosure; nor were the documents disclosed to gain an advantage, therefore, expanding
scope of waiver inappropriate); In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (no
"subject matter" waiver when party asserting privilege did not make advantageous use of
disclosure). As such, any waiver should be limited to the communications actually disclosed
by the manager-lawyers. See In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. at 116; Well v.
Investment/Indicators. Research & Management. Inc., 647 F.2d at 25; Status Time Corp.
v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Champion Int'l Corp. v.
International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE:
CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS WITH
AN EYE TOWARD LITIGATION
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound
to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting
the rightful interests of his clients. In perfonning his various duties,
however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and
their counseL Proper preparation of a client's case demands that
he assemble infonnation, sift what he Gonsiders to be the relevant
from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his
strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the
historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the
framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and
to protect their clients' interests.

. ..
"

Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney:S- thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own..
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of
cases for triaL The effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of
justice would be poorly served.

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).

1.

OVERVIEW

Many lawyers and, indeed, some courts confuse the protections provided by
the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. These concepts are separate
although they do interrelate. ,Notably, some of the gaps in the protection offered by the
attorney-client privilege discussed above can be filled by the work-product doctrine.
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the work-product doctrine
in the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (copy included in Appendix).
The holding in Hickman was later codified in Rule 26(b )(3) of the Federal Ru1es of Civil
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Procedure. Many states, too, have adopted some form of the work-product doctrine as
well.
While some lawyers and courts refer to the protection provided to an
attorney's work-product as a "privilege," the doctrine creates no more than a qualified
immunity for (1) documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable that were

(2) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial (3) by a lawyer, a party, or a party's
representative. As with the attorney-client privilege, the underlying facts incorporated into
the work-product are not protected from discovery.
However, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine is not
absolute; it can be overcome, in some situations, by the requisite showing of substantial
need and undue hardship.

Fed. R. Civ. P.26(b)(3).

Moreover, Rule 26 makes a

distinction between "factual work-product", which encompasses documents or exhibits
prepared in anticipation of litigation, and "opinion work-product." "Opinion work-product"
includes mental impressions, opinions or legal theories. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at
508. Rule 26(b)(3) warns that even if substantial need and undue hardship are shown and
production of "factual work-product" ordered, "the court shall [nonetheless] protect against
the disclosure of "opinion work-product." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b )(3).
Lastly, just as the attorney-client privilege can be waived, so too can the
protection provided by the work-product doctrine be waived, intentionally or otherwise.
Caution, therefore, must be exercised by in-house and outside counsel to avoid the
unintentional waiver of the protections afforded by the work-product doctrine. 2

2Tbis section of the materials addresses applications of the federal work product
doctrine by the federal courts. These materials, for the most part, do not discuss the doctrine's application in criminal cases. (Note, however, that the Supreme Court has stated:
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2.

FEDERAL WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE

"[A]pplication of the work-product rule in federal courts is governed by
federal, not state, law." Harper v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655, 658 (S.D. Ind.
1991); see also Henderson v. Zurn Industries. Inc., 131 F.R.D. 560, 569 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
The federal work-product doctrine, which codifies the Supreme Court's holdings in
Hickman v. Taylor, supra, is set forth in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states, in pertinent part:
A party may obtain discove:ry of documents and
tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b )(1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including the other party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer,
or agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discove:ry has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case
and that the party is unable without uridue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required
showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions. opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney _or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, Rule 26(b )(3) consists of five different components. First, "documents and tangible
things" must be involved. Second, those materials must have been "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial." Third, the preparer must be a lawyer, a party or the party's
representative. Fourth, discovery of the materials is available only upon a showing of
"we agree that [the work product] doctrine applies to criminal litigation as well as civil."
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975»; see also Rule 16(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Finally, these materials do not address the doctrine as it
relates to the preparation of experts for testimony at trial.
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substantial need and undue hardship to obtain substantially equivalent materials. Fifth,

"

"mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories" of the representative are given
special protection by the court. Each of these components, and other considerations, will
be addressed in turn.
A

Work-Product Doctrine Protects Tangible And Intangible
Things.

Although Rule 26(b )(3) states that the work-product doctrine applies only to
"documents and tangible things" (the first component), some courts have held that the rule
applies to intangible materials as well. In re Grand Ju:ry Subpoena Dated November 8.
1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[w]ork product consists of the tangible and
intangible material which reflects an attorney's efforts at investigating and preparing a
case"); EEOC v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 31 FEP Cases 1049, 1050 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
("[a]1though unwritten and intangible material is not within the express scope of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3), the work-product doctrine in nevertheless applicable to unwritten material
developed in anticipation of litigation"); Herwig v. Marine Shale Processors. Inc., No.
92-2753, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7781, at *5 (E.D. La. June 8, 1993) ("[d]efendants have
made no showing which can overcome the special protection afforded an attorney's
recollections"); but see McLaughlin v. Miles Laboratories. Inc., 124 F.R.D. 629, 630
(N.D. Ind. 1988) ("the material must be: ... documents or tangible things"); Anderson v.
Torrington Co., 120 F.R.D. 82, 86 (N.D. Ind. 1987) ("[t]he material must ... be documents
and tangible things"); Toledo Edison v. G A Technologies. Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 339 (6th Cir.
1988) ("the application of subdivision (b )(3) is limited to 'documents and tangible things
oth~rwise

discoverable under subdivision (b )(1 )"'). .
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B.

Work-Product Protection Only Attaches H Materials Are
Prepared In Anticipation Of Litigation Or For Trial.

Ru1e 26(b )(3) requires that the materials in question, in order to be immune
from discovery under the doctrine, must have been "prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial" (the second component). Thus, materials prepared in the ordinary course of
a business pursuant to normal practice are not protected by the work-product doctrine.
Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke. P.c. v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 5
F.3d 1508, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25279, at *22 (D.C. Cir. October 5, 1993) ("litigant must
demonstrate that documents were created 'with a specific claini supported by concrete
facts which wou1d likely lead to litigation in mind,' not merely assembled in the ordinary
course of business or for other nonlitigation purposes") (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp.
v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Harper, 138 F.R.D. at 660
("[i]f documents and materials are produced in the ordinary and regu1ar course of a party's
business, and not to prepare for litigation, they are outside the scope of work-product");
. Stout v. Norfolk & W. RY. Co., 90 F.R.D. 160, 162 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (''we conclude that
the statements taken ... in this case were records made in the ordinary course of business
and were not taken in anticipation of litigation"), even if the possibility of litigation exists.
Binks Mfg. Co.v. Nat. Presto Industries. Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (remote
prospect of litigation is not enough to satisfy the requirement that the materials must be
prepared in anticipation of litigation); Galambus v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 64
F.R.D. 468, 472 (N.D. Ind. 1974) ("even though litigation is already in prospect, there is no
work-product immunity for documents prepared in the regular course of business rather
thap. for the purposes of litigation"); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 110 F.R.D. 245, 255 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) ("'mere possibility' of litigation is insufficient to prevent disclosure").
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Moreover, just because "litigation does eventually ensue does not, by itself, cloak materials
prepared by an attorney with the protection of the work-product privilege." Binks, 709
F.2d at 1118; Taroli v. General Electric Co., 114 F.R.D. 97, 98 (N.D. Ind. 1987), affd 840
F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[n]either does the fact that a lawsuit subsequently was filed
automatically require a finding that the investigation was conducted in anticipation of
litigation"); Mazan v. Schmelzer, 111 F.R.D. 470, 471 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ("[a] statement is
not deemed to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation merely because an accident
has occurred, an investigation was made, and a lawsuit subsequently was filed").
The Sixth Circuit and district courts in that Circuit have not set forth any
guidelines with respect to this requirement other than there be more than a "mere
possibility" of litigation. See Guy v. United Healthcare Corp., No. 2:92-CV-397, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8406 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 1993) (reviewing standards applied by other courts
but not adopting a specific standard). Courts in the Seventh Circuit, on the other hand,
have construed this requirement to mean "that the document in question be produced
because of the anticipation of litigation, i.e., to prepare for litigation or for trial." Harper,
138 F.R.D. at 659; see also Binks, 709 F.2d at 1120; Henderson, 131 F.R.D. at 570 ("the
document sought to be protected can be said to have been prepared or obtained because
of the prospect of litigation when the primary motivation was to aid in possible future
litigation"); Anderson, 120 F.R.D. at 86; Mazan, 111 F.R.D. at 472; Galambus, 64 F.R.D.
at 472. However, whereas one Indiana district court has suggested that the probability of
litigation must be substantial and imminent for the work-product doctrine to attach to
materials prepared at that time, Mazan, 111 F.R.D. at 472, the Seventh Circuit has
suggested otherwise.

Binks, 709 F.2d at 1119 (adopting the reasoning of Janicker v.

George Washington University, 94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982), which stated: "[w]hile
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litigation need not be imminent, the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the
document or investigative report must be to aid in possible future litigation").
C.

Protected Materials Must Be Prepared By A Lawyer, A Party
Or A Party's Representative.

The third component is that the materials desired to be protected must be
prepared by a lawyer, a party or other representative of the party working on behalf of the
party's interest. Thus, "[t]he work-product rule has no application to a document prepared
by and in the hands of a third person who is neither a party to nor interested in the
action." Galambus, 64 F.R.D. at 473. Although the language of some cases might seem to
suggest otherwise,see Mazan, 111 F.R.D, at 472 ("[s]ince the statements were neither
requested by nor prepared for an attorney, they were not prepared in anticipation of
litigation"), most courts have held that the doctrine does, in fact, apply to work performed
by non-attorneys. Henderson, 131 F.R.D. at 569, n. 8 (''by the express language of the
Rule, the work-product privilege is not dependent upon an attorney's involvement, but
instead only requires that the materials be prepared by a 'representative' for purposes of
the work-product doctrine"); McLaughlin, 124 F.R.D. at 630 ("[t]he qualified work-product
privilege extends to documents prepared by or for a representative of a party, including his
agent"); Toledo Edison, 847 F.2d at 339. Eoppolo v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 108
F.R.D. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (attorney need not be involved for doctrine to apply);
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (the doctrine protects "material
prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself.").
D.

Overcoming The Work-Product Doctrine.

The fourth and fifth components draw a distinction between "opinion workproduct" -- "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or
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other representative of a party concerning the litigation" -- and other materials -- "factual
work-product." "Factual work-product" is discoverable "upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26{b )(3); see ~ Harper, 138
F.R.D. at 671; McLaughlin, 124 F.R.D. at 631; Toledo Edison, 847 F.2d at 340.
"Opinion work-product" however, requires, if it is even discoverable, a much
higher showing. The Sixth Circuit recently held that the "opinion work-product" is simply
undiscoverable. Toledo Edison, 847 F.2d at 340 ("the rule flatly states that the court is to
not permit discovery of 'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation'''). Other courts, as
well as an earlier decision of the Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, have declared that
"opinion work-product" is discoverable upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances or
the like. In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1980)
("extraordinary need"); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 688 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
(standard is "much higher"); Tronitech v. NCR Corp., 108 F.R.D. 655, 656 (S.D. Ind. 1985)
("[s]uch material will be disclosed, if at all, only under extraordinary circumstances.... as
when the activities of counsel are directly at issue"); Grand Jury Subpoena, 622 F.2d at 936
("rare and extraordinary circumstances"); United States v. David A Beck. Potter and Co.,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, *25 (E.D. Ky. 1987) ("such work-product cannot be disclosed
simply on a showing of substantial need and inability ... to obtain the equivalent without
undue hardship"); EEOC, 31 FEP Cases at 1050 ("far stronger showing"). The Supreme
Court, while acknowledging that a stronger showing is required for discovery of attorneys'
mental processes, expressly declined to resolve the issue of whether those processes are dis-
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coverable at all, stating, "[w]e do not decide the issue at this time." Upjohn v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981).
E.

Waiver Of The Doctrine And Other Considerations.

Other facets of the work-product doctrine should be noted. For instance,
most courts have held that the work-product doctrine proteCts ''work produced in
anticipation of other litigation," United States v. Leggett & Platt. Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 660
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 945 (1977). However, some courts have limited the
use of the doctrine to related proceedings. Clark v. City of Munster, 115 F.R.D. 609, 614
(N.D. Ind. 1987) ("[t]he work-product may be claimed in a related proceeding even if the
litigation for which the file was created has been terminated"); see also Federal Trade
Commission v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19,26 (1983). Furthermore, the doctrine's immunity
may be claimed by either the attorney or the client. Special September 1978 Grand JUlY,
640 F.2d at 62 ("the work-product doctrine may be asserted by either the client or the
attorney"); Clark, 115 F.R.D. at 614 (adopting statement in Special September 1978 Grand
Jury); Tronitech, 108 F.R.D. at 657 ("[t]he client as well as the attorney may assert work. product protection"); but see Anderson, 120 F.R.D. at 82 ("[w]ork-product is the privilege
of the attorney and not of the client"). Moreover, facts are not protected by the doctrine.
EEOC, 31FEP Cases at 1051.
Finally, there are two instances when, even if the requirements for
application of the doctrine are met, immunity will not exist. First, actions taken by the
attorney or client can waive the protection of the immunity.

~

Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239

(waiver occurred when attorney made testimonial use of protected materials at trial);
Anderson, 120 F.R.D. at 87 ("[i]f documents otherwise protected by the work-product have
been disclosed to others with an actual intention that an opposing party may see the
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documents, the disclosing party should not subsequently be able to claim protection for the
documents as work-product"); Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 688 (no waiver despite disclosure to
a non-party ''because there is nothing to suggest that [the defendant] disclosed the
documents with an eye towards allowing [the plaintiff] access to the information");
Tronitech, 108 F.R.D. at 657 (immunity "is not ordinarily waived by disclosure to third
parties"); In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Securities Litigation, 102 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D.
Ohio 1984) (involuntary disclosure of diary to a newspaper and subsequent publication of
excerpts is not a waiver of the immunity).
Second, the "crime-fraud" exception provides that the immunity is not
available "when there has been a showing of ongoing client fraud," Special September
1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d at 63, or when the work-product is in perpetuation of a tort.
Horizon of Hope Ministry v. Clark County, Ohio, 115 F.R.D. 1, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
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LAWYER ACTING AS BUSINESS PERSON: WHEN
DOES THE ATIORNEY·CLIENT PRMLEGE APPLY?
1.

OVERVIEW

Perhaps one of the most difficult privilege questions arises when the
attorney's duties with the corporation include "certain responsibilities outside the lawyer's
sphere." In Re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 99. In such circumstances, courts scrutinize the
context and content of the pertinent communications to determine whether the attorney
acted as a lawyer with. respect to those communications. Id.; see also Rossi v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1989) ("the need to apply it [attorney·client

privilege] cautiously and narrowly is heightened in the case of corporate staff counsel");
Valente v. Pepsico. Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1975); Malco Mfg. Co. v. E1co Corp.,
45 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D. Minn. 1968). "The possession of a law degree and admission to the
bar is not enough to establish a person as an attorney for purposes of determining whether
the attorney-client privilege applies." North Am. Mortgage Investors v. First Wis. Nat'l
Bank, 69 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Wisc. 1975).
As always, the communication pertaining to the rendering of legal advice

must be made with the intention of confidentiality before the privilege applies. See Great
Plains Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.R.D. 193, 197 (D. Kan. 1993)
(minutes of board meeting held privileged when participants kept content of meeting
confidential and attorney acted in legal capacity during relevant portions of meetings); In
Re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 100; Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37
(D. Md. 1974). Moreover, if the communication involves predominantly legal advice, it is
privileged even if relevant non-legal and business considerations are discussed as well. See
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys .. v. C.R. Bard. Inc.. 144 F.R.D. 372, 375·77 (N.D. Cal. 1992);
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Western Trails. Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast. Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1991); Leonen
v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. at 98-99; Cuno. Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. at 204
("[w]here a lawyer mixes legal and business advice the communication is not privileged
unless the communication... can...be characterized as predominantly legal"); Coleman v.
American Broadcasting Co., 106 F.R.D. 201, 206 (D.D.C. 1985) ("mere fact that business
considerations are weighed in the rendering of legal advice does not vitiate attorney-client
privilege"); Barr Marine Products Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 634-35 (E.D.
Pa. 1979); United States v. ruM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 359.
On the other hand, "[ c]ommunications dealing exclusively with the solicitation
or giving of business advice ... or with any other matters which may as easily be handled
by laymen are not privileged." Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood
Corp., 18 F.R.D. at 464; accord United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d at 461; Ray v. Cutter
Lab. Div. of Miles, 746 F. Supp. 86, 87 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Valente v. Pepsico. Inc., 68
F.R.D. at 367; American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88-89 (D.
Del. 1962); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. at 794; see also
Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir.) ("attorney-client privilege does
not protect client communications that relate only business or technical data"), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 917 (1987); United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 640 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 975 (1981) (overseeing sale of equipment not a legal service). But see
Hydroflow. Inc. v. Endine. Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 630 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (inclusion of
technical information does not vitiate privilege "[i]f the primary purpose of the
communication was to receive legal advice or services"). Similarly, if a court concludes that
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the attorney is acting in his/her business capacity as a corporate director or officer,
communications with respect to those actions are not protected. See United States v.
Gleave, 786 F. Supp. 258, 292 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Teltron Inc. v. Alexander, 132 F.R.D.394
(B.D.Pa. 1990) ("an attorney who serves a client in a business capacity may not assert the
attorney-client privilege because of the lack of a confidential relationship");

Youn~

v.

Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1972); Radiant Burn'ers. Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,
320 F.2d 314,324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); Federal
Corp. v.

Fieldin~,

Savin~s

& Loan Ins.

343 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Nev. 1972); Radio Corp. of America v.

Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. TIL 1955); United States v. Vehicular

Parkin~.

Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753-54 (D. Del. 1943).
2.

THE APPLICATION OF THE ATIORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
TO COMMUNICATIONS INVOLVING A LAWYER ACTING AS
BUSINESS PERSON REOUIRES A FACT SPECIFIC ANALYSIS.

Communications between a corporation and its in-house counsel are
protected to the same extent and in the same manner as those with outside counsel. '
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389-97; United States v. Mobil Corp., 149 F.R.D. 533, 537 (N.D.
Tex. 1993). Nevertheless, the determination of whether the discussions between managerlawyers and other corporate officials are privileged turns upon the particular circumstances
of those discussions. Several factors will be relevant. In order to be within the privilege:
(1) the communications must have been made with the intent of confidentiality; (2) the
manager-lawyers must have acted in their capacity as lawyers; and (3) the communications
must have pertained primarily to the rendering of legal advice by the manager-lawyers.
Since the analysis applied by courts in such situations is fact-specific, both
under the authority discussed above and the Upjohn Co. analysis, it is impossible to
determine whether the discussions would be protected without exploring the individual
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circumstances of each such discussion. Several factors can weigh against a finding that the
attorney-client privilege applies, however. First, when the manager-lawyers are not directly
affiliated with the corporation's legal department, and they do not engage in the practice
of law in their daily corporate duties, it is unlikely that either party to the discussions
would view the manager-lawyers as acting as attorneys with respect to the discussion.
Second, it is also unlikely that such discussions would pertain to the rendering of legal
advice by the manager-lawyers; rather, the discussions presumably would involve the
reporting of legal advice rendered by the corporation's in-house and outside counsel.
Third, the reporting (or rendering) of legal advice probably would not be the predominant
purpose of the discussions. To the extent the discussions relate to dissemination and
implementation of business decisions made on the basis of discussions at the legal
meetings, the manager-lawyers may be viewed as acting in their business capacity. See
Hardy v. New York News. Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (corporate
affirmative action plan documents were not within corporate attorney-client privilege when
they were part of an "ongoing business effort" to develop a plan and were drafted by a
corporate employee who, while he was also an attorney, was acting in his capacity as
director of employee relations).
Several examples illustrate how courts assess the lawyer's role: (1) Where an
attorney negotiates on behalf of his/her client, many courts hold that these
communications, and even related communications between the attorney and client, are not
privileged. See United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 513 (1st Cir. 1986); J.P. Foley & Co.
v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 526-27 (SD.N.Y. 1974); and (2) Where a lawyer simply
traced transfers of funds, courts have denied the privilege claim, explaining: "The mere
fact that a person is an attorney does not render as privileged everything he does for a
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client. Ministerial or clerical services such as those testified to here are not within the
privilege." United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th CiT. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1027 (1969).
Business people operating under the misperception that a privilege arises
merely by funneling documents past counsel will be sorely disappointed. Communications
such as carbon copies to the law department, which reflect the business persons'
assessments will be discoverable where their primary purpose is to report on business
matters, and not to procure legal advice. See Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397,
402-04 (8th Cir. 1987); First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wisc. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174
(B.D. Wisc. 1980).

Nevertheless, "the attorney-client privilege clearly applies to

communications made to corporate counsel in the course of conducting an internal
investigation." United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 655 (8th CiT.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
821 (1990).
Because the in-house lawyer often plays a legal and business role within a
corporation, two questions should continually be asked before communicating with
corporate clients: Which hat am I wearing? Which hat should I be wearing?
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INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
1.

OVERVIEW

Largely as a result of increasing litigation, expanding governmental regulation
and publicity associated with scandals in the business world, internal corporate
investigations have become, regrettably, an all too frequent component of corporate
America. Businesses must be particularly aware of the pitfalls and traps that can be
associated with internal investigations.

Well in advance of commencing an internal

investigation, in-house and outside counsel should carefully ponder how it will be
conducted and, correspondingly, how it can be protected from disclosure in subsequent
legal proceedings. Numerous treatises exist on this topic. These seminar materials will
attempt only to outline key considerations which inside counsel should consider before
commencing an internal investigation.
2.

IDENTIFY THE PURPOSE OF THE
INVESTIGATION UNDER CONSIDERATION.

INTERNAL

Not all internal investigations are alike. The triggering event can be as
varied as the situations that confront any business daily. For example, the decision to .
investigate could flow from an employee's charge of wrongdoing, a competitor's threat of
suit, a criminal investigation, a negative story in the press, a lawsuit, Grand Jury subpoenas,
administrative agencies' document requests, etc. One constant exists, however: Before
commencing an internal investigation, in response to any situation, counsel must carefully
assess the potential benefit versus the potential harm that could result from subsequent
disclosure in a legal proceeding.
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3.

THE KEY CONSIDERATIONS

As a threshold matter, any business considering an internal investigation must

assess the structure, scope and purpose of the internal investigation. An investigation not
properly constituted with substantial lawyer participation will almost always become
discoverable later. It is counsel's active involvement that implicates the attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine. Counsel must therefore quarterback the investigation.
An internal investigation can be costly, time-consuming and simply disruptive.

Consequently, its scope· should be tailored to address the need. A criminal antitrust
investigation would obviously warrant a broader-based investigation than would an
employee's complaint regarding a single, isolated claim of wrongful discharge.
Concomitant considerations are: What will the investigation accomplish? Will it advance
the company's interests? Will it satisfactorily address the pending or impending problem?
With these general concerns in mind, counsel, before authorizing or
participating in an internal investigation, should ponder the following:
1.

What triggered the request or desire to investigate
internally? That is, how serious is the causative agent?

2.

What is your corporate exposure, whether criminal or
civil?

3.

Do extant documents -- once properly assembled and
analyzed by counsel and others -- provide enough
answers?

4.

Will an investigation, with the inherent risk of disclosure,
ultimately benefit the corporation?

5.

How will the investigative team be structured so as to
gather all necessary information and maintain
confidentiality?

6.

Does counsel's role require the rendition of legal as
opposed to business advice, thereby possibly implicating
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the attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product
doctrine?
7.

If non-lawyers, ~, accountants, are required how
should their activities be directed?

8.

In sensitive investigations, should more independence be

sought by appointing outside lawyers to conduct the
investigation?
9.

How can inadvertent disclosure be prevented both
during and after the investigation?

10.

How should the results of the investigation be
memorialized? Must they be in writing?

11.

Who needs to know?

The general considerations naturally give way to the particulars of the
situation confronting the corporation. Caution and confidentiality -- the underpinnings of
each question above -- should pervade your deliberations, planning and investigative work.
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I.

Legislator Prohibited Practices
1.

Shall not use influence as member of General Assembly
in any manner which involves substantial conflict
between personal interests and duties in the public
interest. (Pre-existing law)
Example - vote for incentive package for company that
will buy land from legislator's family.
Penalty

2.

- Class A misdemeanor.

Shall not use official position to obtain financial
gain for legislator, family member, or business
associate. (Pre-existing law)
Example - Pressure Department of Transportation for
road contract for relative.
Penalty

3.

- Class D felony.

Shall not use position to secure privileges,
exemptions, advantages for legislator or others in
derogation of public interest. (Pre-existing law)
Example - Get refund back early; state police
assistance.
Penalty

4.

- Class A misdemeanor.

Shall not use public funds, personnel for private gain.
(New prohibition)
Example - Use LRC secretaries to handle correspondence
for private business.
Penalty

5.

- Class A misdemeanor.

Shall not use public funds, personnel for partisan
political purposes. (New prohibition)
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Example - LRC staff for campaign work; LRC xerox
machines for campaign work.
Penalty
6.

- Class A misdemeanor.

Shall ,not use official stationery to solicit vote or
contribution for a political campaign. (New
prohibition, but consistent with last Ethics Commission
ruling. )
Penalty

- Ethical misconduct.

Punishment:

7.

Shall not be drunk or under influence of controlled·
substance to extent of being unable to discharge duties
of office. (Pre-existing law)
Penalty

8.

Issue cease and 'desist order
Public reprimand
Recommend censure or expulsion
from the House in which he/she
sits
Civil penalty up to $2,000

- Ethical misconduct.

Shall not intentionally disclose confidential
information acquired in the course of official duties
to further own economic interest or that of another.
(New, but covered in Penal Code - misuse of
confidential information. KRS 522.040.)
Example - Economic development project (Toyota) - go
out and option up land.
Penalty

9.

- Class D felony.

Shall not be a party ,to a contract with the state
involving more than $100 (up from $25) - whether
directly or through others. (Pre-existing law)
Exceptions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Contract between state and business he.and
wife own 5' or·less.
Contract entered into after public bidding.
Contract available on similar terms as offered
to other business or profession (e.g., state
day care, medicaid, etc.).
Contract entered into before he became a
legislator.
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Penalty - Class D felony and court may void the
contract.
10.

Shall not sell or lease any real property to state.
(Pre-existing law under general "contracts"
limi tation. )
Exceptions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Issue:

11.

5% rule applies.
Pre-existing contracts.
Nominal consideration contracts if the lease
or sale pre-approved by Ethics Commission.
Sales or leases in condemnation proceedings or
under threat of condemnation.
Extensions of existing leases - okay under this
because a pre-existing contract - probably
should go before the Commission first.

Shall not use or attempt to use any means to influence
a state agency in direct contravention of the public
interest. (Pre-existing law)
Example - Help a friend get a permit or strip mine;
highway access.
Problem in interpretation and application: What if you
try to help new company get EPA permit (e.g., move a
creek) and people in the district are split on whether
this is in the public interest or not ..
Penalty

12.

- Ethical misconduct.

Shall not appear before a state agency--executive
branch, not judicial--for compensation, as an expert
witness. (Pre-existing law)
Example - Legislator-engineer cannot appear before EPA
(sewage treatment plant permit); Department of
Transportation; legislator-doctor cannot testify before
workers' compensation hearing officer.
Penalty

13.

- Ethical misconduct.

Shall not for compensation, represent a client before
or in dealings with a state agency in matters relating
to:
1.

Contracting for sale, lease, purchase, rental of
goods or services;
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Any proceeding relating to rate-making;
Adoption, amendment· or repeal of any
administrative regulation;
Obtaining grants of money or loans;
Licensing or permitting (except matters relating
to drivers licensing);
Any proceeding before the PSC.

Exceptions:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Ministerial functions (not a defined term
except "does not require discretion on the
part of the agency") - examples given: filing
corporate charters, reports, etc.; filing tax
returns; filing reports required by a state
agency; filing an application to particip.ate
in a state-administered federal program if
generally available to similar classes of
people. May eat up much of the prohibition.
Adversarial proceedings.
Workers' Compensation and Special Fund
proceedings.
Unemployment Compensation proceedings.

(Pre-existing law, but greatly modified.)
Penalty - Ethical misconduct.
14.

Shall not represent a state agency.

(New prohibition)

Penalty - falls under general ethical misconduct
provision.
15.

Shall not sue the state or state agency for money
damages. (New prohibition)
Exceptions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Appeal of state-initiated action vs. client.
Workers' Compensation.
Unemployment Compensation.
Cases pending on effective date of new law.

Penalty - falls under general ethical prohibition.
16.

Shall not receive compensation in any case that is
contingent on action by a state agency - contingent
fee. (Pre-existing law)
Penalty

- Ethical misconduct.
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17.

Shall not. accept honoraria for appearances, speeches or
articles - doesn't apply to speeches, etc. related to
legislator's private profession. (New prohibition)
*May accept pre-paid or reimbursed food and lodging for
out-of-state travel associated with official duties pre-approved by LRC.
Penalty

8.

- Ethical misconduct.

Shall not accept compensation, except as provided
by law, for services as a legislator.
(Pre-existing law)
Example - Need to be at committee meeting- person
wants you there for vote - agrees to fly you there in
helicopter.
Penalty

19.

- Class A misdemeanor.

No legislator or spouse shall accept or solicit
anything of value from a lobbyist (legislative agent)
or employer of a legislative agent - e.g., gifts, golf,
trips, tickets, food (except consumed on premises).
(New prohibition)

Definition of anything of value excludes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

Campaign contributions.
Compensation, etc. from private employer.
Usual and customary commercial loan.
Certificate plaque, commemorative token - less
than $150 value.
Informational/promotional items.
Educational items.
Food and beverages consumed on the premises.
Tickets to events to which all legislators
invited; all members of a jOint committee or task
force are invited; to which a caucus is invited;
events sponsored by local government or state
institution of higher education; individual
legislator if pre-approved by LRC.
Gifts from relatives.
Gifts if not used and returned or given to charity
within thirty days.
Cost of attendance·at national organization events
- NCSL exception.
Cost of attendance at ~vents sponsored by civic,
charitable, governmental or community
organizations.
Gift from one legislator to another.
Anything for which legislator pays or gives full
value.
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Penalty - Class B misdemeanor.
20.

Shall not advocate or cause the employment, promotion,
transfer or advancement of family member to executive
br~nch position; or participate in action relating to
the disciplining of a family member; absolute
prohibition on family member being employed in
legislative branch (existing employees grand fathered
in). (New prohibition)
Penalty - Ethical misconduct.

21.

Shall not serve as a lobbyist (except for a public
agency) for two years after leaving office (or be a
lobbyist while in office). (New prohibition)
Penalty - Ethical misconduct.

22.

Shall not participate in discussion/debate in Committee
or on floor in any matter in which he has a conflict of
interest (i.e., where the legislator or a family member
has direct monetary loss or gain, or which relates
directly to business in which the legislator
owns/controls an interest of 5% or $10,000.00).
(Largely pre-existing law)
Exceptions:
1.

Matter that affects all members of a business
or profession the same.

2.

Legislative salary, expenses, benefits.

Penalty - Class D felony.
23.

Shall not accept appointment as officer or employee of
state or state agency, or governing board of local or
regional entity which has authority to levy taxes.
(New prohibition added to pre-existing law.)
Penalty - Ethical misconduct.

24.

Shall not accept a campaign contribution from a
lobbyist. (Largely new prohibition - previous Attorney
General opinion had limited the prohibition to times
when the General Assembly was in session.)
Saving provision: 14 day rule
within 14 days of receipt.
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turn in to Commission

Penalty - Ethical misconduct.
II.

Legislator Reporting/Lobbyists Reporting
1.

Legislator reporting requirements
disclosure

(ALL NEW)

- financial

Report each February 15th on previous year.
$lOO/day fine by Commission for non-compliance.
Intentionally filing false or incomplete statement Class A misdemeanor.
(1)

Positions held by filer and spouse in any
business, partnership, corporation, etc.
(2) Information regarding all businesses, investments,
securities - $10,000/5%.
(3) Sources of gross income - filer and spouse.
(4) Fiduciary positions held.
(5) All real property having value of $10,000 or more
- filer, spouse, minor child.
(6) Gifts of $200 or more except from family member.
(7) Creditors owed more than $10,000 except for debts
. on consumer goods.
.
(8) Name of any lobbyist who is member of filer's
immediate family, partner, officer or director of
filer's employer, employer of filer or spouse,
business associate of filer or filer's family.
(9) Names of clients who are lobbyists or lobbyists'
employers.
(10) List of clients represented by partners and the
state agencies they appeared before in areas where
filer prohibited from acting.
2.

Lobbyist Registration/Reporting (See de!. p. 12 legislative agent)
(1)

Registration
-File with Commission within 7 days of engagement.
-10 employer and legislation action for which
engaged.
-Updated registration statement each month during
regular sessions, 3 times in non-session years.
-Registration lasts until December 31st of next
odd-number year unless sooner terminated.
-Separate filing for each employer.
-Knowing failure to file - Class 0 felony.
-Each employer pays
250 fee.

(2)

Reporting of Expendi~ures - at time of each
registration update (see above) by lobbyist and
employer)
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-Amounts spent for food and beverages consumed on
the premises; names; dates.
-Total amount of lobbying expenditures in period.
-Amounts spent on receptions.
-Compensation paid to/received by lobbyists.
-Details of any financial transaction with or for
benefit of legislator.
Note: If claim to have had financial transaction
for benefit of legislators ~ spent money on
legislators - send legislators a copy first so
they have chance to dispute. (Commission resolves
any dispute.)
"Financial transaction" definition - doesn't
include transactions entered into on same terms as
other members of the general public.
III. Lobbyist Prohibited Practices - Shall Not:
1.

Knowingly fail to register or intentionally file a
false or incomplete statement of expenditures.
Penalty - Class D felony.

2.

Fail to keep receipts/maintain records.
Penalty - Ethical misconduct.

3.

Fail to file a required report.
Penalty - Fine of $lOO/day up to maximum of $1,000.

4.

Give anything of value to legislator, spouse or child.
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct.
Second or subsequent offense - Class D
felony.

5.

Serve as campaign treasurer or fundraiser for
legislator or candidate for General Assembly.
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct.
Second or subsequent offense - Class D
felony.

- 6.

Make a campaign contribution to a legislator or_
candidate for General Assembly.
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct.
Second or subsequent offense - Class D
felony.
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7.

Spend more than $lOO/year on any legislator and
immediate family for food and beverages consumed 4n the
premises - collectively (if lobbyist has several
employers or employer has several lobbyists).
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct.
Second or subsequent offense - Class D
felony.
.

8.

Hire a legislator as lobbyist or former legislator for
two years after leaves office.
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct.
Second or subsequent offense - Class D
felony.

9.

Lobby for contingent fee or hire lobbyist on contingent
fee.
Penalty - Class D felony.

10.

Go on floor of House or Senate while in session.
Penalty

- Class B misdemeanor.
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SECTION I

EXECUTIVE AGENCY LOBBYING
Robert M. Watt, III
Stoll, Keenon & Park
201 East Main Street
Suite 1000
Lexington, Kentucky 40507

I.

II.

Introduction.
A.

The executive agency lobbying provision of S.B. 7 is an
amendment to Chapter 11A of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes, which was originally enacted in .1992 and is
entitled "Executive Branch Code of Ethics."

B.

The statute, KRS 11A.201 through 11A.246, requires
registration and reporting by both the lobbyists and
their employers in connection with attempts to influence
executive agency decisions.

C.

The Executive Branch Ethics Commission is the agency
responsible for regulation of persons and conduct under
this statute.

D.

A violation of these sections exposes the violator to
both civil and criminal penalties.

Who Is Regulated?
A.

"Employer" - any person who engages an executive agency
lobbyist. KRS 11A.201(3).
1.

B.

(KRS l1A.201)

"Person" - an individual, proprietorship, firm,
partnership, joint venture, joint stock company,
syndicate,
business,
trust,
estate,
company,
corporation,
association,
club,
committee,
organization, or group of persons acting in
concert. KRS 11A.201(13).

"Executive Agency Lobbyist" - any person engaged to
influence executive agency decisions or to conduct
executive agency lobbying activity as one of his main
purposes on a regular and substantial basis.
KRS
11A. 20 I ( 8 ) (a) •
1.

Barring other unusual circumstances, only those who
lobby
concerning
executive
agency
decisions
involving state expenditures of more than $5,000
per decision will be considered by the Executive
I-I

Branch Ethics Commission as acting on a "regular
and substantial basis"
and thus
subject
to
regulation as executive agency lobbyists. Advisory
Opinion 93-34.
a.
Those selling goods and services are not
exempt
from the provisions
of S.B.
7 ..
Advisory Opinion 93-34.
b.
A law firm partner must register as a lobbyist
when pursuing a personal service contract if
the activities of the partner or any lawyer
exceed the levels in the foregoing guidelines.
Advisory Opinion 93-34.
2.

"Executive Agency Lobbyist" does not include an
elected or appointed officer or employee of a
federal or state agency, ~tate college, state
university, or political subdivision who attempts
to influence or affect executive agency decisions
in his fiduciary capacity as a representative of
his agency,
college,
university or political
subdivision. KRS IIA.201(8)(b).

c.

"Executive Agency" - the office of an elected executive
official, a cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, or any other
state agency, department, board, or commission controlled
or directed by an elected executive official or otherwise
subject to his authority. KRS lIA.201(6).
1.
"Executive agency" does not include any court or
the General Assembly.
2.
The office of Property Valuation Administrator is
an "executive agency." Advisory Opinion 93-41.

D.

"Executive Agency Official" - an officer or employee of
an executive agency whose principal duties are to
formulate policy or to participate directly or indirectly
in the preparation, review, or award of contracts,
grants, leases or other financial arrangements with an
executive agency. KRS llA.201(10).

E.

"Elected Executive Official"
Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts,
State Treasurer, Attorney General, Commissioner of
Agriculture and Railroad Commissioners. KR.S llA.201(10).

F.

"Staff" - any employee in the office of the Governor, or
a cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, whose official duties are
to formulate policy and who exercises administrative or
supervisory authority, or who authorizes the expenditure
of state funds. KRS llA.201(14).
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III. What Activity Is Regulated?
A.

"Executive Agency Lobbying Activity" - contacts made to
promote, oppose, or otherwise influence the outcome of an
executi ve agency decision by direct communication with an
elected executive official, the secretary of any cabinet
listed in KRS 12.250, or a member of the staff of anyone
of the foregoing officials. KRS lIA.201(9)(a).
1.

B.

C.

(XRS lIA.201)

"Executive agency lobbying activity" does not
include:
a.
The action of any person having a direct
interest in any executive agency decision
which is protected by Section 1 of the
Kentucky Constitution: lawful assembly or
petition for redress of grievances;
b.
Contacts made
for
the
sole purpose
of
gathering information contained in a public
record; or
c.
Appearances
before
public
meetings
of
executive agencies. KRS lIA.201(9)(b).

"Executive Agency Decision" - a decision of an executive
agency regarding the expenditure of funds of the state or
of an executive agency with respect to the award of a
contract, grant, lease or other financial arrangement
under which those funds are distributed or allocated.
KRS lIA.201(7).
1.

"Other financial arrangement" has been interpreted
to mean any arrangement whereby funds of the state
or an elected executive official or agency are
distributed or allocated to the benefit of the
person,
company or
organization
seeking
the
distribution or allocation of such funds, e.g. the
deposit of state funds into a particular commercial
banking
system,
costs
associated
with
the
maintenance of any service agreement, and any type
of
retainer
fees
associated with management
consulting services. Advisory Opinion 93-41.

2.

Decisions concerning licenses and permits, tax
decisions, material specifications, bank charters,
administrative regulations, enforcement actions and
other non-expenditure decisions are not executive
agency decisions. Advisory Opinion 93-41.

"Expenditure" - any of the following that is made to, or
for the benefit of an elected executive official, the
secretary of a cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, an executive
agency official, or a member of the staff of any of the
foregoing officials KRS lIA.201(2)(a):
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D.

1.

A payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit,
reimbursement, or gift of money, real estate, or
anything of value, including, but not limited to,
food
and
beverages,
entertainment,
lodging,
transportation, or honoraria;

2.

A contract, promise,
expenditure; or

3.

The purchase, sale, or gift of services
other thing of value.

4.

"Expenditure" does not include a gift to an
organization exempt from taxation under Section
50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code or the
purchase, sale, or gift of services or any other
thing of value that is available to the general
public on the same terms as it is available to the
foregoing persons. KRS lIA.201(2)(b).

5.

"Expenditure" has been interpreted to include
refreshments, luncheon, meeting room, travel and
consul ting
fees
paid
by
the
lobbyist , b u t
"expenditure" has been interpreted not to include
the cost of maintaining an office and support
services
for
an
executi ve
agency
lobbyist.
Advisory Opinion 93-34.

or

agreement

to

make

an

or any

"Financial Transaction" - A transaction or activity that
is conducted or undertaken for profit and arises from the
joint ownership, or the ownership, or part ownership in
common of any real or personal property or any commercial
or business enterprise of whatever form or nature between
the following KRS lIA.201(5)(a):
1.

An executive agency lobbyist, his employer, or a
member of the immediate family of the executive
agency lobbyist or his employer; and

2.

Any elected executive official, the secretary of a
cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, an executive agency
official, or any member of the staff of any of the
foregoing officials.

3.

"Financial transaction" does not include any of the
foregoing transactions if they are available to the
general
public
on
the
same
terms.
KRS
l1A. 201 ( 5 ) ( b) .
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IV.

Registration of Executive Agency Lobbyists
(KRS llA.206 and llA.2ll)
A.

An

executive agency lobbyist
knowingly fail to '

or

and Employers.

employer shall
register.

not

1.

The lobbyist and the employer must file an initial
registration statement within 10 days following the
engagement of the lobbyist containing information
about the lobbyist, the employer, the executive
agency and the executive decision.

2.

In addition to the initial registration statement,
the lobbyist and the employer must file updated
registration statements on or before the last day
of January, May and September of each year.
a.
Confirms the continuing existence of each
engagement
described
in
the
ini tial
registration statement;
b.
Lists the specific executive agency decisions
the lobbyist sought to influence under the
engagement during the period covered by the
updated statement; and
c.
Attaches a statement of expenditures required
by KRS llA.2l6 and any details of financial
transactions required to be filed by KRS
llA.221.

3.

If a lobbyist is retained by more than one
employer, the lobbyist must file an initial and
updated registration statement for each employer,
but if an employer employs more than one lobbyist,
it must
file
only on~
updated
registration
statement with information regarding all lobbyists.

4.

Any change in the information required to be filed
in registration statements must be reflected in the
next updated registration statement. The lobbyist
must file notice of termination of an engagement
within 30 days after termination of the engagement.

5.

No registration fee is charged for.the
the statements.

6.

Upon registration, each lobbyist receives a card
issued by the Executive Branch Ethics Commission
which is valid until January 31 of each year.

7.

The Commission must review each registration
statement to determine if it is accurate and
complete and notify the lobbyist or employer of
deficiencies who will then have 15 days to file a
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filing of

corrected statement.
The Commission may also
initiate an investigation of a failure to file. If
the Commission initiates such an investigation, the
executive official and secretary of the cabinet
must also be notified.

v.

8.

The Commission will publish statistical information
about executive agency lobbying annually on or
before March 15.

9.

I f an employer who engages a lobbyist is the
recipient of a contract, grant, lease, or other
financial arrangement pursuant to which funds are
distributed or allocated, the executive agency or
any aggrieved party may consider the failure of the
employer or the lobbyist to comply with KRS 11A.211
as a breach of a material condition of the
contract,
grant,
lease
or
other
financial
arrangement.
a.
"Aggrieved party" means a party entitled to
resort to a remedy.

10.

Executive
agency
officials
may
require
certification of compliance with KRS 11A.211 from
any person seeking the award of a contract, grant,
lease or financial arrangement.

Statement of Expenditures by Executive Agency Lobbyists and
Employers.
(KRS 11A.206 and 11A.216)
A.

Each lobbyist and each employer must file a statement of
expenditures with the updated registration statement.
The lobbyist must file a separate statement for each
employer engaging him.

B.

The contents of the statement.
1.

The lobbyist must show the total expenditures made
by the lobbyist during the reporting period.

2.

If the lobbyist or the employer made expenditures
on behalf of a particular elected executive
official, the secretary of a cabinet listed in KRS
12.250, a particular executive agency official or a
particular member of the staff of any of those
officials, the lobbyist or the employer shall state
the name of the official or employee on whose
behalf the expenditure was made, the total amount
of expenditures made, a brief description of
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expenditures made and the approximate date of the
expenditures made.

VI.

3.

In addition, the statement filed by the employer
must show the total amount of expenditures made by
the employer.

4.

An employer is not required to show any expenditure
on his statement if it is shown on a statement
filed by the employer's lobbyist.

C.

If it is impractical or impossible to determine exact
dollar amounts or values of expenditures, reporting of
good faith estimates, based on reasonable accounting
procedures, constitutes compliance wi th this requirement.

D.

Lobbyists and employers are required to retain receipts
or maintain records for all expenditures that are
required to be reported .. These receipts or records must
be maintained for a period ending on December 31 of the
second calendar year after the year in which the
expenditure was made.

E.

At least 10 days before the filing of the statement, each
employer or lobbyist shall deliver a copy of the
statement,
or
the
portion
thereof
showing
the
expenditure, to the official or employee who is listed in
the statement as having received the expenditure or on
whose behalf it was made.

F.

The Executive Branch Ethics Commission has concluded that
there is no exclusion for expenditures made on behalf of
an official or employee which the employer or lobbyist
may not be trying to influence.
If the employer or
lobbyist is registered, all expenditures made to or for
the benefit of any state employee must be reported on the
statement of expenditures. Advisory Opinion 93-41.

Statement
IIA.221)
A.

of

Financial

Transactions.

(KRS

IIA.206

and

Any lobbyist who has had a financial transaction with, or
for the benefit of, an elected executive official, the
secretary of a cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, an executive
agency official, or any member of the staff of any of
those officials must describe the details of the
transaction, including the name of the official or
employee, the purpose and nature of the transaction, and
the date it was made and entered into, in a statement
filed with the Commission with the updated registration
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statement. Each statement shall describe each financial
transaction during the four months preceding the filing
of the updated registration statement.
B.

Any employer who has had
for the benefit of, the
listed above, must file
information with the
registration statement.

a financial transaction with, or
same officials or employees as
a statement containing the same
Commission with the updated

C.

At least 10 days before the date on which the statement
is filed, each employer or lobbyist must deliver a copy
of the statement to the official or employer with whom or
for whose benefit the transaction was made.

D.

An employer is not required to file a statement of
financial transactions or to deliver a copy of the
statement to the official or employee with whom or for
whose benefit the transaction was made if the financial
transaction to which the statement pertains is reported
by the lobbyist engaged by the employer.

VII. Disputes Arising Out of Statements
Financial Transactions.
(KRS 11A.226)

of

Expenditures

or

A.

Complaints arising out of statements of expenditures or
financial transactions may be filed with the Executive
Branch Ethics Commission.

B.

The complaint must be filed at least three days prior to
the time the statement is required to be filed with the
Commission. The filing of a complaint extends the time
for filing the disputed, but not the undisputed, portions
of the statement.
If the Commission decides that the
disputed expenditure or financial transaction should be
reported, the employer or lobbyist must include the
matter in an amended statement to be filed within 10 days
after receiving notice of the decision of the Commission.

C.

An employer or lobbyist who files a false statement of
expenditures or details of a financial transaction is
liable in a civil action to any official or emplQyee who
sustains damage as a result of the filing or publication
of the statement.
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VIII.

Exceptions to the Filing Requirements.
A.

B.

IX.

X.

(KRS lIA.231)

Registration ~tatements and· expenditure statements are
not req\lired to be filed in connection with executive
agency lobbying activity by any of the following:
1.

Appearances at public hearings of the committees or
interim committees of the General Assembly, at
court proceedings, at rule-making or adjudication
proceedings, or at other public meetings;

2.

News, editorial and advertising statements in
newspapers, journals or magazines or broadcast over
radio or television;

3.

The gathering and furnishing of information and
news by bona fide reporters, correspondents or news
bureaus to news media; or

4.

Publications primarily designed for and distributed
to members of associations or charitable or
fraternal nonprofit corporations.

Nothing in the executive agency lobbying portions of KRS
llA requires the reporting of, or prohibits an elected
official from soliciting or acceptirig, a contribution
from or an expenditure by any person if the contribution
or expenditure is reported .in accordance with KRS
Chapters 121 or 121A.

Restrictions on the Form of Compensation for Executive Agency
Lobbying.
(KRS IIA.236)
A.

Contingent fee arrangements are prohibited.

B.

The foregoing prohibition does not prohibit any person
from compensating his sales employees pursuant to an
incentive compensation plan, such as commission sales, if
the incentive compensation plan is the same plan used to
compensate similarly situated sales employees who are not
lobbyists.

Miscellaneous Provisions Relating to
Ethics Commission.
(KRS IIA.241)
A.

the Executive Branch

The Commission is required to keep on file all statements
required to be filed by the Executive Agency Lobbying
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sections of KRS llA and to computerize the files
ready accessibility by the general public.
B.

Twice a year, in February and October, the Commission
must compile a list of registered lobbyists and their
employers and distribute the list to each elected
executive branch official and to each cabinet secretary
listed in KRS 12.250.
Copies of the list must be
provided to the public at cost.

C.

The Commission must maintain a list of all executive
agency lobbyists which must be provided to the public at
cost.

D.

The Commission must prescribe and make available forms
for filing registration, expenditure and financial
transaction reports.
1.

XI.

for

The initial registration statement has been drafted
by the Commission and is in the process of being
finalized.

E.

Any rules promulgated by the Commission must be adopted
as administration regulations in accordance with KRS
Chapter 13A.

F.

The Commission must publish a handbook that explains in
clear and concise language the executive agency lobbying
provisions of KRS liA.

Attorney General Investigations and Penalties.
and lIA.990)

(KRS l1A.266

A.

The attorney general and any assistant or special counsel
designated by him may investigate compliance with the
executive agency lobbying provisions of KRS liA.

B.

The penalties for violation of KRS l1A.206, which
requires
the
filing
of
the
initial
and
update
registration statements, the maintenance of receipts and
records and the filing of expenditure and financial
transaction reports, are as follows:
1.

For the first violation, the lobbyist or employer
is guilty of ethical misconduct; and

2.

For the second and each subsequent violation, the
lobbyist or employer shall be guilty of a Class D
felony.
, r.

.LV
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C.

Any lobbyist or employer who fails to file an initial or
updated registration statement, KRS 11A.211 and 11A.216,
or who fails to remedy a deficiency in a filing in a
timely manner, may be fined by the Commission an amount
not to exceed $100 per day, up to a maximum total fine of
$1,000.

D.

Any lobbyist or employer who intentionally fails to
register, or who intentionally files an initial or
updated registration statement, required by KRS 1lA.211
and 11A.216, which he knows to contain false information
or to omit required information shall be guilty of a
Class 0 felony.

E.

Any lobbyist or employer who files a false statement of
expenditures or details of a financial transaction under
KRS 11A.221 and 11A.226, is liable in a civil action to
any official or employee who sustains damage as a result
of the filing or publication of the statement.

F.

Violation of KRS 11A.236, which prohibits contingent fee
arrangements, is a Class 0 felony.
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SECTION J

PACs and Campaign
Financing After Senate Bill 7
presented by Herbert A. Miller, Jr.
Stoll, Keenon & Park, Attorneys
1.

Introduction

2.

Effective Dates:

3.

New Provisions (all references are to changes in
KRS Chapter 121):
(a)

November 3, 1993 vs. January 1, 1994

All of the following will be required to identify all PAC
contributors "of any amount" and all of contributors of
more than $100 (was $300) by name,

add~ess,

description

of the PAC's business, social or political interest, age
(if

under

18),

occupation

employer,

spouse

("Businessman"

is

(if

applicable)

a

not

and

sufficient

description) :
(1)

Registry of Election Finance (.120)

(2)

Campaign Treasurer· (.160 (2) (b»

- also must

similar deposit records (.220(2».
is

~

keep

"Businessman"

sufficient.

(3)

State and County executive committees (.180(2»

(4)

Fundraisers of more than $3,000 (.180(3»

(5)

]?ACs,

Inaugural

committees

and

contributory

organizations (.180(6)(a»
(b)

Prohibition against cash contributions to candidates,
commi ttees and contributing organizations of over $50
(was $100). (.150(4».
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(c)

No person may contribute to all PACs and contributing
organizations more than $1,500 in anyone (1) year (was
$4,000). (.150 ( 10) ) .

(d)

Effective January 1,

1994,

"affiliated"

PACs will be

treated as if they were one PAC for contribution limits
to candidates, campaign committees and political issues

commi tte.es.

The limit

is

$500 per election

school board races which have their own limits.

(except
See,

.150(7».
(e)

A candidate (except slates for Governor and Lt. Governor)
may not accept more than 35%

(or $5,000 whichever is

greater) of all contributions in an election from PAC
funds (calculated as of the regular election day which
ends the cycle).

Carryover funds are not counted in the

next regular cycle.

To avoid PAC limits, a candidate may

contribute to his/her campaign account or refund excess
PAC funds pro rata.

(.150(25».

accounts on November 2,

Balances in campaign

1993 are not subject to this

restriction.
(f)

Effecti ve January 1,

1994,

no member of

the General

Assembly may organize, form or register a PAC.
4.

Other New Provisions:
(a)

A legislative agent may not lawfully give a campaign
contribution

to

a

member

of

the

General

Assembly,

candidate for the General Assembly or hislher campaign
committee (Section 26 of SB 7).
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(b)

A

legislative

agent

shall

not

serve

as

a

campaign

treasurer or a fundraiser (Section 26 of SB 7),
(c)

Allowable Campaign Expenditures (Section 63 of SB 7):
(1)

Funds in a campaign account may only be used for
expenditures (including reimbursements for actual
expenses) made directly and primarily in support of
or

opposition

to

a

candidate,

constitutional

amendment or public question which will appear on
the ballot.
(2)

Allowable

Campaign

Expenditures

Under

Proposed

Regulation 32 KAR 2:200:
a)

Advertising through charitable donations;

b)

Personal property with a value of $10 or less
each

(hats;

shirts,

calendars,

cards,

etc.)

Tickets distributed generally to influence an
election are not allowed under this section;
c)

Services directly related to the campaign;

d)

Transportation

directly

related

to

the

campaign, including of voters to the polls;
e)

Tickets to events for candidate,

spouse and

staff if a direct benefit to the campaign;
f)

Flags to donate to schools, charities, etc.;

g)

Campaign event meals of $5 or less value each;

h)

Purchase

or

rental

of

phones,

copiers,

computers, fax machines, etc. directly relateq
to the campaign.
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A presumption will exist in

favor of the candidate in the year of
election.

the

In non-election years the campaign

use must exceed 50%.
(3)

Unlawful Campaign Expenditures Under Proposed 32
KAR 2:200:
a)

Dues

to

civic

profession~l,

or

other

organizations;
b)

Defraying

costs

of

the

individual's

performance as an officeholder;
c)

Gifts,

flowers,

food,

etc.

campaign staff or volunteers

for
or

to

benefit

"any other

expenditure which bestows a private, pecuniary
benefit to an individual."
(4)

Burden

of

proof

placed

on

the .candidate

or

officeholder.
5.

"Contribution" Rules:
(a)

A "contribution" is any:
(1)

payment,

distribution,

loan,

deposit or gift of

money or other thing of value ("loan" includes a
guaranty) (See Advisory. Opinion 92-008);
(2)

payment by any other person for personal services
rendered to a candidate;

(3)

goods, advertising or services valued over $100 in
any election furnished or utilized without charge,
or less than the rate normally charged; and

J-4

(4)

independent
influerice

(b)

expenditures

el~ction

made .Qr

furnished

to

results.

A "contribution" is not:

(1)

volunteer services of an individual (See Advisory
Opinion 93-025); or

(2)

loans from financial institutions made per banking
regulations and in the ordinary course of business.

(c)

Continuing
121.150):
(1)

Contribution

Limits

(see

generally

$500 per election per candidate and PAC

KRS

(except

school boards and party executive committees);
(2)

No anonymous contributions over $50, or aggregate
of $1,000 in anyone election;

(3)

No contributions over $100 from anyone not 18 by
the

(4)

gen~ral

election;

Personal Loans from candidates to committees shall
not exceed $50,000 per election for Governor/Lt.
Governor

slates;

$25,000

for

other

statewide

offices; and $10,000 for other offices sought by a
candidate.
(d)

Other Continuing Contribution Restrictions:

(1)

against

Prohibition

corporate

directly

or

indirectly

Corporate

PAC

expenses

contributions,

(including

must

be

in-kind) .

reimbursed

with

detailed records kept.
(2)

Prohibition
soliciting

against
from

and
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candidates
contributing

and
to

PAC

from

charitable

causes

or

org?lnizations,

except

the

candidates

continuation of regular personal contributions (See
Advisory Opinions 93-005 and 93-031).
(3)

Cannot solicit nor accept contributions after the
date of a primary,

regular election,

election for these respective elections.

or special
Includes

solicitations by others on behalf of the candidate.
Excludes

the

candidate's

own

contributions

(See

Advisory Opinion 93-013).
(4)

No

commingling

of

funds

with

candidate's

own

for

other offices

or

contributions. (121.180(9»
(5)

Cannot use

campaign

funds

issues (121.180(10», except for admission tickets
not over $100 per event.
6.

Treasurers and Fundraisers:
(a)

Definitions.

(b)

Fundraisers

to

report

reached (121.180(3»

as

treasurers

once

threshold

on a Registry form (See Advisory

Opinion 93-015).
(c)

Must establish a primary campaign depository. (121.220)

(d)

Expenditures over $25 to be made by check. (121.160)

(e)

Retain records

for 6 years

from date of last report

filed.
(f)

Can serve as treasurer for more than one candidate or
slate but cannot be both treasurer and chairman of a
committee.
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(g)

Vacancies shall be

filed wi thin 3 days

of notice of

vacancy.
7.

Special Rules of KRS 121.330 (See Advisory Opinion 93-002):
(a)

Entities whose officers or employees
spouses)

(including their

knowingly contribute more than $5,000 in the

aggregate (in anyone election) to an elected official's
campaign, cannot knowingly receive, or be awarded by the
elected official or his appointees, any non-bid contract
with

any

governing

authority

on

which

the

elected

official serves during the term of office following the
campaign in which the contributions were made.
(b)

Fundraisers (and their immediate families, employer or
employee) raising over $30,000 in anyone election for
the elected candidate cannot receive or be awarded nonbid contracts,

lease or appointment to any office or

board with a governing authority on which the elected
official serves. (121.330)
8.

Registration Rules:
(a)

Campaign Treasurer - KRS 121.160

(b)

Fundraisers - KRS 121.160

(c)

PACs ($200 to register, plus $200 annually)

9.

Reporting Rules - KRS 121.180

10.

Registry Advisory Opinions
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Summary of Advisory Opinions
Registry of Election Finance
92-001: Attorney's campaign must pay for use of property (phones, copiers, etc.)
owned by the attorney's P.S.C. and used in the campaign.
92-002: Affiliated PACs. Now moot.
92-003: A PAC's 5% administrative fee must be remitted with each PAC report.
Expenditures to federal candidates do not count in the calculation. Reports under
KRS 121.180(6) are not applicable to federally-regulated out-of-state PACs.
92-004: Campaign funds can buy tickets to another candidate's event not to exceed
$100 per event. Cautions against giving them away in order to influence a vote (this
could be a "bribe") .
92-005: PAC contributions cannot be commingled with corporate funds.
92-006: Local Democratic Party cannot sponsor a scholarship at a local college to aid
incoming Democratic freshmen.
92-007: Democratic National Committee can contribute to Kentucky Democratic Party
to help elect candidates to federal office.
The funds should be separately
maintained.
92-008: Donated office space constitutes an in-kind contribution.
92-009: A candidate may use personal funds to buy UK basketball tickets and donate
them to raise scholarship money provided that there is no linkage as to who the
recipients are.
'
92-010: A legislator cannot use his campaign funds to run for Speaker of the House.
92-011: A PAC may fund a status report on the finances and services of Jefferson
County as long as the report is not candidate specific.
93-001: A PAC is limited by statute in how much it can contribute to other PACs
($500/$1,500), state executive committees ($2,500) and the like. A PAC is included
under the definition of "person".
93-002: The prohibition against getting no-bid contracts in KRS 121.330 still applies
even if the elected official (and his/her appointees) constitute minority membership
on an independent board.
93-003: PVA candidates may accept contributions from those whose property they
assess.
93-004: A candidate's corporation owned by the candidate and his wife cannot
contribute to his campaign, and cannot provide reduced rate facilities and services
to the campaign (or the campaigns of others) .
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93-005:
causes.

A candidate may continue to make personal contributions to charitable

93-006: The sole-owner of a personal service corporation (P. S. C.) can contribute
to the sole-owner's campaign. Based on Gable v. Jones case on appeal to the
Kentucky Court of Appeals.
93-007: A dissolving PAC cannot distribute surplus funds to another PAC.
93-008: A corporation may pay for advertising in the Democratic Party newspaper
as long as the paper charges market rates and uses the money for administrative
purposes, not for elections.
93-009: Candidates may split the costs of campaign materials if each pays pro rata.
Payment should be made by campaign fund checks if paid to the vendor or by
individual checks if reimbursing another candidate.
93-010: While a Kentucky corporation cannot contribute to candidates in other
states, a Kentucky PAC can.
93-011: PACs not regulated by KRS 121 do not fall within the contribution limits of
the chapter.
93-012: Not Yet Issued.
93-013: Discusses generally the timely receipt of contributions mailed or delivered
before election day but received after election day. "Several days creates an
impermissible gap."
93-014: Not Yet Issued.
93-015: To qualify as a "fundraiser" a person must both solicit and receive
contributions.
93-016: A candidate may use bulk rate mailing services but is required to include
the sponsorship identification on them.
93-017: A person who has contributed the $500 limit to a candidate can still give the
limit to an executive committee (but not earmarked for a specific candidate).
93-018: A trust created by the Jefferson County Democratic Party to pay its
operating expenses would be regulated by the Registry as a permanent committee or
a political action committee and subject to the contribution limitations, etc. of those
entities.
93-019: The Citizens for Better Judges PAC may endorse judicial candidates through
newspaper advertising not to exceed $500 per candidate, which must be reported as
in-kind contributions to those candidates.
93-020: Discusses the transfer of contribution money between the Republican Party
of Kentucky and its affiliates and subdivisions, and the limitations thereon.
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93-021: A tax-exempt neighborhood association may not lawfully contribute to a
Kentucky judicial candidate.
93-022: When a person endorses a check in blank to a PAC, the instrument is
treated as cash and subject to the cash contribution limit of $50 in KRS 121.150(4).
The Registry recommends such giving from a person's personal checking account.
93-023: A Republican Party newsletter may sell advertising space to corporations
provided it charges regular rates for comparable publications and puts the money
in a separate, segregated administrative account dedicated for party administrative
expenses. (See also Advisory Opinion 93-008).
93-024: See Advisory Opinion 93-032.
93-025: (1) A full partner of a law firm partnership may donate legal services to a
candidate for elected office without it being considered an in-kind contribution. (2)
However, such services by employees of the firm (such as non-equity partners,
associates and clerks) which are paid by the partnership are considereq. in-kind
contributions. To the extent the dollar value of these services exceeds $100 per full
partner, each partner's pro rata share should be reported by the candidate as an inkind contribution. (3) Services provided to a candidate after the general election
must either be volunteered services by the employees or fully compensated at their
fair market value by the campaign.
93-026: Volunteered legal services for a campaign are not contributions.
Advisory Opinion 93-025.

See

93-027: A vendor (in this case, a corporation providing long-distance telephone
discounts) to a state political party may enter into arm's length business agreements
provided that revenue to the party be deposited into a separate, segregated bank
account designated for administrative purposes only (see 93-008 and 93-023).
93-028: In order to qualify as an "independent expenditure" under KRS 121.150(1),
printed political speech (newspaper advertisement) need not contain literal language
urging the defeat of a political candidate. Citing federal cases, the Registry
concluded that the speech qualifies if it is "susceptible of no other reasonable
interpretation but as an exhortation to vote.
. against.
. specific
candidate(s). "
93-029: A campaign may award a bonus to a campaign worker after an election only
if: (1) the worker is a paid employee, (2) the worker has an advance agreement with
the campaign regarding the bonus and (.3) the bonus is reasonable in light of all the
facts and circumstances.
93-030: Bumper stickers are exempt under 32 KAR 2:110 from the disclaimer
language required by KRS 121.190(1).
93-031: (1) A candidate for re-election may not make contributions to charities with
surplus campaign funds from the previous election. KRS 121.180(10) governs the
final disbursements of a fund. (2) The expense of a computer and computer operator
or other equipment in the year of the election will be a permitted campaign expense
if at east 50% of its use is in re-election campaign related activities. (3) A newsletter
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by a candidate for re-election may be viewed as campaign material (as opposed to a
report of an officeholder's activities), particularly as to its timing to an election.
(4) If a potential candidate for re-election ultimately declines to run, the individual
may have ,to reimburse the campaign for expenses not directly related to the
campaign. (5) Expenses for the next election (re-election), even though incurred
within 60 days of the most previous election, cannot be considered part of the
previous campaign. [Note: the foregoing is premised upon adoption of proposed
regulation 32 KAR 2: 200. ]
93-032: The state Republican party may establish a building fund governed by
federal election laws, provided that all contributions to the fund and expenditures
by the fund are reported to the Registry.
93-033: An unincorporated Democratic Women's Club is a "person" as used in KRS
121 .150 (11) , and may contribute $1,000 in a calendar year to a local party executive
committee.
.

*

*

*

*

*

WARNING

The above are just summaries of Advisory Opinions. Please obtain and read the
whole Opinion in order to get the benefit of the full text.
KRS 121.135 provides that an Advisory Opinion is binding on the Registry only to
the person to whom it is addressed and only if the facts stated were complete and
correct at the time the opinion was rendered, and the person acted in good faith
reliance on the opinion.
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ADVISORY OPINION 93-025

Any advisory op1n10n rendered by the registry
under subsections {1) or (2) of this section may
be relied upon only by the person or committee
involved in the specific transaction or activity
with respect to which the advisory opinion is
required. KRS 121.135(4).

November 10, 1993

Hon. Spencer D. Noe
Stoll, Keenon & Park
201 East Main Street
Suite 1000
Lexington, Kentucky 40507-1380
Dear Mr. Noe:
Thank you for contacting the Registry. Also, thank you for
supplementing your facts in our phone conversation.
Based on
the information you have provided, the facts to your question
can be stated as follows:
Dennis Clark ("Clark") is the 1993 Republican
Party candidate for County Judge Executive of
Oldham County, Kentucky.
To gain the office of
Oldham County Judge Executive, Mr. Clark needed
to raise funds for his campaign.
Because Mr.
Clark is an employee of a county merit system,
the Oldham County Police Department, he or his
advisors decided that he needed to obtain a
declaratory judgment which clearly affirmed his
right
to
run
for
political
office
and do
everything necessary to gain office under KRS
95.017,
in spite of what appeared to be a
prohibi tion
against a
merit
system employee
soliciting funds for any political activity under
KRS 78.435(1).
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Kentucky Republican Party officials, asked you,
as a practicing attorney (and an equity partner
in a Kentucky law firm), to volunteer legal
services
by
filing
the
above-referenced
declaratory judgment action in the Oldham County
Circuit Court.
After you
obtained a
favorable
ruling
for
candidate Clark,
the Oldham Circuit Court's
ruling was appealed.
A summer law clerk with
your firm assisted you through the Circuit Court
judgment stage of the lawsuit.
Since you
received notice of the appeal, a non-equity
partner in your firm has assisted you with the
case.
Neither the non-equity partner nor the
summer law clerk knew that you had volunteered
your services for Mr. Clark's campaign effort.
Clark
has
paid
all
out-of-pocket
expenses
required in the above action.
Also, Clark will
receive no bill for the services provided.
Based on the above facts,
follows:

your question can be stated as

Under KRS Chapter 121, may a practicing attorney
volunteer legal services for a candidate for
political office in Kentucky, or would this
practice constitute an in-kind contribution to
the candidate's campaign?
The answer to your question is a qualified yes.
In
general, an attorney may volunteer servicef?· in support of a
candidate for elective office in Kentucky.
A basic tenant of
Kentucky campaign finance law is that anyone may volunteer
various services in support of a candidate for elective office.
For instance, KRS 121.015(7) (a) excludes "services provided
without
compensation"
from
the
definition
of
the
term
"contribution." Id.
KRS 121.160(6) further develops this
concept by stating that "The candidate or slate of candidates
may pay a campaign treasurer a salary for his services which
shall be considered a campaign expense and shall comply with the
reporting
provisions
of
KRS
121.180
and
administrative
regulations promulgated by the registry."
Id.
(Emphasis
added).
Many times treasurers for Kentucky-Candidates are
attorneys or licensed certified public accountants who volunteer
professional services as campaign treasurers. KRS 121.160(6)
J -14
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does not require that a professional be paid by a candidate or
campaign committee for services rendered in support of the
candidacy.
Clearly a treasurer s duties are fundamental to a
campaign effort.
In your particular case, legal services are
fundamental to
Clark s candidacy, since he is an employee of
the Oldham County Police Department.
I

I

Recently, the Registry considered a similar question in
KREF v. Studio Arts, Inc., KREF 93-105.
In that case, which
considered whether or not the services in question constituted a
corporate contribution, commercial artists had volunteered their
services to design a logo for a political campaign in Kentucky.
The commercial artists created the logo design on their own
personal time.
The Registry ruled that the services involved
constituted volunteered professional services.
You have indicated that you are not incorporated as a
professional
service corporation;
therefore,
the corporate
contribution issue is not part of your question.
However, your
services
as
an
attorney
would
easily
exceed
the
$500
contribution limit set forth in KRS 121.150(6) if such services
counted as a contribution.
As the treasurer may volunteer in
KRS 121.160(6), and the professionals were allowed to volunteer
in Studio Arts, Inc., you may volunteer your services to the
Clark campaign.
You did not ask the question of whether or not your
non-equity partner and your summer law clerk may volunteer
services to a campaign.
Using the same reasoning as above I
these employees would also be allowed to volunteer services to a
campaign.
However, you indicated that these employees performed
legal services for Clark during regular work hours and knew
nothing of the "volunteer'" billing, arrangement.
Therefore, the
amount spent by the equity partners as salary paid to. these
employees for their work on the lawsuit. in question, constitutes
an
in-kind
contribution.
The
amount
of
this
in-kind
contribution should be reported by Clark.
Therefore, you may
value the in-kind contribution by-determining the hours spent by
your employees on the project and multiplying that figure by the
hourly amounts the firm compensates these employees.
This
figure should be divided by the number of equity partners in
your law firm and Clark should itemize and report (or record and
report) these amounts depending on whether the amounts are less
than $300 per equity partner.
For example:
The non-equity
partner earns $50 per hour in salary and he or she works twenty
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(20) hours on the project.
If there are ten (10) equity
partners in the firm, each partner has contributed $100 in-kind
to Clark.
Clark should report these as ten (10) unitemized
in":'kind contributions.
Note:
I f the separate contributions
exceeded $300 each, Clark would have to itemize these on his
report.
[See KRS 121.160(2)(b)].
After the 1993 general
election, the threshold amount for itemized reporting will be
$100.
Finally, no contribution may be made or accepted after
the general election.
[See KRS 121.150(16)]. Therefore, in the
event the litigation in question continues after the 1993
general election, your employee (s) would have to volunteer any
services provided after the general election date or the Clark
campaign would have to pay fair market value for such services.
This opinion is based upon the course of action outlined in
your letter.
If you should have any more questions, please give
us a call. Thank you.

TES/dt
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Campaign Committees, or Political Issues
Committee

* 32 KAR 2:190 Committee MfUiation
* 32 KAR 2:200 Allowable Campaign Expenditures
* 32 KAR 2: 170 In-Kind Contributions
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DEPARTMENT Of STATE
Registry of Election Finance
32 KAR

2~180.

Extension of credit to candidates, camp_gn

committees, or politicallssu. committee.
RELATES TO: KRS 121.180(7) .
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 121.12O(1)(g)
NECESSITY AND FUNCTION: KRS 121.180(7) provides that if
the final statement of a candidate, campaign committee, or political
issues committee shows an unexpended balance or outstanding debt,
the entity shall continue to file supplemental reports until all debts
have been settled and any outstanding balance depleted. Except for
debts incurred in campaigns prior to January, 1989, only candidates·
may contribute after an election to defray outstanding debts. As a
result, obligations owed by a candidate are of necessity assumed by
the candidate personally. Regardless of whether an outstanding debt
is !he result of a pre·1989 campaign or subsequent election, the
failure to settle a debt may result in a contribution, and often an illegal
corporate contribution, or a contribution in excess of the contribution
limit in effect at the time of the election. It is necessary to promulgate
this administrative regulation to establish the criteria on which the
registry shall determine if an outstanding debt has been converted to
a contribution.
Section 1. Scope. This administrative regulation shall apply only
to debts incurred for elections held subsequent to November, 1993.
Section 2. Extensions of credit to cancidates, campaign commitI8es, or political issues committees.
(1) For purposes of this section, an 'unsatisfied extension of
crecit" means an outstanding debt which has not been satisfied within
a reasonable time after the date of an election and which has not
been assumed by a candidate personally.
(2) An unsatisfied extension of credit through deferred bUling or
payment fOr goods and services rendered to a cancidate, campaign
committee, or political issues committee shall be construed as a
campaign contribution if:
(a) The transaction was entered into with no reasonable expectation of repayment;

(b) The nnsaction is baed upon tllnns WKI conditions not
avaiable 110 other c:::ustomers sarvad by the creditor;
(c) The transaction is not a transaction between two (2) unrelated
plries bargaining at arms length; or
(d) The transaction constitutes a significant deviation from the
crecitor's regular commercial practices.
(3) An extension of credit through deferred billing or payment for
goods and services rendered to a candidate, campaign committee, or
political issues committee, may be considered a campaign contribution if:
(a) The creditor abandons efforts to enforce or collect the debt on
grounds that are not commercially reasonable;
(b) The creditor abandons, forgives, or cancels the debt under
conditions not generally available to other customers of the creditor;
(c) The creditor abandons, cancels or forgives the debt for no
r&aSonable business purpose; or
(d) In !he case of a creditor who is an individual or unincorporated
entity, if any of the conditions in this subsection are determined to
exist, and the amount of the debt forgiven, abandoned, or cancelled,
when added to other monetary or in-kind contributions made by the
creditor exceed the contribution limits in effect at the time of the
extension of credit
(4) An extension of credit through deferred billing or payment for
goods and services rendered by a creditor to a candidate or campaign committee or the cancellation, forgiveness, or abandonment of
such a debt may be determined by the registry to be a campaign
contribution if a totality of the evidence indicates that the transaction
is not commercially reasonable. The mere passage of time shall not
be determinatiVe, nor shall the finding that a transaction was merely
unwise. In making the determination, the registry shall consider:
(a) Whether owners or controllers of the creditor are contributors
to or political supporters of the candidate;
(b) Whether the amount of credit extended exceeds the amount
of credit extended to nonpolitical customers of the creditor; and
(c) Whether the terms under which the credit was extended are
substantially different than the terms and conditions generally applied
in transactions between the creditor and its nonpolitical customers.

JOSEPH H. TERRY, Chair
APPROVED BY AGENCY: November 12,1993
FILED WITH LAC: November 15, 1993 at 11 a.m.
PUBUC HEARING: A public hearing on this proposed administrative regulation shall be held on December 21,1993, at 9 a.m. at 140
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky. Individuals interested in attending
this hearing shall notify this agency in writing by December 16, 1993,
five days prior to the hearing, of their intent to attend. If no notification
of intent to attend the hearing is received by that date, the hearing
may be cancelled. This hearing is open to the public. Any person who
attends will be given an opportunity to comment on the proposed
administrative regulation. A transcript of the public hearing will not be
made unless a written request for a transcript is made. If you do not
wish to attend the public hearing, you may submit written comments
on the proposed administrative regulation to: George Russell,
Executive Director, Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 140
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, (502) 564-2226.
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
Contact Person: Anita Stanley
(1) Type and number of entities affected: This administrative
regulation affects all candidates, campaign colt:1 mittees , political
issues committees, and also indirectly affects creditors of those
entities. The administrative regulation shall apply. only to debts
incurred for elections held subsequent to November, 1993.
(a) Direct and incirect costs or savings to those affected:
1. First year: No direct or indirect cost will result from the
promulgation of this administrative regulation.
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ADMINISTRATIVE REGISTER· 17222. Con1inuing com « savings: No cIrect « i1dr9ct cost wiI f8SUtt
fnMn !he promulgation of !tIis administrative regulation.
3. Additional factors inc:t9asing « deaeasing costs (nota any
eft8cts u-pon competition: None .
(b) Reporting and paperwork ~iraments: The only adcitionaI
paperwortt resulting from this administrative regulation wi. be that
associated with ~s before the Registry in which !he determination
wi. be made as to whether an unsatisfied debt has became a
contribution .
(2) Effects on !tie promulgating administrative boctj:
(a) Direct and incirect costs « savings:
1. First year: This administrative regulation will result in no
additional direct or indirect cost to the agency.
2. Continuing costs or savings: This administrative regulation will
result in no additional direct or indirect cost to !tie agency.
3. Additional factors increasing or decreasing costs: None
(b) Reporting and paperwork requirements: The agency wiR
experience some increase in paperwork associated wi!tl actions
before the ~gistry in which !tie determination will be made as to
whether an unsatisfied debt has become a contribution.
(3) Assessment of anticipated effect on state and local revenues:
This administrative regulation w~1 have no effect on state and local
revenues.
(4) Assessment of alternative methods; reasons why alternatives
were rejected: The proviSions of this administrative regulation
establish fair guidelines to be useclby the registry in determining
whether an outstanding debt has become a contribution.
(5) Identify any stallJte, administrative regulation or government
policy which may be in conflict, overlapping, or duplication: None
(a) Necessity of proposed regulation if in conflict: None
(b) If in conflict, was effort made to harmonize the proposed
administrative regulation with conflicting provisions: None
(6) Any additional information or comments: None
TIERING: Is tiering applied? Tiering is not applied because the
provisions of this administrative regulation will apply uniformly to
debts incurred subsequent to 1993.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Registry of Section Finance
32 KAR 2:190. Committee affiliation.
RELATES TO: KRS 121.150(7)
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 121.120(1)(g), 121.150(7)
NECESSITY AND FUNCTION: KRS 121.150(7) provides that
permanent committees affiliated by bylaws, structure, or registration,
as determined by the registry, shall be considered one (1) committee
for purposes of the contribution limitations contained in KRS 121.150.
It is necessary to promulgate this administrative regulation to
establish guidelines to be followed by the registry in making the
affiliation determination.
Section 1. (1) For purposes of applying the contribution limits
contained in KRS 121.150, permanent committees shall be considered affiliated committees if they are estab~shecl, financed, maintained, or controlled by or in common control wi1h:
(a) A single corporation or its subsidiaries;
(b) A single national or international union or its state and Ioc:aI
unions or subordinate organizations; and
(c) A membership organization, olher !han a political party
committee, inclucing a trade or professional association or group.
(2) The registry may examine the relationship between organizations that sponsor committees, between the committees themselves,
or between one (1) sponsoring «ganization and a commitille
established by another «ganization ID determine whether the
committees are affiliated. In determining whether committees not

otleI wi.

~

by fIis adrninisuM regUiaeon

ani

atftIiared b

purposes of contribution limitations, the registry may consider !he
circumstantial factors described in this subsection in the context of the
overall relationship between the entities. Such faclDrs include, but
shaJI not be rmil8cl to:
(a) Whether a sponllOring organization of one (1) committee owns
a c:ontroIing inI&rest in the voting steck or SeaJrities of !he sponsoring
organization of another committee;
(b) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee has the
authority or ability to cirect or participate in the governance of another
sponsoring organization or committee through proviSions of conslifu.
tions, bylaws, contracts, or o!tler rules, or through formal or informal
practices «procedJres;
(c) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee has the
authority « ability to hire, appoint, demote, or otherwise contralthe
officers or other decisionmaking employees or members of another
sponsoring organization « committee;
.
(d) Whether a sponsoring organization « committee has a
common or overlapping membership or common contributors with
another sponsoring organization « committee which indicates a
formal or ongoing relationship between the sponsoring organizations
or committees;
(e) Whether a sponsoring «ganizalion « commit!ee has any
- members, officers, or employees who were members, officers, or
employees of another sponsoring organization or committee which
indicates the creation of an aIfer ego of the original committee; and
(f) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee provides
funds or goods in a significant amount or on an ongoing basis to
another sponsoring organization «committee, such as through direct
or incirect payments for administrative, fundraising, or other costs.
Section 2. No person, organization, or committee shall establish
an entity which would qualify as a contributing organization as defined
in KRS 121.035 for the purpose of circumventing the contribution
limitatior:ts contained in KRS 121.150 and the affiliation guidelines
established by this administrative regulation.
JOSEPH H. TERRY, Chair
APPROVED BY AGENCY: November 12,1993
FILED WITH LAC: November 15, 1993 at 11 a.m.
PUBLIC HEARING: A public hearing on this proposed administrative regulation shall be held on December 21, 1993, at 9 a.m. at 140
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky. Individuals interested in attending
this hearing shaH notify this agency in writing by December 16, 1993,
five days prior to the hearing, of their intent to attend. If no notification
of intent tD attend the hearing is received by that date, the hearing
may be cancelled. This hearing is open Ie the public. Any person who
attends win be given an opportunity to comment on the proposed
administrative regulation. A transcript of the public hearing w~1 not be
made unless a written request for a transcript is made. If you do not
wish to attend the public hearing, you may submit written comments
on the proposed administrative regulation to: George Russell,
ExeaJtive Director, Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 140
Walnut SIreat, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, (502) 564-2226.
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
Contact Person: Anita Stanley
(1) Type and number of entilles affeded: This administrative
regulation applies to all permanent committees registered w~ the
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance and their affiliates.
.
(a) Direct and incirect costs «savings to those atfecte«
t. First year. No direct or indirect cost will result from the
promutgaon of this administrative regulation.
2. Continuing costs or saYings: No dinIct or indirect cost wi/lresult
from the promulgdon of !tIiIr administrative regulation.
3. Additional fac1Drs increasin§ « deaeasing costs (note any
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IIIacta upon compeIiIion: None
(b) Reporting and paperwork requirements: No adc:IlionaJ
paperwork and raporting raquiraments will rasuIt from this administra. . ragu/ation.
(2) Effacls on the promulgating administrative body:
(_) Direct and incirect costs or savings:
1. First year: This aaninistraliw regulation will result in no
.a:fdional cirect or indirect cost to the agency.
2. Continuing costs or savings: This administrative regulation wUI
..suit in no adcitionaJ diract or indirect cost to the agency.
3. AdcitionaJ factors increasing or decreasing costs: None
(b) Reporting and paperwork requirements: Some adcitional
paperwork requirements may result through the submission of
documentation by permanent committees related to the question of
whether or not a particular committee is an independent committee
or an affiliate of another committee.
(3) Assessment of anticipated effect on state and local revenues:
No significant effect on slate and local rewnues is expected.
(4) Assessment of alternative methods; reasons why alternatives
were rejected: .No a1temative were considered because the registry
is charged w~ the responsibility for making the affiliation determination.
(5) Identify any statute, administrative regulation or govemment
policy which may be in conflict, overlapping, or duplication: None
(a) Necessity of proposed regulation if in conflict: None
(b) If in conflict, was effort made to harmonize the proposed.
administrative regulation with conflicting ProVisions: None
(6) Any additional information or comments: None
TIERING: Is tiering applied? Tiering is not applied because the
provisions of this administrative regulation will apply uniformly to all
permanent committees.
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primarily and ciraclly related to the individual'sc8nclidacy;
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(4) Expenditures for the purchase of transpot1ation services,
inducing but not linitad to the transportation of voters to the polls,
pro~d that the expancitures are reasonable. in light of the nuinbef
of persons transporl8d, miieage driven, and time spenl All transportation expencitures shall- be primarily 8iId cirectly related. to the
candidacY of the individual on whose behalf the expenditures are
made;
(5) Expenditures for tickets to political and other events to be
attended by the candidate, his spouse, or a campaign staff representative, and from which the candidate derives a direct benefit to his
candidacy. The burden shall be on the candidate to prove to the
registry that representation at the event provided a direct benefit to
his candidacy;
(6) The purchase of American, state, or other flags which are
donated to schools, civic, or charitable organizations;
(7) Campaign events such as bean suppers, breakfasts, luncheons, or ·similar events, regardless of whether admission is
charged, provided that the value of the meal does not exceed five (5)
dollars per person; and
. (8) The purchase or rental of items such as cellular telephones,
copiers, computers, automobiles, facsimile machines, and similar
items. Such purchase or rental shall be presumed to be primarily and
directly related to the individual's candidacy if the purchase or rental
occurs during the year in which the individual will appear on the ballot
or seeks election as a write-in candidate. The purchase of such items
in a year in which the individual is not a candidate shall be allowed
only if the item is purchased solely for use in an upcoming campaign.
The continued rental of such items during a year in which an
individual is not a candidate shall be allowed, provided that the
prorated use thereof which is primarily campaign related exceeds fifty
(SO) percent of the total use. Only that use attributable to the
campaign may be paid for with campaign funds and the burden shall
be on the candidate to prove that an expenditure is allowable under
this .subsection.

Registry of Section Finance
32 KAR 2:200. Allowable campaign expenditures.
RELATES TO: KRS 121.150
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 121.12O(1)(g), 121.175
NECESSITY AND FUNCTION: KRS 121.175, as amended by the
General Assembly in extraordinary session in 1993, requires the
Registry of Election Finance to promulgate administrative regulations
to specifically define those expenditures that may lawfully be made
from a candidate's campaign account. It is therefore necessary to
promulgate this administrative regulation so that the agency may fulfill
its statutory mandate.
.
Section 1. Allowable Expenditures. In addition to the general
categories of allowable campaign expenditures provided.by law, the
following expenditures shall be considered allowable:
(1) Expenditures made or items donated to charitable and civic
organizations such as clubs, neighborhood organizations, schools,
and churches, provided that the expenditure furthers a candidacy
through advertising;
(2) Expenditures for items of personal property bearing the name
or likeness of the candidate in a conspicuous manner for distribution
by a candidate which have a value of ten (10) dollars or iess, and
which are distributed for the purpose of advertising that individual's
candidacy. These items include, but are not limited to, hats, shirts,
calendars, magnets, holiday greeting cards, and similar items. The
purchase of tickets for general distribution for the purpose of
influencing and election, either directly or indirectly, shall not be
aDowed under the subsection;
(3) Reasonable expenditures for services such as distribution of
campaign literature, staff services, and similar services which are

Section 2. Unlawful Campaign Expenditures. In addition to the
expenditures specifically prohibited by law, the following categories of
campaign expenditures shall not be considered allowable expendi.
tures from a campaign account:
(1) Payment of dues to professional, civic, or other organizations
to which the incividual belongs or desires to join;
(2) Expenditures made to defray the costs associated with an
individual's performance of his official duties as an officeholder; and
. (3) Costs associated with gifts, flowers, food, or similar items
which are purchased for the benefit of campaign staff or volunteers,
or any other expenditure which bestows a private, pecuniary benefit
to an individual.
.
Section 3. Expenditures made by a candidate or an incumbent
officeholder during a year in which he will not appear on the ballot as
a candidate shall be subject to strict scrutiny. If the registry staff, in
the course of reviewing a candidate's or incumbenrs campaign
finance statements, determines that a questionable expenditure has
been made, whether or not the expenditure was made during an
eiection year; the burden shall be on the candidate or incumbent to
prove that the expenditure was directly and primarily related to his
candidacy.
JOSEPH H. TERRY, Chairman
APPROVED BY AGENCY: December 9, 1993FILED WITH LAC: December 15,1993 at 10 a.m.
PUBUC HEARING:~ public hearing on this proposed administrative regulation shan be held on January 24, 1994:at 9 a.m., at 140
Walnut Street. Frankfort, Kentucky. Individuals interested in· being
heard at this hearing shall notify this agency in writing by January 19,
1994, five days prior to the hearing, of their intent to attend. If no
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hearing. may be cancellaci. This hearing is open to the public. Ant .
parson who wishes to be heard wiY be giYBn an opportUnity tocomment on this proposed administrative regulation. A transcript of
the public hearing will not be made unless a writ1Bn request fer a rra...
script is made. If you do not wish to be heard at the pubic hearing,
you may- submit Written comments on the proposed administrative·
regulation. SeI1d written notification of intant to be heard at the pub6c
hearing or written comments on the proposed administraJive regulation to: George Russell, Executive Dir8ctor, Kentucky Registry of
Election Finance, 140 Walnut S1rHt, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601,
(502) 564-2226.
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
Agency Contact Person: Anita Stanley
(1) Type and number of entities affected: This proposed administrativa regulation will affect all candidates for public office in the state.
(a) Direct and indirect costs or savings to'those affected:
1. First year: None
2. Continuing costs or savings: None
3. Additional factors increasing or decreasing .costs (Note any
effects upon competition): None
(b) Reporting and paperwork requirements: No additional
paperwork will result except some recordkeeping on vote haulers.
(2) Effects on the promulgateEl administrati'iQ body:
(a) Direct and indirect costs or savings:
1. First year: None
..
2. Continuing costs or savings: None
3. Additional factors increasing or decreasil)9 costs: None
Cb) Reporting and paperwork requirements: No addtional
paperwortt will result to the agency.
(3) Assessment of anticipated effect on state and local revenues:
This proposed administrativa regulation will have no effect on state
and local revenues.
(4) Assessment of alternative methods; reasons why alternatives
were rejected: No altemative methods were considered because the
agency was required by statute. to promulgate this administrativa
regulation. .
(5) Identify any statute, administrative regulation or govemmental
policy which may be in conflict, overlapping, or duplication: None
Ca) Necessity of proposed administrativa regulation if in conflid:
Cb) If in conflict, was effort made to harmonize the proposed
administrativa regulation with conflicting provisions:
(6) Any additional information or comments:
TIERING: Was tiering appHed? Tiering is not applied l?ecause
these provisions regarding allowable campaign expenditures apply in
a uniform manner to all candidates for pUblic office.
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dates, committee, or contributing organization is bona fide, although
compensable, vacation or other earned leave time.

32 teAR 2:170.In-lcind conbibutiona.
RELATES TO: KAS 121.015(6)(b), (e), (d), 121A.010(11)(a)(2),
(3), (4)
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 121.120(1)(g), 121A.020(7)
NECESSITY AND FUNCTION: KRS 121.015(6)(b), (c), and (d)
and 121A.010(11)(a)(2), (3), and (4) include the payment for or
provision of certain goods and services to a candidate, slate of
candidates, committee, or contributing organization within the
definition of ·contribution". Such payments are known as 'in-kind"
contributions. It is necessary to promulgate this administrative
regulation to clearly identify the circumstances under which a
contribution falls within the in-kind category.
Section 1. (1) A candidate, slate of candidates, eommittee, or
contributing organization shall not conspire with an individual or other
entity to disguise an illegal contribution as an in-kind contribution.
(2) It shall be considered an in-kind contribution when an
individual or other entity provides direct goods or services to a
candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or contributing organization
or if an individual purchases goods or services from a third party for
the benefit of a candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or
contributing organization.
(3) A business enterprise may make an in-kind contribution to a
candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or contributing organization
provided, however, that the business enterprise is not incorporated.
The owner of a corporation may make personal in-kind contributions
provided that no corporate funds or assets are involved, or, if
corporate property such as copiers, telephones, or other office
equipment are utilized, the actual costs are billed to the owner and
reimbursed with personal funds, and the cost does not exceed the
applicable individual contribution limit contained in KRS 121.150. A
candidate· shall not accept the use of the assets of any corporation
unless the fair marXet value is billed to the campaign and paid for
with campaign funds.
(4) If goods or services are provided at less than the rate
normally charged, the amount of the in-kind contribution shall be the
difference between the usual and normal charge for the goods and
services at the time of the contribution and the amount actually
charged.
(5) The payment by any person of compensation for the personal
services of another if those services are rendered without charge to
a candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or contributing organization shall. be an in-kind contribution. No compensation shall be
considered paid to any employee under the following conditions:
(a) If an employee is paid on an hourly or salaried basis and is
expected to worX a particular number of hours per period, no
contribution results if the employee engages in activity for the benefit
of a candidate, slat~ of candidates, committee, or contributing
organization during what would otherwise be a regular worX period,
provided that the taken or released time is made up or completed by
the employee within a reasonable time;
(b) No contribution results where.-l employee engages in activity
for the benefit of a candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or
contributing organization during what would otherwise be normal
working hours if the employee is paid on a commission or piecework
basis, or is paid only for worX actually performed and the employee's
time is considered his awn to use as he sees fit; or
(c) No contribution results where the time used by the employee
to engage in activity for the benefit of a cancidate, slate of candi-

Section 2. A contribution made under the following circumstances
shall not be considered an in-kind contribution:
(1) Payment for goods and services previously or simultaneously
acquired by a cancidate, slate of cancidates, committee, or contributing organization; or
(2) Payment of a debt with cash received by a candidate, slate of
candidates, committee, or contributing organization without depositing
the funds into the campaign aCcount and complying with all applicable
reporting requirements.
Section 3. (1) A candidate, slate of candidates, committee, Of
contributing organization shall not attempt to circumvent the contribution limitations of KRS 121.150 or the contribution and expenditure
limits of KRS Chapter 121A by conspiring with an individual, business
enterprise, or other entity to engage in activity which would otherwise
constitute an independent expenditure tor the benefit of the candidate,
slate of candidates, committee, or contributing organization.
(2) Cancidates, slates of candidates, committees, or contributing
organizations shall have no duty to report expenditures made on their
behalf which qualify as independent expenditures. They shall report
receipt of in-kind contributions resulting from expenditures made on
their behalf and with their direct or indirect cooperation, consent,
request, suggestion, or consultation.
JOSEPH H. TERRY, Chair
APPROVED BY AGENCY: November 12,1993
FILED WITH LAC: November 15, 1993 at 11 a.m.
PUBUC HEARING: A public hearing on this proposed administrative regulation shall be held on December 21, 1993, at 9 a.m. at 140
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky. Individuals interested in attending
this hearing shall notify this agency in writing by December 16,1993,
five days prior to the hearing, of their intent to attend. If no notification
of intent to attend the hearing is received by that date, the hearing
may be cancelled. This hearing is open to the public. Any person who
attends will be given an opportunity to comment on the proposed
administrative regulation. A transcript of the public hearing will not be
made unless a written request for a transcript is made. If you do not
wish to attend the public hearing, you may submit written comments
on the proposed administrative regulation to: George Russell,
Executive Director, Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 140
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, (502) 564-2226.
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
Contact Person: Anita Stanley
(1) Type and number of entities affected: This administrative
regulation affects all candidates for public office in Kentucky as well
as individuals who contribute to those candidates.
(a) Direct and indirect costs or savings to those affected:
1. First year: No direct or indirect cost will be associated with this
administrative regulation.
2. Continuing costs or savings: No direct or indirect cost will be
associated with this administrative regulation. .
3. Additional factors increasing or decreasing costs (note any
'effects upon competition: None
(b) Reporting and paperworX requirements: All in-kind contributions in excess of $100 per election must be repGrted to the Registry
as provided in KRS 121.180. There wiD be no additional paperworil
and reporting requirements as a result of this administrative regula-

tion.
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RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING KENTUCKY BANKS:
Alticle 1
Pitch Witch Trenching v. C & S Carpentry, Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 171 (1991).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals applied KRS 355.1-207, the UCC section on
performance or acceptance under reservation of rights, to allow the payee of a "payment in full"
check to accept the check under an explicit reservation of rights without the acceptance
constituting an accord and satisfaction. Kentucky has accepted the position that the enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code modified the old common law rule. Although this is a
minority position among the states, it is one in accord with most commentators on the Code and
the law of several other states including Missouri, New York, and Ohio.

Alticle 2
J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx Arabians

n. Ltd.,

825 F.Supp. 146 (W.D.Ky. 1993).

- This case involves issues that fall across the full breadth of the Code from Article 2 to
Article 9. Applying the exception to the parol evidence rule found at KRS 355.2-202(b), the
Court recognized an oral agreement that was in addition to, but not contradictory to, a written
contract.
Keeneland Association. Inc. v. Earner, 830 F.Supp. 974 (E.D.Ky. 1993).
This is one of the many cases that have come out of the liquidation of the assets of.
Calumet Farm. The Keeneland Association sued the buyer of a Calumet filly for breach of
contract. The buyer removed the action to federal court, sought recision of the contract, and
brought his own claim against Calumet. Keeneland prevailed partially because of the warranty
disclaimer language in its sales contract: "THERE IS NO WARRANTY IMPLIED BY
AUCTIONEER OR CONSIGNOR (INCLUDING OWNER), EXCEPT AS SET FORTH
HEREIN, AS TO THE MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
PURPOSE OF ANY ANIMAL OFFERED IN THIS SALE. ALL SALES ARE MADE ON AN
AS IS BASIS, WITH ALL FAULTS." Relying on prior Kentucky law (Greg Coats Cars. Inc.'
y. Kasey, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 251 (1978); Childers & Venters, Inc. y. Sowards, Ky. 460
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Potts v. Draper, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 896 (1993); Rogers v. Wheeler, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 892
(1993).
In companion cases decided on September 30, 1993, the Kentucky Supreme Court found,

that for liability insurance purposes, automobile dealers are the legal owners of a vehicle until
such time as the AVIS System shows their customer as the owner. In. the Potts case, the Court
referred to the 1983 Commentary (the unofficial Commentary found in the Bank's Baldwin
edition of the statutes) to KRS 355.2-202 (parol evidence rule) in fmding that "actual
performance of the parties must be considered the best indication of what they intended the
writing to mean and that it is not proper to include testimony or other evidence of the parties'
conduct as opposed to their words". The specific ruling was on the question of whether the
transaction between the dealer and customer was a conditional sale as opposed to a transfer with
a retention of a security interest. Although the dicta in regard to KRS 355.2-202 remains, the
practical effect of both cases is being overruled by Senate Bill 106, passed by both houses and
delivered to the Governor on February 28.
Wyatt v. Mullins, 91-CA-002628 (September 3, 1993) (NOT FINAL).
The Court of Appeals was called upon to settle a dispute between two innocent parties
concerning the purchase of a 1984 Corvette that was stolen. The vehicle was recovered by the
Kentucky State Police and returned to an Illinois insurer. The last owner of the vehicle, Wyatt,
brought an action against his seller, Mullins, for breach of warranty of good title pursuant to
KRS 355.2-312. (The Court notes that the actual warranty involved was the warranty of
merchantability, KRS 355.2-314.) Mullins' defense was based on the notice requirements of
KRS 355.2-607(3)(a). Mullins alleged that Wyatt was required to notify him of any breach prior
to commencing a lawsuit or be barred from relief. Our Court of Appeals found that the
summons and suit could serve as a notice under KRS 355.2-607 but remanded the case for the
determination of whether Wyatt's notice was "reasonably timely."

Article 3
Davis v. Davis, Ky. App., 838 S.W.2d 415 (1992).
This is another case where Kentucky courts have ruled that the enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code "superseded" the prior rule of law in the Commonwealth. In this case, KRS
355.3-111 on bearer paper was applied to overturn the decision of Finley v. Rose, 189 Ky. 359,
224 S.W. 1059 (1920). The case involved a note with a blank payee line. The holder argued
that the note constituted bearer paper. However, the Court ruled that KRS 355.3-111 restricted
bearer paper to instruments payable to a bearer, a specified person or bearer, or cash. The
Court determined that the instrument in question was incomplete and could not be enforced until
completed.
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Federal Land Bank v. Hardin-Mapes Coal, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 225 (1991).
This decision is described by Leibson and Nowka as ". . . an opinion packed with
incorrect and ambiguous analysis made in order to reach what the Court felt was a fair result. "
(The Uniform Commercial Code of Kentucky 2 Ed., Section 4.6(A)(1}.} The opinion of the
Court of Appeals, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, held that: (1) forged instruments are a
nullity, and (2) that a bank as payee of a check, presented by one who is not a maker, and who
directs the bank to credit the check to his personal account, cannot be a holder in due course and
is on notice that it should inquire further as to the presenters authority. The Court places a
burden on Kentucky banks far greater than that prescribed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
The UCC allocates the primary risk of loss and forgeries to the drawee or payor bank, not the
payee as does the decision in Hardin-Mapes.
The decision may well have resulted due to application of the principles of equity and,
several procedural twists in the underlying litigation. Hardin-Mapes never brought a claim
against its bank that paid the forged check and the Federal Land Bank of Louisville did not raise
on appeal Hardin-Mapes' failure to timely report the forgery.
Hopefully, this aberration in Kentucky law can be corrected legislatively or through
future litigation that brings a more attractive case, in a better procedural posture, before our
courts. Bank counsel must be careful to distinguish Hardin-Mapes based on both its facts and
the legal issues presented to our Supreme Court. (Thus far the case has not been cited as
authority in any other decision from any jurisdiction. In nearly identical facts, the New York
Supreme Court recently reached a different but correct result in Gino's of Caprie. Inc. v.
Chemical Bank, 592 N. Y.S. 2d 682 (January 1993).}
J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx Arabians II. Ltd., 825 F.Supp. 146 (W.D.Ky. 1993).
The holder of notes associated with the sale of Arabian horses claimed holder in due
course status. That the original transferor of the notes did not endorse the notes. Applying KRS
355.3-201, the Court found that subsequent transferees were entitled to have the endorsement
of the original tra'1sferor; however, without t~e endorsement the subsequent mm.sferees could
not attain holder in due course status (KRS 355.3-202).

Article 4
Ferguson Enterprises. Inc. v. Main Supply. Inc. and Bank of Danville, 92-CA-0884
(1993) (Final, Motion For Discretionary Review denied 2-19-94).
The Court applied KRS 355.4-303 to allocate priorities between a judgment creditor that
levied a garnishment on a depositor's account and the bank's right of setoff. Picking up on the
concept of the Code section, the Court said that a bank cannot charge a customer's account with
a setoff after accepting a garnishment thereon, the garnishment being the type of legal process
anticipated by the Code. Regardless of whether the debtor's loan account was in default, the
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Court ruled that the setoff must be. effected prior to receipt of the garnishment in order for the
setoff to take priority. To determine when a setoff takes effect, our Court of Appeals followed
the Sixth Circuit in using the following criteria: (1) the decision to exercise the right, (2) some
action which accomplishes the setoff, and (3) some record. which evidences that the right of
setoff has been exercised. The burden of proof is allocated to the bank to demonstrate when the
setoff actually occurred as evidenced by intent, affirmative acts, and records.
In the event the Kentucky Supreme Court allows this decision to stand, the KBA is

currently working on a legislative solution.
James v. Webb, Ky. App., 827 S.W.2d 702 (1992).
The Court determined that a safe deposit box is not an "account" or "other like
arrangement" for the purposes of KRS 391.300(1) entitling the surviving party to the balance.
The Court cited as authority KRS 355.4-104(1)(a) that defines "account" as any account with
a bank including "a checking, time, interest or savings account;.... "
Arncle 9
Validity of Security Agree"!ent and Rights of Parnes Thereto
In re Bush (Estate of Conn v. First National Bank of Pikeville), 159 BR 209 (Bkrtcy.
E.D.Ky. 1993).
The debtor, Marvin T. Bush, and his P.S.C., Marvin T. Bush, D.M.D., P.S.C., filed,
respectively, a Chapter 7 petition and Chapter 11 petition on the same date. Conn was an
unsecured creditor who challenged the security interest of First National Bank of Pikeville in the
personal property associated with the dental practice. Although the debtor practiced as a P.S.C.
in February 1989, the Bank took its security interest from the individual. The P.S.C. was
administratively dissolved in December 1990. On the issue of attachment of the security
interest, the Court found for the Bank on the basis that the security agreement clearly referred
to the debtor's dental practice and that third parties could not fail to be put on notice that the
Bank was claiming a security interest in the personal property related to the dental practice
whether or not the debtor was identified as a P.S.C. Although ruling on the attachment of the
security interest under Part 2 of Article 9, the Court apparently applied, without specifically
statmg, the seriously misleading error test of KRS 355.9-402(7).
J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx Arabians II. Ltd., 825 F.Supp. 146 (W.D.Ky. 1993).
The second aspect of the Morgan case concerns KRS 355.9-206(1). The holder of the
note, having failed in its attempt to claim holder in due course status, attempted to assert its
rights under KRS 355.9-206(1) as an assigneeibeneficiary of a waiver of defenses clause in a
security agreement. Although the Court recognized the statutory defense, it found the defense
inapplicable due to its location on the reverse of the contract without proper incorporation
language above the signature on the face of the contract.
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Priority of Liens
Central Trust Co. v. Dan's Marina, Ky. App., 858 S.W.2d 211 (1993).
This case presented the Court of Appeals with a classic confrontation between the claim
of a mechanic for towing, repairs, storage, and service charges versus the claim of the secured
creditor. The boat, on which a balance of over $28,000.00 was owed, was placed in the
possession of Dan's Marina in May 1989. A total bill of $4,574.00 accumulated by February
1992. The bill was composed of towing and storage charges, service charges, and actual repair
costs. For a resolution of the priority claim, the Court looked at KRS 355.9-310:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or
materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods
in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such material
or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is
statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise.
The Court thus found that the repair costs and the towing and storage charges, properly
came ahead of the bank's lien but denied priority to the claim for services charges. This was
in keeping with the spirit and intent of the mechanic's lien statute. The Court reaffrrmed the
law of this state as first enunciated in Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, Ky., 384 S.W.2d 302,
(1964). The Court particularly noted that Dan's Marina retained possession of the boat
continuously from May 1989. Possession is the key to the mechanic's retention of priority.
Once possession is released, even if the vehicle or boat returns to the possession of the
mechanic, the priority on the original claim is lost.
A different result might have been reached had Central Trust Company taken a ship
mortgage. The law of ship mortgages is more akin to the law of real estate. Except for certain
claims to wages, and marine torts, the holder of a properly recorded ship mortgage primes all
other liens.
McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Kentucky law in a dispute between a
Louisville law fum and a Kentucky bank as to the priority of their respective claims to
settlement funds from a securities claim. The bank argued that the settlement funds constituted
proceeds from the disposition of stock in which it held a prior perfected security interest. The
Court ruled in favor of the bank, based on Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code, and the
Code's definition of proceeds as "whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or
other disposition of collateral ... " Citing In re Stone, 52 BR 305 (Bankr. W.D.Ky. 1985), the
Court ruled that it was the intent of the Kentucky Legislature to give the term "proceeds" the
broadest possible defmition. After making the determination that the settlement funds constituted
proceeds under the Code, the Ninth Circuit determined, outside the Code, that a perfected
security interest that is prior in time is superior to a later lien.
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Peifection of Security Interests
Banque Worms v. Davis Const. Co .. Inc., Ky. App., 831 S.W.2d 921 (1992).
Judge Gudgle, in a decision cited in the December 1992 uee Bulletin, applied the
brightline rule of most jurisdictions on the period during which a continuation statement can be
fIled. A fIled fmancing statement is effective for fIve years. KRS 355.9-403(2). To continue
the perfection of a lien for another fIve years from the date of expiration of the original
fInancing statement, a creditor must fue a continuation statement "within six mop,ths prior to the
expiration of the fIve year period." KRS 355.9-403(3). Banque Worms' continuation statement
was ffied six months and two days before the end of the five year perfection period. Thus,
under the decision of our Court of Appeals, it was ineffective. Although the brightline standard
has been criticized by some commentators, the position taken by Kentucky is in accord with that
of other states.
In re Bush (Estate of Conn v. First National Bank of Pikeville), 159 BR 209 (Bkrtcy.
E.D.Ky. 1993).
Having survived the· test for attachment of its security interest, the bank lost on a
perfection issue. The perfection question borders on a law school exam. The individual debtor
maintained residences in Floyd County and Fayette County. His dental practice was located in
Pike County. The bank recorded in Floyd County. The Court applied KRS 355. 9-401 (5) (a) and
found the proper place to record a lien against an individual is their principal place of business.
With the dental practice located in Pike County, the Court found the bank not to have properly
perfected its security interest. This gets back to the old Kentucky rule on where to record:
EVERYWHERE.

Default and Remedies
Great American Insurance Company v. Stapleton and GMAC, 92-CA-OOI625 (1994)
(NOT FINAL).
GMAC repossessed a 1984 Cadillac from its customers. After GMAC had applied for
and obtained a repossession title, the customers exercised their right under KRS 355.9-506 and
redeemed the collateral. Here, the Code conflicts with the new Supreme Court decisions in
Potts v. Draper and Rogers v. Wheeler. The debtor was entitled to redeem the collateral at any
time prior to its disposition under KRS 355.9-504. GMAC properly surrendered its collateral
upon payment and forwarded documents to reverse the repossession title to the Pike County
Clerk. Unfortunately for GMAC, its debtors were involved in an accident prior to the time of
transfer.
Holt v. Peoples Bank of Mt.Washington, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 568 (1991) (copy attached).
There were formerly two camps on the issue of whether a creditor could collect a
defIciency if its sale of collateral failed to meet any of the several tests of commercial
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reasonability. One line of cases held that a rebuttable presumption was created that the value
of the collateral was equal to the debt but that a creditor could present evidence to show it
remained entitled to a deficiency. Other jurisdictions, including Kentucky, held that any failure
on the part of a creditor in the disposition of collateral negated its legal right to sue for a
deficiency.· Bank Josephine v. Conn, Ky. App., 599 S.W.2d 773 (1980).
The decision in Holt strikes a middle ground that has received favorable comment. A
secured creditor who properly notifies the debtor of the sale will not forfeit a deficiency if it can
prove that the commercial unreasonableness did not reduce the selling price, or that if the selling
price was reduced, the amount of the reduction did not wipe out the deficiency. The critical
difference between this and the former line of rebuttable presumption cases relates to the notice
of sale. Writing for the Court, Justice Lambert emphasized the importance of a notice of sale
as a fundamental right of due process and held that a creditor's failure to give notice borders on
conversion and voids the right to a deficiency.
J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx Arabians II. Ltd., 825 F.Supp. 146 (W.D.Ky. 1993).
Bank Josephine v. Conn, Ky. App., 599 S.W.2d 773 (1980) may have been partially
reversed by Holt v. Peoples Bank of Mt. Washington; however, the federal court applied,
properly, the rule that the burden of proof is on the secured party to show that it has acted with
commercial reasonableness.
Lee & Mason Intern. v. Daugherty, Ky. App., 828 S.W.2d 677 (1992).

The fact situation addressed by the Court involved a bank with insurance coverage
relating to deficiencies on certain of its installment sale contracts. When the bank repossessed
its collateral, a car, it notified its debtor that the vehicle would be sold at public auction. At the
auction, the highest bid, $7,400.00, was rejected by the bank on the advice of its insurance
carrier. Subsequently, the bank was paid off by the insurance carrier and assigned to the
insurance carrier all of its rights in the security agreement and collateral. The insurance carrier
applied $7,400.00 to the debtor's account and sued for a deficiency. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that the sale to the insurance ca...rrier did not constitute the public auction of which
the bank's debtor was notified. The Court further ruled that the insurance carrier could have
collected a deficiency as an assignee of the bank (KRS 355.9-504(5» if it had met the statutory
requirements for a commercially reasonable sale.

THE STATUS OF KENTUCKY'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Kentucky was one of the first, if not the first, states to enact the Code in 1958. There
were no substantial changes in Kentucky's Code until 1986 when the legislature adopted the
1972 amendments to Article 9 and the 1977 amendments to Article 8.

There were minor

amendments in a "clean-up" bill in 1988 to iron out certain problems, particularly in relation to
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motor vehicle and mobile home liens. The 1990 Legislature enacted the model version of
Article 2A on leases. The 1992 Legislature, following the recommendations of the American
Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, repealed
Article 6 on bulk transfers and enacted the model amendments to Article 2A. A small but
significant amendment in the 1992 UCC bill added KRS 355.1-110. This section adopts the
comments of the National Conference of Commissioner's on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute as interpretative of the Code. This can be very useful in a state where
reported case law provides little guidance in interpretation of the Code.
Kentucky's Code has recently stayed abreast of the remainder of the country with the
possible exception of action on the amendments to Articles 3 and 4. As of December 1, 1993,
40 states have adopted Article 2A on leases with 38 adopting the model amendments, 30 states
have adopted the amendments to Articles 3 and 4, 47 states have enacted Article 4A, and 24
states, including Kentucky, have repealed the Bulk Sales Act in its entirety (Louisiana never
adopted Article 6) while 5 have enacted an amended and less burdensome version.
Although we have less than two years of experience with the repeal of Article 6, the sky
has not fallen in Kentucky. The ability of inventory creditors to obtain purchase money security
interest, ahead of other filers, and use of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act have essentially
alleviated the need for the Bulk Sales Act. The Bulk Sales Act has been a greater burden on
commerce since the enactment of Article 9 than it has been a protector of vendors who sell
inventory.

AMENDED ARTICLE 2A
The model amendments adopted by the 1992 Legislature are generally lender friendly.
The new KRS 355.2A-303 (3) voids provisions in lease agreements that prohibit the assignment
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or sale of leases by a lessor. Equipment leases are now freely available to lenders as collateral
and can be treated much as accounts receivable and general intangibles under KRS 355.9-318(4).
Taking the leased equipment as collateral remains risky. If goods are leased to "a lessee
in the ordinary course of business," the lessee takes free of any security interest created by the
lessor. KRS 355.2A-307(3). The equipment does not become available to the secured lender
until expiration of the lease term for default by the lessee. This follows the pattern set by KRS
355.9-307(1).
If the leased equipment is unavailable to the secured party while in the possession of the
lessee, the lease payments may be available as proceeds of the collateral. Case law has been
to the contrary; however, Permanent Editorial Board Commentary No.9 (1992) treats equipment
lease payments as proceeds except where the lease term is of avery short term such as daily car
rental payments.
A companion amendment to Article 1 sets a statutory distinction between a true lease and
a disguised security transaction. The text, found at KRS 355.1-201(37) "Security Interest",
focuses on economic reality. If the lease term covers the economic life of the collateral, or if
a purchase option at the end of the lease term is for little or nominal consideration, the
transaction will be deemed to be in the nature of a security interest. A protective filing should
be made in borderline cases. KRS 355.9-408. If the lessor is confident under the new and more
precise definition that the transaction is a pure lease, flling is not necessary. The new defInition
should resolve a point that has created a significant amount of litigation under the Code.

AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES 3 AND 4:

The Prospects For Change In Kentucky

Article 3
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Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, governing commercial paper and negotiable
instruments, is essentially a spruced up version of the old Negotiable Instruments Law first
promulgated in 1896. Shortcomings of the current Article 3 include the failure to address
modern check processing where numbers of checks unanticipated by the drafters of Article 3 are
processed using visual and electronic scanners and computers, and the failure to recognize the
different functions of notes and the various forms of drafts.
In 1990 the American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws recommended revisions for Article 3, and corresponding revisions to Article
4, to cure deficiencies identified both through the decisions of courts and operational experience.
Highlights of the proposed revisions include:
•

Narrowing the scope to include only checks and bearer or order instruments.

•

The requirement that a negotiable instrument state a "sum certain" is eliminated
in favor of a requirement for a "readily ascertainable amount of money, with or
without interest or other charges described in the promise or order." Interest may
be fixed or variable. (Kentucky adopted language authorizing a variable rate in
1990. See KRS 355.3-106(2).)

•

A party who satisfies an instrument has a right of contribution from co-parties
signing in the same capacity. When a co-party is insolvent, contribution is
divided between the parties who remain solvent.

•

A new statute of limitations requires that any action under Article. 3 must be
brought according to the ordinary statute of limitations existing in the state.

•

The effect of restrictive endorsements is limited. Endorsements conditioning the
right to payment do "not effect the right of the endorsee to enforce the
instrument." A person paying the instrument, or an intermediary party that takes
for value, may disregard conditions imposed by endorsement.

•

The effect of certain restrictive endorsements such as "for deposit", "for
collection", and "pay any bank", is retained.

•

Non-depository payor banks join intermediary banks as being exempt from
wrongfully paying over a restrictive endorsement.
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•

Indicia of a regularly executed instrument is added to the requirements for
attaining holder-in-due-course status.
"Apparent evidence of forgery or
alteration" prevents a holder from becoming a holder-in-due-course.

•

Modem check processing is addressed by relaxation of rules from the old
mechanical system requiring "presentment as a condition of payment. "

Corresponding Changes in Article 4
Article 4 is not as fully revised as Article 3. The primary reason being uncertainty as
to whether the Federal Reserve Board will exercise greater authority over bank deposits and
collections. Only amendments necessary to take care of immediate problems and corresponding
amendments required by changes in Article 3 have been suggested.
Primary changes include:
•

Truncation agreements between banks and customers are permitted allowing
presentment for payment by "transmission of an image of an item or information
describing the item rather than delivery of the item itself. "

•

The statute of limitations requires that actions to enforce obligations, duties, and
rights under Article 4 be brought within three years of the time the action
accrues.

•

Warranties relating to encoding and retention are added. One who encodes
information on an item warrants that the encoding is correct. Retention
warranties relate to original instruments subject to truncation agreements.

•

Customers provided with a sufficiently detailed statement of items credited and
debited, in lieu of the actual item, must notify the payor bank of an altered or
forged item following receipt of the statement as opposed to the item.

•

Banks providing statements of items credited and debited must keep the item or
legible copies for seven years and supply legible copies at the customer's request.

Amendments to Articles 3 and 4 in Kentucky
Until this Legislature, Kentucky's Special Study Commission on the Uniform Commercial
Code, sponsored by the Legislative Research Commission, had met each biennium since 1984.
At the request of legislative leadership, and due to the continuing specter of special sessions and
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large legislative agendas, the Commission did not meet to consider legislation for the 1994
session. As of December 1, 1993, 31 states have enacted the amendments for Articles 3 and
4. This is significant in that 12 states enacted the amendments in the fIrst eleven months of
1993.

If Kentucky banks and their counsel are interested in enacting the amendments in

Kentucky they should make their wishes known to the legislators.

Article 4A Funds Transfer
The transfer of money takes place through three primary systems:

checks that are

regulated by Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, electronic funds transfers by consumers (primarily
automated teller machines) regulated by the Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act, and "funds
transfers", sometimes referred to as wholesale transfers or wire transfers. Funds transfers are
unregulated except for rules of the Fedwire (Reg. J), clearing houses and private contracts.
Article4A is designed to provide certainty as to what the rights and obligations of the
parties to funds transfers are. The Article addresses the interests of banks, commercial users
and the public. The Article establishes who takes the risk of loss and who will be liable and
what the damages will be.
Article 4A has been enacted more quicldy than any other article of the Code. First
recommended in 1989, as of December 1, 1993, Article 4A had been adopted in its uniform
version by all states except New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont.
It is easy to understand the quick acceptance of Article 4A. Funds transfers account for

many times the amount of money transferred each day than the system of checks and consumer
use of electronic funds transfers combined. On an average day, over a trillion dollars transfers
through funds transfers. More than three trillion dollars have transferred on a single day. This
is roughly equivalent to the country's annual gross national product. In the average funds
transfer, five million dollars changes hands.
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Important Definitions:

A.

. B.

"payment order" means an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted
orally, electronically, or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a
fIXed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary i: (i) the instruction does
not state a condition to payment to the beneficiary other than time of payment,
(ii) the receiving bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise
receiving payment from, the sender, and (iii) the instruction transmitted by the
sender directly to the receiving bank or to an agent, funds transfer system, or
communication system for transmittal to the receiving bank.
"beneficiary" means the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank.

C.

"beneficiary's bank" means the bank identified in a payment order in which an
account of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order or which
otherwise is to make payment to the beneficiary if the order does not provide for
payment to an account.

D.

"receiving bank" means the bank to which the sender's instruction is addressed ..

E.

"sender" means the person giving the instruction to the receiving bank.

F.

"funds transfer" means the series of transactions, beginning with the originator's
payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the
order. The term includes any payment order issued by the originator's bank or
an intermediary bank intended to carry out the originator's payment order. A
funds transfer is completed by acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of a payment
order. for the benefit of the beneficiary of the originator's payment order.

G.

"intermediary bank" means a receiving bank other than the originator's bank or
the beneficiary's bank.

H.
L

." originator" means the sender of the first payment order in a funds transfer.
"originator's bank" means (i) the receiving bank to which the payment order of
the originator is issued if the originator is not a bank, or (ii) the originator if the
originator is a bank.

Article 4A divides the funds transfer process into three primary areas: issuance and
acceptance of payment orders, execution of sender's payment orders by receiving banks, and
payment. A fmal part of Article 4 governs such miscellaneous provisions as a variation of the
statutory requirements by agreement, creditors actions against funds in the transfer process, rates
of interest, and choice of law.
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Consumer transactions are specifically outside the cope of Article 4A. The statute also
provides that to the extent it is inconsistent with regulations and operating circulars of the
Federal Reserve Board, those regulations take precedence. Transfer system rules will also
prevail over the statutory provisions of Article 4A.
Two major subjects covered by Article 4A are unauthorized payment orders and
authorized but erroneous payment orders. If a bank is to avoid liability, it must provide a
"commercially reasonable security procedure. "? The words "commercially reasonable" have
been a source of substantial litigation under Article 9 and in all likelihood will follow in Article
4A. However, as opposed to Article 9, the question of commercially reasonable under Article
. 4A is a question of law that is to be decided by the courts. [4A-202(c)] The courts are directed
to. consider the instructions of the customer, the circumstances surrounding the customer
including their normal funds transfer activity, alternative security procedures issued to the
customer, and security procedures used in similar transactions by similar parties. A bank that
has complied with the security procedures, and relied on written instructions of its customer, will
generally not bear a loss for an unauthorized transfer. However, if a bank's customer meets its
burden of proof, and a crook has initiated the transfer, the loss does fallon the bank.
A more frequent occurrence than a fraudulent payment order is an authorized but
erroneous order. Here a bank is liable to its customer for direct expenses but is exempted from
consequential damages unless there is a written contract to the contrary.

Article 4A also

imposes a one year statute of repose.
Benefits for users of funds transfers include:
•

Finality of payment; funds transfers, although equivalent to cash, are made with
a more certain degree of finality.

•

Customers have a "money back guarantee" if a transfer is not completed.
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•

There is a statutory discharge of underlying obligations upon acceptance by the
beneficiary's bank.

•

In order to take advantage of loss allocation rules, banks will provide reasonable

security procedures.
•

A receiving bank suffers the loss for an unauthorized transfer unless the bank can
prove: . (i) its security procedure was commercially reasonable, (ii) the bank
followed the procedure, (iii) the bank acted in good faith, and (iv) the bank
complied with the .customer's written agreement or instructions restricting
acceptance of payment orders. Regardless, the loss will fall on the bank, if a
customer can prove it is without fault.

•

A customer may receive damages for dishonor if its bank has accepted an order
and the bank fails to pay. Consequential damages are available to customers if
the beneficiary gave notice of particular circumstances that would give rise to
such damages and an indication of the magnitude of the damages.

Benefits to Banks Under Article 4A:
•

Enactment of a body· of statutory law fills the large gaps that now exist in
determination of the rights and remedies of parties to the payment system.

•

When banks are users of the system, they have all of the benefits of users noted
above.

•

Bank liability is limited to loss of interest and principal and in certain instances
incidental costs and attorneys fees. Consequential damages are available to a
customer only in the event of intentional dishonor. The statute of limitations
requires objections to payment be made within one year from the time the
customer receives notice that the order was sent (4A-502)

•

There is statutory guidance for choice of law that will promote certainty as to
legal rights (4A-507)

•

There is statutory recognition of the netting of obligations between banks. This
is particularly important in the reduction of insolvency risks. (4A-402)

•

Banks are authorized to rely upon numbers used by customers to identify a
beneficiary, even if there is a conflict with name. (4A-305)

•

Banks can rely upon a message that tests against a security procedure unless a
customer proves that a payment order was unauthorized and any breach of
confidential security procedures was not the fault of the customer.
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FUTURE CHANGES IN OTHER ARTICLES OF THE CODE
Article 1 (General Provisions)

During 1993, the Permanent Editorial Board issued a draft commentary on the meaning
of the term "good faith" as used in the Code. The commentary has not yet been adopted.
The essence of the commentary is that the "good faith" requirement of the Code does not
support an independent cause of action where no other basis for a cause of action exists.
Once adopted, no legislative· action will be necessary. See KRS 355.1-110.
Article 2 (Sale of Goods)

A comprehensive redraft of Article 2 is being prepared following a study report and
preliminary draft proposals. The primary changes will accommodate cases dealing with
computer software and other intangible commercial property.
Article 5 (Letters of Credit)

A fifth discussion draft of amendments to the article on letters of credit is being
circulated. The drafting committee has particularly worked to harmonize Article 5 with
the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (500).
Article 7 (Warehouse Receipts) .

The Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the American Bar Association formed an
Article 7 Task Force in 1992, to consider the need for revisions.
Article 8 (Securities)

A final reading of draft amendments was expected before the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws last summer. However, the time schedule has
been pushed back. The primary changes. address the indirect holding system for
securities. The term "securities entitlement" is coined to deal with the interest in
securities held by most customers of brokerage houses. The rules for priority in regard
to security interest in securities are returned to Article 9. However, a special section,
8-502 would deal with purchase money interest in securities. A final draft is now
expected this summer.
Article 9 (Secured Transactions)

A drafting committee has been appointed to consider a final report of the Article 9 Study
Commission of the permanent Editorial Board on the Uniform Commercial Code. A
massive Study Commission Report is available for those with incurable insomnia. There
are no radical changes in the scope of Article 9. Some of the primary changes relate to
remedies of both the secured party and the debtor. One proposed amendment does away
with the absolute bar to a deficiency rule. Other amendments clear up the relation of
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security interest in personal property to real property. Amendments are proposed to
make the filing system more accurate and fundamental.

REGUIATION B-UPDATE
Section 223 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation improvement act of 1991
amended the Equal Opportunity Act by adding a new section (e) to 15 USC 1691. The new
section requires a creditor to furnish to an applicant, upon the applicant's request, a copy of any
appraisal report used by the creditor in connection with its evaluation of a loan secured by
residential real estate. At the creditor's option, it may require reimbursement of the cost of the
appraisal from the applicant. The requirement applies to applicants whose applications are
rejected as well as those whose applications are accepted. Section 223 ofF.D.I.C.I.A. became
effective December 19, 1991; however, the correspondent amendments to Regulation B of the
Federal Reserve Board were not published in the Federal Register until December 14, 1993.
The new portions of the regulation were effective that date; however, compliance is optional
until June 14, 1994.

Transactions Affected:
All loans (whether business or consumer) secured by a lien on a dwelling. Dwelling is
defmed in the regulation as "a residential structure that contains one to four units whether or not
that structure is attached to real property. The term includes, but is not limited to, an individual
condominium or cooperative unit and a mobile or other manufactured home.

What Must Be Provided:
The documents relied upon by the creditor in evaluating the value of the dwelling,
collectively defmed as an "appraisal report."

Compliance:
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A creditor may routinely provide a copy of the appraisal report to an appalicant (whether
credit is granted or denied or the application is withdrawn)." Section 202.5a(a)(1). If a creditor
does not routinely provide appraisal reports, it shall provide a copy upon an applicant's written
request. If the creditor does not routinely provide appraisal reports, the applicant must be
notified in writing of their right to receive an appraisal report. The notice may be given at any
time during the application process but no later than when the creditor provides a notice of
action.

The notice must specify that the applicant's request must be in writing, give the

creditor's mailing address, and state that the request must be received within 90 days after the
creditor has provided notice of action taken on the application. The creditor must mail or
deliver the copy of the appraisal report "promptly" after receiving the applicant's request. The
regulation defines promptly as "generally within 30 days." Mailing or delivery may also be
contingent upon receipt of the report or receipt of reimbursement from the applicant.
Model Notice:

You have the right to a copy of the appraisal report used in connection with your
application for credit. If you wish a copy, please write to us at the mailing
address we have provided. We must hear from you no later than 90 days after
we notify you about the action taken on your credit application or you withdraw
your application.
Federal Reserve Form C-9.
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APPENDIX

Robert E. BOLT; Collllie Bolt; and
Marion E. Bolt, Appellants,
1'.

The PEOPLES BANK OF MT.
WASBINGTON, Appellee.
No. 9O-SC-M29-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Aug. 29, 1991.

..

In action to recover deficiency judgment, the Circuit Court, Bullitt County, det.ennined that secured party did not act in a
reasonable commercial manner when, after
repossession, it failed to timely dispose of
truck which secured indebtedness. Dimi-nution in value of vehicle was fixed at
$1,439 and debtors were allowed a credit
for such sum against amount of deficiency
judgment entered in favor of creditor. On
review from Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, Lambert,J., held that secured party may present evidence as to
amount of damage caused by its lack of
commercial reasonableness in disposing of
collateral and such sum will be deducted
from deficiency.
Affinned.

1. Secured Transactiona C=240

Secured party who fails to give notice
to debtor that collateral is about to be
disposed denies debtor an opportunity to
assert defenses, contest the amount
claimed or pay any indebtedness prior to
sale of the collateral; when notice is omitted, principle of estoppel prevents recovery
of any deficiency judgment. KRS 355.9504(3), 355.9-507.
2. Secured Transactiona -=-240

It is presumed that collateral is worth
at least the amount of debt it secures, and
burden is cast upon secured party to prove
~i9ita commercial 1UU'ea8Onable1)e8S in

HOLT v. PEOPLES BANK OF MT. WASHINGTON
ate ... J(y.. 114 S.W.2d 561

disposing of collateral did not result in
diminished proceeds, or if it did, by what
amount; upon failure of secured party to
prove that his conduct did not diminish the
proceeds, presumption that collateral is of
lufficient value to satisfy the debt controls
and claim for deficiency is forfeited; if, in
8uch circumstances, secured party is unwilling to depend entirely upon contention,
that its conduct did not result in diminished
proceeds, it may present evidence as to
amount of damage it caused and such sum
will be deducted from the deficiency. KRS
355.9-504 et seq., 355.9-507.
John A. Schmidt, Shepherdsville, for appellants.
Joseph J. Wantland, Shephersdville, for
appellee.
LAMBERT, Justice.
The issue presented is whether any failure of a secured party to dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable
manner necessarily results in a forfeiture
of its right to a deficiency judgment. Decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
in Bank Josephine v. Conn, Ky.App., 599
S.W.2d 773(1980), Rering v. Doug Evam
Auto Sales, Inc., Ky.App., 703 S.W.2d 491
(1986), and Bailey v. Nawror Financial
Corp., Ky.App., 709 S.W.2d 841 (1986),
broadly hold that a secured party found to
be in violation of the requirements of KRS
355.9-504 is estopped to claim entitlement
to a deficiency judgment. Despite these
decisions, in the instant case, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals fashioned an
equitable remedy which allowed the debtors a credit against the amount of the
deficiency for the damage which resulted
from the commercially unreasonable dis~
sition of the collateral.
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the amount of the deficiency judgment entered in favor of appellee. In this Court
there is no viable contention that the finding of commercial unreasonableness and
the amount of loss occasioned thereby is
clearly erroneous. CR 52.01.
Throughout this litigation, appellants
have argued that the finding of commercial
unreasonableness barred recovery of any
deficiency judgment. The courts below rejected this contention, but failed to distinguish or adequately explain their failure to
fol]pw what appears to be controlling authority. See Bank Josephine v. Conn, supra, Rering v. Doug Evam Auto Sales,
Inc., supra, and Bailey v. Nawror Financial Corp., supra. The Court of Appeals
simply said "[i]n light of the minimal decrease in value of the truck due to the
bank's action, it would not be fair to the
bank to completely bar it from seeking a
deficiency judgment." Instead, the Court
of Appeals adopted the view found in Wil-

son Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal
Corp., 220 N.W.2d 83 (Mich.App.1974),
which allows an offset for the damage
caused by the secured party.
Prior to addressing the real issue, appellee has contended that the loss was occasioned by appellants' own misconduct or
that- the trial court's finding was clearly
erroneous. This issue was settled against
appellee in the Court of Appeals, "We cannot say then that the trial court's finding
that the bank did not act in a commercially
reasonable manner is clearly erroneous,"
and appellee's failure to present the issue
to this Court by means of a cross-motion
for discretionary review precludes any further review. CR 76.21 and Common-

wealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways v. Taub,

Ky., 766 S.W.2d 49 (1989).
In the trial court it was determined that
the secured party, appellee herein, did not
On the merits, appellee contends that if
act in a commercially reasonable manner the debtor can prove damages occasioned
when, after repossession, it failed to timely by the secured party's improper disposition
dispose of the truck which secured the in- of the collateral with reasonable certainty,
debtedness. Diminution in value of the such sum should be deducted from the
vehicle, earlier appraised at $18,()()().-$19,- amount of the deficiency judgment allowed.
000, was fixed at $1,439 and appellants If 8uch damages are not subject to reasonwere allowed a credit for this sum agains~ _~be calculation, appellee concedes that the
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entire deficiency should be forfeited.
While this view is not unappealing, in most
cases it would provide little incentive to the
secured party to strictly observe the requirements of KRS 355.9-504. In one
study of repossession and resale of automobiles, the author concluded that the code
procedure which pennits recovery of deficiency provided a disincentive to the secured creditor to obtain the highest price
and recommended elimination of all deficiency judgments in this context Shuchman, "Profit on Default: An Archival
Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale," 22 Stan.L.Rev. 20 (1969). If the approach urged by appellee was followed, in
many cases a secured party would be entitled to ignore or circumvent the requirements of the law with no greater risk of
loss than payment of that which his misconduct brought about. We considered a
similar question in the context of bad, faith
refusal to pay insurance policy proceeds
and held that an insurer should not be
entitled to wrongfully withhold payment
"with no greater possible detriment than
payment of the amount justly owed plus
interest." Curry v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., Ky., 784 S.W.2d 176 (1989). The
analogy is appropriate. Duties arising under an insurance contract are consensual
and the duties of a secured party are imposed by law. We decline to wholly adopt
the approach urged by appellee.
The parties and the courts below have
relied heavily upon the decisions of Ule
Court of Appeals in Bank Josephine v.

sults in the forfeiture, Rezing and Bailey
rely exclusively on Bank J08ephine, which
relies exclusively on the common law doetrine of estoppel rather than a provision of
the Unifonn Commercial Code. In our
view, estoppel was too broadly applied and
should be limited as hereinafter explained.
Whether or to what extent a secured
party should be denied a deficiency judgment upon a determination that it failed to
act in a commercially reasonable manner is
not clear in the Unifonn Commercial 'Code.
See J. White and R. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code, § 26-15 (1972). KRS
355.9-504 provides that the debtor is liable
for any deficiency, but KRS 355.9-507 provides that the secured party is liable for
any loss caused by its failure to comply
with the requirements of KRS 355.9-504, et
seq. In an effort to achieve a proper remedy, we have examined the approach taken
by numerous state courts and various text
writers. See generally, Annot., Improper
Sale of Collateral-Judgment Ba,r, 10
A.L.R.4th 413, (1980), and J. White and R.
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, su-

pra.

At the outset, a distinction should
be made between the failure to give presale notice of the intended disposition of
collateral and other acts of commercially
unreasonable behavior. Notice to the debtor that the collateral is about to be disposed of is so fundamental that no remedy
less severe than forfeiture of the deficiency
amount would be adequate and this remedy
Conn, supra, Rexing v. Doug Evans Auto is by no means exclusive. In a proper case,
Sales, Inc., supra, and Bailey v. Nawtar criminal and tort liability may be imposed
Financial Corporation, supra, cases in and a debtor is entitled to the benefits of
which the real controversy was whether KRS 355.9-507. See J. White and R. Sumthe secured party breached its duty to act mers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 26in a commercially reasonable manner, a 12, et seq. The essence of the notice requestion which is not before us now. It quirement was explained in Bailey v. Navappears to have been conceded that upon istar Financial Corporation, supra, as
such a detennination, the doctrine of estop- , follows:
.
pel prevented recovery of a deficiency judg"The purpose of pre-sale notice is to give
the debtor sufficient time to protect his
ment. Whether the doctrine of estoppel
arises to automatically forfeit a secured
interest in the collateral by participating
party's right to recover any deficiency
in the sale, or by taking appropriate
judgment does not appear to have been the
steps to oppose the sale. See KRS
855.9-604, Kentucky Commentary to BUbmain event. For the proposition that any
violation of commercial reasonableness
~n (3). Here, Bailey alleged that be

rex _

[1]

· BOLT

y.

PEOPLES BANK OF MT. WASHINGTON
aa.-.lty.. 114 S.W.2d . .

would have participated in or opposed the
ule and there is no evidence that his
in~ts were protec:ted by any other
person or that he was not damaged by
lack of notice." Bailq, ftprtJ, at 843.
"A secured party who falls to give the notice
required by KRS 855.9-004(3) denies the
debtor· an opportunity to assert defenSes,
contest the amount claimed or pay the indebtedness prior to sale of the collateral.
The greatest protection available to debtors
from unscrupulous conduct by secured "parties" who have repossessed collateral is notice of disposition of the collateral. When
notice is omitted, the principle of estoppel
heretofore recognized by the courts of this
Commonwealth prevents recovery ~f any
deficiency judgment. Skeels 11. UnIversal
CIT Credit Corpora.tion, 222 F.Supp. 696
(W.D.Pa.I963).
We now turn to the myriad of other
cireumstances in which the finding of co~
mercial unreasonableness is based on some
defect other than a failure to give notice.
Three possible remedial fonnulas are described in D. Leibson and R. Nowka, The

Uniform Commercial Code of Kentucky,
§ 8.6(G)(2) (1983). Having heretofore reaffirmed our reliance on the first of these
when the defect is lack of notice but rejected it in other circumstances, the first approach need not be discussed further.
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will be dedueted from the deficiency. To
avoid application of the presumption that
the collateral is of sufficient value to satisfy the debt, a secared party whose conduct
has been found to be commercially unreasonable must prove that its conduct did not
cause damage or if it did, by what amount.
In the case at bar, the trial court determined that appellee failed to dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable
manner and that this reduced its value in
the sum of $1439. Appellants were given a
c:redit for this sum in the trial court's deficiency judgment and this was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. While our reasoning
may differ to some extent from that of the
courts below, we are obliged to affirm if
the result achieved was correct. Keesee v.
Smith., 289 Ky. 609, 159 S.W.2d 56 (1941),
and Ritchie v. Perry County, 276 Ky. 57,
122 S.W.2d 988 (1938). While the burden
of proof may not have been allocated precisely as we have direeted, the result would
have been the same and the error, if any,
was harmless. CR 61.01.
One final issue merits brief discussion.
It was contended in the courts below and at
oral argument in this court that the discharge provisions of KRS 855.3-606(1)(b)
operate to absolve appellant, Marion E.
Holt, of liability. Of course, this necessarily depends on the view that said appellant
was an accommodation party whether as
maker or endorser. See Schmuckie 11. AIwy, Ky., 758 S.W.2d 81 (1988). Appellants
construe the statute too broadly, however,
when they seek complete discharge of the
accommodation party. The Court of Appeals correctly construed the statute when
it granted relief "to the extent" the collateral was unjustifiably impaired. Appellant,
Marion E. Holt, along with the other appellants, was benefited by the c:redit allowed
for the diminished value resulting from the
commercially unreasonable conduct of appellee.
We affirm.

[2] . The second and third approaches described by Professors Leibson and Nowa
are substantially the same except as to the
allocation of the burden of proof. In our
view, the second approach is preferable. It
begins with a presumption that the collateral is worth at least the amount of debt is
secures and the burden is cast upon the
secured party to prove that its commercial
unreasonableness did not result in diminished proceeds, or if it did, by what
amount. Upon failure of the secured party
to prove that its conduct did not diminish
the proceeds, the presumption that the collateral is of sufficient value to satisfy the
debt would control and the claim for deficiency would be forfeited. If, in such cirAll
eumstanc:es, a secured party is unwilling to
depend entirely upon" the view, if any, that
its conduct did not result in diminished
proceeds, it may present evidence as to the
amount of damage it caused and such sum K _ 22
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'SECTIONL

EMPLOYMENT LAW ISSUES W A TIME OF DOWNSIZING
AND STAFF CONSOLIDATIONS

Depressed economic conditions, recent technological developments, business
restructuring, financial losses and a whole host of variables frequently cause employers to
make reductions in force. In these instances, employers must be cognizant of the
requirements of the Workers Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which protects employees over the
age of40.
If the reduction disproportionately affects employees within the protected age
group, groups of such employees and/or individual employees may believe the reduction in
force was prompted to get rid of older workers to bring in younger workers in the future.
Thus, any reduction in force raises the prospect of affected employees filing age
discrimination claims. Theref6re, when an employer contemplates reductions in force, it
must exercise caution to avoid ADEA violations and violation of the WARN Act.

I.

GENERAL SCOPE AND PROlllBITIONS OF ADEA

A.

Coverage

(i)

ADEA applies to all employers who are "engaged in an industry

affecting commerce" and who have twenty or more employees. (29 USC §630); and

(ii)

ADEA protects anyone who has attained at least age 40. (29 USC

§631)
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B.

Prohibitions

Employers are prohibited from discriminating against any employee over
the age of 40 in employment decisions including hiring, promotions, work assignments,
compensation, and terms and conditions of employment. In addition employers shall not
limit, segregate or classify employees in a way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities because of such individual's age. (29 USC §623 )

C.

Proof

(i)

Prim~

Facie Case

With respect to a reduction in force, to establish a prima facie ·case,
the employee must establish (I) that he/she is a member of the protected age class; (2) that
he/she is qualified for the available position;(3) that he/she was terminated; and (4) he/she
must provide circumstantial or direct evidence that the employer intended to discriminate
in reaching its reduction decisions. Mauter v~ Hardy Corp., 825 F2d 1554 (II th Cir.,
1987).
Prima facie case of discriminatory impact may be established by
showing that an employer's facially neutral practice has a disparate impact on members of
plaintiffs class. Geller v. Markham 24 FEP Cases 920 (1980).

(ii)

Defenses

(a)

Legitimate non-discriminatory reasons

(b)

Job related policy

L-2
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I
( c)

Statutory exemption or exception
- BFOQ: Bona fide occupational qualification
- Differentiations based on reasonable factors other than age
[29 USC §623(t)(1)]
- Observation of the terms of a bona fide seniority system
that is not intended to evade the Act [29 USC
§623 (t)(2)(A)]
- Observation of the terms of a bona fide employee benefit
plan [29 USC §623(t)(2)(B)]

D.

Remedies

ADEA specifically authorizes the courts to grant prevailing plaintiffs "such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of" the Act. 29
USC §626(b). Courts have held that such relief includes back pay, reinstatement,
promotions, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, injunctive relief and criminal
penalties.

n.

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING A REDUCTION IN FORCE

A.

Consideration of Alternatives to Discharge or Layoff

Before an employer makes a final decision to make a reduction in staff,
other less burdensome alternatives should be explored. Exploring alternatives to reduction

t.

in force is most effective when the magnitude of the anticipated reduction is relatively
small. Even when a relatively large layoff or reduction is planned, the use of several
alternatives may be effective to reduce the size of employee displacement.
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However, to the extent alternatives are helpful in addressing the employers
needs, they should be utilized. In defending a civil action based on age discrimination, the
fact that the employer considered and/or adopted alternatives to staff reductions lends
credence to the employers argument that it sought to protect its employees to the extent
possible. Before reducing its workforce, an employer might consider the feasibility and/or
appropriateness of personnel alternatives including:
--Hiring and Recruitment Freeze
--Reduction of work force through attrition
--Part time positions
--Freeze on Pay Raises
--Examination of unit and Department Budgets
--Pay Reductions
--Reassigning displaced workers to other jobs within the company
* --Voluntary Early Retirement*

*Note: Many believe that this option creates more problems than it solves.
Employees within the protected age group represent the greatest concern in these
endeavors. Many view "voluntary" early retirement options as dangerous because
of the hidden ADEA pitfalls. The issue usually turns on whether or not the choice
was actually "voluntary". And, in reduction in force situations, the issue is also
whether or not the employer targeted older workers and forced them into
retirement.
If an employer does utilize voluntary early retirement to diminish or avoid
reduction in force, the employer should offer the option to all eligible employees
before particular job functions are targeted for reduction.
Although waivers have been effective in protecting employers from
liability under ADEA, waivers have been the source of much litigation under
ADEA. To withstand judicial review, the waiver must: (I) be written in language
easily understood; (2) not allow employee to waive or release future claims which
may arise after the date of the agreement; (3) be given in exchange for
consideration beyond other benefits to which the employee is already entitled;
(4) make specific reference to rights and claims under ADEA; (5) give the
employee a reasonable time period in which to consider and review the document
(21 days); (6) advise the employee to seek the advice ofan attorney; and (7) allow
the employee at least 7 days within which to revoke the agreement after it is
signed.
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Documentation of alternatives is essential to an employer in the event of a
civil action based on age discrimination. And, remember, the larger the number of
employees affected by a reduction in force, the higher the probability of a civil action being

filed under ADEA since reductions virtually aiways include some persons age 40 or over.

B.

Establishing Business Justifications for Staff Reductions

Courts generally defer to employer's business justifications in cases of
reduction in force, so long as the actions are carried out in a non-discriminatory manner
and the reasons are not pretext for age discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals at
Richmond denied an age discrimination claim from older employees who were demoted in
a reduction in force, finding that the employer "attempted to achieve its overall reduction
in force objectives in a fair and legitimate way.and the employer's reasons were grounded
on qualifications and geographical considerations". EEOC v. Western Electric Co., 32
FEP Cases 708, 712 (1983). Legitimate business reasons for reductions in force are
numerous, but typically include technological advances, financial problems, tum down in
business and reorganization. Also, See Chappell v. GTE Prods. Corp., 803 F2d 261 (6th
Cir. 1986); Bechold v. IGW Sys. Inc., 817 F2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1987) and Tice v. Lampert
Yards. Inc., 761 F2d 1210 (7th Cir., 1985).

The identification of a legitimate business justification is crucial evidence to
show the relationship of the particular layoff to a valid business objective. The Court in
Sahadi v. Reynolds Chern., held that ".. a prima facie case of age discrimination is not
shown by mere termination of a competent employee where it is shown that an employer is
making cutbacks due to economic necessity." 636 F2d 1116, 1118 (6th Cir., 1980).
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While no action taken by an employer making personnel decisions that
result in reduction in force will guarantee that no civil action will be filed, proper actions
taken by such an employer will minimize the prospect of such actions and will increase the
probability of a favorable outcome for the employer.

C.

Essential Tools For The Evaluation Process

(i)

Workforce Statistical Analysis
An employer considering a reduction in force should make a

determination of the race, sex and age distribution of all employees in the company.
Next, a similar analysis should be made with respect to the facilities and/or departments to
be affected by the reduction. This information is necessary for the employer to evaluate
the impact of its reduction decisions. If patterns of disparate impact on older workers are
detected, the employer can reexamine the process for bias and take corrective action when
necessary.
This statistical infmmation should not be shared with
decision-makers in the reduction process, as this would afford a plaintiff an opportunity to
allege that the decision-maker did in fact base the decision on race, sex or age. Before
reduction decisions are final, top-management should use this statistical data to determine
the effect of planned reduction decisions.

(ii)

Job-Function Evaluation

The next step in implementing a selection and evaluation process to
facilitate force reduction is the identification by management of the particular operations
of the employer that will be curtailed or eliminated. Management should also determine
which jobs within the identified operations would be subject to cutback. Finally,
L-6 .

management must decide which functions within jobs must be curtailed or eliminated.
Further consideration should be given to whether new functions will be performed by the
employer and whether these new functions can be absorbed by present employees who
otherwise would face layoff or termination.

A review of the job functions in the different departments will be
necessary to determine the qualifications required to perform these jobs. Evidence that the
employer made a determination of the qualifications required to perform the retained jobs
will help prove that those employees laid off or terminated as a result of the reduction in
force were less qualified to fill the positions than those employees retained.

In some cases, plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by showing that a policy underlying a layoff disproportionately affected employees within
the protected age group. Geller v. Markham, 24 FEP Cased 920 (1980). An employer's
defense can be buttressed by this type of job function evaluation, which objectively
determines necessary qualifications.

(iii).

Employee Appraisal Criteria

Since the lack of qualifications by an employee to perform a
particular job is a sound defense to a legal challenge, it is vital that the criteria used to
evaluate employees be objective and job-related. Again, the aim or purpose of employee
evaluations is to establish a basis to show that those employees laid off or terminated were
less qualified for the available positions than those retained.

Job-related criteria includes: knowledge of a particular job function
(Matthews v. Allis-chalmers, 769 F2d 1215, (7th CiT;, 1985); quality of work supported by
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records; past performance evaluations, ifbased on objective criteria (Mistretta v. Sandia
Corp., 15 FEP Cases 1690, (1977); education; training if training was available to all
employees equally; attendance, test scores, length of service with employer (Gill v. Union
Carbide, 368 F. Supp. 364, (1973).

(iv)

Market Conditions

Market conditions should be studied prior to any use of criteria
based on salary. It is best to avoid salary as a criteria for evaluation in the reduction
process. Some courts might find salary inextricably tied to the age of an employee.
~oklitar

v. CBS. Inc. 652 F. Supp. 1023 (SDNY 1987). Metz v. Transit Mix, 44 FEP

Cases 1339, (1989).

However, the U.S. Court of Appeals at New York in Bay v. Times
Mirror Magazines, 56 FEP Cases 407 (1991) found that during cutbacks, ADEA does not
"... prohibit an employer from making employment decisions that relate to an employee's
salary to contemporaneous market conditions ... so long as the employer's decisions view
each employee individually ... do not impose a general role that has a disparate impact on
older workers and are based solely on financial considerations ... " 56 FEP Cases 407,
411.

(v)

Consultant Guidelines

In reduction in force cases involving a significant number of
employees, an outside consultant familiar with the industry might be hired to help develop
job-related evaluation guidelines. The use of a consultant would further underscore the
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job-relatedness of the evaluation criteria and help defeat a prima facie case of age
discrimination based on the disproportionate impact of the criteria.

D.

The Evaluation Process

Once management has determined which job functions are essential to the
\

j

I

remaining operations of the employer and has determined the qualifications necessary for
these jobs; and management has developed appropriate job-related criteria to evaluate
employees, the next step involves the actual evaluation of employees.

(i)

Role of Department Heads and Supervisors

Employee evaluations should be performed by department heads
and first line supervisors who have been trained on how to properly apply the developed
II

I!

criteria and to maintain the necessary records. Ratings of employees should be done on a
comparative basis so that department heads and supervisors are forced to actually rank all
employees relative to each other.

Supervisors and department heads should be cautioned against
making any statements, comments or remarks relative to age. Although such comments or
remarks alone are insufficient to prove an age discrimination case, courts will allow
plaintiffs to introduce evidence of such comments to show that a policy underlying a staff
reduction is based on discrimination. Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F2d 691 (9th Cir.,
1981).
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(ii)

Reduction in Force Committee

If the reduction in force involves a significant number of employees,
an additional review of employee appraisals is worthwhile. This can be accomplished by
establishing a Reduction in Force (RIF) Committee. This is an internal committee
comprised of management and non-management personnel, including representatives of all
protected groups. The review conducted by this Committee should include a comparison
between each employee's previous evaluation and the reduction evaluation. Discrepancies
should be resolved and any significant changes should be based on legitimate grounds.
More importantly, this Committee's review should determine the impact of the reduction
on all employees and groups of employees over the age of 40. The review should not
confine its impact analysis to the single group of employees over 40, but should look for
patterns of impact on groups within the protected age group (i.e. age 50 or above; age 60
or above, etc.). Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 FEP Cases 1690 (1977) and Lowe v.
Commack Union School District, 50 FEP Ca.ses 1400, (1989) Also, See EEOC
Interpretations of ADEA, 29 CFR §1625.2

If an adverse impact is observed, the evaluation of each employee in
that particular age group should be reexamined to ensure that the evaluations are based on
job-related factors. The employer must be able to substantiate its decision on legitimate
grounds.

E.

Notice to Employees

The final step in the reduction in force process, is employee notification.
To be more humane, notification should be given in a meeting with the employee. The
employer should establish guidelines to be used by individuals conducting the notification
L: 10

meetings. These guidelines should be written; should cover the issues common to all
employees; and should provide inform~tion on how the selection process works. Further,
the individual conducting the notification meeting should be able to inform the employees
of how and why job functions were eliminated or curtailed. Employees should then be
told how their individual evaluations were made and in what ways their performance was
less than other employees who were retained.
During this meeting management might solicit comments or input from
employees affected by the reduction. '
The notification meetings should be limited to conveying the essential
information to employees and should avoid gratuitous remarks referencing age (e.g..
:~IYoulve

had a number of good years here"; or," you wiIl not suffer much because you

are eligible for early retirement").
If the employer is subject to the WARN Act, there are precise notification
requirements discussed later in this outline..
I

\

F.
~

Appeal Process

I

As a final check and balance of the reduction in force process, an employer
might also consider providing affected employees with an appeal process. This process
need not be complex to be effective. The scope of the appeal could be tailored to the
number of affected employees, with a more thorough process used when significant
numbers of the workforce are affected. The RIP Committee could function in an appeals
capacity. Or, the employer might use membeis of higher management to review employee
appeals.

Giving employees advanced notice of the possibility of a reduction in force
and establishing an approach that: considers reduction alternatives; determines necessary
L - 11

job functions and qualifications, evaluates employees based on job-related criteria and
provides for reexamination of employee reviews, has many advantages. First, it forces the
employer to document and substantiate the reasons for termination or layoff And, it
assures that uniform criteria are uniformly applied to all employees. This process will
boost employee morale by demonstrating fairness and will create a strong psychological
effect that will help deter lawsuits.

III.

WORKER ADmSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), commonly
referred to as the Plant Closing Act, was enacted by Congress in 1988 and took effect
February 4,1989. (29 USC §2101 et seq.). Congress enacted this legislation in response
to concerns arising out of unannounced plant closings and mass layoffs.

Though commonly known as the Plant Closing Act, WARN in fact applies to
situations other than plant closings. Any employer who is shutting down a unit or facility
within a plant or site of employment, or who is laying off a significant number of
employees at a single site of employment, must comply with the notice requirements
mandated by the WARN Act.

A.

Requirements

The basic requirement of the WARN Act is for all employers subject to the
Act to give sixty days' advance written notice of shutdowns or mass layoffs. This notice
must be given to: (1) the bargaining representative of the affected employees, or absent
such representative, each individual employee; (2) the local community where the work
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force reduction is to take place; and (3) to the state dislocated workers unit. 29 USC
§2102 (a)(I) and (2)

The Act contains exceptions to the sixty days advance notice requirement
where the employer can show that at the time of plant closing the employer was actively
seeking capital or business to avoid a plant closing; or the employer must show that the
circumstances necessitating the closing or layoff were "not reasonably foreseeable" as of
the time notice should have been given. 29 USC §2102(b)(I) and (2).

B.

Coverage

The Act covers all employers with more than 100 employees at all sites
combined. Part-time employees are excluded from this definition 29 USC §2101(a)(I)(A)
and (B). "Part-time" employee is defined in the Act as "an employee who is employed for
an average of fewer than 20 hours per week or who has been employed for fewer than 6
of the 12 months preceding the date on which notice is required". 29 USC §2101(a)(8).

The Act defines a "plant closing" as "the permanent or temporary
shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more facilities or operating units
within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an employment loss at the
single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding
any part-time employees" 29 USC §2101(a)(2).

The statute defines "mass layofP' as " a reduction in force which is not the
result of a plant closing; and results in an employment loss at the single site of employment
during any 30 day period for at least 33 percent of the employees and at least 50
employees or at least 500 employees. 29 USC §2101(a)(3)(A)and (B).
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The Act defines "employment loss" as (A) any employment termination,
other than a discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement, (B) a layoff
exceeding 6 months, or (C) a reduction in hours of work of more than 50 percent during
each month of any 6-month period. 29 USC §2101(1)(b).

An employee has not suffered an employment loss if the employer has
offered himlher a transfer to a different site of employment within a reasonable commuting
distance with no more than a six-month break in employment or if the employer offers to
transfer the employee anywhere with no more than a six-months break,. and the employee
accepts within thirty days of the offer or of the closing or layoff, whichever is later. No
employment loss has occurred in this instant, therefore notice is not required. 29 USC
§2101(b)(2)(A) and (B).

Thus, under the definition of "employment loss", a bargaining
representative or in the absence thereof, an employee terminated or otherwise displaced as
a result of reduction in force is entitled to the required advanced written notice, if all of
the above mentioned jurisdictional requirements are met. .

C.

Exemptions

The Act exempts from its coverage temporary facilities, and the completion
of a particular project or undertaking. However, to escape the notice requirements under
these circumstances, the employer· must show that the employee was hired with the
understanding that the employment was limited to the duration of the facility or project.
29 USC §2103(1)

Strikes and lockouts will also negate an employer's responsibility to give
notice under this act, if the closing or layoff is caused by the strike or lockout. 29 USC
§2103 (2).

D.

Contents of Written Notice

The regulations requires that notices of layoffs and plant closings be
specific. 20 CPR §639.7. Notices to representatives of affected employees must contain
the name and address of the employment site; the nature of the planned action and
whether it is expected to be permanent or temporary; if the entire plant is to be closed, a
statement to that effect; the expected date of the first separation and the schedule for
making separations; the job titles of positions to be affected and the names of the people
currently holding those jobs; and the name and telephone number of an employer official
to contact for further information.

Notices to individual employees, absent a collective bargaining agreement,
must contain a statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be temporary or
permanent and whether the entire plant is to be closed; the expected date when the plant
closing or mass layoff will begin; the expected date when the individual employee will be
separated; a statement on the existence of applicable bumping rights; and the name and
telephone number of an employer official to contact for further information.

The regulations also suggest that employers include in these notices other .
useful information such as the availability of retraining assistance and other assistance for
dislocated workers.
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E.

Enforcement

The WARN Act may be enforced in court by individual employees, their
representatives, or local units of government. A person seeking to enforce the WARN
Act may sue for him or herself or on behalf of a class in any U.S. district court in which
the violation is alleged to have occurred or in which the employer transacts business.
29 USC §2104(a)(5).

Thus, while the Act authorizes the Department of Labor to issue
regulations interpreting the WARN Act, no federal government agency has enforcement
power to process claims by aggrieved employees.

F.

Remedies

An employer who violates the WARN Act is liable to each aggrieved

employee for back pay for each day of violation and any benefits available under an
employee benefit plan, up to· a maximum of sixty days but in no event for more than one
half the number of days the employee was employed by the employer. The amount of
back pay is reduced by any wages that were paid during the period of violation, any
voluntary payment of the employer that is not required by any legal obligation, and any
payment by the employer to a third party or trustee attributable to the employee, such as
premiums for health benefits. 29 USC §2104(a).

The Act specifically states that the remedies provided for in this Act shall
be the exclusive remedies for any violation of the Act. Federal courts are specifically
prohibited from enjoining a plant closing or mass layoff. 29 USC §21 04(b).
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1961
Following is the text of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age for anyone aged
40 or over. Codified as 29 U.S.C. §621 et
seq., the statute reads as amended by the
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of
1990, P.L. 101-433, and by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, effective
November 21, 1991.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
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629. Criminal Penalties.
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631. Age Limits.
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633. Federal-State Relationship.
633a. Nondiscrimination on Account of Age in
Federal Government Employment.

Sec. 621. Statement of Findings and
Purpose

(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that(1) in the face of rising productivity
and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to
retain employment, and especially to
regain employment when displaced from
jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits
regardless of potential for job performance has become a common practice,
and certain otherwise desirable practices
9-93

may work to the disadvantage of older
persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with
resultant deterioration of skill. morale,
and employer acceptability is, relative to
the younger ages, high among older
workers; their numbers are great and
growing; and their employment problems
grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting
commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in
employment because of age, burdens
commerce and the free flow of goods in
commerce.
(b) It is therefore the pUrpose of this
chapter to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather
than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment.
[Editor's note: The Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, P.L. 101-UJ3, effective October 16, 1990, prO'lJided as follows:
Sec. 101. Finding
The Cong7"ess finds that,as a result of
the decision of the Supreme Court in
Public Employees Retirement System of
Ohio v. Betts, 109 S.Ct. 256 (1989), legislative action is. necessary to restore the
original cong7"essional intent in passing
and amending the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et
seq.), which was to prohibit discrimination against older workers in all employee benefits except when age-based reductions in employee benefit plans are justified by sign'ijicant cost considerations.]
Sec. 622. Education and Research
Program
(a) The Secretary of Labor shall undertake studies and provide information
to labor unions, management, and the
general public concerning the needs and
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abilities of older workers, and their potentials for continued employment and
contribution to the economy. In order to
achieve the purposes of this chapter, the
Secretary of Labor shall carryon a continuing program of education and information. under which he may, among other measures(1) undertake research, and promote
research, with a view to reducing barriers to the employment of older persons,
and the promotion of measures for utilizing their skills;
(2) publish and otherwise make available to employers, professional societies,
the various media of communication,
and other interested persons the findings
of studies and other materials for the
promotion of employment;
(3) foster through the public employment service system and through cooperative effort the development of facilities
of public and private agencies for expanding the opportunities and potentials
of older persons;
(4) sponsor and assist State and community informational and educational
programs.
(b) Not later than six months after the
effective date of this chapter, the Secretary shall recommend to the Congress
any measures he may deem desirable to
change the lower or upper age limits set
forth in section 631 of this title.
Sec. 623. Prohibition of Age
Discrimination
(a) Employer practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
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(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
(b) Employment agency practices
It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for
employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of
such individual's age, or to classify or
refer for employment any individual on
the basis of such individual's age.
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be unlawful for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his
age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such
employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's age;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
(d) Opposition to unlawful practices;
participation in investigations, proceedings, or litigation
It shall be unlawful .for any employer
to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment,
for an employment agency to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against
any member thereof or applicant for
membership, because such individual,
member, or applicant for membership,
has opposed any practice made unlawful
by this section, or because such individual, mell)ber, or applicant for membership
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under
this chapter.
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(e) Printing or publication of notice or
advertisement indicating preference,
limitation, etc.
It shall be unlawful for an employer,
labor organization, or employment agency to print or publish, or cause to be
printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to employment by
such an employer or membership in or
any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or
relating to any classification or referral
for employment by such an employment
agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination,
based on age.
(j) Lawful practices; age an occupational qualification; other reasonable factors; laws offoreign workplace; seniority
. system; employee benefit plans; discharge
. or discipline for good cause
It shall not be unlawful for an employer,employment agency, or labor organization(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or
(e) of this section where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age or where such practices
involve an employee in a workplace in a
foreign country, and compliance with
such subsections would cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by
such employer, to violate the laws of the
country in which such workplace is located;
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or
(e) of this section(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system that is not intended to
evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such seniority system shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title because of the age
of such individual; or
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(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide
employee benefit plan(i) where, for each benefit or benefit
package, the actual amount of payment
made or cost incurred on behalf of an
older worker is no less than that made or
incurred on behalf of a younger worker,
as permissible under section 1625.10, title
29, Code of Federal Regulations (as in
effect on June 22, 1989); or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with the
relevant purpose or purposes of this
chapter.
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of
subparagraph (B), no such employee benefit plan or voluntary early retirement
incentive plan shall excuse the failure to
hire any individual, and no such employee benefit plan shall require or permit
the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this
title, because of the age of such individual. An employer, employment agency, or
labor organization acting under subparagraph (A), or under clause (i) or (ii)
of subparagraph (B), shall have the burden of proving that such actions are lawful in any civil enforcement proceeding
brought under this chapter; or (As
amended by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act, eff. Oct. 16, 1990)
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline
an individual for good cause.
[Editor'S note: Paragraph (g), Entitlement to coverage under group health
plan, was repealed by P.L. 101-239, effective December, 19, 1989.]
(h) Practices of foreign corporations
controlled by American employers; foreign persons not controlled by American
employers; factors determining control
. (1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is in a
foreign country, any practice by such
corporation prohibited under this section
shall be presumed to be such practice by
such employer.
(2) The prohibitions of this section
shall not apply where the employer is a
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foreign person not controlled by an
American employer.
(3) For the purpose of this subsection
the determination of whether an employer controls a corporation shall be based
upon the(A) interrelation of operations,
(B) common management,
(C) centralized control of labor relations, and
(D) common ownership or financial
control, of the employer and the corporation. (As added by P.L. 98-459, eif. Oct. 9,
1984)

(i) Employee pension beMfit plans; cessation or reduction of benefit accrual or
of allocation to employee account; distribution of benefits after attainment of
normal retirement age; compliance;
highly compensated employees (As
amended by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act, eif. Oct. 16, 1990)
(1) Except as otherwise provided in
this subsection, it shall be unlawful for
an employer, an employment agency, a
labor organization, or any combination
thereof to establish or maintain an employee pension benefit plan which requires or permits(A) in the case of a defined benefit
plan, the cessation of an employee's benefit accrual, or the reduction of the rate
of an employee's benefit accrual, because
of age, or
(B) in the case of a defined contribution plan, the cessation of allocations to
an employee's account, or the reduction
of the rate at which amounts are allocated to an employee's account, because of
age.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit an employer, employment agency, or labor organization
from observing any provision of an employee pension benefit plan to the extent
that such provision impose.., (without regard to age) a limitation on the amount
of benefits that the plan provides or a
limitation on the number of years of service or years of participation which are
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taken into account for purposes of determining benefit accrual under the plan.
(3) In the case of any employee who, as
of the end of any plan year under a defined benefit plan, has attained normal
retirement age under such plan(A) if distribution of benefits under
such plan with respect to such employee
has commenced as of the end of such
plan year, then any requirement of this
subsection for continued accrual of benefits under such plan with respect to such
employee during such plan year shall be
treated as satisfied to the extent of the
actuarial equivalent of in-service distribution of benefits, and
(B) if distribution of benefits under
such plan with respect to such employee
has not commenced as of the end of such
year in accordance with section
1056(a)(3) of this title [Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974] and
section 401(a)(14)(C) of title 26 [Internal
Revenue Code of 1986], and the payment
of benefits under such plan with respect
to such employee is not suspended during
such plan year pursuant to section
1053(a)(3)(B) of this title [Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974] or
section 411(a)(3)(B) of title 26 [Internal
Revenue Code of 1986], then any requirement of this subsection for continued accrual of benefits under such plan with
respect to such employee during such
plan year shall be treated as satisfied to
the extent of any adjustment in the benefit payable under the plan during such
plan year attributable to the delay in the
distribution of benefits after the attainment of normal retirement age.
The provisions of this paragraph shall
apply in accordance with regulations of
the Secretary of the Treasury. Such regulations shall provide for the application
of the preceding provisions of. this paragraph to all employee pension benefit
plans subject to this subsection and may
provide for the application of such provisions, in the case of any such employee,
with respect to any period of time within
a plan year.
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(4) Compliance with the requirements
of this subsection with respect to an employee pension benefit plan shall constitute compliance with the requirements of
this section relating to benefit accrual
under such plan.
(5) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with
respect to any employee who is a highly
compensated employee (within the meaning of section 414(q) of title 26 [Internal
Revenue Code of 1986]) to the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury for purposes of
precluding discrimination in favor of
highly compensated employees within
the meaning of subchapter D of chapter
1 of title 26.
(6) A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) solely because the subsidized
portion of any early retirement benefit is
disregarded in determining benefit accruals.
(7) Any regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to
clause (v) of section 411(b)(I)(H) of title
26 and subparagraphs (C) and (0) of section 411(b)(2) of such title 26 shall apply
with respect to the requirements of this'
subsection in the same manner and to
the same extent as such regulations apply with respect to the requirements of
such sections 411(b)(I)(H) and 411(b)(2).
(8) A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the requirements of this section solely because such plan provides a
normal retirement age described in section loo2(24)(B) of this title [Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974]
and section 411(a)(8)(B) of title 26. [Internal Revenue Code of 1986]
(9) For purposes of this subsection(A) The terms "employee pension benefit plan", "defined benefit plan", "defined
contribution plan", and "normal retirement age'" have the meanings provided
such terms in section 1002 of this title.
[Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974]
. (B) The term "compensation" has the
meaning provided by section 414(s) of ti-
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tle 26. [Internal Revenue Code of 1986]
(Added by P.L. 99-509, effective with respect to plan years starting on or after
Jan. '1, 1988. For collectively bargained
plans, it is effective on the earlier of (1)
Jan. 1,1990 or (2) the later of Jan. 1, 1988
or the expiration date of the last contract.)
(j) Employment as firefighter or law
enforcement officer
(i) It shall not be unlawful for an employer which is a State, a political subdi.."
vision of a State, an agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate agency
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual because of such individual's age if such action is taken(1) with respect to.the employment of
an individual as a firefighter or as a law
enforcement officer and the individual
has attained the age of hiring or retirement in effect under applicable State or
local law on March 3, 1983, and
(2) pursuant to a bona fide hiring or
retirement plan that is not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of this chapter.
(Added by P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. I, 1987,
through Dec. 31, 1993)
[Editor's note: The above section does
not apply to any causes of action arising
under ADEA before Jan. 1, 1987. Section
5 of P.L. 99-592 directed EEOC and the
Lahor Department to conduct a study
and make recommendations on the use of
physical and mental fi·tness tests to measure the ability and competence of police
officers and firefighters. In addition. by
Nov. 1991, EEOC must propose guidelines for the administration and use of
such tests.]
(k) &niority system or employee benefit plan; compliance
A seniority system or employee benefit
plan shall comply with this chapter regardless of the date of adoption of such
system or plan. (As added by the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act, eff. Oct.
16, 1990)
(l) Lawful practices; minimum age as
condition of eligibility for retirement
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benefits; deductions from severance pay;
reduction of long-term disability benefits
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of
subsection (f)(2)(B) of this section(1) It shall not be a violation of subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section
solely because(A) an employee pension benefit plan
(as defined in section 1002(2) of this title
[Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974] provides for the attainment
of a minimum age as a condition of eligibility for normal or early retirement
benefits; or
(B) a defined benefit plan (as defined in
section 1002(35) of this title) provides
for(i) payments that constitute the subsidized portion of an early retirement benefit; or
(ii) social security supplements for
. plan participants that commence before
the age and terminate at the age (specified by the plan) when participants are
eligible to receive reduced or unreduced
old-age insurance benefits under title II
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401
et seq.), and that do not exceed such oldage insurance benefits.
(2)(A) It shall not be a violation of
subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section solely because following a contingent event unrelated to age(i)the value of any retiree health benefits received by an individual eligible for
an immediate pension;
(ii) the value of any additional pension
benefits that are made available solely as
a result of the contingent event unrelated
to age and following which the individual is eligible for not less than an immediate and unreduced pension; or
(iii) the values described in both
clauses (i) and (ii);
are deducted from severance pay made
available as a result of the contingent
event unrelated to age.
(B) For an individual who receives immediate pension benefits that are actuarially reduced under subparagraph
(A)(i), the amount of the deduction avail-
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able pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i)
shall be reduced by the same percentage
as the reduction in the pension benefits.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph,
severance pay shall include that portion
of supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (as described in section
501(c)(17) of title 26 [Internal Revenue
Code of 1986]) that(i) constitutes additional benefits of up .
to 52 weeks;
(ii) has the primary purpose and effect
of continuing benefits until an individual
becomes eligible for an immediate and
unreduced pension; and
(iii) is discontinued once the individual
becomes eligible for an immediate and
unreduced pension.
(D) For purposes of this paragraph
and solely in order to make the deduction
authorized under this paragraph, the
term "retiree health benefits"means benefits provided pursuant to a group health
plan covering retirees, for which (determined as of the contingent event unrelated to age).
(i) the package of benefits provided by
the employer for the retirees who are below age 65 is at least comparable to benefits provided under title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.);
(ii) the package of benefits provided by
the employer for the retirees who are age
65 and above is at least comparable to
that offered under a plan that provides a
benefit package with one-fourth the value of benefits provided under title XVIII·
of such Act; or
(iii) the package of benefits provided
by the employer is as described in clauses
(i) and (ii). (As amended by P.L. 101-521,
eff. Nov. 5, 1990)
(E)(i) If the obligation of the employer
to provide retiree health benefits is of
limited duration, the value for each individual shall be calculated at a rate of
$3,000 per year for benefit years before
age 65, and $750 per year for benefit
years beginning at age 65 and above.
(ii) If the obligation of the employer to
provide retiree health benefits is of un-
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limited duration, the value for each individual shall be calculated at a rate of
$48,000 for individuals below age 65, and
$24,000 for individuals age 65 and above.
(iii) The values described in clauses (i)
and (ii) shall be calculated based on the
age of the individual as of the date of
the contingent event unrelated to age.
The values are effective on October 16,
1990, and shall be adjusted on an annual
basis, with respect to a contingent event
that occurs subsequent to the first year
after October 16, 1990, based on the medical component of the Consumer Price
Index for all-urban consumers published
by the Department of Labor.
(iv) If an individual is required to pay
a premium for retiree health benefits, the
value calculated pursuant to this subparagraph shall be reduced by whatever
. percentage of the overall premium the
~individual is required to pay.
(F) If an employer that has implemented a deduction pursuant to subparagraph (A) fails to fulfill the obligation
described in subparagraph (E), any aggrieved individual may bring an action
for specific performance of the obligation
described in subparagraph (E). The relief
shall be in addition to any other remedies provided under Federal or State law.
(3) It shall not be a violation of subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section
solely because an employer provides a
bona fide employee benefit plan or plans
under which long-term disability benefits received by an individual are reduced
by any pension benefits (other than those
attributable to employee contributions)(A) paid to the individual that the individual voluntarily elects to receive; or
(B) for which an individual who has
attained the later of age 62 or normal
retirement age is eligible. (Added by the
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act,
eff. Oct. 16, 1990)
[Editor's note: The Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, P.L. 101-433, effective October 16,· 1990, provided as follows:
9-93
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Sec. 104. Rules and Regulations
Notwithstanding section 9 of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (29 U.s.C. 628), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may issue
such rules and regulations as the Commission may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out this title, and
the amendments made by this title, only
after consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor.
Sec. 105. Effective Date
(a) In General-Except as otherwise
provided in this section, this title and the
amendments made by this title shall apply only to(1) any employee benefit established or
modified on or after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(2) other conduct occurring more than
180 days after the date of enactment of
this Act.
(b) Collectively Bargained Agreements. - With respect to any employee
benefits provided in accordance with a
collective bargaining agreement(1) that is in effect as of the date of
enactment of this Act; or that is a result
of pattern collective bargaining in an industry where the agreement setting the
pattern was ratified after September 20,
1990, but prior to the date of the enactment, and the final agreement in the industry adhering to the pattern was ratified after the date of enactment, but not
later than November 20, 1990;
(2) that terminates after such date of
enactment;
(3) any provision of which was entered
into by a labor organization (as defined
by section 6(d)(J,) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(J,)));
and
(4) that contains any provision that
would be superseded (in whole or part)
by this title and the amendments made
by this title, but for the operation of this
section, this title and the amendments
made by this title shall not apply until
the termination of such collective bar-

Copyricht e 1993 by The Bureau of NatloDai Main, IDe.

L - 23

401:214

TEXT OF FEDERAL LAWS

No. 730

gaining agreement or June 1, 1992, the new disability benefits, the employer
may continue to C01Jer the employee unwhichever occurs first.
(c) States and Political Subdivi- der the previous disability benefits even
sions.though such pre'pious benefits do not oth(1) In generaL- With respect to any erwise satiify the requirements of the
employee benefits provided by an em- Age Discrimination in Employment Act
ployerof 1967 (as amended by this title).
(A) that is a State or political subdivi(C) Abrogation of right to receive benesion of a State or any agency or instru- fits.-An election of coverage under the
mentality of a State or political subdivi- new disability benefits shall abrogate any
sion of a State; and
right the electing employee may have
(B) that maintained an employee benehad to receive existing disability benefits.
fit plan at any time between June 23, The employee shall maintain any years
1989, and the date of enactment of this of service accumulated for purposes of
Act that would be superseded (in whole determining eligibility for the new beneor part) by this title and the amendments fits.
made by this title butfor the operation of
(3) State assistance.-The Equal Emthis subsection, and which plan may be ployment Opportunity Commission, the
modified only through a change in appli- Secretary of Labor, a nd the Secretary of
cable State or local law,
the Treasury shall, on request, pr01Jide to
this title and the amendments made by States assistance in identifying and sethis title shall not apply until the date curing independent technical advice to
that is 2 years after the date of enact- assist in complying u'ith this subsection.
ment of this Act.
(4) Definitions.-For purposes of this
(2) Election of disability C01Jerage for
subsection.'
employees hir;ed prior to effective
(A) Employer and state.-The terms
date."employer
"and "State" shall have the re(A) In general.-An employer that
spective
meanings
provided such terms
maintains a plan described in paragraph
(b)
a nd (i) of section 11
under
subsections
(1)(B) may, with regard to disability benof the Age Discrimination in Employefits pr01Jided pursuant to such a planment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 630).
(i) following reasonable notice to aU
(B) Disability benefits. - The term "disemployees, implement new disability
ability
benefits" means any program for
benefits that satisfy the requirements of
employees
of a State or political subdivithe Age Discrimination in Employment
of
a
State
that provides long-term
sion
Act of 1967 (as amended by this title);
disability
benefits.
whether on an insured
and
(ii) then offer to each employee c01Jered basis in a separate employee benefit plan
by a plan described in paragraph (1)(B) or as part of an employee pension benefit
the option to elect such new disability plan.
(C) Reasonable notice.-The term
benefits in lieu of the existing disability
"reasonable
notice" means, with respect
benefits, ifto
notice
of
new disability benefits de(l) the offer is made and reasonable
notice provided no later than the date scribed in paragraph (2j{A) that is gil'en
that is 2 years alter the date of enact- to each employee, notice thatment of this Act; and
(i) is suJficiently accurate and compre(II) the employee is given up to 180 hensive to appraise the employee of the
days after the offer in which to make the terms and conditions of the disability
election.
benefits, including whether the employee
(B) Previous disability benefits.-Ifthe is immediately eligible for such benefits;
employee does not elect to be c01Jered by and
9-93
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(ii) is written in a manner calculated
to be understood by the average employee
eligible to participate.
(d) Discrimination in Employee Pension Benefit Plans.-Nothing in this title,
or the amendments made by this title,
shall be construed as limiting the
prohibitions against discrimination that
are set forth in section 4(j) of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (as redesignated by section 103(2) of
this Act).
(e) Continued Benefit Payments.Notwithstanding any other provision of
this section, on and after the effective
date of this title and the amendments
made by this title (as determined in accordance with subsections (a), (b), and
(c)), this title and the amendments made
by this title shall not apply to a series of
benefit payments made to an individual
or the individual's representative that
began prior to the effective date and that
continue after the effective date pursuant
to an arrangement that was in effect on
the effective date, except that no substantial modification to such arrangement
may be made after the date of enactment
. of this Act if the intent of the modification is to evade the purposes of this Act.]
Sec. 624. Study by Secretary of
Labor
(1) The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall, not later than 12
months after the date of enactment of
this Act (Oct. 31, 1986), enter into an
agreement with the National Academy of
Sciences for the conduct of a study to
analyze the potential consequences of the
elimination of mandatory retirement on
institutions of higher education.
(2) The study required by paragraph
(1) of this subsection shall be conducted
under the general supervision of the National Academy of Sciences by a study
panel composed of 9 members. The study
panel shall consist of(A) 4 members who shall be administrators at institutions of higher education selected by the National Academy of
Sciences after consultation with the
9-93
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American Council of Education, the Association of American Universities, and
the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges;
(B) 4 members who shall be teachers
or retired teachers at institutions of
higher education (who do not serve in an
administrative capacity at such institutions), selected by the National Academy
of Sciences after consultation with the
American Federation of Teachers, the
National Education Association, the
American Association of University
Professors, and the American Association of Retired Persons; and
(C) one member selected by the National Academy of Sciences.
(3) The results of the study shall be
reported, with recommendations, to the
President and to the Congress not later
than 5 years after the date of enactment
of this Act (Oct. 31, 1986).
(4) The expenses of the study required
by this subsection shall be paid from
funds available to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (As
amended by P.L. 99-592, eff. Oct. 31,1986)
Sec. 625. Administration
The Secretary shall have the power (a) Delegation of functions; appoint-'
ments of personne~' technical assistance
to make delegations, to appoint such
agents and employees,. and to pay for
technical assistance on a fee-for-service
basis, as he deems necessary to assist
him in the performance of his functions
under this chapter:
(b) Cooperation with other agencies,
employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies
to cooperate with regional, State, local,
and other agencies, and to cooperate with
and furnish technical assistance to employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies to aid in effectuating
the purposes of this chapter.
Sec. 626. Recordkeeping,
Investigation, and Enforcement
[Editor's note: The Age Discrimination Claims Assistance Act of 1988, which
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extended the statute of limitations for
employees whose ADEA claims were
jeopardized by EEOC'sfailure to process
their cases in a timely manner, effective
April 7, 1988, was added to the end of this
section. See 401:685 for the text of that
Act.]
(aj Attendance of witnesses; investigations, inspections, records, and homework regulations
The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall have the power to
make investigations and require the
keeping of records necessary or appropriate for the administration of this chapter in accordance with the powers and
procedures provided in sections 209 and
211 of this title. [Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938]
(bj Eriforcement; prohibition of age
discrimination under fair labor standards; unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensation; liquidated
damages; judicial relief; conciUiation,
coriference, and persuasion
The provisions of this chapter shall be
enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies, and procedures provided in
sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title
[Fair Labor Standards Act of 19381 and
subsection (c) of this section. Any act
prohibited under section 623 of this title
shall be deemed to be a prohibited act
under section 215 of this title. Amounts
owing to an individual as a result of a
vioiation of this chapter shall be deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation for purposes of
sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided, that liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of
this chapter. In any action brought to
enforce this chapter the court shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement
or promotion, or enforcing the liability
for amounts deemed to be unpaid mini9-93
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mum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section. Before instituting any action under this section, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate the
discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance
with the requirements of this chapter
through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
(c) Civil actions; persons aggrieved; jurisdiction; judicial relief; termination of
individual action upon commencement
of action by Commission; jury trial
(1) Any person aggrieved may bring a
civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this
chapter: Provided, that the right of any
person to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce the right of
such person under this chapter.
(2) In an action brought under paragraph (1), a person shall be entitled to a
trial by jury of any issue of fact in any
such action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of this chapter, regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such action.
(d) Filing of charge with Commission;
timeliness; conciliation, conference, and
persuasion

No civil action may be commenced by
an individual under this section until 60
days after a charge alleging unlawful
discrimination has been filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a.charge shall be filed(1) within 180 days after the alleged
unlav.-1'ul practice occurred; or
(2) in a case to which section 633(b)
applies, within 300 days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred, or within 30
days after receipt by the individual of
notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.
Upon receiving such a charge, the
Commission shall promptly notify all
persons named in such charge as pro-
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spective defendants in the action and
(E) the individual is advised in writing
shall promptly seek to eliminate any al- to consult with an attorney prior to exeleged unlawful practice by informal cuting the agreement;
methods of conciliation, conference, and
(F)(i) the individual is given a period
persuasion.
of at least 21 days within which to con(e) Reliance on administrative rulings; sider the agreement; or
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connecnotice 0/ dismissal or termination; civil
tion with an exit incentive or other emaction after receipt 0/ notice
Section 259 of this title [Portal-to-Por- ployment termination program offered
tal Act of 1947] shall apply to actions to a group or class of employees, the indiunder this chapter. If a charge filed with vidual is given a period of at least 45
the Commission under this chapter is days within which to consider the agreedismissed or the proceedings of the Com- ment;
(G) the agreement provides that for a
mission are otherwise terminated by the
Commission, the Commission shall noti- period of at least 7 days following the
fy the person aggrieved. A civil action execution of such agreement, the individmay be brought under this section by a ual may revoke the agreement, and the
person defined in section 630(a) of this agreement shall not become effective or .
title ,against the respondent named in the enforceable until the revocation period
charge within 90 days after the date of has expired;
the receipt of such notice. (As amended
(H) if a waiver is requested in connecby the Civil Rights Act of 1991, eff. Nov. tion with an exit incentive or other em'021, 1991)
ployment termination program offered
[Editor's note: See J,.Ol:15/or'the perti- to a group or class of employees, the emnent portions 0/ the Portal-ta-Portal ployer (at the commencement of the period specified in subparagraph (F» inAct.]
forms
the individual in writing in a man(f) Waiver
,ner calculated to be understood by the
(1) An individual may not waive any
average individual eligible to participate,
right or claim under this chapter unless
the waiver is knowing and voluntary. as to(i) any class, unit, or group of individExcept as provided in paragraph (2), a
waiver may not be considered knowing uals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any
and voluntary unless at a minimumtime limits applicable to such program;
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement and
between the individual and the employer
(ii) the job titles and ages of all indithat is written in a manner calculated to viduals eligible or selected for the pro- '
be understood by such individual, or by
gram, and the ages of all individuals in
the average individual eligible to particithe same job classification or organizapate;
,
tional unit who are not eligible or select(B) the waiver specifically refers to ed for the program'.
rights or claims arising under this chap(2) A waiver in settlement of a charge
ter;
filed with the Equal Employment Oppor(C) the individual does not waive tunity Commission, or an action filed in
rights or claims that may arise after the court by the individual or the individudate the waiver is executed;
al's representative, alleging age discrimi(D) the individual waives rights or nation of a kind prohibited under section
claims only in exchange for consideI:- 623 or 633a of this title may not be conation in addition to anything of value to sidered knowing and voluntary unless at
which the individual already is entitled; a minimum-
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(A) subparagraphs CA) through (E) of
paragraph (1) have been met; and
(B) the individual is given a reasonable
period of time within which to consider
the settlement agreement.
(3) In any dispute that may arise over
whether any of the requirements, conditions, and circumstances set forth in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F),
(G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), have
been met, the party asserting the validity
of a waiver shall have the burden of
proving in a court of competent jurisdiction that a waiver was knowing and vol-.
untary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) No waiver agreement may affect
the Commission's rights and responsibilities to enforce this chapter. No waiver
may be used to justify interfering with
the protected right of an employee to file
a charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the
Commission. (Added by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, eff. Oct. 16,
1990)
[Editor's note: The Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, P.L. 101-1,.33, effective October 16, 1990, provided as follows:
Sec. 202. Effective Date
(a) In General.-The amendment
made by section 201 [626 f] shall not apply with. respect to waivers that occur
before the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) Rule on Waivers.-Effective
the
date of enactment of this Act, the rule on
waivers issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com mission and contained in section 1627.16(c) of title 29,
Code of Federal Regulations, shall ha.ve
no force and effect.]

on

Sec. 627. Notices To Be Posted
Every employer, employment agency,
and labor organization shall post and
keep posted in conspicuous places upon
its premises a notice to be prepared or
approved by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission setting forth information as the Commission deems ap-
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propriate to effectuate the purposes of
this chapter.
[Editor's note: 29 CFR 1627, at
403:1473, gives posting requirements.]
Sec. 628. Rules and Regulations
In accordance with the provisions of
subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5.
United States Code, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may issue such rules and regulations as it may
consider necessary or appropriate for
carrying out this chapter, and may establish such reasonable exemptions to
and from any or all provisions of this
chapter as it may find necessary and
proper in the public interest.
Sec. 629. Criminal Penalties
Whoever shall forcibly resist, oppose,
impede, intimidate, or interfere with a
duly authorized representative of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission while it is engaged in the performance of duties under thi~ chapter shall
be punished by a fine of not more than
$500 or by imprisonment for not more
than one year, or by both: Provided;
however, That no person shall be imprisoned under this section except when
there has been a prior conviction hereunder.

Sec. 630. Definitions
For the purposes of this chapter(a) The term "person" means one or
more individuals, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, corporations,
business trusts, legal representatives, or
any organized groups of persons.
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year: Provided, that prior to June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employers.
The term also means (1) any agent of
such a person, and (2) a State or political
subdivision of a State and any agency or
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instrumentality of a State or a political
subdivision of a State, and any interstate
agency but such term does not include
the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States. (As amended, eff. May 1, 1974)
(c) The term "employment agency"
means any person regularly undertaking
with or without compensation to procure
employees for an employer and includes
an agent of such a person; but shall not
include an agency of the United States.
(As amended, eff. May 1, 1974,
(d) The term "labor organization"
means a labor organization engaged in
an industry affecting commerce, and any
agent of such an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any
agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment,
and any conference, general committee,
joint or system board, or joint council so
engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization.
(e) A labor organization shall be
deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce if (1) it maintains or
operates a hiring hall or hiring office
which procures employees for an employer or procures for employees opportunities to work for an employer, or (2) the
number of its members (or, where it is a
labor organization composed of other labor organizations or their representatives, if the aggregate number of the
members of such other labor organization) is fifty or more prior to July 1, 1968,
or twenty-five or more on or after July 1,
1968, and such labor organization (1) is the certified representative of
employees under the provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or the Railway Labor Act, as amended; or
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(2) although not certified, is a national
or international labor organization or a
local labor organization recognized or
acting as the representative of employees
of an employer or employers engaged in
an industry affecting commerce; or
(3) has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary body which is representing or actively seeking to represent
employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2); or
(4) has been chartered by a labor organization representing or actively seeking
to represent employees within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) as to local or
subordinate body through which such
employees may enjoy membership or become affiliated with such labor organization; or
(5) is a conference, general committee,
joint or system board or joint council
subordinate to a national or international labor organization, which includes a
labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of
this subsection.
(f) The term "employee" means any individual employed by an employer except
that the term "employee" shall not in-_
elude any person elected to public office
in any State or political subdivision of
any State by the qualified voters thereof,
or any person chosen by such officer to be
on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy-making level or an
immediate adviser with respect to the ex-ercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth
in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.
The term "employee" includes any individual who is a citizen of the United
States employed by an employer in a
workplace _in a foreign country. (As
amended by P.L. 98-459, eff. Oct. 9, 1984)
(g) The term "commerce" means trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the
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several States, or between a State and
any place outside thereof; or within the
District of Columbia, or a possession of
the United States, or between points in
the same State but through a point outside thereof.
(h) The term "industry affecting commerce" means any activity, business, or
industry in commerce or in which a labor
dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free ftow of commerce and
includes any activity or industry "affecting commerce" within the meaning of
the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
(i) The term "State" includes a State of
the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island,
the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental
Shelf Lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
(j) The term "firefighter" means an
employee, the duties of whose position
are primarily to perform work directly
connected with the control and extinguishment of fires or the maintenance
and use of firefighting apparatus and
equipment, including an employee engaged in this activity who is transferred
to a supervisory or administrative position.
(k) The term "law enforcement officer"
means an employee, the duties of whose
position are primarily the investigation,
apprehension, or detention of individuals
suspected or convicted of offenses against
the criminal laws of a State, including an
employee engaged in this activity who is
transferred to a supervisory or administration position. For the purpose of this
subsection, "detention" includes the duties of employees assigned to individuals
incarcerated in any penal institution.
(Sections l1(j) and (k) were added by
P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. 1, 1987, but do not
apply to any causes of action arising under ADEA as in effect before Jan. 1,
1987.)
(1) The term "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment"
9-93
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encompasses all employee benefits, including such benefits provided pursuant
to a bona fide employee benefit plan.
(Added by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act, eff. Oct. 16, 1990)
Sec. 631. Age Limits
(a) Individu.als a.t least 40 years of age
The prohibitions in this chapter shall
be limited to individuals who are at least
40 years of age. (As amended by P.L. 101239, eff. Dec. 19, 1989)
(b) Employees or applicants for employment in Federal Government
In the case of any personnel action aCfecting employees or applicants for employment which is subject to the provisions of section 633a of this title, the
prohibitions established in section 633a
of this title shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.
(c) Bonafide executives or high policyma~s
'
(1) Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained
65 years of age, and who, for the twoyear period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking position, if
such employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement
benefit from a pension, profit-sharing,
savings, or deferred compensation plan,
or any combination of such plans, of the
employer of such employee, which
equals, in aggregate, at least $44,000 (As·
amended by P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. 1, 1987) (2) In applying the retirement benefit
test of paragraph (1) of this subsection,
if any such retirement benefit is in a
form other than a straight life annuity
(with no ancillary benefits), or if employees contribute to any such plan or make
rollover contributions, such benefit shall
be adjusted in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, after
consultation with the Secretary of the
treasury, so that the benefit is the equivalent of a straight life annuity (with no
ancillary benefits) under a plan to which

Fair Employment Practlcee

L - 30

No. 730

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

employees do not contribute and under
which no rollover contributions are
made.
(d) Tenured employee at institution of
higher learning
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement
of any employee who has attained 70
years of age, and who is serving under a
contract of unlimited tenure (or similar
arrangement providing for unlimited
tenure) at an institution of higher education (as defined by section 1141(a) of title
20 [Higher Education Act of 1965].)
(Added by P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. 1, 1987
through Dec. 31, 1993. For section 6 of
P.L. 99-592, see Sec. 624)
[Editor's note on history of amendments: This section was amended in 1978
to raise the age of coverage of the Act
from 65 to 70 in 1978. In 1987, the section
was amended by P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. 1,
1987, which removed the age-70 upper
limit. &ction 12(d) was added, establishing a seven-year exemption from the ban
on mandatory retirement for tenured
college professors aged 70 and older. An
exception to the Jan. 1, 1987, effective
date was made for coUective bargaining
agreements which were in effect on June
30, 1986, and which terminate after Jan.
1, 1987. The 1987 amendments do not apply to those agreements until they terminate or Jan. 1, 1990, whichever occurs
first.]
Sec. 632. Annual Report to Congress
The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall submit annually in
January a report to the Congress covering its activities for the preceding year
and including such information, data,
and recommendations for further legislation in connection with the matters
covered by this chapter as it may find
advisable. Such report shall contain an
evaluation and appraisal by the Commission of the effect of the minimum and
maximum ages established by this
chpater, together with its recommendation to the Congress. In making such
evaluation and appraisal, the Com mis9-93
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sion shall take into consideration any
changes which may have occurred in the
general age level of the population, the
effect of the chapter upon workers no1
covered by its provisions, and such other
factors as it may deem pertinent.
Sec. 633. Federal-State Relationship
(a) Federal action superseding State
action
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the
jurisdiction of any agency of any State
performing like functions with regard to
discriminatory employment practices on
account of age except that upon commencement of an action under this chapter such action shall supersede any State
action. .
(b) Limitation of Federal action upon
commencement of State proceedings
In the case of an alleged unlawful
practice occurring in a State which has a
law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing
or authorizinga State authority to grant
or seek relief from such discriminatory
practice, no suit may be brought under
section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have
been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated: Provided, That such sixtyday period shall be extended to one hundred any twenty days during the first
year after the effective date of such State
law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State authority other than a
requirement of the filing of a written and
signed statement of the facts upon which
the proceeding is based, the proceeding
shall be deemed to have been commenced
for the purposes of this subsection at the
time such statement is sent by registered
mail to the appropriate State authority.
Sec. 633a. Nondiscrimination
on Account of Age in Federal
Government Employment
(aJ Federal agencies aJfected
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who
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are at least 40 years of age (except personnel actions with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United
States) in military departments as defined in section 102 of title 5, in executive
agencies as defined in section 105 of title
5, (including employees and applicants
for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States
Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units in the government of the District of Columbia having
positions in the competitive service, and
in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government
having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall
be made free from any discrimination
based on age.
(b) Enforcement by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and by
Librarian of Congress in Library of Congress; remedies; rules, regulations, orders, and instructions of Commission:
compliance by Federal agencies; powers
and duties of Commission; notijication of
final action On complaint of discrimination; exemptions: bona fide occupational
qualijication
Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is authorized to
enforce the provisions of subsection (a)
of this section through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring
of employees with or without backpay, as
will effectuate the policies of this section.
The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall issue such rules, regu-,
lations, orders, and instructions as it
deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this section. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall(1) be responsible for the review and
evaluation of the operation of all agency
programs designed to carry out the policy of this sectio~, periodically obtaining
and publishing (on at least a semiannual
basis) progress reports from each de9-93
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partment, agency, or unit referred to in
subsection (a) of this section;
(2) consult with and solicit the recommendations of interested individuals,
groups, and organizations relating to
nondiscrimination in employment on account of age; and
(3) provide for the acceptance and processing of complaints of discrimination
in Federal employment on account of
age.
The head of each such department,
agency, or unit shall comply with such
rules, regulations, orders, and instructions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which shall include a
provision that an employee or applicant
for employment shall be notified of any
final action taken on any complaint or
discrimination filed by him thereunder.
Reasonable exemptions to the provisions
of this section may be established by the
Commission but only when the Commission has established a maximum age requirement on the basis of a determination that age is a bona fide occupational
qualification necessary to the performance of the duties of the position. With
respect to employment in the Library of
Congress, authorities granted in this
subsection to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised
by the Librarian of Congress.
(c) Civil actions; jurisdiction; relief
Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of
competent jurisdiction for such legal -or
equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter.
(d) Notice to Commission; time of notice; Commission notification of prospective defendants; Commission elimination
of unlawful practices
When the individual has not filed a
complaint concerning age discrimination
with the Commission, no civil action may
be commenced by any individual under
this section until the individual has given the Commission not less than thirty
days notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed within one
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hundred and eighty days after the al- be subject to, or affected by, any provileged unlawful practice occurred. Upon sion of this chapter, other than the proreceiving a notice of intent to sue, the visions of section 631(b) of this title and
Commission shall promptly notify all the provisions of this section.
(g) Stud1land repo-rt to President and
persons named therein as prospective deCongress
by Equal Employment Opporfendants in the action and take any appropriate action to assure the elimina- tunity Commissicm; scope
tion of any unlawful practice.
(1) The Equal Employment Opportuni(e) Dut1l of Government O{}enc1l or offi- ty Commission shall undertake a study
cial
.
relating to the effects of the amendments
Nothing contained in this section shall made to this section by the Age Discrimrelieve any Government agency or official ination in Employment Act Amendof the responsibility to assure non-dis- ments of 1978, and the effects of section
crimination on account of age in employ- 631(b) of this of this title.
ment as required under any provision of
(2) The Equal Employment OpportuniFederal law.
ty Commission shall transmit a report to
(j) Applicabilit1l of statutory provisions the President and to the Congress conto perscmnel acticm of Federal depart- . taining the findings of the Commission
resulting from the study of the Commisments, etc.
Any personnel action of any depart- sion under paragraph (1) of this subsecment, agency, or other entity referred to tion. Such report shall be transmitted no
in subsection (a) of this section shall not· later than January 1, 1980.
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EEOC: Interpretations of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act
FoUowing is the text of EEOC's Interpretations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, codified as ~9 CFR
Part 1625, which reads as amended at 53
FR 5972, Feb. 29, 1988, and corrected at
53 FR 15673, May 3, 1988. Effective June
25, 1987, the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin on Employee Benefit Plans, formerly designated as ~9 CFR
860.120, was redesignated by EEOC as
Section 1625.10 of these ADEA interpretations. Part (f)(l)(ivj(B) of Section
16~5.10, which allowed employers to discontinue pension accruals for employees
who work beyond normal retirement age,
was rescinded by the commission, pursuant to court order, at 52 FR 8448, March
18, 1987.

PART 1625-AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
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Subpart A-Interpretations
Sec. 1625.1. Definitions
The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission is hereinafter referred to as
the "Commission". The terms "person",
3-90

"employer", "employment agency", "labor organization", and "employee" shall
have the meanings set forth in Section 11
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
621, et seq., hereinafter referred to as the
"Act", References to "employers" in this
part state principles that are applicable
not only to employers but also to labor
organizations and to employment agencies.

Sec. 1625.2. Discrimination Between
Individuals Protected by the Act
(a) It is unlawful in situations where
this Act applies, for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way
by giving preference because of age between individuals 40 and over. Thus, if
two people apply for the same position,
and one is 42 and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must
make such decision on the basis of some
other factor.
(b) The extension of additional benefits, such as increased severance pay, to
older employees within the protected
group may be lawful if an employer has a
reasonable basis to conclude that those
benefits will counteract problems related
to age discrimination. The extension of·
those additional benefits may not be used
as a means to accomplish practices otherwise prohibited by the Act. (As amended by 53 FR 5972, eff. Jan. 1, 1987)
Sec. 1625.3. Employment Agency
(a) As long as an employment agency
regularly procures employees for at least
one covered employer, it qualifies under
section l1(c) of the Act as an employment agency with respect to all of its
activities whether or not such activities
are for employers covered by the act.
(b) The prohibitions of section 4(b) of
the Act apply not only to the referral
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activities of a covered employment agency, but also to the agency's own employment practices, regardless of the number
of employees the agency may have.
Sec. 1625.4. Help Wanted Notices or
Advertisements
(a) When help wanted notices or advertisements contain terms and phrases
such as "age 25 to 35," "young," "college
student," "recent college graduate,"
"boy," "girl," or others of a similar nature, such a term or phrase deters the
employment of older persons and is a violation of the Act, unless one of the exceptions applies. Such phrases as "age 40
to 50," "age over 65," "retired person," or
"supplement your pension" discriminate
against others within the protected
group and, therefore, are prohibited unless one of the exceptions applies.
(b) The use of the phrase "state age" in
help wanted notices or advertisements is
not, in itself, a violation of the Act. But
because the reques~ that an applicant
state his age may tend to deter older applicants or otherwise indicate discrimination based on age, employment notices
or advertisements which include the
phrase "state age," or any similar term,
will be closely scrutinized to assure that
the request is for a lawful purpose.
Sec. 1625.5. Employment Applications
A request on the part of an employer
for information such as "Date of Birth"
or "State Age" on an employment application form is not, in itself, a violation of
the Act. But because the request that an
applicant state his age may tend to deter
older applicants or otherwise indicate
discrimination based on age, employment application forms which request
such information will be closely scrutinized to assure that the request is for a
permissible purpose and not for purposes
proscribed by the Act. That the purpose
is not one proscribed by the statute
should be made known to the applicant,
either by a reference on the application
form to the statutory prohibition in language to the following effect:
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"The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 prohibits discrimination on the basis of age
with respect to individuals who are at least 40 years
of age," or by other means. The term "Employment
applications" refers to aU written inquiries about
employment or applications for employment or promotion including, but not limited to, resumes or other summaries of the applicant's background. It relates not only to written preemployment inquiries,
but to inquiries by employees concerning terms, conditions, or privileges of employment as specified in
section 4 of the AcL (As amended by 53 FR 5972, eff.
Jan. I, 1987)

Sec. 1625.6. Bona Fide Occupational
Qualifications
(a) Whether occupational qualifications will be deemed to be "bona fide" to
a specific job and "reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular
business," will be determined on the basis of all the pertinent facts surrounding
each particular situation. It is anticipated that this concept of a bona fide
occupational qualification will have limited scope and application. Further, as
this is an exception to the Act it must be
narrowly construed.
(b) An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that (1)
the age limit is reasonably necessary to
the essence of the business, and either (2)
that all or substantially all individuals
excluded from the job involved are in
fact disqualified, or (3) that some of the
individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by reference to age. If the
emplOyer's objective in asserting a BFOQ
is the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that the challenged practice
does indeed effectuate that goal and that
there is no acceptable alternative which
would better advance it or equally advance it with less discriminatory impact.
(c) Many State and local governments
have enacted laws or administrative regulations which limit employment opportunities based on age. Unless these laws
meet the standards for the establishment
of a valid bona fide occupational qualification under section 4(f)(1) of the Act,
they will be considered in conflict with
and effectively superseded by the ADEA.
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Sec. 1625.7. Differentiations Based on
Reasonable Factors Other Than
Age
(a) Section 4(f)(1) of the Act provides_
that
- - -it shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization • • • to take
any action otherwise prohibited under paragraphs
(a), (b), (c), or (e) o( this section • • • where the
differentiation is based on reasonable (actors other
than age • - -

(b) No precise and unequivocal determination can be made as to the scope of
the phrase "differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age." Whether such differentiations exist must be decided on the basis of all the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding
each individual situation.
(c) When an employment practice uses
__age as a limiting criterion, the defense
that the practice is justified by a reasonable factor other than age is unavailable.
(d) When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for
different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the grounds
that it is a "factor other than" age, and
such a practice has an adverse impact on
individuals within the protected age
group, it can only be justified as a business necessity. Tests which are asserted
as "reasonable factors other than age"
will be scrutinized in accordance with
the standards set forth at Part 1607 of
this title.
(e) When the exception of "a reaso~
able factor other than age" is raised
against an individual claim of discriminatory treatment, the employer bears the
burden of showing that the "reasonable
factor other than age" exists factually.
(f) A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees as
a group is unlawful except with respect
to employee benefit plans which qualify
for the section 4(f)(2) exception to the
Act.
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Sec. 1625.8. Bona Fide Seniority
Systems
Section 4(f)(2) of the Act provides that
• • • It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization • • • to observe the terms of a
bona fide seniority system • • • which is
not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
this Act except that no such seniority
system • • • shall require or permit the
involuntary retirement of any individual
specified by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age of such individual. • • •
(As corrected at 53 FR 15673, May 3,
1988)
(a) Though a seniority system may be
qualified by such factors as merit, capac- _
ity, or ability, any bona fide seniority
system must be based on length of service as the primary criterion for the equitable allocation of available employment opportunities and prerogatives
among younger and older workers.
(b) Adoption of a purported seniority
system which gives those with longer
_service lesser rights, and results in discharge or less favored tr~atment to those
within the protection of the Act, may,
depending upon the circumstances, be a
"subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the
Act.
(c) Unless the essential terms and conditions of an alleged seniority system
have been communicated to the affected
employees and can be shown to be applied uniformly to all of those affected,
regardless of age, it will not be consid-ered a bona fide seniority system within
the meaning of the Act.
(d) It should be noted that seniority
systems which segregate, classify, or
otherwise discriminate against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, are prohibited
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, where that Act otherwise applies.
The "bona fides" of such a system will be
closely scrutinized to ensure that such a
system is, in fact, bona fide under the
ADEA. -
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Sec. 1625.9. Prohibition of
Involuntary Retirement
(a)(I) As originally enacted in 1967,
section 4(f)(2) of the Act provided: "It
shall not be unlawful • • • to observe the
terms of a bona fide seniority system or
any bona fide employee benefit plan such
as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade
the purposes of this Act, except that no
such employee benefit plan shall excuse
the failure to hire any individual • • •. "
The Department of Labor interpreted the
provisions as "Authoriz[ing] involuntary
retirement irrespective of age: Provided,
That such retirement is pursuant to the
terms of a retirement or pension plan
meeting the requirements of section
4(f)(2)." &e 34 FR 9709 (June 21, 1969).
The Department took the position that in
order to meet the requirements of section
4(f)(2), the involuntary retirement provision had to be (i) contained in a bona fide
pension or retirement plan, (ii) required
by the terms of the plan and not optional, and (iii) essential to the plan's economic survival or to some other legitimate business purpose-i.e.• the provision was not in the plan as the result of
arbitrary discrimination on the basis of
age.
(2) As revised by the 1978 amendments, section 4(f)(2) was amended by
adding the following clause at the end:
"and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this
Act because of the age of such individual
• • •. " The Conference Committee Report
expressly states that this amendment is
intended "to make absolutely clear one of
the original purposes of this provision,
namely, that the exception does not authorize an employer to require or permit
involuntary retirement of an employee
within the protected age group on account of age" (H.R. Rept. No. 95-950, p. 8)
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(b)(I) The amendment applies to all
new and existing seniority systems and
employee benefit plans. Accordingly, any
system or plan provision requiring or
permitting involuntary retirement is unlawful, regardless of whether the provision antedates the 1967 Act or the 1978
amendments.
(2) Where lawsuits pending on the date
of enactment (April 6, 1978) or filed
thereafter challenge involuntary retirements which occurred either before or
after that date, the amendment applies.
(c)(I) The amendment protects all individuals covered by section 12(a) of the
Act. Section 12(a) was amended in October of 1986 by the Age Discrimination in
Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub.
L. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986), which
removed the age 70 limit. Section 12(a)
provides that the Act's prohibitions shall
be limited to individuals who are at least
forty years of age. Accordingly, unless a
specific exemption applies, an employer
can no longer force retirement or other=
wise discriminate on the basis of age
against an individual because (s)he is 70
or older.
(2) The amendment to section 12(a) of
the Act became effective on January I,
1987, except with respect to any employee
subject to a collective bargaining agreement containing a provision that would
be superseded by such amendment that
was in effect on June 30, 1986, and which
terminates after January I, 1987. In that
case, the amendment is effective on the
termination of the agreement or January
1, 1990, whichever comes first.
(d) Neither section 4(0(2) nor any other provision of the Act makes it unlawful
for a plan to permit individuals to elect
early retirement at a specified age at
their own option. Nor is it unlawful for a
plan to require early retirement for reasons other than age. (As amended by 53
FR 5973, eff. Jan. 1, 1987)
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Sec. 1625.10. Costs and Benefits
UnderEmployee Benefit Plans
[Editor's note: The foUowing section,
/ormerlydesignated as £9 CFR 860.120,
was redesignated by EEOC as £9 CFR
1625.10, effective June £5, 1987 (52 FR
£3812). However, Part (f)(1)(iv)(B) 0/ the
section, which allowed employers to
cease pension accruals for employees
who continue working beyond normal retirement age, was rescinded by EEOC on
March 18, 1987, pursuant to court order
(See 52 FR 8448). Part (f)(1)(iv)(B) is,
there/ore, rendered obsolete, and has
been removed/rom the CFR.J
(a)(I) General. Section 4(f)(2) of the
Act provides that it is not unlawful for
an employer, employment agency, or labor organization "to observe the terms of
... any bona fide employee benefit plan·
such as retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, which is not subterfuge to evade
the purposes of this Act, except that no
such employee benefit plan shall excuse
the failure to hire any individual, and no
such ••• employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age
of such individuals." The legislative history of this provision indicates that its
purpose is to permit age-based reductions in employee benefit plans where
such reductions are justified by significant cost considerations. Accordingly,
section 4(f)(2) does not apply, for example, to paid vacations and uninsured paid
sick leave, since reductions in these benefits would not be justified by significant
cost considerations. Where employee
benefit plans do meet the criteria in section 4(f)(2), benefit levels for older workers may be reduced to the extent necessary to achieve approximate equivalency
in cost for older and younger workers.. A
benefit plan will be considered in compliance with the statute where the actual
amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in behalf of an older worker is
equal to that made or incurred in behalf
of a younger worker, even though the
3-90
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older worker may thereby receive a lesser
amount of benefits or insurance coverage. Since section 4(f)(2) is an exception
from the general non-discrimination
provisions of the Act, the burden is on
the one seeking to invoke the exception to
show that every element has been clearly
and unmistakably met. The exception
must be narrowly construed. The following sections explain three key elements
of the exception: (i) What a "bona fide
employee benefit plan" is; (ii) what it
means to "observe the terms" of such a
plan; and (iii) what kind of plan, or plan
provision; would be considered "a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the] Act."
There is also a discussion of the application of the general rules governing all
plans with respect to specific kinds of
employee benefit plans.
(2) Relation 0/ section 4(f)(£) to sections .Ua), Mb), and Mc). Sections 4(a),
4(b), and 4(c) prohibit specified acts of
discrimination on the basis of age. Section 4(a) in particular makes it unlawful
for an employer to "discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age···." Section 4(f)(2) is an
exception to this general prohibition.
Where an employer under an employee
benefit plan provides the saine level of
benefits to older workers as to younger
workers, there is no violation of section
4(a), and accordingly the practice does
not have to be justified under section
4(f)(2).
(b) "Bona fide employee benefit plan. "
Section 4(f)(2) applies only to bona fide
employee benefit plans. A plan is condisered "bona fide" if its terms (including
cessation of contributions or accruals in
the case of retirement income plans)
have been accurately described in writing to all employees and if it actually
provides the benefits in accordance with
the terms of the plan. Notifying employees promptly of the provisions and
changes in an employee benefit plan is
essential if they are to know how the
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plan affects them. For these purposes, it
would be sufficient under the ADEA for
employers to follow the disclosure requirements of ERISA and the regulations thereunder. The plan must actually
provide the benefits its provisions describe, since otherwise the notification of
the provisions to employees is misleading
and inaccurate. An "employee benefit
plan" is a plan, such as a retirement,
pension, or insurance plan, which provides employes with what are frequently
referred to as "fringe benefits." The term
does not refer to wages or salary in cash;
neither section4(f)(2) nor any other section of the Act excuses the payment of
lower wages or salary to older employees
on account of age. Whether or not any
particular employee benefit plan may
lawfully provide lower benefits to older
employees on account of age depends on
whether all of the elements of the exception have been met. An "employee-payaU" employee benefit plan is one of the
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" with respect to which discrimination on the basis of age is forbidden under section 4(a)(1). In such a plan,
benefits for older workers may be reduced only to the extent and according to
the same principles as apply to other
plans under section 4(f)(2).
(c) "To observe the terms" ola plan. In
order for a bona fide employee benefit
plan which provides lower benefits to
older employees on account of age to be
, within the section 4(0(2) exception, the
lower benefits must be provided in "observ[ance of] the terms of" the plan. As
this statutory text makes clear, the section 4({)(2) exception is limited to otherwise discriminatory actions which are
actually prescribed by the terms of a
. bona fide employee benefit plan. Where
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization is not required by the
express provisions of the plan to provide
lesser benefits to older workers, section
4(f)(2) does not apply. Important purposes are served by this requirement.
Where a discriminatory policy is an ex3-90
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press term of a benefit plan, employees
presumably have some opportunity to
know of the policy and to plan (or protest) accordingly. Moreover, the requirement that the discrimination actually be
prescribed by a plan assures that the
particular plan provision will be equally
applied to all employees of the same age.
Where a discriminatory provision is an
optional term of the plan, it permits individual, discretionary acts of discrimination, which do not fall within the section 4(f)(2) exception.
(d) "Subterfuge." In order for a bona
fide employee benefit plan which
prescribes lower benefits for older employees on account of age to be within
the section 4(f)(2) exception, it must not
be "a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
[the]Act." In general, a plan or plan provision which prescribes lower benefits for
older employees on account of age is not
a "subterfuge" within the meaning of
section 4({)(2), provided that the lower
level of benefits is justified by age-related
cost considerations. (The only exception
to this general rule is with respect to certain retirement plans. See paragraph
(f)(4) of this section.) There are certain
other requirements that must be met in
order for a plan not to be a subterfuge.
These requirements are set forth below.
(1) Cost data-general. Cost data used
in justification of a benefit plan which
provides lower benefits to older employo
ees on accounto( age must be valid and
reasonable. This standard is met where
an employer has cost data which show
the actual cost to it of providing the particular benefit (or benefits) in question
over a representative period of years. An
employer may rely in cost data for its
own employees over such a period, or on
cost data for a larger group of similarly
situated employees. Sometimes, as a result of experience rating or other causes,
an employer incurs costs that differ sig e
nificantly from costs for a group of simie
larly situated employees. Such an employer may not rely on cost data for the
similarly situated employees where such

Fair Employmeat Practice.

L - 40

No. 641

EEOC: ADEA INTERPRETATIONS

reliance would result in significantly
lower benefits for its own older employees. Where reliable cost information is
not available, reasonable projections
made from existing cost data meeting
the standards set forth above will be considered acceptable.
(2) Cost data - Individual benefit basis and "benefit package" basis. Cost
comparisons and adjustments under section 4(f)(2) must be made on a benefitby-benefit basis or on a "benefit package"
basis, as described below.
(i) Benefit-by-benefit basis. Adjustments made on a beilefit-by-benefit basis
must be made in the amount or level of a
specific form of benefi t for a specific
event or contingency. For example, higher group term life insurance costs for
older workers would justify a corresponding reduction in the amount of
group term life insurance coverage for
older workers, on the basis of age. However, a benefit-by-benefit approach would
not justify the- substitution of one form
of benefit for another, even though both
forms of benefit are designed for the
same contingency, such as death. See
paragraph (f)(I) of this section. (ii) "Benefit package" basis. As an alternative to the benefit-by-benefit basis,
cost comparisons and adjustments under
section 4(f)(2) may be made on a limited
"benefit package" basis. Under this approach, subject to the limitations described below, cost comparisons and adjustments can be made with respect to
section 4(f)(2) plans in the aggregate.
This alternative basis provides greater
flexibility than a benefit-by-benefit basis
in order to carry out the declared statutory purpose "to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment." A Ubenefit package" approach is an alternative approach consistent with this purpose and with the general purpose of section 4(f)(2) only if it is
not used to reduce the cost to the employer or the favorability to the employees of
overall employee benefits for older em3-90
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ployees. A "benefit package" approach
used for either of these purposes would
be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
the Act. In order to assure that such a
cCbenefit package" approach is not abused
and is consistent with the legislative intent, it is subject to the limitations described in paragraph (f), which also includes a general example.
(3) Cost data- five year maximum basis. Cost comparisons and adjustments
under section 4(f)(2) may be made on the
basis of age brackets of up to 5 years.
Thus a particular benefit may be reduced
for employees of any age within the protected age group by an amount no
greater than that which could be justified by the additional cost to provide
them with the same level of the benefit as
younger employees within a specified
five-year age group immediately preceding theirs. For example, where an employer chooses to provide unreduced
group term life insurance benefits until
age 60, benefits for employees who are
between 60 and 65 years of age may be
reduced only to the extent necessary to
achieve approximate equivalency in costs
with employees who are 55 to 60 years
old. Similarly, any reductions in benefit
levels for 65 to 70 year old employees
cannot exceed an amount which is proportional to the additional costs for their
coverage over 60 to 65 year old employees.
(4) Employee contributions in support
of employee benefit plans- (iJ As a con-'
dition of employment. An older employee
within the protected age group may not
be required as a condition of employment
to make greater contributions than a
younger employee in support of an employee benefit plan. Such a requirement
would be in effect a mandatory reduction
in take-home pay, which is never authorized by section 4(f)(2), and would impose an impediment to employment in violation of the specific restrictions in section 4(f)(2).
(ii) As a conditUm of participation in a
'Voluntary employee benefit plan. An old-
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er employee within the protected age
group may be required as a condition of
participation in a voluntary employee
benefit plan to make a greater contribution than a younger employee only if the
older employee is not thereby required to
bear a greater proportion of the total
premium cost (employer-paid and employee-paid) than the younger employee.
Otherwise the requirement would discriminate against the older employee by
making compensation in the form of an
employer contribution available on less
favorable terms than for the younger
employee and denying that compensation
altogether to an older employee unwilling or unable to meet the less favorable
terms. Such discrimination is not authorized by section 4(f)(2). This principle applies to three different contribution arrangements as follows:
(A) Employee-pay-all plans. Older employees, like younger employees, may be
required to contribute as a condition of
participation up to the full premium cost
for their age.
(B) Non-contrilndory ("employer-pay-

all 'J plans. Where younger employees are
not required to contribute any portion of
the total premium cost, older employees
may not be required to contribute any
portion.
(C) Contributo-ry plans. In these plans
employers and participating "employees
share the premium cost. The required
contributions of participants may increase wi th age so long as the proportion
of the total premium required to be paid
by the participants does not increase
with age.
(iii) As an option in order to receive an
unreduced benefit. An older employee
may be given the option, as an individual, to make the additional contribution
necessary to receive the same level of
benefits as a younger employee (provided
that the contemplated reduction in benefits is otherwise justified by section
4(f)(2».
(5) Forfeiture clauses. Clauses in em-:ployee benefit plans which state that liti-
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gation or participation in any manner in
a formal proceeding by an employee will
result in the forfeiture of his rights are
unlawful insofar as they may be applied
to those who seek redress under the Act.
This is by reason of section 4( d) which
provides that it is unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization to discriminate against any
individual because such individual "has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this
Act."
(6) Refusal to hire clauses. Any provision of an employee benefit plan which
requires or permits the refusal to hire an
individual specified in section 12(a) of the
Act on the basis of age is a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the Act and cannot
be excused under section 4(f)(2).

(7) Involuntary retirement clauses.
Any provision of an employee benefit
plan which requires or permits the involuntary retirement of any individual
specified in section 12(a) of the Act on
the basis of age is a subterfuge to evade
the purpose of the Act and cannot be excused under section 4(f)(2).
(e) Benefits provided by the Government. An employer does not violate the
Act by permitting certain benefits to be
provided by the Government, even
though the availability of such benefits
may be based on age. For example, it is
not nec.essary for an employer to provide
health benefits which are otherwise pro-.
vided to certain employees by Medicare.
However, the availability of benefits
from the Government will not justify a
reduction in employer-provided benefits
if the result is that, taking the employerprovided and Government-provided benefits together, an older employee is entitled to a lesser benefit of any type (including coverage for family andlor dependents) than a similarly situated
younger employee. For example, the
availability of certain benefits to an older
employee under Medicare will not justify
denying an older employee a benefit

Fair Employment Practice.

L - 42

No. 641

EEOC: ADEA INTERPRETATIONS

403:1377

which is provided to younger employees able to employees who become disabled
and is not provided to the older employee . at older ages, without reducing the level
of benefits. In this connection, the Deby Medicare.
(f) Application of section J,(j)(2) to var- partment would not assert a violation
ious employee benefit plans-(1J Benefit- where the level of benefits is not reduced
by-benefit approach. This portion of the and the duration of benefits is reduced in
interpretation discusses how a benefit- the following manner:
(A) With respect to disabilities which
by-benefit approach would apply to four
of the most common types of employee occur at age 60 or less, benefits cease at
age 65.
benefit plans.
(B) With respect to disabilities which
(i) Life insurance. It is not uncommon
for life insurance coverage to remain occur after age 60, benefits cease 5 years
constant until a specified age, frequently after disablement. Cost data may be pro65, and then be reduced. This practice duced to support other patterns of reducwill not violate the Act (even if reduc- tion as well.
(iii) Retirement plans - (A) Particitions start before age 65), provided that
the reduction for an employee of a par- pation. No employee hired prior to norticular age is no greater than is justified mal retirement age may be excluded
by the increased cost of coverage for that from a defined contribution plan. With
employee's specific age bracket encom- respect to defined benefit plans not subpassing no more than five years. It ject to the Employee Retirement Income
should be noted that a total denial of life Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. 93-406,
insurance, on the basis of age, would not 29 U.S.C. 1001, l003(a) and (b), an embe justified under a benefit-by-benefit ployee hired at an age more than 5 years
analysis. However, it is not unlawful for prior to normal retirement age may not
life insurance coverage to cease upon sep- be excluded from such a plan unless the
exclusion is justifiable on the basis of
aration from service.
(ii) Long-term disability. Under a ben- cost considerations as set forth elseefit-by-benefit approach, where employ- where in this section. With respect to deees who are disabled at younger ages are fined benefit plans subject to ERISA,
entitled to long-term disability benefits, such an exclusion would be unlawful in
there is no cost-based justification for any case. An employee hired less than 5
denying such benefits altogether, on the years prior to normal retirement age
basis of age, to employees who are dis- may be excluded from a defined benefit
abled at older ages. It is not unlawful to plan, regardless of whether or not the
cut off long-term disability benefits and plan is covered by ERISA. Similarly, any
coverage on the basis of some non-age employee hired after normal retiremerit
factor, such as recovery from disability. age may be excluded from a defined beneReductions on the basis of age in the lev- fit plan. (As amended by 53 FR 5973, eff.
el or duration of benefits available for Jan. 1, 1987)
disability are justifiable only on the basis
(2) "Benefit package" approach. A
of age-related cost considerations as set "benefit package" approach to compliforth elsewhere in this section. An em- ance under section 4(f)(2) offers greater
ployer which provides long-term disabil- flexibility than a benefit-by-benefit apity coverage to all employees may avoid proach by permitting deviations from a
any increases in the cost to it that such benefit-by-benefit approach so long as
coverage for older employees would en- the overall result is no lesser cost to the
tail by reducing the level of benefits employer and no less favorable benefits
available to older employees. An employ- for employees. As previously noted, in
er may also avoid such cost increases by order to assure that such an approach is
reducing the duration of benefits avail- used for the benefit of older workers and
3-90
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not to their detriment, and is otherwise
consistent with the legislative intent, it
is subject to limitations as set forth below:
(i) A benefit package approach shall
apply only to employee benefit plans
which fall within section 4(fJ(2).
(ii) A benefit package approach shall
not apply to a retirement or pension
plan. The 1978 legislative history sets
forth specific and comprehensive rules
governing such plans, which have been
adopted above. These rules are not tied to
actuarially significant cost considerations but are intended to deal with the
special funding arrangements of retirement or pension plans. Variations from
these special rules are therefore not justified by variations from the cost-based
benefit-by-benefit approach in other benefit plans, nor may variations from the
special rules governing pension and retirement plans justify variations from
the benefit-by-benefit approach in other
benefit plans.
.
(iii) A benefit package approach shall
not be used to justify reductions in health
benefits greater than would be justified
under a benefit-by-benefit approach.
Such benefits appear to be of particular
importance to older workers in meeting
"problems arising from the impact of
age" and were of particular concern to
Congress. Therefore, the "benefit package" approach may not be used to reduce
health insurance benefits by more than is
warranted by the increase in the costs to
the employer of those benefits alone. Any
greater reduction would be a subterfuge
to evade the purpose of the Act.
(iv) A benefit reduction greater than
would be justified under a bene./it-by-benefit approach must be offset by another
benefit available to the same employees.
No employees may be deprived because of
age of one benefit without an offsetting
benefit being made available to them.
(v) Employers who wish tojusti/y benefit reductions under a benefit package
3-90
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approach must be prepared to produce
data to show that those reductions are
fully justified. Thus employers must be
able to show that deviations from a benefit-by-benefit approach do not result in
lesser cost to them or less favorable benefits to their employees. A general example consistent with these limitations may
be given. Assume two employee benefit
plans, providing Benefit "A" and Benefit
uB." Both plans fall within section
4(f)(2), and neither is a retirement or
pension plan subject to special rules.
Both benefits are available to all employees. Age-based cost increases would justify a 10% decrease in both benefits on a
benefit-by-benefit basis. The affected employees would, however, find it more favorable - that is, more consistent with
meeting their needs - for no reduction
to be made in Benefit "A" and a greater
reduction to be made in Benefit "B". This
"trade-oW' would not result in a reduction in health benefits. The "trade-off"
may therefore be made. The details of the
"trade-oW' depend on data on the relative cost to the employer of the two benefits. If the data show that Benefit "A"
and Benefit "B" cost the same, Benefit
"B" may be reduced up to 20%, if Benefit
"A" is unreduced. If the data show that
Benefit "A" costs only half as much as
Benefit "B", however, Benefit "B" may be
reduced up to only 15% if Benefit "A" is unreduced, since a greater reduction in
Benefit "B" would result in an impermissible reduction in total benefit costs.
(g) Relation 0/ ADEA to State laws.
The ADEA does not preempt State age
discrimination in employment laws.
However, the failure of the ADEA to
preempt such laws does not affect the issue of whether section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) preempts State laws which related to employee benefit plans.
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Sec. 1625.11. Exemption for Employees Serving Under a Contract of
Unlimited Tenure
(a)(I) Section 12(d) of the Act, added
by the 1986 amendments, provides:
"Nothing in this Act shan be construed to prohibit
compulsory retirement of any employee who has at·
tained 70 years of age, and who is serving under a
contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure) at an insti.tution of higher education <as defined by section
1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965)."

(2) This exemption from the Act's protection of covered individuals took effect
on January 1, 1987, and is repealed on
December 31, 1993 (see section 6 of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592,
100 Stat. 3342). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. is require~ to
enter into an agreement with the Nabonal Academy of Sciences, for the conduct
of a study to analyze the potential consequences of the elimination of mandatory
retirement on institutions of higher education. (As amended by 53 FR 5973, eft'.
Jan. 1, 1987)
(b) Since section 12(d) is an exemption
from the nondiscrimination requirements of the Act, the burden is on the
one seeking to invoke the exemption to
show that every element has been clearly
and unmistakably met. Moreover, as
with other exemptions from the ADEA,
this exemption must be narrowly construed.
(c) Section 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, and set
forth in 20 U.S.C. 1141(a), provides in
pertinent part:
The term "institution of higher education" means
an educational institution in any State which <I)
admits as regular students only persons having a
certificate of graduation from a school providing secondary education, or the recognized eq.uivale~t ?f
such a certificate (2) is legally authorized Within
such State to provide a program of education beyond
secondary education, (3) provides an educational
program for which it awards a bachelor's d~ ~r
provides not less than a two-year program whIch IS
&cceptable for full credit toward such a degree, (4) is
a public or other nonprofit institu.tion. and (?). is
accredited by a nationally recogmzed accredltlDg
agency or association or, if not 80 ~ceredited, (A). is
an institution with respect to which the Commls-
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sioner has determined that there is satisfactory assurance considering the resources available to the
institution, the period of time, if any, during which it
has operated, the effort it is making to meet accreditation standards, and the purpose for which this determination is being made, that the institution will
meet the accreditation standards of such an agency
or association within a reasonable time, or (B) is an
institution whose credits are accepted, on transfer,
by not less than three institutions which are 80 accredited, for credit on the same basis as if transferred from an institution so accredited .•••

The definition encompasses almost all
public and private universities and twoand four-year colleges. The omitted portion of the text of section 1201(a) refers
largely to one-year technical schools,
which generally do not grant tenure to
employees, but which, if they do, are also
eligible to claim the exemption.
(d)(l) Use of the term "any employee"
indicates that application of the exemption is not limited to teachers, who are
traditional recipients of tenure. The exemption may also be available with re
spect to other groups, such as academic
deans, scientific researchers, professional
librarians and counseling staft', who frequently have tenured status.
(2) The Conference Committee Report
on the 1978 amendments expressly states
that the exemption does not apply to
Federal employees covered by section 15
of the Act (H.R. Rept. No. 95-950, p. 10).
(e)(I) The phrase "unlimited tenure" is
not defined in the Act. However, the almost universally accepted definition of
academic "tenure" is an arrangement
under which certain appointments in an
institution of higher education are continued until retirement for age or physical disability, subject to dismissal for
adequate cause or under extraordinary
circumstances on account of financial exigency or change of institutional program. Adopting that definition, it is evident that the word "unlimited" refers to
the duration of tenure. Therefore, a contract (or other similar arrangement)
which is limited to a specific term (for
example, one year or 10 years) will not
meet the requirements of the exemption.
(2) The legislative history shows that
Congress intended the exemption to ap-
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ply only where the minimum rights and
privileges traditionally associated with
tenure are guaranteed to an employee by
contract or similar arrangement. While
tenure policies and practices vary greatly
from one institution to another, the minimum standards set forth in the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, jointly developed
by the Association of American Colleges
and the American Association of University Professors, have enjoyed widespread
adoption or endorsement. The 1940
Statement of Principles on academic tenure provides as follows:
(a) After the expiration of a probationary period,
teachers or investigators should have permanent or
continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for adequate cause, exoept in the case of
retirement for age, or under extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies.
In the interpretation of this principle it is understood that the following represents acoeptable academic practioe:
(1) The precise terms and conditions of every appointment should be stated in writing and be in the
possession of both institution and teacher before the
appointment is consummated.
(2) Beginning with appointment to the rank of
full-time instructor or a higher rank, the probationary period should not exoeed seven years, including
within this period full-time servioe in all institutions
of higher education; but subject to the proviso that
when, after a term of probationary servioe or more
than three years in one or more institutions, a teacher is called to another isntitution it may be agreed in
writing that his new appointment is for a probationary period of not more than four years, even though
thereby the person's total probationary period in the
academic profession is extended beyond the normal
maximum of seven years. Notioe should be given at
least one year prior to the expiration of the probationary period if the teacher is not to be continued in
servioe after the expiration of that period.
(3) During the probationary period a teacher
should have the academic freedom that all other
members of the faculty have.
(4) Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dismissal (or cause of a teacher previous
to the expiration of a term appointment, should, if
possible, be considered by both a faculty committee
and the governing board of the institution. In all
cases where the facts are in dispute, the accused
teacher should be informed before the hearing in
writing of the charges against him and should have
the opportunity to be heard in his own defense by all
bodies that pass judgment upon his case. He should
be permitted to have with him an advisor of his own
choosing who may act as Counsel. There should be •
full stenographic record of the hearing available to
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the parties conoerned. In the hearing of charges of
incompetence, the testimony should include that of
teachers and other scholars, either (rom his own or
from other institutions. Teachers on continuous appointment who are dismissed for reasons not involving moral turpituide should receive their salaries for
at least a year from the date of notification of dismissal whether or not they are continued in their
duties at the institution.
(5) Termination of • continuous appointment because of financial exigency should be demonstrably
bona fide.

(3) A contract or similar arrangement
which meets the standards in the 1940
Statement of Principles will satisfy the
tenure requirements of the exemption.
However, a tenure arrangement will not
be deemed inadequate solely because it
fails to meet these standards in every respect. For example, a tenure plan will not
be deemed inadequate solely because it
includes a probationary period somewhat longer than seven years. Of course,
the greater the deviation from the stan~
dards in the 1940 Statement of Principles, the less likely it is that the employee in question will be deemed subject to
"unlimited tenure" within the meaning
of the exemption. Whether or not a tenure arrangement is adequate to satisfy
the requirements of the exemption must
be determined on the basis of the facts of
each case.
(f) Employees who are not assured of a
continuing appointment either by contract of unlimited tenure or other similar
arrangement (such as a state statute)
would not, of course, be exempted from
the prohibitions against compulsory retirement, even if they perform functions.
identical to those performed by employees with appropriate tenure.
(g) An employee within the exemption
can lawfully be forced to retire on account of age at age 70 (see (a)(l) above).
In addition, the employer is free to retain
such employees, either in the same position or status or in a different position or
status: Provided, That the employee voluntarily accepts this new position or status. For example, an employee who falls
within the exemption may be offered a
nontenured position or part-time employment. An employee who accepts a
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nontenured position or part-time employment, however, may not be treated
any less favorably, on account of age,
th~n any similarly situated younger employee (unless such less favorable treatment is excused by an exception to the
Act). (As amended by 53 FR 5973, eff.
Jan. 1, 1987)
Sec. 1625.12. Exemption for Bona
Fide Executive or High
Policymaking Employees

(a) Section 12(c)(I) of the Act, added
by the 1978 amendments and as amended
in 1984 and 1986, provides: UNothing in
this Act shall be construed to prohibit
compulsory retirement of any employee
who has attained 65 years of age, and
who, for the 2-year period immediately
before retirement, is employed in a bona
fide executive or higher policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an
immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation
plan, or any combination of such plans,
of the employer of such employee which
equals, in" the aggregate, at least
$44,000." (As amended by 53 FR 5973, eff.
Jan. 1, 1987)
(b) Since this provision is an exemption "from the non-discrimination requirements of the Act, the burden is on
the one seeking to invoke the exemption
to show that every element has been
clearly and unmistakably met. Moreover,
as with other exemptions from the Act,
this exemption must be narrowly construed.
(c) An employee within the exemption
can lawfully be forced to retire on account of age at age 65 or above. In addition, the employer is free to retain such
employees, either in the same position or
status or in a different position or status.
For example, an employee who falls
within the exemption may be offered a
position of lesser status or a part-time
position. An employee who accepts such
a new status or position, however, may
not be treated any less favorably, on ac3-90
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count of age, than any similarly situated
younger employee.
" (d)(I) In order for an employee to qualify as a "bona fide executive," the employer must initially show that the employee satisfies the definition of a bona
fide executive set forth in §541.1 of this
chapter. Each of the requirements in"
paragraphs (a) through (e) of §541.1
must be satisfied, regardless of the level
of the eqtployee's salary or compensation.
[Editor's note: Section 5.41.1 appears
at 29 CFR Part 5.1,1, the Labor Department's Wage and Hour regulations. The
section reads as follows:
Sec. 541.1. Executive.
The term "employee employed in a
bona fide executive ... capacity" in section 19(a)(1) of the act shaU mean any
employee:
(a) Whose primary duty consists of the
management of the enterprise in which
he is employed or of a customarily recognized department of subdivision thereof;
and
(b) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees therein; and
(c) Who has the authority to hire or
fire other employees or whose suggestions
and recommendations as to the hiring or
firing and as to the advancement and
promotion or any other change of status
of other employees will be given particular weight; and
(d) Who customarily and regularly ex-.
ercises discretionary powers; and
(e) Who does not devote more than 20
percent, or, in the case of an employee of
a retail or service establishment who
does not devote as much as 40 percent, of
his hours of work in the workweek to
activities which are not directly and
closely related to the performance of the
U'ork described in paragraphs (a)
through (d) of this section: Provided,
That this paragraph shall not apply in
the case of an employee who is in sole
charge of an independent establishment
or a physically separated branch estab-
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lishment, or who owns at least a 20-percent interest in the enterprise in which
he is employed; and
(j) Who is compensatedfor his sert'ices
on a salary basis at a_rate of not less than
$155 per week (or $130 per week, if employed by other than the Federal Government in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
or American Samoa), exclusive of board,
lodging, or other faCilities; Provided,
That an employee who is compensated on
a salary basis at a rate of not less than
$250 per week (or $200 per week, if employed by other than the Federal Government in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands
or American Samoa), exclusive of board,
lodging, or other facilities, and whose
primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily
recognized department or subdivision
thereof, and includes the customary and
regular direction of the work of two or
more other employees therein, shall be
deemed to meet all the requirements of
this section. (33 FR 11390, May 7, 1973,
as amended at ~O FR 7092, Feb. 19,
1975) ]

(2) Even if an employee qualifies as an
executive under the definition in §541.1 of
this chapter, the exemption from the
ADEA may not be claimed unless the
employee also meets the further criteria
specified in the Conference Committee
Report in the form of examples (see H.R.
Rept. No. 95-950, p.9). The examples are
intended to make clear that the exemption does not apply to middle-management employees, no matter how great
their retirement income, but only to a
very few top level employees who exercise
substantial executive authority over a
significant number of employees and a
large volume of business. As stated in
the Conference Report (H.R. Rept. No.
95-950, p. 9):
Typically the head of a significant and substJntial
local or regional operation of a corporation [or other
business organizationl such as a major production
facility or retail establishment, but not the head of a
minor branch, warehouse or retail store. would be
covered by the term "bona fide executive." Individu-
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als at higher levels in the corporate organizational
structure who possess comparable or greater levela
of responsibility and authority as measured by established and recognized criteria would al80 be covered.
The heads of major departments or divisions of
corporations [or other business organizations] are
usually located at corporate or regional headquarters. With respect to employees whose duties are as
80ciated with corporate headquarters operations,
such as finance. marketing. legal. production and
manufacturing (or in a corporation organized on a
product line basis. the management of product lines).
the definition would cover employees who head those
divisions.
In a large organization. the immediate subordinates of the heads of these divisions sometimes al80
exercise executive authority, within the meaning of
this exemption. The conferees intend the definition to
cover such employees if they possess responsibility
which is comparable to or greater than that p0ssessed by the head of a significant and substantial
local operation who meets the definition.

(e) The phrase "high policymaking position," according to the Conference Report (H.R. Rept. No. 95-950, p. 10), is limited to "***certain top level employees
who are not 'bona fide executives'···."
Specifically, these are:
"·individuals who have little or no line authority
but whose position and responsibility are such that
they play a significant role in the development of
corporate policy and effectively recommend the implementation thereof.
For example. the chief economist or the chief research scientist of a coporation typically has little
line authority. His duties would be primarily intellectual as opposed to executive or managerial. His
responsibility would be to evaluate significant ec0nomic or scientific trends and issues. to develop and
recommend policy direction to the top executive officers of the corporation. and he would have a significant impact on the ultimate decision on such policies
by virtue of his expertise and diiect access to the
decisionmakers. Such an employee would meet the
definition of a "high policymaking" employee.

On the other hand, as this description
makes clear, the support personnel of a
"high policymaking" employee would not
be subject to the exemption even if they
supervise the development, and draft the
recommendation, of various policies submitted by their supervisors.
(f) In order for the exemption to apply
to a particular employee, the employee
must have been in a "bona fide executive
or high policymaking position," as those
terms are defined in this section, for the
two-year period immediately before re-
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(k)(I) The annual retirement benefit
tirement. Thus, an employee who holds
two or more different positions during must be "nonforfeitable." Accordingly,
the two-year period is subject to the ex- the exemption may not be applied to any
emption only if each such job is an execu- employee subject to plan provisions
tive or high policymaking position.
which could cause the cessation of pay(g) The Conference Committee Report ments to a retiree or result in the reducexpressly states that the exemption is tion of benefits to less than $44,000 in
not applicable to Federal employees cov- anyone year. For example, where a plan
ered by section 15 of the Act (H.R. Rept. contains a provision under which beneNo. 95-950, p. 10).
'
fits would be suspended if a retiree en(h) The "annual retirement benefit," to gages in litigation against the former
which covered employees must be enti- employer, or obtains employment with a
tled, is the sum of amounts payable dur- competitor of the former employer, the
ing each one-year period from the date retirement benefit will be deemed to be
on which such benefits first become re- forfeitable. However, retirement benefits
ceivable by the retiree. Once established, . will not be deemed forfeitable solely bethe annual period upon which calcula- cause the benefits are discontinued or
tions are based may not be changed from suspended for reasons permitted under
year to year.
section 411(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue
(i) The annual retirement benefit must Code.
be immediately available to the employee
(2) An annual retirement benefit will
to be retired pursuant to the exemption. not be deemed forfeitable merely because
For purposes of determining complaince, the minimum statutory benefit level is
"immediate" means that the payment of not guaranteed against the possibility of
plan benefits (in a lump sum or the first plan bankruptcy or is subject to benefit
of a series -of periodic payments) must restrictions in the event of early termioccur not later than 60 days after the nation of the plan in accordance with
effective date of the retirement in ques- Treasury Regulation 1.401-4(c). Howtion. The fact that an employee will re- ever, as of the effective date of the retireceive benefits only after expiration of the ment in question, there must be at l~ast a
GO-day period will not preclude his re- reasonable expectation that the plan will
tirement pursuant to the exemption, if meet its obligations.
the employee could 'have elected to reSec. 1625.13. Apprenticeship
ceive benefits within that period.
Programs
(j)(1) The annual retirement benefit
Age limitations for entry into bona
must equal, in the aggregate, at least
fide
apprenticeship programs were not,
$44,000. The manner of determining
intended
to be affected by the Act. Entry
whether this requirement has been satisinto
most
apprenticeship programs has
fied is set forth in §1627.17(c).
(2) In determining whether the aggre- traditionally been limited to youths ungate annual retirement benefit equals at der specified ages. This is in recognition
least $44,000, the only benefits which of the fact that apprenticeship is an exmay be counted are those authorized by tension of the educational process to preand provided under the terms of a pen- pare young men and' women for skilled
sion, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred employment. Accordingly, the prohibicompensation plan. (Regulations issued tions contained in the Act will not be
pursuant to section 12(c)(2) of the Act, applied to bona fide apprenticeship proregarding the manner of calculating the grams which meet the standards speciamount of qualified retirement benefits fied in §§521.2 and 521.3 of this chapter.
[Editor's. note: Sections 521.2 and
for purposes of the exemption, are set
521.3 appear at 29 CFR Part 521, the Laforth in §1627.17 of this chapter.)
3-90
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bor Department's Wage and Hour re{}Ulations. The sections read as foUows:

Sec. 521.: Definitions.
As used in th is part:
(a) "Apprentice" means a worker at
least sixteen years of age, except where a
higher minimum age standard is otherwise fixed by law, who is employed to
learn a skiUed trade as defined in §521.4,
and in conformity with or substantial
c01l/ormity with the standards of apprenticeship as set forth in §521.3.
(b) "Apprenticeship agreement" means
a written agreement between an apprentice and either his employer or a joint
apprenticeship committee, which contains the terms and conditions of the employment and training of the apprentice,
and which conforms or substantially conforms with the standards of apprenticeship set forth in §521.3.
(c) "Apprenticeship program" means a
complete plan of terms and conditions
for the employment and training of apprentices which conforms or substantially conforms with the standards of apprenticeship, as set forth in §521.3.
(d) "Joint apprenticeship committee"
means a local committee, equally representative of employers and employees,
which has been established by a group of
employers and a bona fide bargaining
agent or agents, to direct the training of
apprentices with whom it has made
agreements. This term does not include a
joint apprenticeship committee established for an individual plant.
(e) "Recognized apprenticeship agency" means either (1) a state apprenticeship agency recognized by the Bureau of
Apprenticeship, United States Department of Labor, or (2) if no such apprenticeship agency exists in the state, the
Bureau of Apprenticeship, United States
Department of Labor.
(j) "Registration" means the approval
by a recognized apprenticeship agency 0/
an apprenticeship program or agreement
as meeting the basic standards adopted
by the Bureau of Apprenticeship, United
States Department of Labor, upon the
3-90
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recommendation of the Federal Committee on Apprenticeship.
(g) "State" means any state of the United States or the District of Columbia or
any territory or possession of the United
States.
Sec. 521.3. Standards of
Apprenticeship
An apprenticeship program must conform with or substantially conform with
the following standards of apprenticeship before the Administrator or his authorized representative will issue a special certificate authorizing employment
o/an apprentice under such program at
wages lower than the minimum wages
applicable under section 6 of the act:
(a) Employment and training of the
apprentice .in a skiUed trade. A skilled
trade is an apprenticeable occupation
which satUifi,es the criteria set forth in
§521.4(b) One year or more (2,000

or more
hours) of work experience.
(c) A progressively increasing schedule
of wages to be paid the apprentice which
averages at least 50 percent of the journeyman's rate over the period of apprenticeship.
(d) A schedule of work processes or 0perations in which experience is to be given the apprentice on the job.
(e) Submission of the apprenticeship
program and the apprenticeship agreement to the recognized apprenticeship
agency for registration as provided in

§521.5.
(j) Joint agreement to the apprenticeship program by the employer and the

bona.fide bargaining agent, where a bargaining agent exists.
(g) An indication that the number of
apprentices to be employed conforms to
the needs and practices in the community.
(h) Adequate facilities for training and
supervi.sion of the apprentice and the
keeping of appropriate records concerning his progress.
(iJ Related instruction, if available,
(144 hours a year is normally considered
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necessary. Related instruction means an
organized and BYstematic form of instruction which is designed to provide
the apprentice with knowledge of the the-
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oretical and technical subjects related to
his trade. Such instruction may be given
in a classroom, through correspondence
courses, or other forms of self-study.} ]
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Worker Adjustment And Retraining Notification Act
Following is the text of The Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, which, with some exceptions,
requires employers to provide 60 days'
advance notice of plant closings and
layoffs. The law (P L 100-979, 102 Stat
890, 29 USC §§2101-2109) automatically became law on Aug. 4, 1988, without
the president's signature, and took effect, except where noted, on Feb. 4,
1989.

29 U.S.C. 8 2101
TITLE 29-LABOR
CHAPTER 23- WORKER AD=
JUSTMENT AND RETRAINING
NOTIFICATION
,
Sec. 2101. Definitions; exclusions
from definition of loss of employment
(a) Definitions. As used in this chapter(1) the term "employer" means any
business enterprise that employs~
(A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or
(B) 100 or more employees who in
the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours
per week (exclusive of hours of overtime);
(2) the term "plant closing" means
the permanent or temporary shutdown
of a single site of employment, or one
or more facilities or operating units
within a single site of employment, if
the shutdown results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50

7-90

or more employees excluding any parttime employees; .
(3) the term "mass layoff" means a
reduction in force which(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at
the single site of employment during
any 30-day period for(i)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees); and
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding
any part-time employees); or
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding
any part-time employees);
(4) the term "representative" means
an exclusive representative of employees within the meaning of section
159(a) or 158(f) of this title or section
152 of Title 45;
(5) the term "affected employees"
means employees who may reasonably
be expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant closing or mass layoff by
their employer; .
(6) subject to subsection (b) of this
section, the term "employment loss"o
means (A) an employment termination, other than a discharge for cause,
voluntary departure, or retirement, (B)
a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (C) a
reduction in hours of work of more
than 50 percent during each month of
any 6-month period;
(7) the term "unit of local government" means any general purpose political subdivision of a State which has
the power to levy taxes and spend
funds, as well as general corporate and
police powers; and
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(8) the term "part-time employee"
Sec. 2102. Notice required before
means an employee who is employed plant closings and mass layoffs
for an average of fewer than 20 hours
(a) Notice to employees, state disloper week or who has been employed for
cated
worker units, and local governfewer than 6 of the 12 months precedAn employer shall not order a
ments.
ing the date on which notice is replant
closing
or mass layoff until the
quired.
end of a 60-day period after the em(b) Exclusions from definition of
ployer serves written notice of such an
employment loss. (1) In the case of a ordersale of part or all of an employer's
(1) to each representative of the afbusiness, the seller shall be responsible
for providing notice for any plant clos- fected employees as of the time of the
ing or mass layoff in accordance with notice or, if there is no such represensection 2102 of this title, up to and tative at that time, to each affected
including the effective date of the sale. employee; and
After the effective date of the sale of
(2) to the State dislocated worker
part or all of an employer's business, unit (designated or created under title
. the purchaser shall be responsible for III of the Job Training Partnership
providing notice for any plant closing Act [29 V.S.C.A. s 1651 et seq.]) and the
or mass layoff in accordance with sec- chief elected official of the unit of local
tion 2102 of this title. Notwithstanding government within which such closing
any other provision of this chapter, or layoff is to occur.
any person who is an employee of the
If there is more than one such unit,
seller (other than a part-time employ- the unit of local government which the
ee) as of the effective date of the sale employer shall notify is the unit of
shall be considered an employee of the local government to which the employpurchaser immediately after the effec- er pays the highest taxes for the year
tive date of the sale.
preceding the year for which the deter(2) Notwithstanding subsection mination is made.
(a)(6) of this section, an employee may
(b) Reduction of notification period. .
not be considered to have experienced (1) An employer may order the shutan employment loss if the closing or down ofa single site of employment
layoff is the result of the relocation or before the conclusion of the 60-day
consolidation of part or all of the em- period if as of the time that notice
ployer's business and, prior to the clos- would have been required the employer
ing or layoff. was actively seeking capital or busi-,
(A) the employer offers to transfer ness which, if obtained, would have
the employee to a different site of enabled the employer to avoid or postemployment within a reasonable com- pone the shutdown and the employer
muting distance with no more than a reasonably and in good faith believed
6-month break in employment; or
that giving the notice required would
(B) the employer offers to transfer have precluded the employer from obthe employee to any other site of em- taining the needed capital or business ..
(2)(A) An employer may order a
ployment regardless of distance with
no more than a 6-month break in em- plant closing or mass layoff before the
ployment, and the employee accepts conclusion of the 60-day period if the
within 30 days of the offer or of the closing or mass layoff is caused by
business circumstances that were not
closing or layoff, whichever is later.
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reasonably foreseeable as of the time
that notice would have been required.
(B) No notice under this chapter
shall be required if the plant closing or
mass layoff is due to any form of
natural disaster, such as a flood,
earthquake, or the drought currently
ravaging the farmlands of the United
States.
(3) An employer relying on this subsection shall give as much notice as is
practicable and at that time shall give
a brief statement of the basis for reducing the notification period.
(c) Extension of layoff period. A
layoff of more than 6 months which, at
its outset, was announced to be a layoff of 6 months or less, shall be treated
as an employment loss under this
. chapter unless": (1) the extension beyond 6 months is
"caused by business circumstances (including unforeseeable changes in price
or cost) not reasonably foreseeable at
the time of ~he initial layoff; and
(2) notice is given at the time it
becomes reasonably foreseeable that
the extension beyond 6 months will be
required.
(d) Determinations with respect to
employment loss. For purposes of this
section, in determining whether a
plant closing or mass layoff has occurred or will occur, employment
losses for 2 or more groups at a single
site of employment, each of which is
less than the minimum number of employees specified in section 2101(a)(2)
or (3) of this title but which in the
aggregate exceed that minimum number, and which occur within any 90day period shall be considered to be a
plant closing or mass layoff unless the
employer demonstrates that the employment losses are the result of separate and distinct actions and causes
and are not an attempt by the employer to evade the requirements of this
chapter.
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Sec. 2103. Exemptions.

This chapter shall not apply to a
plant closing or mass layoff if(1) the closing is of a temporary
facility or the closing or layoff is the
result of the completion of a particular
project or undertaking, and the affected employees were hired with the understanding that their employment
was limited to the duration of the
facility or the project or undertaking;
or
(2) the closing or layoff constitutes a
strike or constitutes a lockout not intended to evade the requirements of
this chapter. Nothing in this chapter
shall require an employer to serve
written notice pursuant to section 2102
(a) of this title when permanently replacing a person who is deemed to be
an economic striker under the National Labor Relations Act: [29 U.S.C.A. s
151 et seq.~ Provided, That nothing in
this chapter shall be deemed to validate or invalidate any judicial or administrative ruling relating to the hir:"
ing of permanent replacements for
economic strikers under the National
Labor Relations Act.
Sec. 2104. Administration and enforcement of requirements.
(a) Civil actions against employers.

(1) Any employer who orders a plant
closing or mass layoff in violation of
section 2102 of this title shall be liable
to each aggrieved employee who suf":
fers an employment loss as a result of
such closing or layoff for(A) back pay for each day of violation at a rate of compensation not less.
than the higher of .
(i) the average regular rate received
by such employee during the last 3
years of the employee's employment;
or
(ii) the final regular rate received by
such employee; "and
(B) benefits under an employee bene-
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fit plan described in section 1002 (3) of
this title, including the cost of medical
expenses incurred during the employment loss which would have been covered under an employee benefit plan if
the employment loss had not occurred.
Such liability shall be calculated for
the period of the violation, up to a
maximum of 60 days, but in no event
for more than one-half the number of
days the employee was employed by
the employer.
(2) The amount for which an employer is liable under paragraph (1)
shall be reduced by(A) any wages paid by the employer
to the employee for the period of the
violation;
(B) any voluntary and unconditional
payment by the employer to the em.;.
ployee that is not required by any legal
obligation; and
(C) any payment by the employer to
a third party or trustee (such as premiums for health benefits or payments
to a defined contribution pension plan)
on behalf of and attributable to the
employee for the period of the violation.
In addition, any liability incurred
under paragraph (1) with respect to a
defined benefit pension plan may be
reduced by crediting the employee with
service for all purposes under such a
plan for the period of the violation.
(3) Any employer who violates the
provisions of section 2102 of this title
with respect to a unit of local government shall be subject to a civil penalty
of not more than $500 for each day of
such violation, except that such penalty shall not apply if the employer pays
to each aggrieved employee the amount
for which the employer is liable to that
employee within 3 weeks from the date
the employer orders the shutdown or
layoff.
(4) If an employer which has violated this chapter proves to the satisfac-
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tion of the court that the act or omission that violated this chapter was in
good faith and that the employer had
reasonable grounds for believing that
the act or omission was not a violation
of this chapter the court may, in its
discretion, reduce the amount of the
liability or penalty provided for in this
section.
(5) A person seeking to enforce such
liability, including a representative of
employees or a unit of local government aggrieved under paragraph (1) or
(3), may sue either for such person or
for other persons similarly situated, or
both, in any district court of the United States for any district in which the
violation is alleged to have occurred, or
in which the employer transacts business.
(6) In any such suit, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing
party a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs.
(7) For purposes of this subsection,
the term, "aggrieved employee" means
an employee who has worked for the
employer ordering the plant closing or
mass layoff and who, as a result of the
failure by the employer to comply with
section 2102 of this title did not receive
timely notice ei ther directly or
through his or her representative as
required by section 2102 of this title.
(b) Exclusivity of remedies.

The remedies provided for in this .
section shall be the exclusive remedies.
for any violation of this chapter. Under this chapter, a Federal court shall
not have authority to enjoin a plant
closing or mass layoff.
Sec. 2105. Procedures in addition
to other rights of employees.
The rights and remedies provided to
employees by this chapter are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other
contractual or statutory rights and
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remedies of the employees, and are not
intended to alter or affect such rights
and remedies, except that the period of
notification required by this chapter
shall run concurrently with any period
of notification required by contract or
by any other statute.
Sec. 2106. Procedures encouraged
where not required.
It is the sense of Congress that an
employer who is not required to comply with the notice requirements of
section 2102 of this title should, to the
extent possible, provide notice to its
employees about a proposal to close a
plant or permanently reduce its workforce.

Sec. 2107. Authority to prescribe
regulations.

(a) The Secretary of Labor shall
prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out this chapter.
Such regulations shall, at a minimum,
include interpretative regulations describing the methods by which employers may provide for appropriate
service of notice as required by this
chapter.
(b) The mailing of notice to an employee's last known address or inclusion of notice in the employee's paycheck will be considered acceptable
methods for fulfillment of the employer's obligation to give notice to each
affected employee under this chapter.
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Sec. 2108. Effect on other laws.

The giving of notice pursuant to this
chapter, if done in good faith compliance with this chapter, shall not constitute a violation of the National
Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C.A. s 151
et seq.] or the Railway Labor Act.
Sec. 2109. Report on employment
and international competitiveness.

Two years after Aug. 4, 1988, the
Comptroller General shall submit to
the Committee on Small Business of
both the House and Senate, the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, and the Committee on Education and Labor a report containing a
detailed and objective analysis of the
effect of this chapter on employers
(especially small-and medium-sized
businesses), the economy (international competitiveness), and employees (in
terms of levels and conditions of employment). The Comptroller General
shall assess both costs and benefits
including the effect on productivity:
competitiveness, unemployment rates
and compensation, and worker retraining and readjustment. (Effective February 4, 1989, expect that the authority
of the Secretary of Labor under Sec.
2107 took effect August 4, 1988.)
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639.6 Who must receive notice!
639.7 What must the notice contain!
639.8 How iJ the notice eerved?
639.9 When may notice be given leal than 60 day.
in advance!
639.10 When may notice be extended!

§639.1 Purpose and scope.
(a) Purpose of WARN.

Final Rule
Accordingly, Chapter V of Title 20, Code of Federal Regulations. is amended by Revising Part 639, to
read as follows:

PART 639 - WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTI·
FICATION
Sec..
639.1 Purpose and &cope.
639.2 What does WARN require?
639.3 Definitions.
639.4 Who must give notice?
639.5 When must notice be given!

8-t2,

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN or
the Act) provides protection to workers, their families and communities by
requiring employers to provide notification 60 calendar days in advance of
plant closings and mass layoffs. Advance notice provides workers and
their families some transition time to
adjust to the prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs and., if necessary, to enter
skill training or retraining that will
allow these workers to successfully
compete in the job market. WARN also
provides for notice to State dislocated
worker units so that dislocated worker·
assistance can be promptly provided.
(b) Scope of these regulations.
These regulations establish basic
definitions and rules for giving notice,
implementing the provisions of
WARN. The Department's objective is
to establish clear principles and broad
guidelines which can be applied in specific circumstances. However, the Department recognizes that Federal rulemaking cannot address the multitude
of industry and company-specific situations in which advance notice will be
given.
(c) Notice encouraged where not required.
Section 7 of the Act states:
It is the sense of Congress that an
employer who is not required to comply with, the notice requirements of
section 3 should, to the extent possible,
provide notice to its employees about a
proposal to close a plant or permanently reduce its workforce.
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State dislocated worker unit, WARN
enforcement.
Enforcement of WARN will be notice begins the process of assisting
through the courts, as provided in §5 workers who will be dislocated.
of the statute. Employees, their repre(g) WARN not to supersede other
sentatives and units of local govern- laws and contracts.
ment may initiate civil actions against
The provisions of WARN do not suemployers believed to be in violation of persede any laws or collective bargain§3 of the Act. The Department of ing agreements that provide for addiLabor has no legal standing in any tional notice or additional rights and
enforcement action and, therefore, will remedies. If such law or agreement
not be in a position to issue advisory provides for a longer notice period,
opinions on specific cases. The Depart- WARN notice shall run concurrently
ment will provide assistance in under- with that additional notice period. Colstanding these regulations and may lective bargaining agreements may be
revise them from time to time as may used to clarify or amplify the terms
be necessary.
and conditions of WARN, but may not
(e) Notice in ambiguous situations.
reduce WARN rights.
It is civically desirable and it would
appear to be good business practice for §639.2 What does WARN require?
an employer to provide advance notice
WARN requires employers who are
to its workers or unions, local govern- planning a plant closing or a mass
ment and the State when terminating layoff to give affected employees at
a significant number of employees. In least 60 days' notice of such an empractical terms, there are some ques- ployment action. While the 6O-day petions and ambiguities of interpretation riod is the minimum for advance noinherent in the application of WARN tice, this provision is not intended to
to business practices in the market discourage employers from voluntarily
economy that cannot be addressed in providing longer periods of advance
these regulations. It is therefore pru- notice. Not all plant closings and laydent for employers to weigh the desir- offs are subject to the Act, and certain
ability of advance notice against the - employment thresholds must be
possibility of expensive and time-con- reached before the Act applies. WARN
suming litigation to resolve disputes sets -out specific exemptions, and prowhere notice has not been given. The vides for a reduction in the notificaDepartment encourages employers to tion period in particular circumgive notice in all circumstances.
stances. Damages and civil penalties
(f) Coordination with job placement can be assessed against employers who
and retraining progra'ITUJ.
violate the Act.
The Department, through these regulations and through the Trade Ad- §639.3 Definitions.
justment Assistance Program (TAA)
(a) Empicyer. (1) The term "employand Economic Dislocation and Worker
er"
means any business enterprise that
Adjustment Assistance Act (EDW AA)
employs
regulations, encourages maximum co(i)
100
or more employees, excludordination of the actions and activities
ing
part-time
employees; or
of these programs to assure that the
(ii) 100 or more employees, includnegative impact of dislocation on
ing part-time employees, who in the
workers is lessened to the extent possiaggregate work at least 4,000 hours
ble. By providing for notice to the
(d) WARN

l
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per week, exclusive of hours of overtime.
Workers on temporary layoff or on
leave who have a reasonable expectation of recall are counted as employees.
An employee has a "reasonable expectation of recall" when he/she understands, through notification or
through industry practice, that
his/her employment with the employer
has been temporarily interrupted and
that he/she will be recalled to the
same or to a similar job. The term
"employer" includes non-profit organizations of the requisite size. Regular
Federal, State, local and federally recognized Indian tribal governments are
not covered. However, the term "employer" includes public and quasi-public entities which engage in business
(Le., take part in a commercial or industrial enterprise, supply a service or
good on a mercantile basis, or provide
independent management of public assets, raising revenue and making desired investments), and which are separa tely organized from the regular
government, which have their own
governing bodies and which have independent authority to manage their
personnel and assets.
(2) Under existing legal rules, independent contractors and subsidiaries
which are wholly or partially owned by
a parent company are treated as separate employers or as a part of the
parent or contracting company depending upon the degree of. their independence from the parent. Some of the
factors to be considered in making this
determination are (i) common ownership, (ii) common directors and/or officers, (iii) de facto exercise of control,
(iv) unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source, and (v) the
dependency of operations.
(3) Workers, other than part-time
workers, who are exempt from notice
under §4 of WARN are nonetheless

No. 101

counted as employees for purposes of
determining coverage as an employer.
(4) An employer may have one or
more sites of employment under common ownership or control. An example
would be a major auto maker which
has dozens of automobile plants
throughout the country. Each plant
would be considered a site of employment, but there is only one "employer," the auto maker.
(b) Plant closing. The term "plant
closing" means the permanent or temporary shutdown of a "single site of
employment," or one or more "facilities or operating units" within a single
site of employment, if the shutdown
results in an "employment loss" during any 30-day period at the single site
of employment for 50 or more employees, excluding any part-time employees. An employment action that results in the effective cessation of
production or the work performed by a
unit, even ira few employees remain, is
a shutdown. A '·temporary shutdown"
triggers the notice requirement only if
there are a sufficient number of terminations, layoffs exceeding 6 months, or
reductions in hours of work as specified under the definition of "employment loss."
(c) Mass layoff. (1) The term "mass
layoff" means a reduction in force
which first, is not the result of a plant
closing, and second, results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period
for:
(i) at least 33 percent of the active
employees, excluding part-time employees, and
(ii) at least 50 employees, excluding
part-time employees.
Where 500 or more employees (excluding part-time employees) are affected,
the 33% requirement does not apply,
and notice is required if the other criteria are met. Plan!.. ~lo.!Jin~s involve
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employment loss which results from
the shutdown of one or more distinct
units within a single site or the entire
site. A mass layoff involves employment loss, regardless of whether one or
more units are shut down at the site.
(2) Workers, other than part-time
workers, who are exempt from notice
under §4 of WARN are nonetheless
counted as employees for purposes of
determining coverage as a plant closing or mass layoff. For example, if an
employer closes a temporary project
on which 10 permanent and 40 temporary workers are employed, a covered
plant closing has occurred although
only 10 workers are entitled to notice..
(d) Representative. The term "representative" means an exclusive representative of employees within the
meaning of §9(a) or S(f) of the National Labor Relations Act or §2 of the
Railway Labor Act.
(e) A.ffected employees. The term
"affected employees" means employees
who may reasonably be expected to
experience an employment loss as a
consequence of a proposed plant closing or mass layoff by their employer.
This includes individually identifiable
employees who will likely lose their
jobs because of bumping rights or other factors, to the .extent that such
individual workers reasonably can be
identified at the time notice is required
to be given. The term "affected employees" includes managerial and supervisory employees, but does not include business partners. Consultant or
contract employees who have a separate employment relationship with another employer and are paid by that
other employer, or who are self-employed, are not "affected employees" of
the business to which they are assigned. In addition, for purposes of
determining whether coverage thresholds are met, either incumbent workers
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in jobs being eliminated or, if known
60 days in advance, the actual employees who suffer an employment loss
may be counted.
(f) Employment loss. (1) The term
"employment loss" means (i) an employment termination, other than a
discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement, (ii) a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (iii) a reduction in
hours of work of individual employees
of more than 50% during each month
of any 6-month period.
(2) Where a termination or a layoff
(see paragraphs (f)(l)(i) and (ii) of this
section) is involved, an employment
loss does not occur when an employee
is reassigned or transferred to employer-sponsored programs, such as retraining or job search activities, as
long as the reassignment does not constitute a constructive discharge or other involuntary termination.
(3) An employee is not considered to
have experienced an .employment loss
if the closing or layoff is the result of
the relocation or consolidation of part
or all of the employer's business and,
prior to the closing or layoff (i) the employer offers to transfer
the employee to a different site of
employment within a reasonable
commuting distance with no more
than a 6-month break in employment, or
(ii) the employer offers to transfer
the employee to any other site of .
employment regardless of distance
with no more than a 6-month break
in employment, and the employee
accepts within 30 days of the offer or
of the closing or layoff, whichever is
later.
(4) A "relocation or consolidation"
of part or all of an employer's business, for purposes of paragraph
§639.3(h)(4), means that some defin-
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able business, whether customer orders, product lines, or operations, is
transferred to a different site of employment and that transfer results in a
plant closing or mass layoff.
(g) Unit of local govern:ment. The
term "unit of local government" means
any general purpose political subdivision of a State, which has the power to
levy taxes and spend funds and which
also has general corporate and police
powers. When a covered employment
site is located in more than one unit of
local government, the employer must
give notice to the unit to which it
determines it directly paid the highest
taxes for the year preceding the year
for which the determination is made.
All local taxes direCtly paid to the local
government should be aggregated for
this purpose.
(h) Part-time employee. The term
"part-time" employee means an employee who is employed for an average
of fewer than 2O'hours per week or who
has been employed for fewer than 6 of
the 12 months preceding the date on
which notice is required, including
workers who work full-time. This term
may include workers who would traditionally be understood as "seasonal"
employees. The period to be used for
calculating whether a worker ha.s
worked "an average of fewer than 20
hours per week" is the shorter of the
actual time the worker has been employed or the most recent 90 days.
(i) Single site of employment. (1) A
single site of employment can refer to
either a single location or a group of
contiguous locations. Groups of structures which form a campus or' industrial park, or separate facilities across
the street from one another, may be
considered a single site of employment.
(2) There may be several single sites
of employment within a single building, such as an office building, if separate employers conduct activities with-
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in such a building. For example, an
office building housing 50 different
businesses will contain 50 single sites
of employment. The offices of each
employer will be its single site of employment.
(3) Separate buildings or areas
which are not directly connected or in
immediate proximity may be considered a single site of employment if they
are in reasonable geographic proximity, used for the same purpose, and
share the same staff and equipment.
An example is an employer who manages a number of warehouses in an
area but who regularly shifts or rotates the same employees from one
building to another.
(4) Non-contiguous sites in the same
geographic area which do not share
the same staff or operational purpose
should not be considered a single site.
For example, assembly plants which
are located on opposite sides of a town
and which are managed by a single
employer are separate sites if they
employ different workers.
(5) Contiguous buildings owned by
the same employer which have separate management, produce different
products, and have separate workforces are considered separate single
sites of employment.
(6) For workers whose primary duties require travel from point to point,
who are outstationed, or whose primary duties involve work outside any of
the employer's regular employment
sites (e.g., railroad workers, bus drivers, salespersons), the single site of
employment to which they are assigned as their home base, from which
their work is assigned, or to which
they report will be the single site in
which they are covered for WARN
purposes.
(7) Foreign sites of employment are
not covered under WARN. U.S. workers at such sites are counted to deter-
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mine whether an employer is covered
as an employer under §639.3(a).
(8) The term "single site of employment" may also apply to truly unusual
organizational situations where the
above criteria do not reasonably apply.
The application of this definition with
the intent to evade the purpose of the
Act to provide notice is not acceptable.
(j) Facility (}1" operating unit. The
term "facility" refers to a building or
buildings. The term "operating unit"
refers to an organizationally or operationally distinct product, operation,
or specific work function within or
across facilities at the single site.
(k) State dislocated W(}1"/rer unit. The
term "State dislocated worker unit"
means a unit designated or created in
each State by the Governor under Title
III of the Job Training Partnership
Act, as amended by EDWAA.
(1) State. For the purpose of WARN,
the term "State" includes the 50
States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Viriin Islands.
§639.4 Who must give notice?
Section 3(a) of WARN states that
"an employer shall not order a plant
closing or mass layoff until the end of
a 6O-day period after the employer
serves written notice of such an order· • • ." Therefore, an employer who
is anticipating carrying out a plant
closing or mass layoff is required to
give notice to affected employees or
their representative(s), the State dislocated worker unit and the chief elected
official of a unit of local government.
(See definitions in §639.3 of this part.)
(a) It is the responsibility of the
employer to decide the most appropriate person within the employer's organization to prepare and deliver the
notice to affected employees or their
representative(s), the State dislocated
worker unit and the chief elected offi-
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cial of a unit of local government. In
most instances, this may be the local
site plant manager, the local personnel
director or a labor relations officer.
(b) An employer who has previously
announced and carried out a shortterm layoff (6 months or less) which is
being extended beyond 6 months due to
business circumstances (including unforeseeable changes in price or cost)
not reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the initial layoff is required to give
notice when it becomes reasonably
foreseeable that the extension is required. A layoff extending beyond 6
months from the date the layoff commenced for any other reason shall be
treated as an employment loss from
the date of its commencement.
(c) In the ease of the sale of part or
all of a business, §2(b)(1) of WARN
defines who the "employer" is. The
seller is responsible for providing notice of any plant closing or mass layoff
which takes place up to and including
the effective date (time) of the sale,
and the buyer is responsible for providing notice of any plant closing or
mass layoff that takes place thereafter. Affected employees are always
entitled to notice; at all times the employer is responsible for providing notice.
(1) If the seller is made aware of any
definite plans on the part of the buyer
to carry out a plant closing or mass
layoff within 60 days of purchase, the.
seller may give notice to affected employees as an agent of the buyer, if so
empowered. If the seller does not give
notice, the buyer is, nevertheless, responsible to give notice. If the seller
gives notice as the buyer's agent, the
responsibility for notice still r~mains
with the buyer.
(2) It may be prudent for the buyer
and seller to determine the impacts of
the sale on workers, and to arrange
between them for advance notice to be
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given to affected employees or their
representative(s), if a mass layoff or
plant closing is planned.
§639.5 When must notice be given?
(a) General rule. (1) With certain
exceptions discussed· in paragraphs
(b), (c) and (d) of this section and in
§639.9 of this part, notice must be
given at least 60 calendar days prior to
any planned plant closing or mass layoff, as defined in these regulations.
When all employees are not terminated on the same date, the date of the
first individual termination within the
statutory 30-day or 90-day period triggers the 6O-day notice requirement. A
worker's last day of employment. is
considered the date of that worker's
layoff. The first and each subsequent
group of terminees are entitled to a
full 60 days' notice. In order for an
employer to decide whether issuing notice is required, the employer should(i) Look ahead 30 days and behind
30 days to determine whether employment actions both taken and
planned will, in the aggregate for
any 30-day period, reach the minimum numbers for a plant closing or
a mass layoff and thus trigger the
notice requirement; and
(ii) Look ahead 90 days and behind
90 days to determine whether employment actions both taken and
planned each of which separately is
not of sufficient size to trigger
WARN coverage will, in the aggregate for any 9O-day period, reach the
minimum numbers for a plant closing or a mass layoff and thus trigger
the notice requirement. An employer
is not, however, required under §3(d)
to give notice if the employer demonstrates that the separate employment losses are the result of separate and distinct actions and causes,
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and are not an attempt to evade the
requirements of WARN.
(2) The point in time at which the
. number of employees is to be measured
for the purpose of determining coverage is the date the first notice is required to be given. If this "snapshot"
of the number of employees employed
on that date is clearly unrepresentative of the ordinary or average employment level, then a more representative
number can be used to determine coverage. Examples of unrepresentative
employment levels include cases when
the level is near the peak or trough of
. an employment cycle or when large
upward pr downward shifts in the
number of employees occur around the
time notice is to be given. A more
representative number may be an
average number of employees over a
recent period of time or the number of
employees on an alternative date
which is more representative of normal employment levels. Alternative
methods cannot be used to evade the
purpose of WARN, and should only be
used in unusual circumstances.
(b) Transfers. (1) Notice is not required in certain cases involving
transfers, as described under the definition of "employment loss" at
§639.3(f) of this part.
(2) An offer of reassignment -to a
different site of employment should
not be deemed to be a "transfer" if the
new job constitutes a constructive dis- .
charge.
(3) The meaning of the term "reasonable commuting distance" will vary
with local and industry conditions. In
determining what is a "reasonable
commuting distance", consideration
should be given to the following factors: geographic accessibility of the
place of work, the quality of the roads,
customarily available transportation,
and the usual travel time.
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(4) In cases where the transfer is
beyond reasonable commuting distance, the employer may become liable
for failure to give notice if an offer to
transfer is not accepted within 30 days
of the offer or of the closing or layoff
(whichever is later). Depending upon
when the offer of transfer was made
by the employer, the normal 6O-day
notice period may have expired and the
plant closing or mass layoff may have
occurred. An employer is, therefore,
well adviSed to provide 6O-day advance
notice as part of the transfer offer.
(c) Temporary employment. (1) No
notice is required if the closing is of a
temporary facility, or if the closing or
layoff is the result of the cOmpletion of
a particular project or undertaking,
and the affected employees were hired
with the understanding that their employment was limited to the duration
of the facility or the project or undertaking.
(2) Employees must clearly understand at tHe time of hire that their
employment is temporary. When such
underStandings exist will be determined
by reference to employment contracts,
collective bargaining agreements, or employment practices of an industry or a
locality, but the burden of proof will lie
with the employer to show that the
temporary nature of the project or facility was clearly communicatai should
questions arise regarding the temporary
employment understandings.
(3) Employers in agriculture and
construction frequently hire workers
for harvesting, processing, or for work
on a particular building or project.
Such work may be seasonal but recurring. Such work falls under this exemption if the workers understood at
the time they were hired that their
work was temporary. In uncertain situations, it may be prudent for employers to clarify temporary work understandings in writing when workers are
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hired. The same employers may also
have permanent employees who work
on a variety of jobs and tasks continuously through most of the calendar
year. Such employees are not included
under this exemption. Giving written
notice that a project is temporary will
not convert permanent employment
into .temporary work, making jobs
exempt from WARN.
(4) Certain jobs may be related to a
specific contract or order. Whether
such jobs are temporary depends on
whether the contract or order is part
of a long-term· relationship. For example, an aircraft manufacturer hires
workers to produce a standard airplane for the U.S. fleet under a contract with the U.S. Air Force with the
expectation that its contract ~ll continue to be renewed during the foreseeable future. The employees of this
manufacturer would not be considered
temporary.
(d) Strikes ~ lockouts. The statute
provides an exemption for strikes and
lockouts which are not intended to
evade the requirements of the Act. A
lockout occurs when, for tactical or
defensive reasons durhig" the course of
collective bargaining or during a labor
dispute, an employer lawfully refuses
to utilize some or all of its employees
for the performance of available work.
A lockout not related to collective bargaining which is intended as a subterfuge to evade the Act does not qualify
for this exemption. A plant closing or
mass layoff at a site of employment
where a strike or lockout is taking
place, which occurs for reasons unrelated to a strike or lockout, is not
covered by this exemption. An employer need not give notice when permanently replacing a person who is
deemed to be an economic striker under the National Labor Relations Act.
Non-striking employees at the same
single site of employment who exper-
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ience a covered employment loss as a
result of a strike are entitled to notice;
however, situations in which a strike
or lockout affects non-striking employees at the same plant may constitute an unforeseeable business circumstance, as discussed in §639.9, and
reduced notice may apply. Similarly,
the "faltering company" exception,
also discussed in §639.9 may apply in
strike situations. Where a union which
is on strike represents more than one
bargaining unit at the single site, nonstrikers includes the non-striking bargaining unit(s). Notice also is due to
those workers who are not a part of
the bargaining unit(s) which is involved in the labor negotiations that
led to the lockout. Employees at other
plants which have not been struck, but
at which covered plant closings or
mass layoffs occur as a direct or indirect result of a strike or lockout are
not covered by the strike/lockout exemption. The unforeseeable business
circumstances exception to 60 days'
notice also may apply to these closings
or"layoffs at other plants.
§639.6 Who must receive notice?
Section 3(a) of WARN provides for
notice to each representative of the
affected employees as of the time notice is required to be given or, if there
is no such representative at that time,
to each affected employee. Notice also
must be served on the State dislocated
worker unit and the chief elected official of the unit of local government
within which a closing or layoff is to
occur. Section 2(b)(1) of the Act states
that ""any person who is an employee
of the seller (other than a part-time
employee) as of the effective date
[time] of the sale shall be considered an
employee of the purchaser immediately after the effective date [time] of the
sale." This provision preserves the notice rights of the employees of a busi-
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ness that has been sold, but creates no
other employment rights. Although a
technical termination of the seller's
employees may be deemed to have occurred when a sale becomes effective,
WARN notice is only required where
the employees, in fact, experience a
covered employment loss.
(a) Representative(s) 0/ affected employees. Written notice is to be Served
upon the chief elected officer of the
exclusive representative(s) or bargaining agent(s) of affected employees at
the time of the notice. If this person is
not the same as the officer of the local
union(s) representing affected employees, it is recommended that a copy also
be given to the local union official(s).
(b) Affected employees. Notice is required to be given to employees who
may reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss. This includes employees who will likely lose
their jobs because of bumping rights
or" other factors, to the extent that
such workers can be identified at the
time notice is required to be given. If,
at the time notice is required to be
given, the employer cannot identify the
employee who may reasonably be expected ~ experience an employment
loss due to the elimination of a particular position, the employer must
provide notice to the incumbent in that
position. While part-time employees
are not counted in determining whether plant closing or mass layoff thresh;.
olds are reached, such workers are due
notice.
(c) State dislocated worker unit. Notice is to be served upon the State
dislocated worker unit. Since the
States are restructuring to implement
training under EDW AA, service of notice upon the State Governor constitutes service upon the State dislocated
worker unit until such time as the
Governor makes public State procedures for serving notice to this unit.
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(d) Chief elected ojficial of the unit
of local government. The identity of
the chief elected official will .vary according to the local government structure. In the case of elected boards, the
notice is to be served upon the board's
chairperson.

§639.7 What must the notice contain?
(a) Notice must be specific. (1) All
notice must be specific.
(2) Where voluntary notice has been
given more than 60 days in advance,
but does not contain all of the required
elements set out in this section, the
employer must ensure that all of the
information required by this section is
provided in writing to the parties listed in §639.6 at least 60 days in advance
of a covered employment action.
(3) Notice may be given conditional
upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of.an event, such as the renewal of a
major contract, only when the event is
definite and the consequences of its
occurrence or nonoccurrence will necessarily. in the normal course of business, lead to a covered plant ·closing or
mass layoff less than 60 days after the
event. For example, if the non-renewal
of a major contract will lead to the
closing of the plant that produces the
articles supplied under the contract 30
days after the contract expires,· the
employer may give notice at least 60
days in advance of the projected closing date which states that if the contract is not renewed, the plant closing
will occur on the projected date. The
notice must contain each of the elements set out in this section.
(4) The information provided in the
notice shall be based on the best information available to the employer at
the time the notice is served. It is not
the intent of the regulations, that errors in the information provided in a
notice that occur because events subse-
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quently change or that are minor, in-:
advertent errors are to be the basis for
finding a violation of WARN.
(b) As used in this section, the term
"date" refers to a specific date or to a
14-day period during which a separation or separations are expected to
occur. If separations are planned according to a schedule, the schedule
should indicate the specific dates on
which or the beginning date of each 14day period during which any separations are expected to occur. Where a
14-dayperiod is used, notice must be
given at least 60 days in advance of the
first day of the period.
(c) Notice to each representative of
affected employees is to contain:
(1) The name and address of the
employment site where the plant closing or mass layoff win occur, and the
name and telephone number of a company official to contact for further
information;
(2) A statement as to whether the
planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and,. if the entire
plant is to be closed, a statement to
that effect;
(3) The expected date of the first
separation and the anticipated schedule for making separations;
(4) The job titles of positions to be
affected and the names of the workers
currently holding affected jobs.
The notice may include additional information useful to the employees such
as information on available dislocated
worker assistance, and, if the planned
action is expected to be temporary, the
estimated duration, if known.
(d) Notice to each affected employee
who does not have a representative is
to be written in language understandable to the employees and is to contain:
(1) A statement as to whether the
planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire
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plant is to be closed, a statement to
that effect;
(2) The expected date when the plant
closing or mass layoff will commence
and the expected date when the individual employee will be separated;
(3) An indication whether or not
bumping rights exist;
(4) The name and telephone number
of a company official to contact for
further information.
The notice may include additional information useful to the employees such
as information on available dislocated
worker assistance, and, if the planned
action is expected to be temporary, the
estimated duration, if known.
(e) The notices separately provided
to the State dislocated worker unit and
to the chief elected official of the unit
of local government are to contain:
(1) The name and address of the
employment site where the plant closing or mass layoff will occur, and the
name and telephone number of a company official to contact for further
information;
(2) A statement as to whether the
planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire
plant is to be closed, a statement to
that effect;
(3) The expected date of the first
separation, and the anticipated schedule for making separations;
(4) The job titles of positions to be
affected, and the number of affected
employees in each job classification;
(5) An indication as to whether or
not bumping rights exist;
(6) The name of each union representing affected employees, and the
name and address of the chief elected
officer of each union.
The notice may include additional information useful to the employees such
as a statement of whether the planned
action is expected to be temporary and
if so, its expected duration.
I
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(f) As an alternative to the notices
outlined in paragraph (e) above, an
employer may give notice to the State
dislocated worker unit and to the unit
of local government by providing them
with a written notice stating the name
and address of the employment site
where the plant closing or mass layoff
will occur; the name and telephone
number of a company official to contact for further information; the expected date of the first separation; and
the number of affected employees. The
employer is required to maintain the
other information listed in §639.7(e) on
site and readily accessible to the State
dislocated worker unit and to the unit
of general local government. Should
this information not be available when
requested, it will be deemed a failure to
give required notice.
.
§639.8 How 1. the notice served?

Any reasonable method of delivery
to the parties listed under §639.6 of
this part which is designed to ensure
receipt of notice at least 60 days before
separation is acceptable (e.g., first
class mail, personal delivery with optional signed receipt). ~n the case of
notification directly to affected employees, insertion of notice in to pay
envelopes is another viable option. A
ticketed notice, i.e., preprinted notice
regularly included in each employee's
pay check or pay envelope, does not
meet the requirement!; of WARN.
§639.9 When may notice be given
less then 60 days in advance?

Section 3(b) of WARN sets forth
three conditions under which the notification period may be reduced to less
than 60 days. The employer bears the
burden of proof that conditions for the
exceptions have been met. If one of the
exceptions is applicable, the employer
must give as much notice as is practi-
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cable to the union, non-represented
employees, the State dislocated worker
unit, and the unit of local government
and this may, in some circumstances,
be notice after the fact. The employer
must, at the time notice actually is
given, provide a brief statement of the
reason for reducing the notice period,
in addition to the other elements set
out in 1639.7.
(a) The exception under §3(b)(1) of
WARN, termed "faltering company",
applies to plant closings but not to
mass layoffs and should be narrowly
construed. To qualify for reduced notice under this exception:
(1) An employer must have been
actively seeking capital or business at
the time that 6O-day notice would have
been required. That is, the employer
must .have been seeking financing or
refinancing through the arrangement
of loans, the issuance of stocks, bonds,
or other methods of internally gener-·
ated financing; or the employer must
have been seeking additional money,
credit, or· business through any other
commercially reasonable method. The
employer must be able to identify specific actions taken to obtain capital or
business.
(2) There must have been a realistic
opportunity to obtain the financing or
business sought.
(3) The financing or business sought
must have been sufficient, if obtained,
to have enabled the employer to avoid
or postpone the shutdown. The employer must be able to objectively demonstrate that the amount of capital or
the volume of new business sought
would have enabled the employer to
keep the facility, operating unit, or site
open for a reasonable period of time.
(4) The employer reasonably and in
good faith must have believed that giving the required notice would have precluded the employer from obtaining the
needed capital or business. The employ-
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er must be able to objectively demonstrate that it reasonably thought that a
potential customer or source of financing would have been unwilling to provide the new business or capital if notice were given, that is, if the
employees, customers or the public
were aware that the facility, operating
unit, or site. might have to close. This
condition may be satisfied if the employer can show that the financing or
business source would not choose to do
business with a troubled company or
with a company whose workforce would
be looking for other jobs. The actions of
an employer relying on the "faltering
company" exception will be viewed in a
company-wide context. Thus, a company with access to capital markets or
with cash reserves may not avail itself
of this exception by looking solely at
the financial condition of the facility,
operating unit, or site to be closed.
(b) The "unforeseeable business circumstances" exception under
§3(b)(2)(A) of WARN applies to plant
closings and mass layoffs caused by
business circumstances that were not
reasonably foreseeable at the time that
GO-day notice would have been required.
(1) An important indicator of a business circumstance that is not reasonably foreseeable is that the circumstance is caused by some sudden,
dramatic, and unexpected action or
condition outside the employer's control. A principal client's sudden and
unexpected termination of a major
contract with the employer, a strike at
a major supplier of the employer, and
an unanticipated and dramatic major
economic downturn might each be considered a business circumstance that is
not reasonably foreseeable. A government ordered closing of an employment site that occurs without prior
notice also may be an unforeseeable
business circumstance.
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(2) The test for determining when
business circumstances are not reasonably foreseeable focuses on an employer's business judgment. The employer
must exercise such commercially reasonable business judgment as would a
similarly situated employer in predicting the demands of its particular market. The employer is not required, however, to accurately predict general
economic conditions that also may affect demand for its products or services.
(c) The "natural disaster" exception
in §3(b)(2)(B) of WARN applies to
plant closings and mass layoffs due to
any form of a natural disaster.
(1) Floods, earthquakes, droughts,
storms, tidal waves or tsunamis and
similar effects of nature are natural
disasters under this provision.
(2) To qualify for this exception, an
employer must be able to demonstrate
that its plant closing or mass layoff is
a direct result of a natural disaster.
(3) While a disaster may preclude
full or any advance notice, such notice
as is practicable, containing as much
of the information required in §639.7
as is available in the circumstances of
the disaster still must be given, whether in advance or after the fact of an
employment loss caused by a natural
disaster.
(4) Where a plant closing or mass
layoff occurs as an indirect result of a
natural disaster, this exception does not
apply but the "unforeseeable business
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circumstance" exception described in
paragraph (b) of this section may be
applicable.
§639.10 When may notice be extended?
Additional notice is required when
the date or schedule of dates of a
planned plant closing or mass layoff is
extended beyond the date or the ending
date of any 14-day period announced in
the original notice as follows:
(a) If the postponement is for less
than 60 days, the additional notice
should be given as soon as possible to
the parties identified in§639.6 and
should include reference to the earlier
notice, the date (or 14-day period) to
which the planned action is postponed,
and the reasons for the postponement.
The notice should be given in a manner
which will provide the information to
all affected employees.
(b) If the postponement is for 60
days or more, the additional notice
should be treated as new notice subject
to the provisions of §§639.5, 639.6, and
639.7 of this part. Rolling notice, in the
sense of routine periodic notice, given
whether or not a plant closing or mass
layoff is impending, and with the intent to evade the purpose of the Act
rather than give specific notice as required by WARN, is not acceptable.
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